Events - An Annotated Bibliography

Introduction

This bibliography is concernedwith recent literature on the nature of events and the place they occupy in ourconceptual scheme. The subject has received extensive consideration in thephilosophical debate over the last few decades, with ramifications reaching farinto the domains of allied disciplines such as linguistics and the cognitivesciences. At the same time, the literature is so wide and widely scattered thatit has become very difficult to keep track of every line of development. Ourhope is that this work will prove useful to overcome that difficulty.

Content andscope of the bibliography

We have chosen Hans Reichenbach’s 1947 pioneeringcontribution on the logical form of action sentences as a starting point (theother acknowledged milestone being the publication of an influential paper byDonald Davidson exactly 20 years later), and we headed for a review of theextensive literature that followed in the fifty years thereafter. For convenient reference, we have also included a short Appendix withsome early works referred to in much of the literature.

The focus is represented by philosophical literaturedevoted explicitly to such questions as the following:

- Are events a kind ofentity?

- If so, what are they? (Forinstance, are events particulars or universals, concrete or abstract?)

- How do they differ fromother kinds of entity? (For instance, how do they differ from material objects,if at all? How do they differ from states of affairs, if at all?)

- What are their identity andindividuation criteria?

- Are there any substantialdifferences between various kinds of event? (For instance, are actions a kindof event? What is the difference between mental and physical events, if any?Are facts, states, processes species of one single event category?)

- What position do eventsoccupy in the causal network? How do they fit in the spatio-temporal framework?

- How does reference to orquantification over events affect the semantics of ordinary language? How doesit feature in the construction of formal semantic models?

- How do semantic issuesinteract with metaphysical ones?

In addition, we have alsoincluded relevant entries from various collateral fields: the philosophy ofaction; the philosophy of mind; the philosophy of space, time, and causation;the logic of tense and time, and the treatment of tense and aspect inlinguistics; situation theory; knowledge representation; planning and temporalreasoning in artificial intelligence. All of these are areas of research inwhich the notion of an event arguably has played and still plays a prominentrole (whether positively, i.e., as something to be relied on for a proper treatmentof the core issues, or negatively, as a concept to be eliminated fromunadulterated philosophical or otherwise technical vocabulary). However, itwould have hardly been possible to include every piece of work dealing in someway or another with the notion of an event. In regard to those collateralareas, the present bibliography is therefore only meant to give some indicationof the main trends and contributions, but aims at no completeness. (In somecases, for instance, we have included anthologies and collective works, withoutitemising each relevant essay.) This limitation is even more drastic withrespect to other allied areas such as psychology, decision and probabilitytheory, or the philosophy of history: here too events play an important role, butit would have been impossible to give a reasonable coverage of this rolewithout stretching the relevant parameters beyond bearable limits. Even so, thelist includes some 1850 entries by over 900 authors, and gives a measure of theimportance that the topic has registered in the literature.

Thephilosophical co-ordinates

The entries are listed in alphabetical/chronologicalorder by author. This means the bibliography is offered as raw material: thereis no topical subcategorization. Such a categorization might have beeneffective in serving the purpose of a guided tour through the literature, butit would have also incorporated a conspicuous amount of arbitrariness, whichcould have only been mitigated (and then only partially) at the cost ofoverwhelming repetitions and cross-indexing. We have preferred keeping this toa minimum. Our annotations along with the comprehensive apparatus of subjectand name indexes included in the last part of the volume should help providequick access to the topics of interest.

Some major guidelines, however, have been followed in thecompilation. They correspond to four main co-ordinates within which it seemspossible to stake out--at least in part--the multiform spectrum of philosophicalpositions contemplated in the literature:

1. Realists vs. non-realists. A first obvious co-ordinate, corresponding to a major line of research, is the degree ofreality that different theories ascribe to events. On one side is the realistposition, viewing events as part of our basic ontological inventory--objects ofreference and quantification. This is the view advocated by Reichenbach andDavidson and accepted by the majority of authors (though sometimes for verydifferent reasons and within the framework of radically different metaphysical conceptions).On the other side we find the non-realist’s position: it denies existence toevents in favor of ontological parsimony, arguing that every seeminglyevent-committing sentence can in principle be paraphrased in terms ofevent-free ones. This view has been defended, for instance, by T. Horgan, R.Trenholme, and B. Aune in the 70’s, and underlies much of the work in the fieldof adverbial modification pioneered by R. Clark and R. Montague. In betweenthese two opposite positions are those authors who avoid the language ofreduction, but also deny that events and objects are co-ordinate and equallybasic. We find here philosophers in the tradition of P. F. Strawson, but alsoauthors such as J. Kim, L. B. Lombard, and J. Bennett, who maintain some formof dependency or supervenience of events over material substances or entitiesof other sorts. We find also philosophers who defend the primacy of events overobjects: this is a view that is rooted in the early work of B. Russell and A. N. Whitehead, and which has been explored,e.g., in some works of R. M. Martin.

2. Particularists vs.recurrentists; concretists vs. abstractists.A second way of scanning the variety of metaphysical theories of events is withreference to the distinction between the conception of events asspatio-temporal particulars versus their conception as recurrable entities,entities which can occur more than once. The latter view is exemplified by R.Chisholm’s early writings, according to which events are fact-like entities--aspecies of states of affairs, differing from propositions only in their beingtime-bound. The opposite, particularist view is most explicitly exemplified byDavidson’s own seminal writings as well as by such authors as M. Brand, P. vanInwagen, or D. H. Mellor. A better picture, however, is obtained by furtherdistinguishing a continuum of particularist positions based on the degree of"concreteness" that they assign to events, i.e., the degree to which they viewevents as soaking up the content of the spatio-temporal region at which theyoccur. At one extreme, authors like W. V. O. Quine push the concretistconception as far as possible by denying any categorial distinction amongspatio-temporal entities and eventually assimilating events to materialobjects. The other extreme is not explicitly represented by any author, butcorresponds ideally to the view that there is no lower bound on theabstractness (lack of content) of events. In between these two extremepositions we have a variety of intermediate conceptions, corresponding to themajority of official positions: each of them sees events as spatio-temporalentities, but with various constraints on the lower limit on how concrete anevent can be. For instance, Davidsonian events are all rather thick, though neveras thick as to coincide with the material objects with which they may happen tobe co-localized; Kimean events, by contrast, may be highly abstract, thoughpresumably never as abstract as to leave their spatio-temporal regions entirelyunqualified: events are exemplifications of properties by objects at times(i.e., they are tropes, on some recent variants of this account), and theconstituent objects and properties impose some constraints on what can possiblygo on at the relevant spatio-temporal location. Lastly, it is fair to add thata number of authors--mostly concerned with the application of the event conceptto problems in the semantics of natural language, the logic of temporaldiscourse, or the representation of temporal knowledge--do not take any standwith respect to the concrete-abstract continuum, treating events as somewhatunderspecified "bare" entities subject to first-order reference andquantification.

3. Unifiers vs. multipliers. The above classification pattern is closely related to a third, rather popular way of approaching the field of event theories, which is based on the underlying identity and individuation criteria. (Succeeding in making sense of assertions or denials of identity between entities of some sort is often considered a minimal prerequisite for the viability of a theory resting on the idea that there are entities of that sort, and in the case of events the issue has received particular attention.) Again we havehere a wide spectrum of theories, though their exact assessment is often madedifficult by the uncertain boundary between ontological and semantic issues ofidentity. At one end we have the "unifiers" (to use I. Thalberg’s fortunateterm), initially represented by Anscombe and Davidson. This is the view that asingle event can be referred to by significantly distinct linguisticexpressions. In its most radical version, this view turns into Quine’s, whichmakes events so concrete as to leave no room for two events to occupy exactlythe same spatio-temporal region. At the other end of the spectrum we have the"multipliers", who emphasize dissimilarities in meaning from oneevent-referring expression to another, inferring corresponding ontologicaldistinctions. This view is chiefly associated with the writings of J. Kim andA. I. Goldman, and is typically affiliated with a conception of events assupervening on their participants. In between we have various intermediatepositions. Generally speaking, these agree in their heart with the unifier’sintuitions, but acknowledge the legitimacy of various concerns underlying themultiplier’s approach. Among others, we find here accounts based on thepart-whole structure of events (J. J. Thomson, I. Thalberg) or their modalproperties (M. Brand, D. K. Lewis).Some theorists, such as J. Bennett, also subscribe in this regard to a sort ofindeterminacy thesis, and regard the whole identity issue as resulting fromimpossible attempts to bridge the chasm between semantic and metaphysic issues.

4. Events and semantics. Finally, the fourth co-ordinate has to do withlanguage, and more specifically with the role played by events within theframework of semantic theorizing. Although some authors would deny that thereis any semantic way to argue for the existence of events, others view events ascomprising a necessary category of entities to be posited next to othercategories (such as material objects) as the referents of quantified variablesvisible only in deep grammatical structure. This is the Davidsonian line ofthought, leading to what T. Parsons has labelled "sub-atomic semantics"; but itis also the line of thought that grew out of the independent work of Z. Vendlerand A. Kenny in the analysis of sentence nominals, leading to an extensiveliterature in the semantic account of Aktionsarten (action types) and related natural languagephenomena. Though sometimes the focus of a vehement debate, such lines ofreasoning have come to define an independent dimension within which mosttheories can now be appraised and compared to one another. Also in thecognitive sciences, and particularly in the domain of representation tools forArtificial Intelligence, the interplay between logical semantics and eventontology has been the battlefield of several proposals and developments.

Format and indexingcriteria

In addition to the admittedly vague limits set by theseconcerns, the scope and range of the bibliography is defined by the typology ofthe literature that we have surveyed.

There are four main types of entry: monographs; journalarticles; articles in collective volumes (including conference and workshopproceedings); collective volumes (including conference and workshopproceedings). In all cases, as already mentioned, all entries have been orderedalphabetically by the surname of the author(s) or (in the case of a collectivevolume) of the editor(s). Works by the same author(s) or editor(s) are listedchronologically under the surname; these are followed, again in chronologicalorder, by their co-authored or co-edited works. (Co-authors or co-editors arealways listed alphabetically by the first author/editor. There are noindividual cross-references under the names of the second or subsequentauthors, since the Index of Authorsallows the user to locate all works by the same author. To facilitate quickauthor reference, a special Index to Second and Subsequent Authors, listing the names of all people appearing as secondor subsequent authors or editors of titles registered as main entries, has alsobeen included.) For the purpose of alphabetic ordering, hyphens and diacritics(including diaeresis) have been disregarded and unhyphenated complex surnameshave been treated as single units. (This applies also to surnames beginningwith ‘von’,‘van’, and the like.) If more than one work by the same author(s) oreditor(s) has the same publication year, lower case letters are added inalphabetic order (as in ‘1967a’) to avoid ambiguity in case of cross-reference.Cross-references are always given by indicating the author(s) or editor(s)surname(s) (with initials, if necessary) followed by the year of publication ofthe referred title (with alphabetic tag, if applicable).

In addition to the above four categories, we haveincluded some doctoral dissertations which have played a prominent role in theliterature, but no attempt has been made to give a full coverage to thiscategory. Occasionally (and with the same selection criteria) we have alsoincluded papers that appeared as technical reports, but unpublished manuscriptshave been systematically omitted.

Some attempt has also been made to include reviews orreferences to reprints or later editions of books listed in the bibliography.Reviews are treated as regular entries, under the reviewer’s name. (Across-reference is provided in the annotation under the reviewed work.)Reprints or later editions are listed together with the original edition,separated by a colon and in chronological order. (In case of ambiguity, pagenumbers of citations and excerpts must be taken to refer to the most recent reprint or edition.) Non-original editions inlanguages other than English are not included (though we always give theEnglish translation of a title originally published in another language; inthat case the translation is treated as a reprint, following the criteriaindicated above).

As for the annotations, they are mostly given in the formof a short summary, sometimes accompanied by quotations from particularlysignificant passages. Inevitably, this may reflect our personal interpretation.Moreover, many articles or books registered here are not devoted specificallyto the topic of events, and our annotations are correspondingly partial: weremark on the authors’ views only as far as events are concerned. Otherannotations are simply cross-references, or excerpts from the authors’ ownabstracts (as appearing at the beginning of an article, or as reported in ThePhilosopher’s Index). In any case, it isunderstood that the length of the annotation is never and by no means intendedto be indicative of the value of the work. (We have tried to keep everyannotation to a maximum of a dozen lines.)

For ease of reference, we have avoided all abbreviationsin the titles of journals, collective volumes (such as conference proceedings),or publishers. Thus virtually each entry is self-contained. However, in thecase of an article included in a collective volume which is listed as anindependent entry (typically because of the number of relevant articles orbecause its publication represents a contribution of its own), the entry isgiven in abbreviated form by providing a cross-reference.

Many people helped us with this work in many ways. Wewould especially like to thank Andrea Bonomi and Bernard Katz. We are alsograteful to an anonymous referee of the Philosophy Documentation Center forproviding detailed comments on an earlier draft, and to George Leaman for hissupport during the final stages of this work.

We offer this bibliography together with our apologiesfor any omission and for any error of fact or interpretation that might haveslipped in. We anticipate our thanks to anyone who will send us integrations,comments, corrections, or suggestions that might help us improve this work inview of an updated edition.

An Annotated Bibliography 1947 to 1997

1985 ‘Einzelding-und Ereignisontologie’ [‘The Ontology of Particulars and of Events’, inGerman], Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 39, 157-85.

On treating individual events as part of our basic ontologicalinventory. "Any such attempt may neither rely simply on scientific results, norconsist of suggestions to improve the scheme already at our disposal. On theother hand, there is the danger of falling into a positivism of factual use, apositivism of ordinary language. These are the Scylla and Charybdis of aphilosophy of events" [pp. 160-61]. Includes a discussion of the views ofDavidson, Quine, Strawson, and Moravcsik.

1985 OnVerbs and Time, Doctoral Dissertation,University of Massachusetts at Amherst.

Argues that "just as change and causation can be viewedconceptually as either instantaneous or continuous, inchoatives and processverbs whose meanings involve such notions appear in natural language as eitherevent or process type verbs" [Abstract]. Includes a discussion of variousissues in the semantics of the English progressive.

1986 ‘Verbsof Change, Causation, and Time’, Stanford: Center for the Study of Language andInformation, Report No. CSLI-86-50.

Building on Dowty (1979), observes that the categories ofinchoatives and causatives are not of uniform aspectual type. In particular,accomplishments are not to be identified with causatives, since there arecausatives that meet tests for process verbs (as in ‘The man walked his dog foran hour’).

1975a ‘Causation,Transparency and Emphasis’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy

, 5, 1-23.

Causation is not relational, because this would imply thatcausal statements are referentially transparent in cause- and effect-positions,and they are not. Compare Dretske (1977) and Kim (1977).

1975b ‘TheObject of Explanation’, in S. Körner, ed., Explanation

, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 1-45.

A general analysis of such sentences as "Plato explained whySocrates died" or "Plato explained why Socrates died from drinking hemlock",favoring the view that the object of explanation is a complex consisting of anevent, a description, and a question (or an indirect interrogative). It isobserved that the controversy on event identity rests on a confusion. "Davidsonis talking about one sort of thing and Kim and Goldman about another. There isthe event of Socrates’ death, which, as Davidson urges, can be variouslydescribed as Socrates’ death or as Socrates’ death from drinking hemlock. Butthere is also what might be called the state of affairs

which consists of Socrates’ having the property ofhaving died, and this is different from the state of affairs of Socrates’having the property of having died from drinking hemlock" [pp. 8-9].

1979 ‘TheCausal Relation’, in P. A. French, T. Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein, eds.(1979), pp. 369-86; incorporated in Achinstein (1983), Chapter 6.

A defense of Achinstein (1975a) against various objections,including those of Levin (1976), Dretske (1977), and Kim (1977).

A theory of the explaining act, of the resulting explanation(the act’s "product"), and its ontological status. Includes a chapter on the natureof the causation, based on (1975a, 1979).

1965 ‘Aristotle’sDistinction Between Energeia and Kinêsis

’, in R. Bambrough, ed., New Essays onPlato and Aristotle, London: Routledge andKegan Paul, pp. 121-41.

Classic reference for a comparison between Aristotle’s kinêsis/energeiadistinction and the event typologies ofRyle (1949), Kenny (1963), and Vendler (1957). Detailed criticisms in Penner(1970). Related material in Graham (1980) and Mourelatos (1993).

1986 ‘Intentionand Intentional Action: The Simple View’, Mind & Language

, 1, 281-301.

A defense of the view that the intention to do an action isnecessary for doing it intentionally.

1989 ‘TheRole of Intention in Intentional Action’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy

, 19, 511-32.

Defends a "control model" of intentional action and comparesit with the competing model of Searle (1979, 1983).

1992 ‘TheIntention/Volition Debate’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy

, 22, 323-38.

"There is no need to incorporate volition--construed assomething other than intending, trying, sensory feedback, or a combinationthereof--into one’s theory of action" [p. 337].

1967 ‘OnSeeing Bodily Movements as Actions’, American Philosophical Quarterly

, 4, 222-30.

"Perception by a person of what another is doing amounts, inthe usual case, to perceiving a pattern of ‘fine shades of behavior’, eachitself an (atomic) action unmistakablypresent, not just an ‘observed movement’" [p. 230].

1967 ‘ALogical Condition for the Redescription of Actions in Terms of TheirConsequences’, The Journal of Value Inquiry,1, 132-34.

1981 ‘AnInterval-Based Representation of Temporal Knowledge’, Proceedings of the 7thInternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-81)

, Vol. 1, Vancouver: IJCAI [Morgan Kaufmann], pp.221-26.

One of the first attempts--and a very influential one--toincorporate temporal reasoning into Artificial Intelligence (see also McDermott1982). Based on a many-sorted predicate calculus with variables ranging over anontology including properties, time intervals, and events (these latter beingassumed as primitive and said to occur over intervals of time).

1983 ‘MaintainingKnowledge about Temporal Intervals’, Communications of the ACM

, 26, 823-43; reprinted in D. Weld and J. de Kleer,eds., Readings in Qualitative Reasoning About Physical Systems

, San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann, 1990, pp. 361-72.

An interval-based temporal logic (as in 1981). There are notime instants, for no event is truly instantaneous: "there seems to be a strongintuition that, given an event, we can always ‘turn up the magnification’ andlook at its structure" [p. 363].

1984 ‘Towardsa General Theory of Action and Time’, Artificial Intelligence

, 23, 123-54; reprinted in J. F. Allen, J. Hendler,and A. Tate, eds. (1990), pp. 464-79.

An extension of the theory put forward in (1981, 1983). Treatsprocesses as an intermediate category between events and properties (they mayoccur over subintervals, but not over every subinterval). See Sadri (1987) andGalton (1990) for critical examinations.

1991a ‘TemporalReasoning and Planning’, in J. F. Allen,H. A. Kautz, R. N. Pelavin, and J. D. Tenenberg (1991), pp. 2-68.

An extensive survey of the main problems and lines of researchin the field of temporal reasoning (including a review of Allen’s own research)with emphasis on applications to planning.

1991b ‘Timeand Time Again: The Many Ways to Represent Time’, International Journal ofIntelligent Systems, 6 [Special Issue on"Temporal Reasoning", Part A, K. M. Ford and F. D. Anger, eds.], 341-55.

Reviews some AI techniques for representing time. "Can oneassume that a timestamp can be assigned to each event, or barring that, thatthe events are fully ordered? Or can we only assume that a partial ordering ofevents is known? Can events be simultaneous? Can they overlap in time and yetnot be simultaneous? If they are not instantaneous, do we know the duration ofevents? Different answers to each of these questions allow very differentrepresentations of time" [p. 341, Abstract].

1994 ‘Actionsand Events in Interval Temporal Logic’, Journal of Logic and Computation

, 4, 531-79.

Presents a formalism--based on an interval temporal logic--forrepresenting events and actions, viewed as "primarily linguistic or cognitivein nature" [p. 533]. (They are the way by which rational agents classifypatterns of change. "The world does not really contain events" [ibid.].) Thepresentation includes a formal axiomatization of the structure of time periodsas well as of the relationships between actions and events and their effects.

1985 ‘ACommon-Sense Theory of Time’, Proceedings of the 9th International JointConference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-85), Vol. 1, Los Angeles: IJCAI [Morgan Kaufmann], pp. 528-31.

Proposes a theory of commonsense knowledge about timeexploiting the interval-based theory of Allen (1981, 1983, 1984).

1989 ‘Momentsand Points in an Interval-Based Temporal Logic’, Computational Intelligence

, 5, 225-38.

Presents a new axiomatization of the theory of Allen andexplores the relationships between interval-basedand point-based theories. "The interval-based theory starts withintuitions about time as reflected in natural language. Time in naturallanguage is intimately associated with events. When an event occurs, it definesa time. Temporal ordering is simply an abstraction derived from the ordering ofevent occurrences". Still, the theory "maintains a distinction between eventsand times. Fort instance, in an event logic [without explicit time, such asKamp’s 1979], two events may be exactly simultaneous and yet not be equal" [p.225].

Includes J. F. Allen(1984), Hanks and McDermott (1987),Lifschitz (1987a), and McDermott (1978).

A comprehensive reader on planning and related AIapplications. Includes J. F. Allen (1991a), Kautz (1991), and Pelavin (1991).

Makes use of a bounded/nonbounded aspectual distinctiongermane in many ways to the accomplishment/activity (Vendler 1957) orperformance/ activity (Kenny 1963)distinctions.

1972 ‘Responseto Weitz’s "The Concept of a Human Action"’, Philosophical Exchange

, 1, 239-47.

A criticism of Weitz (1972): one should not try to set theproblems of action theory by seeking general application criteria for theordinary term ‘human action’. The term ‘action’ is often a mass noun.

A criticism of Horgan’s (1978) eliminative strategy. Inaddition to specific objections, it is argued that "the basic issue betweenHorgan and his opponents is really a conflict between competing principles ofparsimony [...] Horgan will brandish Occam’s Razor and deplore the proliferationof entities [...] But Horgan’s opponent might deplore analyses which involve theproliferation of special, nontruthfunctional sentential connectives such asHorgan’s causal connective and generational connective. The opponent canbrandish what might be called Russell’s Razor: Do not multiply logicalconnectives or logical apparatus in general beyond necessity" [pp. 306-7].

1995 Time,Space and Movement: Meaning and Knowledge in the Sensible World. Proceedings ofthe 5th International Workshop, Toulouse:COREP.

Includes Amsili and Le Draoulec(1995), Casati (1995), Glasbey (1995),Krifka (1995), Reboul (1995), C. S. Smith (1995), and Verkuyl (1995b).

1995 ‘Contributionto the Event Negation Problem’, in P. Amsili, M. Borillo, and L. Vieu, eds.(1995), Part A, pp. 17-29.

On the treatment of negated event sentences within theframework of Discourse Representation Theory.

1972 Aktionalitätim Deutschen: Eine Untersuchung unter Vergleich mit dem Russischen Aspektsystem

[Actionality in German: An Investigationwith Reference to the Aspectual System of Russian, in German], Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis.

Extensive discussion of aspect-related phenomena. In relationto the activity-accomplishment (performance) distinction of Vendler (1957) andKenny (1963), a twofold distinction is examined between situations, processes,actions that are directed toward attaining a goal (‘John was writing a letter’versus ‘John was writing’) and those which actually reach the goal (‘John wrotea letter’ versus ‘John was writing a letter’). See Dahl (1981) for discussion.

1983 TheExplanation of Actions: A Critical Analysis of Donald Davidson’s Theory

, Doctoral Dissertation, State University of New Yorkat Albany.

An attempt to provide a coherent systematic account ofDavidson’s theory of explaining human actions in the context of his theory ofmeaning and truth.

1968 Actionand Bodily Movement, Doctoral Dissertation,University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

A comparison of Anscombe’s and Davidson’s thesis of theredescribability of actions, pointing out some differences. "We can say that wehave one action under different descriptions if the descriptions are relatedas descriptions of means to descriptions of ends. It is only when this important qualification is left out that what[Anscombe] says can be made to look artificially like what Davidson says" [p.253]. Davidson’s view is open to objections that Anscombe’s escapes.

1977/8 ‘How BasicAre Basic Actions?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

, 78, 195-213.

Argues that the only philosophically interesting notion ofbasicness is that of "causal basicness", and that the notion of a basic actioncan play no useful role in an account of action and agency.

"An action is not called intentional in virtue of any extrafeature which exists when it is performed" [p. 28]. What distinguishesintentional from non-intentional actions is that the former are "actions towhich a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is given application". It isargued that "a single action can have many different descriptions, e.g. ‘sawinga plank’, ‘sawing oak’, ‘sawing one of Smith’s planks’, ‘making a squeaky noisewith the saw’, ‘making a great deal of sawdust’ and so on", and that an agent"may know that he is doing a thing under one description, and not underanother" [p. 11]. An influential point of view.

1963 ‘TheTwo Kinds of Error in Action’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 60, 393-401.

Consent is always consent to something "under a description".Thus, if somebody signed a property transfer, it is possible that "under thedescription ‘signing the document presented by so and so’ there was consent towhat took place; under the description ‘signing a property transfer’ there wasnot" [p. 393].

1969a ‘Causalityand Extensionality’, The Journal of Philosophy, 66, 152-59; reprinted in Anscombe (1981b), pp. 173-79.

A discussion of the "slingshot" argument. "I find it harmlessto say that causal statements are intensional. But our considerations lead toraising the following question: What is at stake in maintaining or denying thatan effect is properly described or presented in a proposition

? [...] Whatever it is, in this issue one side isprobably correctly represented by the insistence on the proposition but Isuspect (my hunch is) that the other side is the right one, but is not

correctly represented by objecting to thepresentation in a proposition" [pp. 178-79].

1969b ‘Beforeand After’, The Philosophical Review,73, 3-24; reprinted in Anscombe (1981b), pp. 180-95.

Includes a discussion of events as the terms of the twotemporal relations before and after and an analysis of those relations in thecase of instantaneous events. "Though we cannot think of an instantaneous eventfalling within our experience that is not a terminus of something that takestime, we can think of plenty of events that are such termini". Thus, "Russell[...] was wrong in saying that no instantaneous events occur within our experience,because he had a false picture of what that would be like, like people whosuppose that a point that could be seen would be an extensionless dot" [p.193].

1979a ‘Undera Description’, Noûs, 13, 219-33;reprinted in Anscombe (1981b), pp. 208-19, and in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi,eds. (1996), pp. 303-17.

Replies to several objections ("misunderstandings") putforward against the view of (1957), according to which one and the same eventmay be singled out by different descriptions. Authors discussed include A. I.Goldman, D. Bennett, and J. J. Thomson.Moreover, it is pointed out that "while Iam in agreement with Davidson that there are many descriptions of an action, wepart company when it comes to his ‘theory of event-identity’. Or again, histheory of adverbial modification. This really doesn’t go at all well with theidea of many descriptions. For the adverbial modification that suits one verbmay not consort well with another, and yet the two verbs may occur in differentdescriptions of the same action" [p. 232].

1979b ‘Chisholmon Action’, Grazer philosophische Studien,7/8 [special issue "Essays in the Philosophy of R. M. Chisholm", also publishedas E. Sosa, ed. (1979)], 205-13.

On how Chisholm’s theory of action can deal with the fact thatone can produce neuro-physiological changes by moving a limb.

1981b TheCollected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe. Volume 2: Metaphysics andthe Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: BasilBlackwell.

1983 ‘TheCausation of Action’, in C. Ginet and S. Shoemaker, eds., Knowledge andMind. Philosophical Essays, New York:Oxford University Press, pp. 174-90.

1987 ‘Attributionsof Intentional Action’, Philosophical Studies, 51, 311-23.

Argues that Davidson’s (1967a) analysis of adverbs aspredicates of events can be extended to intensional adverbs such as‘intentionally’ as long as one is a realist about mental representations.

1994 ‘TheInadequacy of Anomalous Monism as a Realist Theory of Mind’, in Preyer, G.,Siebelt, F., and Ulfig, A., eds. (1994), pp. 223-53.

Argues that Davidson’s principle of the anomalism of the mentalrests on "a profoundly anti-naturalistic--indeed, anti-realistic--conception ofthe mental", and that anomalous monism is therefore "unable to satisfy minimaldesiderata of an adequate naturalistic mentalism" [p. 224].

1976 ‘Mereology,Time, Action and Meaning’, in B. Kantscheider, ed., Sprache und Erkenntnis

, Innsbruck: AMOE, pp. 189-233.

1982 ‘SomeRemarks on Ontology’, in J. Agassi and R. S.Cohen, eds., Scientific Philosophy Today.Essays in Honor of Mario Bunge,Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 1-44.

Critical study of Bunge’s view on ontology as presented in(1977b). Includes a discussion of Bunge’s theory of processes and events [pp.34ff].

1979 ‘MentalParticulars, Mental Events, and the Bundle Theory’, Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy, 9, 109-20.

Regards experiences as events so as to argue inter alia

that the bundle theory does not imply the possibilityof experiences apart from experiencers.

1974 ‘ANew Approach to the Logical Theory of Actions and Causality’, in S. Stenlund,ed., Logical Theory and Semantic Analysis. Essays Dedicated to Stig Kanger

on His Fiftieth Birthday

, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 73-91.

A formal theory of the bringing-about relation. Germane to thework by Pörn (1971, 1974).

1976 ‘FormalSemantics for Verb Tenses as Analyzed by Reichenbach’, in T. van Dijk, ed., Pragmaticsof Language and Literature, Amsterdam:North-Holland, pp. 229-36.

A reconstruction of Reichenbach’s (1947) analysis of Englishtenses within the framework of a "double-indexed" semantics.

1977 ‘Onthe Analysis of Some Accomplishment and Activity Verbs’, in C. Rohrer, ed.(1977), pp. 31-65.

An analysis of compound accomplishment and activity verbphrases (in the sense of Vendler 1957), such as ‘to draw a circle’ or ‘to pusha cart’, using the system of tense logic first given in Åqvist and Guenthner(1978).

1978 ‘Fundamentalsof a Theory of Verb Aspect and Events within the Setting of an Improved TenseLogic’, in F. Guenthner and C. Rohrer, eds., Studies in Formal Semantics:Intentionality, Temporality, Negation,Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 167-99.

The first part develops a formal semantic account of tenselogic; on that basis, in the second part the notion of an event is subjected toan analytic treatment, including a classification of so-called finite genericevents and a formal account of the trichotomy of the beginning, the middle, andthe end of any event. An extended language with operators corresponding to suchlocutions as ‘it begins to be the casethat ... by its being the casethat---" is also presented.

1966 CriticalNotice of R. Taylor (1965), Australasian Journal of Philosophy

, 44, 231-40.

1975 ‘Beliefsand Desires as Causes of Action: A Reply to Donald Davidson’, PhilosophicalPapers, 4, 1-8.

An attempt to solve various problems arising from the viewthat beliefs and desires are causes of actions. Discussion of Davidson’s (1963)statement of that view.

1993 ‘AWorld of States of Affairs’, in J. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophy of Language

(Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 7), Atascadero,CA: Ridgeview, pp. 429-40.

The world (=space-time manifold) is a vaste assemblage ofstates of affairs, having individuals and properties as constituents.

1993 ‘AUnified Framework for Representing Time, Actions and Plans’, in F. Anger, H.Guesgen, and J. van Benthem, eds., Proceedings of the Workshop on Spatialand Temporal Reasoning. 13th International Joint Conference on ArtificialIntelligence, Chambéry: IJCAI, pp. 193-217.

An AI approach to reasoning about time, actions, and plans.Following J. F. Allen’s (1984) account, an action is represented by describingwhat is true while the action is occurring: "An action is defined by means oftemporal constraints on the world states, which pertain to the action itself,and on other more elementary actions occurring over time" [p. 193, Abstract].

1994 ‘AComputational Account for a Description Logic of Time and Action’, in J. Doyle,E. Sandewall, and P. Torasso, eds., Principles of Knowledge Representationand Reasoning: Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference (KR94)

, San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 3‑14.

1993 Referenceto Abstract Objects in Discourse. A Philosophical Semantics for NaturalLanguage Metaphysics, Dordrecht, Boston,and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Rich semantic analysis of the patterns of reference toabstract entities (propositions, properties, states of affairs, facts)integrated by an account of the semantics of discourse structure to analyseanaphoric reference. The analysis is pursued "in tandem" with a study ofreference to concrete entities such as states and events (E. Bach’s"eventualities"). Indeed it is suggested that there is a spectrum of worldimmanence, with eventualities and propositions at the two ends, and entitiessuch as facts and states of affairs taking an intermediate position: "like events, [they] have causal efficacy but,like propositions, [they] do not take spatio-temporal modificationfelicitously" [p. 2]. It is also suggested that these entities are closelycorrelated, as "natural language metaphysics slides easily from ‘semi-concrete’eventualities to abstract entities" [p. 214]. Other topics include identity andindividuation, the typology of eventualities, event negation, and much more.

On the differences between situation semantics (Barwise 1981,Barwise and Perry 1981b, 1983) and event-based semantics (Higginbotham 1983)for naked infinitives. It is argued that the latter "neither accounts for therelevant usages nor succeeds, on its own terms, in presenting coherentsemantics for N[aked] I[nfinitive] perception verbs" [p. 57]. A version of thesituation-based theory is presented and defended.

1985b ‘HowExtensional is Extensional Perception?’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 8, 203-28.

Argues that naked infinitive perception sentences are actuallymore extensional than Barwise and Perry’s (1981b, 1983) situation semanticsallows.

1995 ‘ATypology and Discourse Semantics for Motion Verbs and Spatial PPs in French’, Journalof Semantics, 12, 163-209.

A semantic analysis of motion describing expressions based onan ontology of "eventualities" and spatio-temporal extensions.

1969 ‘TheAccordion Effect Thesis’, The Philosophical Quarterly

, 19, 337-42.

1986 ‘Actingfor Reasons’, The Philosophical Review,95, 511-46; reprinted as Chapter 6 of Audi (1993a), pp. 145-78.

Presents a theory of action for a reason (a discriminativeresponse to, and not merely an effect of, a reason). Includes a comparisonbetween fine-grained (unifying) and coarse-grained (multiplying) approaches toevents; the account of acting for reasons is presented as neutral between thetwo approaches.

Chapter 6 [pp. 126-41] on how practical reasoning figures inthe dynamics of action: "As a process constituted by a pattern of events

, it [practical reasoning] is a candidate to accountfor the dynamics of actions basedon it, above all for what causes them, and for how, in relation to causativeevents, they come about" [p. 127].

A collection of essays (including a reprint of Audi 1986)where action is viewed as "behavior that is intentional under somedescription". Includes a general introductory overview [pp. 1-32] where it isstated that "the principal contributions of the book can accommodate either thefine-grained or the coarse-grained ontology (or various intermediate views,such as the component approach)" [p. 3].

1993b ‘MentalCausation: Sustaining and Dynamic’, in J. Heil and A. R. Mele, eds. (1993), pp.53-74.

After a critical assessment of various sources of doubt aboutthe causal power of the mental, offers a positive account according to which(i) intentional dispositions such as reason states play the role of"sustaining" causation, whereas (ii) mental events play the role of "dynamic"causation, which is "a productive or at least eliciting relation betweencausative events and other events, those constituting their effects" [p. 74].

1979 ‘AgentCausality: A Model’, Tulane Studies in Philosophy, 28 [Issue on "Studies in Action Theory", ed. by R. C. Whittemore],71-79.

"Agent causality is notsomehow in competition with event causality. A person causes an event whencertain events, related to this person i[n] certain ways, cause these events"[p. 79].

1976 ‘RelationalBecoming’, Poznan Studies in thePhilosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities,2/2, 12-23.

1987 ‘Point-Eventism’,Reports on Philosophy, 11, 49-55; reprintedas ‘Appendix: Point-Eventism’ in Z. Augustynek, Time. Past, Present,Future (translated from the Polish by S.Semczuk and W. Strawinski), Dordrecht, Boston, andLondon: Kluwer Academic Publishers; Warszawa: Polish Scientific Publishers,1991, pp. 120-27.

Outlines a formal ontological theory proclaiming that everyempirical object is either an event or a set-theoretic construction thereof.Events are thought of as non-extended spatio-temporal particulars.

Compares alternative monistic ontologies, based on events andpoints, respectively.

1993b ‘PointEventism. An Outline of a Certain Ontology’, in Z. Augustynek and J. J.Jadacki, Possible Ontologies [Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and theHumanities, 29], Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Editions Rodopi, pp. 15-100.

1971 ‘Comments’,in R. Binkley, R. Bronaugh, and A. Marras, eds. (1971), pp. 69-75.

"Although we must acknowledge that [people and things] changeor act in various ways, we do not also have to acknowledge the existence ofthings called ‘changes’ or ‘actions’. We may, of course, speak of changes oractions both in our technical and in our everyday discourse; but our speech inthis regard should be viewed as a mere manner of speaking. Singular termspurporting to refer to events and actions [...] can in principle be eliminated fromour discourse: though perhaps highly convenient to use, they are not actuallyneeded to describe what is or exists" [p. 26].

An introduction to basic distinctions such as that betweencontinuants and processes. Holds that "the ordinary view of the world can beunderstood as a thing or substance ontology in which events have only aderivative reality" [p. 133]. Favors a predicate modifier approach to adverbialmodification.

On the grounds for the ontological commitments of a theory ofhuman action, defending an "agent" theory. Includes a discussion of eventidentity criteria.

1950 ‘Truth’(Symposium with P. F. Strawson), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

, Suppl. Vol. 24, 111-28; reprinted in Austin(1961b), pp. 85-101 (enlarged edition 1970, pp. 117-33).

Argues that a statement is true when it corresponds to thefacts, implying that facts are in the world. Criticisms in Strawson (1950),Shorter (1962), and Vendler (1967a); discussion in Tillman (1966) and Chisholm(1979c).

1956/7 ‘A Pleafor Excuses’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

, 57, 1-30; reprinted in Austin (1961b), pp. 123-52(enlarged edition 1970, pp. 175-204). Also in D. A. Gustafson, ed., Essaysin Philosophical Psychology, New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1964, pp. 1-29; in R. A. Ammerman, ed., Classics ofAnalytic Philosophy, New York: McGraw-Hill,1965, pp. 379-98; in M. Weitz, ed., Twentieth-Century Philosophy: TheAnalytic Tradition, New York: The FreePress, 1966, pp. 329-51; in A. R. White, ed. (1968), pp. 19-42; and in C. Lyas,ed., Philosophy and Linguistics,London: Macmillan, 1971, pp. 79-101.

"It is in principle always open to us, along various lines, todescribe or refer to "what I did" in so many ways [...] How far, that is, are themotives, intentions and conventions to be part of the description of actions?[...] what is an or one

or theaction? For we can generally split up what might be named as one action inseveral distinct ways, into different stretches

or phasesor stages" [1961, pp. 148-49].

1961a ‘UnfairTo Facts’, in Austin (1961b), pp. 102-22 (enlarged edition 1970, pp. 154-74).

Analysis of the locution "The fact that...". Suggests that "Thecollapse of the Germans is an event and is a fact". Criticisms in Vendler(1967a).

1961b PhilosophicalPapers (J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock,eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press (enlarged edition London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1970).

1962 Howto Do Things with Words (J. O. Urmson,ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (second revised edition, 1975, M.Sbisà and J. O. Urmson eds.).

On the description of actions: "The perlocutionary act alwaysincludes some consequences, as when we say ‘By doing x

I was doing y’: we do bring in a greater or less stretch of ‘consequences’ always,some of which may be ‘unintentional’. There is no restriction to the minimumphysical act at all. That we can import an arbitrarily long stretch of whatmight also be called the ‘consequences’ of our act into the nomenclature of theact itself is, or should be’ a fundamental commonplace of the theory of ourlanguage about all ‘action’ in general. Thus if asked ‘What did he do?’, we mayreply either ‘He shot the donkey’ or ‘He fired a gun’ or ‘He pulled thetrigger’ or ‘He moved his trigger finger’, and all may be correct" [pp. 107-8].

On how events emerge and what determines their boundaries: "Itis usually taken for granted that one knows what an event is or how events aredemarcated. In this paper an explanation is offered for the emergence ofevents, the cut hypothesis, which states: ‘A sub-sequence of stimuli is cut outof a sequence to become a cognitive entity if it has been experienced manytimes in different contexts’, and three experiments to demonstrate thepredictive power of the hypothesis are described" [p. 239, Abstract].

1980 ‘Tensesand Aspects as Functions on Verb-Phrases’, in C. Rohrer, ed. (1980), pp. 19-37.

Includes an discussion of the progressive originating with thequestion: What kinds of expressions are to be classified as having to do withstates, processes, accomplishments, and achievements?

1981 ‘OnTime, Tense and Aspect: An Essay in English Metaphysics’, in P. Cole, ed., RadicalPragmatics, New York: Academic Press, pp.63-81.

An attempt to "dig out" the hidden metaphysical assumptionsthat are essential to an understanding of English tenses and aspects. Analysestime on the basis of Vendler’s (1957) fourfold classification of verb typesinto states, processes, accomplishments (or "protracted" events) andachievements ("instantaneous" events), collectively referred to as"eventualities". Analyses the latter both ontologically (using mereologicalnotions) and from the perspective of linguistic theory.

1986a ‘TheAlgebra of Events’, Linguistics and Philosophy, 9 [Special Issue on "Tense and Aspect in Discourse", D.

R. Dowty, ed.], 5-16; reprinted in R. Casatiand A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp. 497-508.

An extension of Link’s (1983) account of the count-mass-pluraldomain to the domain of "eventualities", yielding a characterization of thestructure of semantic models whose (sorted) domains include events andprocesses. Based on the proportion events: processes

= things:stuff, the proposal is madethat events are analogous to singular and plural individuals, while boundedprocesses (bits of process) are analogous to the portions of matter that makeup the ‘material extension’ of those individuals [p. 8].

1986b ‘NaturalLanguage Metaphysics’, in R. Barcan-Marcus, G. J. W. Dorn, and P. Weingartner,eds., Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science VII

, Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 573-95.

Any "serious account of the semantics of natural language" leadsto metaphysical questions such as "What do people talk as if there is?" and"What kinds of things and relations among them does one need in order toexhibit the structure of meanings that natural languages seem to have?" [p.573]. Section 2 ("Eventology") argues that (i) "something like events" must beincluded in the domains of the model structures used for doing formalsemantics, and (ii) one should provide a classification of these entities ifone wants to do natural language semantics. "I don’t claim that it isimpossible to construct them out of things otherwise needed, just that all theattempts to do so that I know about don’t seem to work" [p. 586].

1978 ‘ARepresentational Theory of Action’, Philosophical Studies

, 34, 361-79.

Outlines a theory ("Representational Causalism") which seeksto do justice to the execution of action, intentional or not, by positing"executive representations for the duration of the action as the requisitepsychological cause".

1980 ‘ActionsAre Not Events’, Mind, 89, 114-20;reprinted in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp. 343-49.

Actions are not events. Rather, they are instances of arelation (bringing-about) between an agent and an event, as in von Wright(1963) and Chisholm (1964). Consequences: "We are not obliged to produce atheory of individuation of actions. Instances are not individuals and are notsubject to quantification" [p. 119]. Moreover, "Since actions are not events,they do not enter straightforwardly into causal relations--they are neithercauses nor effects. This is perfectly consistent with the Causal Theory ofaction, which does not say that actions are caused but only that an action isperformed if a change is caused (in the right way) by a mental episode of theright sort" [p. 120].

1994 Tense,Aspect and Action. Empirical and Theoretical Contributions to Language Typology

, Berlin and New York: de Gruyter.

1995 Universalsand Property Instances. The Alphabet of Being,Oxford: Blackwell.

1971 ‘AMultiple-Aspect Theory of Time’, Southwestern Journal of Philosophy

, 2, 163-71.

Every change--every becoming different--is an event, and someevents completely include several others.

Argues that "in the narration and description of events andactions we do not employ exactly the same categories [...] Nevertheless, thetheory here defended maintains that all kinds of action, including intentionalones, admit of causal or deterministic explanation" [p. 183].

Contra Chisholm, arguesthat the proper objects of intention are acts, not states of affairs.

1971 ‘TheSearch for Basic Actions’, American Philosophical Quarterly

, 8, 161-70.

Argues that there is no independently identifiable class ofactions which may be said to be basic (in some interesting sense) with regardto other actions. Hence the very concept of a basic action is "of dubiousvalue".

Rejects the view that bodily movements are basic actions infavor of a conception of basic actions as "exercises of competences" analysedas "moves" (not "movements").

1984 Language,Sense and Nonsense. A Critical Investigation into Modern Theories of Language

, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

On Davidson’s (1967a) analysis of action sentences: "Whyshould the legitimacy of an inference a five-year-old has mastered turn on theintricacies of a novel extension of the predicate calculus? And if there arelanguages which lack devices for nominalizing verbs, is the inference notvalid? Or are the ‘grounds’ of its validity beyond the comprehension ofspeakers of that language?" [p. 246].

1993 ‘Metaphysicsand Mental Causation’, in J. Heil and A. R. Mele, eds. (1993), pp. 75-95.

An attempt to dissolve the problem of mental causation byrooting out and motivating rejection of one of the metaphysical assumptionsthat lead to it, namely the thesis of the "causal closure of the physical" (=the thesis that "every instantiation of a micro-physical property that has acause at t has a complete micro-physicalcause at t" [p. 79]).

1982 ‘Propositions,Facts, and Events’, in W. Leinfellner, E. Kraemer, and J. Schank, eds., Languageand Ontology. Proceedings of the 6th International Wittgenstein Symposium

, Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, pp. 125-29.

Includes an account of propositions in which facts aretruth-value-donors, the analysis focusing on the connection between facts andevents "properly construed".

1972 Adverbial

semantik. Die Konstitutionlogisch-semantischer Repräsentationen von Adverbialkonstruktionen

[‘Adverbial Semantics. The Constitution ofLogical-semantic Representations of Adverbial Constructions’, in German],Frankfurt: Athenäum; Eng. trans. published as The Grammar of Adverbials.A Study in the Semantics and Syntax of Adverbial Constructions

, Amsterdam: North Holland, 1976.

An investigation into the logical structure of adverbialconstructions, aiming at making inference properties that do not rely onlexical-semantic analysis formally explicit in the logical syntax. The proposedaccount is a modification of Davidson’s (1967a) event-based representation: averb-nominalization is predicated about processes as well as about theindividuals involved (agent, direct object, etc.). Compare T. Parsons (1980,1985), Carlson (1984) and Dowty (1989) for related material.

1981 ‘Semanticsand Syntax of Nominalizations’, in J. Groenendijk, T. Janssen, and M. Stokhof,eds., Formal Methods in the Study of Language, Amsterdam: CWI, Centrum dor Mathematics and Computer Science, pp.1-28.

1983 ‘Overde semantiek von nominalisaties’ [On the Semantics of Nominalizations’, inDutch], Glot, 6, 1-29; revised Englishedition published as ‘On Aspectual Properties of Dutch and GermanNominalizations’, in V. Lo Cascio and C. Vet, eds., TemporalStructure in Sentence and Discourse,Dordrecht: Foris, pp. 7-39.

Objections to Kamp (1979) based on data from Dutch and German.Includes a topology-based classification of three main groups of verb phrases:process (interior of time interval), process with completion/result (intervalwith defined boundary), and completion/result (boundary of interval).

1988/9 ‘Tensesand Aspects in Discourse’, Theoretical Linguistics

, 15, 135-94; incorporated in Chapter 2 of Bartsch(1995), pp. 127-210.

Gives a formal treatment of tense and aspect in German, usingindividuals and space-time regions as basic entities of the semantic models;situations (events, states, and properties) are construed as intensionalentities represented as functions from possible worlds to regions.

1992 ‘Scopesof Tenses and Aspects in a Flexible Categorial Grammar’, TheoreticalLinguistics, 18, 1-44; incorporated inChapter 3 of Bartsch (1995), pp. 211-64.

Developments of the approach set out in (1988/9) within theframework of a "compositional" discourse representation theory.

1995 Situations,Tense, and Aspect. Dynamic Discourse Ontology and the Semantic Flexibility ofthe Temporal System in German and English,Berlin and New York: de Gruyter.

The first part of the book is devoted to an examination ofsome basic ontological issues in semantics. "We do not develop a situationsemantics [...] Rather, we treat basic situations as entities within semantics.Over these entities, like over individuals, we can quantify and we can refer tothem in predicating about them" [p. 6]. See especially § 1.1, where basicsituations (events, states, and properties) are construed as intensional,functional entities in the spirit of (1988/9). Includes also a discussion of identitycriteria, and of alternative ontologies (e.g., a Quinean ontology with onlysituations as basic entities: § 8.2). The second part of the book containsapplications to the semantics of tense and aspect.

Argues that traditional model-theoretic semantics is incapableof accounting for the semantics of perceptual reports of the "naked infinitive"sort, and formulates an alternative situation-based account. (Further developedin Barwise and Perry 1981b, 1983). Compare Higginbotham (1983) and Vlach (1983)for replies in the spirit of Davidson’s (1967a) theory of action sentences.

1981a ‘SemanticInnocence and Uncompromising Situations’, in P. A. French, T. Uehling, and H.K. Wettstein, eds., Foundations of Analytic Philosophy

(Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. VI),Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 387-403; reprinted in A. P.Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language, Third Edition, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996,pp. 369-81.

A preliminary sketch of situation semantics. Includes adefense against the "slingshot" argument (term introduced here for the firsttime, in view of the simplicity and minimum of accessories employed by theargument) and a brief outline of the semantics of perceptual reports presentedin Barwise (1981).

1983 Situationsand Attitudes, Cambridge, MA, and London:MIT Press / Bradford Books.

Full-fledged formulation of situation semantics. Events aretreated as dynamic situations (as opposed to states of affairs). The proposedaccount is germane to that of Kim (1966, 1969, 1973a) and Goldman (1970):events (called "courses of events") are essentially sets of partial functionsfrom spatio-temporal locations to "situation-types" defined by a tuple ofobjects standing or failing to stand in a certain relation. On the identityissue: "We can say that there is one actual event e

, and that its factual parts e

1, e

2 and e

3correspond to its being several different types of events at once [...] But wecould equally well say that all the events are actual and fit together invarious ways into larger events. Depending on how we view the matter, we willsee the situation structure that represents the world as having fewer or more actual

events, but the same factual

events" [pp. 67-68].

1986 Story,Performance, Event: Contextual Studies of Oral Narrative

, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Events are "action structures, organized by relationships ofcausality, temporality, and other such linkages; narratives are verbalstructures, organized by rules of discourse. Most commonly narratives are seenas "verbal icons of the events they represent, and the problem is one ofdetermining the nature and extent of the isomorphism between them and the meansby which this formal relationship is narratively achieved" [p. 5].

1986 ‘TheRole of Event Expressions in Grammar’, Studies in Language

, 10, 1-52.

There is a common core, shared by how

-sentences and bare infinitives following perceptionverbs, that lies "in the fact that it must be event-expressions that are in thescope of the operator HOW or in the complement of a (non-epistemic) perceptionverb like see, hear

, etc." [p. 5]. The event analysis is used to derive"a unified treatment of manner adverbs and predicative adjectives. The result of this [is] that the categorialdistinction between some adverbs and adjectives becomes superfluous" [p. 5].

Includes a fact-based analysis of sentences such as ‘Mary ismaking pies’ which resembles Davidson’s (1967a) event-based analysis of actionsentences. See Clark (1975).

1975 ‘Actionsand Events: The Problem of Individuation’, American Philosophical Quarterly,

12, 263-76.

"For the events e and f

to be identical, they must have same subject andspatio-temporal location, and their (participial) property descriptions mustbelong to the same ‘modification set’ (e.g. reddening, reddening slowly,reddening in July). The samecriterion applies to actions, which are here treated strictly as a propersubclass of events (John’s closing the door = the door’s becoming closed).Actions related by Goldman’s ‘causal generation’ are therefore distinct, butthose related by this and other three types of act-generation are not. Thisconclusion requires abandonment of the view--questionable on other grounds--thatcausal context are thoroughly extensional" [The Philosopher’s Index

Abstract].

Includes reprints of Davidson (1967c), Gasking (1955), Humberand Madden (1971), and Pap (1957).

1974 ‘SingularCausal Statements: A Reconsideration’, Philosophical Forum

, 5, 611-18.

1981 Humeand the Problem of Causation, New York andOxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 7 on "Events, Facts, and the Extensionality of CausalConcepts" covers a number of modern accounts of causation and of its ontology(particular attention is devoted to the "slingshot" argument) and relates themto Hume’s philosophy. "The Humean will insist that the Titanic’s sinking andits sinking rapidly are two distinct spatiotemporally restricted particulars.The former is an event. The latter may not be so classified by ordinarythought, but it is surely as much a concrete particular item with its owncauses and effects as the former [...] What is crucial for the Humean is that theresulting multiplication of events makes possible a coherent and defensibleontology, a commitment to the extensionality of causal sentences, and ananalysis of events that complements the regularity theory" [pp. 274-75].

1977 ‘Handelnund Handlungserklärung’ [‘Acting and Action Explanation’, in German], in A.Beckermann, ed. (1977), pp. 7-84.

1977 AnalytischeHandlungstheorie. Band 2: Handlungserklärungen[Analytical Action Theory. Volume 2: Action Explanations

, in German], Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

An anthology of classic papers on action theory (in Germantranslation), focusing on the topic of action explanation. See Meggle, ed.(1977) for volume 1 (on action description).

1981 TemporalIndexicals and the B-Theory of Time,Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh.

1988 ‘TemporalIndexicals and the Passage of Time’, Philosophical Quarterly

, 38, 158-64; reprinted in L. N. Oaklander and Q.Smith, eds. (1994), pp. 87-93.

Puts forward a "co-reporting theory of tenseless and tensedsentences", whence it is argued that "an event’s having an A-determination--itsbeing past, present, or future--is identical with that event’s bearing atemporal relation to some moment of time. Criticism in Smith (1990a).

1991 ‘AModel of Events and Processes’, in Proceedings of the

12th International Joint Conference onArtificial Intelligence (IJCAI-91), Vol. 1,Sydney: IJCAI [Morgan Kaufmann], pp. 506-11.

A model for reasoning about arbitrarily complex dynamicdomains involving multiple agents.

1965 ‘Action,Reason, and Purpose’, The Journal of Philosophy, 62, 85-95; reprinted in N. Care and C. Landesman, eds. (1968), pp.238-52.

On the question: How do intention and reason modify agency toyield the basic idea of action?

1966 ‘Whateverthe Consequences’, Analysis, 26, 83-102;reprinted in B. Steinbock and A. Norcross, eds., Killing and LettingDie (second edition), New York: FordhamUniversity Press, 1994, pp. 167-91.

1973 ‘Shooting,Killing, and Dying’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy

, 2, 315-23; reprinted in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi,eds. (1996), pp. 319-27.

A unifier’s solution to the time-of-a-killing problem (Goldman1971, Thomson 1971a), drawing upon an analogy with material objects. If John isstabbed in the morning and dies at night, can the stab be redescribed as akill? The problem is the same for material objects: can we describe Wagner athis birth as the composer of Tristan? Compare Vollrath (1975), Grimm (1977),Anscombe (1979a) for similar accounts. See also Davidson (1985b, 1987).Critical remarks in Thalberg (1975) and A. R. White (1979/80).

1981 ‘Moralityand Consequences’, in M. McMurrin, ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human ValuesII, Salt Lake City: University of UtahPress; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 45-116.

Lecture 1, on "Killing and Letting Die" [pp. 47-72], is on thecontrast between "what happens because a person did

do such and such" and "what happens because he didnot" [p. 47].

1985 ‘Adverb-DroppingInferences and the Lemmon Criterion’, in E. LePore and B. P. McLaughlin, eds.(1985), pp. 193-206.

Argues that if Davidson endorses Lemmon’s (1967) criterion forevent identity in terms of sameness of spatio-temporal location, "he ought notto account for any adverbs in terms of predications on events; and so he willbe committed to relinquishing one of his two main arguments for having anontology of events" [p. 206].

1987 ‘EventCausation: The Counterfactual Analysis’,in J. Tomberlin, ed., Metaphysics(Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 1), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, pp. 367-86;reprinted in E. Sosa and M. Tooley, eds. (1993), pp. 217-33.

On some complications for D. K. Lewis’s (1973) counterfactualanalysis of causation stemming from the "asymmetry fact": in short, the factthat hasteners are causes but delayers are not.

Thorough analysis of the different types of nominal phrasesderived from verbs via nominalizations, such as "that John runs", "John’srunning", "John’s run". Events are the referent of the latter type. Theirmetaphysics is accounted for in terms of Kim’s conception of events as propertyexemplifications (more precisely, events are instances of particular properties--tropes--atparticular spatio-temporal zones). Kim’s semantics of event names (and therelated identity criteria for events) is however rejected: "The metaphysicalthesis that Leibniz’s journey was an instance of property P hasnot the faintest tendency to imply the semantic thesis that any name ofLeibniz’s journey must contain a name of P or a predicate that connotes P" [p. 93]. Arguments in favour of fact causation, every event beingassociated with an underlying fact. Reviewed by Cresswell (1989), McHenry(1989), Teichmann (1990), Wilkerson (1990), Petit (1991b), McIntyre (1992),Cleland (1994). See also the (1991a) ‘Précis’ and the related symposium.

1991a ‘Précisof Events and Their Names’, Philosophyand Phenomenological Research, 51, 625-28.

Compact exposition of the views and arguments advanced in(1988). See also (1991b).

1991b ‘Replyto Reviewers’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

, 51, 647-62.

1994 ‘The"Namely" Analysis of the "By"-Locution’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 17, 29-51.

Argues that the "by"-locution (in sentences like "He broke apromise by coming home late") states "a relation between two completepropositions about how the personbehaves--propositions which usually do not involve the concept of an act [...] Theinitial clause says that somefact about how the person behaved had relational property RP, and the gerundialphrase says what [...] Thus, ‘He broke a promise - by - coming home late’analyses into ‘Some fact about his behavior conflicted with a promise he hadmade earlier--namely the fact that--he came home late’" [p. 36]. Based on thelast chapter of (1988).

Includes some new thoughts on the "by"-relation and on event-and act-individuation.

1996 ‘WhatEvents Are’, in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp. 137-51.

A compact and refined formulation of the views put forward in(1988, 1991a, 1991b, 1994), including a development of Bennett’s criticism ofKim’s "confusion" between metaphysical and semantic issues.

1977 ‘AGuide to the Logic of Tense and Aspect in English’, Logique et Analyse

, 20, 491-515.

Puts forward an interval-based analysis of tensed sentences.Developments in (1981).

1981 ‘OnTense and Aspect: One Analysis’, in P. Tedeschi and A. Zaenen, eds. (1981), pp.13-30.

Develops an interval-based analysis of the progressive-perfectdistinction in English according to which (1) a sentence in the progressiveform such as "Jones is leaving" is true at some time interval I

iff the extension of the subject is in the extensionof the verb at some open intervalI' including I

; (2) a simple non-progressive sentence such as"Jones has left" is true at I iffthe extension of the subject is in the extension of the verb at some closedinterval I'

preceding I. "The present perfect tense always describes a performance; theperfect aspect indicates a completion [...] The present progressive alwaysdescribes an activity" [p. 14-15].

1978 Towardthe Logic of Tense and Aspect in English,Indianapolis: Indiana University Linguistics Club.

A semantic analysis of tense and aspect using intervals oftime (as opposed to instants of time, as in standard tense logic of the time).

1974 ‘ElementaryCausal Structures in Newtonian and Minkowskian Space-Time’, Theoria

, 40, 191-201.

Puts forward a unified treatment of certain aspects of thecausal structures of Newtonian and Minkowskian space-time. The account isformulated within first-order classical logic with identity and uses as asingle primitive notion a ternary relation of causal betweenness amongspace-time events.

1955 ‘ProfessorQuine on Analyticity’, Mind, 64, 254-58;reprinted in Bergmann (1959), pp. 139-43.

"The events signified by proper names of the interpreted[relativity] calculus are happenings among ordinary physical objects persistingin time and space. This is why one does not have to accept a sense data philosophy or any other sort of ‘eventism’ inorder to square one’s self with modern science" [p. 142].

1957 ‘Elementarism’,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,18, 107-14; reprinted in Bergmann (1959), pp. 115-23.

"‘Event’, to be sure, is vague. In some contexts we call theFrench Revolution a single event; in some others we don’t. In the presentcontext, though, an event is, without doubt, what is wholly contained

in a specious present. A particular is whollycontained in a specious present; a character (universal) is not [...] Events area kind of states of affairs. A state of affairs is what is referred to (not "named"!)by a sentence. In our context, which "ties" events to a specious present, anevent is a state of affairs referred to by a substitution instance of ‘ƒ(x

)’, say, ‘gr(a)’ [where ‘gr

’ is a first-order predicate such as ‘green’]" [pp.117-18].

1981 ‘Føllesdaland Davidson on Reasons and Causes: A Preliminary Account’, in W. Rabinowicz(ed.), Tankar och Tankefel: Tillägnade Zalma Puterman

(Philosophical Studies of the Philosophical Societyand the Department of Philosophy of the University of Uppsala, nr. 33),Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 9-21.

Argues that Føllesdal (1980) has not succeeded in refutingDavidson’s (1963) view that the causes of actions are the reasons for acting,though "the truth of the matter may very well contain elements from both sidesof the dispute" [p. 9].

1994 RelatingEvents in Narrative. A Crosslinguistic Developmental Study

, Hillsdale, NJ, and Hove, UK: Erlbaum.

An extensive psychological study of the way narrators developlinguistic means to connect events and syntactically "package" them intocoherent structures.

On characterizing determinism: All events involve the presenceof some change; hence, if determinism is formulated as a thesis about events,it turns into a thesis about changes, which implies that a body at restpresents a difficulty for the determinist. This and related difficulties areavoided by not using the concept of event in the definition of determinism.

1973 ‘TheCounterfactual Analysis of Causation’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 70, 568-69.

1994 ‘TemporalReference, Aspect and Actionality: Their Neutralization and Interactions,Mostly Exemplified in Italian’, in C. Bache, H. Basbøll, and C.-E. Lindberg,eds. (1994), pp. 113-37.

An inventory of facts about the semantics of verbs, with aview to a typological systematization.

1995 TemporalReference, Aspect, and Actionality. Vol. 1: Semantic and Syntactic Perspectives

, Torino: Rosenberg & Sellier.

Includes Bonomi (1995), Desclés and Guentchéva (1995),Pustejovsky and Busa (1995) and Verkuyl (1995a) along with many other papers ontense, aspect, and Aktionsarten.

1995 TemporalReference, Aspect, and Actionality. Vol. 2: Typological Perspectives

, Torino: Rosenberg & Sellier.

Sequel to Bertinetto, Bianchi, Higginbotham, Squartini, eds.(1995). Mostly linguistics-oriented contributions.

1989 ‘EventNominalization: Proposals and Problems’, Linguistische Studien

194, 1-73.

1995 ‘DonaldDavidson’, in J. Kim and E. Sosa, eds., A Companion to Metaphysics

, Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, pp. 108-10.

Includes a presentation of the main lines of interactionbetween semantics and ontology in Davidson’s programme, with particularreference to the analysis of action sentences.

1992 ‘Actions,evénements et forme logique’ [‘Actions, Events, and Logical Form’, in French], Philosophie

, 33, 52-71.

1976 ‘TheLogic of Action’, in M. Brand and D. Walton, eds. (1976), pp. 87-104.

Suggests to get rid of actions and events by paraphrasing themaway (in a language with suitably rich logical resources).

1989 ‘ParticularActions’, in D. Stewart, ed., Entities and Individuation. Studies inOntology and Language in Honor of Neil Wilson,Lewiston, Lampeter, and Queenston: Edwin Mellen Press, pp. 19-38.

Against ontological commitment to events: "Events [...] are likewrinkles, and are creatures of the superstructure. At the base level wedescribe events by referring to and characterizing objects, places and times"[p. 21]. Includes several objections to Brand’s (1976a, 1977) criterion forevent identity in terms of necessary spatio-temporal coincidence: neitherobjects nor events are essential occupiers of spatio-temporal regions, and evenif they were, the difference introduced by Brand would not properly distinguishamong them. Moreover, argues that Brand’s criterion suffers crucially from thedifficulty of fixing the spatial boundaries of many events.

Includes Davidson (1971a) and a useful thirty-three pagebibliography on the philosophy of action.

Argues that basic intentional action should be understood asconsisting of an irreducible relation between an agent and an event (or betweenan agent and a set of events).

Argues that agent causality cannot be analysed as a species ofevent causation and is thus best viewed as a conceptual primitive.

1989 NaturalAgency. An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The core of the problem of natural agency: "What makes actionproblematic from a naturalistic perspective is that actions [...] are understoodas essentially involving determination of events by the agent

. [...] But from the perspective of natural science, ifevents are understood as ‘determined’ at all, it is just in the sense thattheir occurrence is event-caused"[p. 39]. The solution--it is argued--lies in a causal theory of action: actionsare events caused by mental states of the right sort.

1958 ‘MakingSomething Happen’, in S. Hook, ed., Determinism and Freedom in the Age ofModern Science. A Philosophical Symposium,New York: New York University Press, pp. 15-30 (reprint New York: CollierBooks, 1961, pp. 31-45).

An analysis of the locution ‘Person P made motion M happen bydoing action A’.

1994 ‘Backand Forth Through Time and Events’, in P. Dekker and M. Stokhof, eds., Proceedingsof the 9th Amsterdam Colloquium, Amsterdam:Institute for Language, Logic and Computation, pp. 161-73.

"Formal accounts of temporal constructions in naturallanguage often disagree about the semanticontology to be assumed--should it be point based, interval based, or eventbased? We think that more adequate analyses of natural language will beobtained by combining ontologies,not choosing between them. We illustrate this by combining interval structureswith (various forms of) event structures into what we call back-and-forthstructures" [p. 161]. It is then arguedthat such structures enable one to view temporal constructions (such as tenseand aspect) as methods for moving systematically between information sources.

1994 TheOxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford andNew York: Oxford University Press.

The entry ‘Event’ [p. 128] takes the central philosophical questionabout events to be whether they are individuals or proposition-like entities.

1990a ‘ConcertedInstant-Interval Temporal Semantics I: Temporal Ontologies’, Notre DameJournal of Formal Logic, 31, 403-14.

An examination of the relationships between instant-based andinterval-based temporal semantics.

1990b ‘ConcertedInstant-Interval Temporal Semantics II: Temporal Valuations and Logics ofChange’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic,31, 580-601.

Considers some "logics of change" stemming from the mutualdefinability of instant and interval temporal structures, as examined in(1990a).

1979 ‘Meaningand Contrastive Stress’, The Philosophical Review, 88, 263-98.

A criticism of Dretske (1977) on the effect of contrastivestress on the interpretation of, e.g., causal statements.

1968 ‘PhysicalDeterminism’, in N. Care and C. Landesman, eds. (1968), pp. 127-56.

Includes a discussion of the by-relation and of such questions as: "don’t ‘A moved his finger’ and‘A’s finger moved’ refer to one and the same event? If so, how could the formerpossibly explain the occurrence of the latter?" [p. 145].

Argues that "if we take seriously English sentences asreferring expressions", Kim’s own defence against the argument that all truesentences pick out the same event is "ill-founded". Kim is anyway defended ondifferent grounds.

A systematic analysis of the semantics of sentences reportingmental events such as desires and perceivings.

1995 ‘Aspectand Quantification’, in P. M. Bertinetto, V. Bianchi, J. Higginbotham, and M.Squartini, eds. (1995), pp. 93-110.

An analysis of when-clausesin Italian, focusing on the interaction between aspect, event reference, andquantificational structure.

1993 ‘Only

: Association with Focus in Event Semantics’, NaturalLanguage Semantics, 2, 1-45.

Proposes a semantic analysis of sentences involving ‘only’ (incombination with focused expressions) within the frame of an event semantics àla E. Bach (1986a) and Krifka (1989a).

1982 Whitehead’sTheory of Events, Doctoral Dissertation,Wayne State University.

A detailed reconstruction, including comparisons with theviews of Quine, Chisholm, Lemmon, Davidson. Concludes that the merging of thecategories of event and object in Whitehead’s later works, and his insistenceon internal relations, commit him to the "untenable position" of theessentiality of an entity’s spatio-temporal location.

1985 ‘EventCalculus’, Proceedings of the 9th International Joint Conference onArtificial Intelligence (IJCAI-85), Vol. 1,Los Angeles: IJCAI [Morgan Kaufmann], pp. 524-27.

"This paper presents Event Calculus, a model for representingthe identifying characteristics of physical events in terms of changes in ascene of time-related combinations of other physical events. The model is usedto construct a knowledge-based system for event recognition which forms ahigh-level description of changes on a scene, given a lower-level descriptionof the input" [Author’s abstract]. Not to be confused with either the "eventcalculus" of Kowalski and Sergot (1986) or that of Larson and Segal (1995).

Criticizes Davidson’s (1967a) analysis of adverbial contextsas linguistically incorrect and lacking in generality. Outlines an accountwhereby adverbial modification is treated as an operation on sentences (adverbsbeing of various kinds--of time, place, manner, etc.). The principles underlyingthe inferential relations among adverbs are given in axiomatic form.

1996 ‘Abductionto Plausible Causes: An Event-based Model of Belief Update’, ArtificialIntelligence, 83, 143-66.

A critical examination of various adequacy conditions putforward in the literature, culminating with the formulation of a core set ofconditions that any adequate criterion of event identity should satisfy.

1983 ‘Criteriafor Event Identity’, Philosophy Research Archives, 9, 29-78.

Reviews arguments in favor or against various event identitycriteria. (The adequacy conditions argued for in (1981) turn out to beinsufficient for deciding among such a variety of criteria.)

1979 ‘TwoLogical Connection Arguments and Some Principles about Causal Connection’, Erkenntnis

, 14, 1-23.

Denies the principle that causally related events arelogically distinct, and objects to its application to the case of mental eventsand movements.

1967 SomeSystematic and Extra-Systematic Considerations Concerning the Description ofHuman Actions, Doctoral Dissertation,University of Rochester.

Argues that some actions that would intuitively be taken asnon-basic (viz., complexes of basic actions) are rated basic by Danto’s (1965)account. Also criticises Danto’s definitions insofar as they imply that aperson’s actions cause the person to perform other actions.

On the question: What are the candidates for causes ofactions? Examines various options; does not make a case for any particularcandidate, but rejects Davidson’s (1963) account that the causes of actions arethe reasons for acting.

1971 ‘TheLanguage of Not Doing’, American Philosophical Quarterly

, 8, 45-53.

An analysis of refraining according to which S

refrains from performing a

iff (i) it is not the case that S

performs a, and (ii) there is some action that S

performs, b, such that S performs b

in order that S's performing b prevents S

's performing a. Criticized by Gorr (1979).

Points out that Goldman’s notion of "generation" yieldsincomplete diagrams, with infinitely many missing intermediate actiondescriptions between each term (when properly completed, the diagrams branchindefinitely leftward).

1976a ‘Particulars,Events, and Actions’, in M. Brand and D. Walton, eds. (1976), pp. 133-58.

Events are spatio-temporal particulars, differing fromphysical objects only in that they do not fully occupy the spatio-temporalregion in which they occur. The relevant identity criterion is a modalstrengthening of Quine’s and Lemmon’s: events are the same which occur necessarily

within the same region. (See Quinton 1979, Hacker1982b, and Lombard 1986 for the objection that this makes events still too similarto material objects, and Binkley 1989 for objections to the modal distinctionbetween the two.) Semantically, the criterion says that an event-identitystatement ‘a=b’ is true iff ‘Necessarily, a+ and b

+ occur within thesame spatio-temporal region’ is true, where aand b are canonical eventdescriptions and a

+ and b+ the result of applying Kaplan’s Dthat

operator to rigidify names and descriptionsoccurring transparently therein. See Tye (1979), Horgan (1980a), Wierenga andFeldman (1981), Simons (1981), and Tomberlin (1987) for further criticisms tothis characterization.

1977 ‘IdentityConditions for Events’, American Philosophical Quarterly

, 14, 329-37; reprinted in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi,eds. (1996), pp. 363-71.

Davidson’s account (1969a) is found inadequate insofar as itimplies that all ineffectual events are identical; Kim’s criterion (1969,1973a) is found inadequate insofar as it presupposes a way of specifying therange of properties that are constitutive of events, which can only be given bydelineating some "conceptually significant property" of events. Brand’s ownproposal is a restatement of the one put forward in (1976a): "necessaryspatiotemporal coincidence provides adequate identity conditions for events"[p. 329]. (See 1976a for related references.)

What properties must a mental event have in order for it to bethe proximate cause of action? Tentative answer: it must involve a conative

component, a property of "immediate intending" whosemain characteristic is a "pushing effect" (or "moving to act").

1979b ‘OnTye’s "Brand on Event Identity"’, Philosophical Studies

, 36, 61-68.

A response to Tye’s (1979) criticisms of the event identitycriterion put forward in Brand (1976a, 1977).

1979c ‘Causality’,in P. Asquith and H. Kyburg, Jr., eds., Current Research in Philosophy ofScience, East Lansing, MI: Philosophy ofScience Association, pp. 252-81.

1980b ‘PhilosophicalAction Theory and the Foundations of Motivational Psychology’, in M. Bradie andM. Brand, eds. (1980), pp. 1-19.

An attempt to take "a step toward the unifying forces" of thephilosophy of action and the psychological theory of motivation and behaviorinsofar as they focus on the single issue of human action. Includes arestatement of the views put forward in (1979a). Comments in Kim (1980).

1981a ‘AParticularist Theory of Events’, Grazer philosophische

Studien,12/13 [special issue also published as R. Haller, ed., Science andEthics, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1981], 187-202.

A revised version of the theory of events advanced in (1976a,1977): based on Horgan’s (1980) discussion, the semantic formulation of theidentity criterion becomes "if a

+ and b+ are rigid, then ‘a=b’ istrue iff ‘Necessarily, a

+ and b+ occur within the same spatio-temporalregion’ is true. Includes some remarks on the consequences of the theory forissues concerning mental events.

1982 ‘PhysicalObjects and Events’, in W. Leinfellner, E. Kraemer, and J. Schank, eds., Languageand Ontology. Proceedings of the 6th International Wittgenstein Symposium

, Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, pp. 106-16.

Defense of the particularist conception put forward in (1976a,1981a): "Physical objects occupy spatio-temporal regions, and so do events:they are both types of concrete particulars. But there is a crucial differencebetween them. Physical objects whollyoccupy the spatio-temporal regions in which they exist; but events do notwholly occupy the spatio-temporal regions in which they occur". This is whyevents appear to be ephemeral, though in fact they are on a par with physicalobjects. Restatement of the identity criterion defended in (1976a, 1977,1979b).

1984 Intendingand Acting. Toward a Naturalized Action Theory,Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

A comprehensive essay on action theory, its ontologicalfoundations, and the folk psychology of intending, desiring and believing.Chapter 3 defends and further articulates the particularist conception ofevents and the corresponding identity criterionput forward in (1976a, 1977, 1979b, 1981a, 1982).

1986 ‘IntentionalActions and Plans’, in P. A. French, T. Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein, eds., Studiesin the Philosophy of Mind (Midwest Studiesin Philosophy, Vol. X), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 213-30.

Articulates and defends the thesis that intentional action isaction performed in following a plan.

1989a ‘ProximateCausation of Action’, in J. Tomberlin, ed. (1989), pp. 423-42.

Argues that a successful causal theory of action requires thatthere is a single unique type of event that proximately causes action.

1989b ‘Eventsas Spatio-temporal Particulars: A Defense’, in W. L. Gombocz, H. Rutte, and W.Sauer, eds., Traditionen und Perspektiven der analytischen Philosophie.Festschrift für Rudolf Haller, Vienna,Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, pp. 398-414.

Defends the view put forward in (1976a, 1977, 1979, 1981a,1982, 1984) against Kim’s view and the counterarguments of Lombard (1986) andTomberlin (1987). The final section compares that view with that of D. K. Lewis(1986b).

1989c Reviewof Lombard (1986), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

, 49, 525-29.

1991 ‘Action’,in H. Burkhardt and B. Smith, eds., Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology

, Vol. 1, Munich: Philosophia, pp. 17-18.

Concise and useful introduction to the main issues andpositions in action theory.

Includes Prichard (1949), Davidson (1963), Danto (1965),Rescher (1970), and an extensive annotated bibliography.

Includes reprints of Burks (1951), Gasking (1955), R. Taylor(1963b), J. L. Mackie (1965), and Davidson (1967c) along with an extensiveintroduction (Brand 1976c) and an annotated bibliography on causation [pp.369-87].

1976 ActionTheory. Proceedings of the Winnipeg Conference on Human Action

, Dordrecht: Reidel.

Includes Binkley (1976), Brand (1976a, 1976b), Chisholm(1976b), Goldman (1976), Kim (1976), R. M. Martin (1976), Sellars (1976), andThalberg (1976).

1991 ‘SomeRemarks on the "Slingshot" Argument’, in G. Schurz and G. J. W. Dorn, eds., Advancesin Scientific Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Paul Weingartner on the Occasionof the 60th Anniversary of His Birthday[Poznan Studies in the Philosophy ofthe Sciences and the Humanities, 24], Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: EditionsRodopi, pp. 421-37.

Proposes to take fact-bundles, rather than individual facts,as truth-makers also for atomic sentences, arguing that this blocks theapplication of the "slingshot" argument against an ontology of facts. Includesa review of the literature on the argument.

1989 TheMind of Donald Davidson [=Grazerphilosophische Studien, 36], Amsterdam andAtlanta, GA: Editions Rodopi.

1963 ‘Wantsas Explanations of Actions’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 60, 425-35; reprinted in N. Care and C. Landesman,eds. (1968), pp. 199-213.

1967 ‘TheLogic of the Identity Theory’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 64, 515-37.

An attempt to provide "a formulation of the identity theorywhich we think everyone can at least understand, which affirms that phenomenalevents like being-looked-red-to and itching are retained as ultimate items inthe furniture of the world, and which construes ‘identity’ in a waysufficiently strong to remove the traditional philosophical puzzles" [p. 515].

Argues that the fine-grained approach to action identity ofKim and Goldman cannot account for certain relations intuitively holdingbetween the various events involved in cases such as x

’s raising his nose by raising his hand (therebybecoming a person with an uptilted nose).

1985 ‘Davidson’sTheory of Intention’, in B. Vermazen and M. B. Hintikka, eds. (1985), pp.13-26; reprinted with an added Appendix in E. LePore and B. P. McLaughlin, eds.(1985), pp. 14-28.

Difficulties for Davidson’s theory of intention "are rooted inan overly limited conception of intentions and plans in practical reasoning"[p. 13].

1987 Intention,Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA,and London: Harvard University Press.

Argues that intentions are neither desires nor beliefs butplans (or pieces of partial plans) foractions.

A tense-logic reformulation of Chisholm’s (1970) formalreduction of talk about event occurrences to talk about recurrable events.

The ‘event’ concept "always has a temporal connotation andimplies a ‘happening’ of some sort. We are not likely to speak of a bookpassively resting on a table as an ‘event’" [p. 115].

Section 2 on Strawson’s (1959) views on the asymmetricrelation of dependency between events and objects. Section 3.3.b criticizesboth Davidson’s (1969a) and Kim’s (1969) identity criteria for actions andevents as failing to provide a sufficient condition. (Most author criticize Kimwith regard to the sufficiency condition, as being excessively fine-grained.)Concludes that "it is best [...] simply to adopt our general theory of identityand apply it to the identity of events" [p. 70].

1962 ‘WhatAre Effects?’, in R. J. Butler, ed., Analytical Philosophy

, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 15-20.

An account of the concept of action "from the point of view ofthe agent", based on "the primacy of inanimate action" and "the pervasivenessof explanatory insight in the description of action".

1960 Time,Tense, and the Verb. A Study in Theoretical and Applied Linguistics, withParticular Attention to Spanish, Berkeleyand Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Foresees twelve distinct tense forms "representing allpossible order relations between all possible events and four axes oforientation". (See diagram on p. 31 for the nine tenses exemplified inEnglish.) Gives "seven basic axioms which are descriptive of the objectivenature of events: (1) All events take place in time. (2) All events take timeto take place; they have length and are measurable. (3) All events--with,perhaps, some theoretical or irrelevant exceptions--have a beginning (initiativeaspect), a middle (imperfective aspect), and an end (terminative aspect). (4)All events take place unidirectionally; the end is always later in time thanthe beginning. (5) No event can be identical with itself. (6) All repetitionsof the same event are sequent and serial. (7) All events are either cyclic ornoncyclic, that is, desinent or indesinent in grammatical terminology" [pp.16-17].

1977a ‘Statesand Events’, in W. E. Hartnett, ed., Systems: Approaches, Theories,Applications, Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel,pp. 71-95.

Claims that "the concepts of state and event are employed notonly in ontology but also in epistemology [...], but uncritically since they arenot analyzed" [p. 72]. On the proposed analysis, "Every event occurs in or tosome concrete thing, and it consists in a change of state of the thing" [p. 89]. Events that can be analyzed into furtherevents "may be also called processes [...] Being changes of states of things,events and processes are representable as trajectories in the state spaces ofchanging things. And because states are relative to the reference frame and therepresentation [...], their changes too are relative in the same sense" [ibid.].

1977b OntologyI: The Furniture of the World, Volume 3 of Treatiseon Basic Philosophy, Dordrecht and Boston:Reidel.

Chapter 5, "Change", expounds the view that every eventconsists in a (quantitative or qualitative) change of state of some thing:"science [...] provides no ground for hypothesising the existence of thinglessevents any more than it suggests that there might be changeless things" [p.273]. A systematic formalization of this view is provided.

1979 ‘Individualismand the Mental’, in P. A. French, T. Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein, eds. (1979),pp. 73-121

Contains an argument against the token-identity of the mentaland the physical [pp. 109-113].

1993 ‘Mind-BodyCausation and Explanatory Practice’, in J. Heil and A. R. Mele, eds. (1993),pp. 97-120.

Includes a discussion of Davidson’s (1986) reactions to theargument against token-identity put forward in Burge (1979).

1984 ‘BasicTense Logic’, in D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, eds., Handbook of PhilosophicalLogic, Volume II (Extensions of Classical Logic), Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 89-133.

1951 ‘TheLogic of Causal Propositions’, Mind, 60,263-82; reprinted in M. Brand, ed. (1976), pp. 257-76.

Develops a language for expressing causal propositions: itmakes use of a connective of causal implication and is eventually extended withmodal operators of causal possibility and causal necessity. Compare Føllesdal(1965, 1966) for problems (in the spirit of Davidson’s 1967c "slingshot") anddevelopments.

1975 Cause,Chance, Reason: An Inquiry into the Nature of Scientific Evidence

, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Chapters 6 and 7 include developments and applications of thelogic of causal propositions introduced in (1951).

1986 ‘Statesof Affairs’, in R. J. Bogdan, ed., Roderick M. Chisholm

, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 113-33.

Raises various questions about the nature of the category ofstates of affairs in Chisholm’s ontology, and argues that the concept of astate of affairs is itself obscure.

1969 ‘OnEvents and Event-Descriptions’, in J. Margolis, ed. (1969), pp. 84-94.

Symposium with D. Davidson (1969b) and R. M. Martin (1969b).Argues, against Martin, that "the sharp contrasts he draws between facts andevents fail to catch all-important nuances of talk about both [...] Sometimes onejust cannot say whether [a given phrase] describes an event or names a fact"[pp. 86, 88].

1984 ‘Relationismand Possible Worlds’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

, 35, 101-13.

On the possibility of rewriting physical theories by referringonly to material objects and events (as opposed to space-time points). Focuseson modal arguments.

Two ways of revising a tense logic à la

Kripke by adding predicate modifiers so as to giveclose-to-the-surface analyses of sentences involving temporal qualifications.

1991 ‘EventStructure versus Discourse Coherence’, in M. Caenepeel, J. Delin, E.Oversteegen, and J. Sanders, eds., Proceedings of the dandi Workshop on Discourse Coherence

, Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh.

On how the text type (e.g., narrative vs. non-narrative)affects the temporal ordering and the functioning of aspectual constructions indiscourse. Focuses on simple past event sequences.

Further explorations of the ideas put forward in (1991), butwith reference to past perfect constructions.

1994 ‘TemporalStructure and Discourse Structure’, in C. Vet and C. Vetters,eds. (1994), pp. 5-20.

Argues that knowledge about relationships between events isnot enough to explain when simple-past reverse-order discourses are acceptable; knowledge about discourse structureis also important.

1981 ‘TheMetaphysic of Abstract Particulars’, in P. A. French, T. Uehling, and H. K.Wettstein, eds., Foundations of Analytic Philosophy

(Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. VI),Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 477-88.

Events "are widely acknowledged to be particulars. They areplainly not ordinary concrete particulars. They are, in my opinion, best viewedas trope-sequences, in which one condition gives way to others. Events, on thisview, are changes in which tropes replace one another" [p. 480].

Very rich analysis of tropes, including some applications toevents: "On the trope scheme, events fitin without difficulty. Since the tropes are themselves particulars, asuccession of tropes at a place will be itself a particular occasion. And sincetropes have natures, trope succession will involve that transformation ofquality or relation which every event consists in" [p. 22].

1991 ‘Causation,Supervenience, and Method. Reflections on Jonathan Bennett’s Events andTheir Names’, Philosophy andPhenomenological Research

, 51, 637-40.

Part of a symposium on J. Bennett (1988) (with replies in J.Bennett 1991b). Assuming that Bennett believes facts to be tropes of a kind(which Bennett denies in his reply), objects that "the distinction betweenfacts and their ‘corresponding’ events is a language-dependent distinction. Ina world without thought, without different ways of conceptualizing the samesituation, there is no way to distinguish a given swim from the journey that itis. Bennett’s claim that these must be distinct because they differ in causalpower rests on intensional examples--that Peter swam surprised us, for instance,while that he journeyed did not" [p. 638].

1984 ‘Innerand Outer Basic Action’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

, 84, 83-102.

An account of basic actions is proposed and argued to solveproblems arising in other theories, especially with respect to the"internalizing" of actions.

On whether cases of unexpected paralysis imply that bodilyactions beginning inside the body with brain events of trying also end insidethe body.

Chapter 8 ("Time, Tense and Aspect") includes a brief expositionof Vendler’s classification of events and Aktionsarten

Includes Bogen (1968) and reprints of D. Bennett (1965),Brandt and Kim (1963), Danto (1963, 1965), Davidson (1963), Melden (1956),Silber (1963/4).

1970 ‘Davidson’sNotion of Logical Form’, Inquiry, 13[Special Issue on "Action"], 129-39.

Criticisms of the notion of logical form underlying Davidson’saccount of action sentences in (1967a). Among other things, it is argued that"($x)(Kicked (Shem, Shaun, x

))" is not the logical form of "Shem kicked Shaun"but (at most) a logically equivalent sentence. Davidson’s reply in (1970c).

1984 ‘ThematicRoles and their Role in Semantic Interpretation’, Linguistics

, 22, 259-79.

Puts forward a theory of semantic roles as relations betweenindividuals and events. The account is similar to those of T. Parsons (1980)and of Dowty (1989).

Events and processes are particulars that involve changes inother particulars [pp. 51-52].

1980 ‘WhatPlace Has the Notion of a Basic Action in the Theory of Action?’, Ratio

, 22, 39-51.

Against Danto (1965), argues that it is a mistake to supposethat reasoning about actions begins with "basic actions". The relations betweenbasic and non-basic actions are of an inferential rather than a causal kind.

1981a ‘EventIdentity and a Significant Physicalism’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy

, 19, 171-80.

Argues that Davidson’s (1969a) identity criterion for eventsin terms of sameness of causes and effects applies to physical (law-governed)events, not just events simpliciter. Asa consequence, the thesis of anomalous monism becomes: "every mental event hasa physical description that occurs in a law statement concerning thatevent".

On the condition for transworld event identity adopted by vanInwagen (1978a). Among other things, the following theses are negativelyassessed: (a) For any event particular e,if one of the parts of e occursat time t, then it is anessential feature of e that thispart occurs at t [p.

445]; (b) For any event particular e

, if e'causes e, then the property ofhaving e' as a cause is essentialto e [p. 448].

1989a ‘CanSubstantial Changes Be Qualitative Changes?’, Analysis

, 49, 33-35.

Sees no reason for rejecting the possibility that some eventsqualify as qualitative changes (events whose subjects change qualitatively) aswell as substantial changes (events whose subjects either begin or cease toexist).

An examination of the essentialist principle, defended e.g. byLombard (1986), that the minimal subjects of an event are essential to theevent. Subscription to this principle "may require non-cosmetic revisions oforthodox modal intuitions bearing upon commonplace things" [p. 217].

1992 GliEventi [Events

, in Italian], Doctoral Dissertation, University ofMilan.

Against J. Bennett (1988) argues that properties are thereferent of gerundive nominals. Draws a distinction between states and eventson the one hand, and static and dynamic states on the other hand.

1995 ‘TemporalEntities in Space’, in P. Amsili, M. Borillo, and L. Vieu, eds. (1995), Part D,pp. 66-78.

On the spatial structure of events and processes. Hypothesisesthat some spatial and temporal concepts are not completely domain-specific(complementarity hypothesis; see Mayo 1961). Includes a discussion of eventmotion and object rotation.

Argues that events are the primary auditory objects--located atthe resonating body--and that some of these are sounds. Includes a discussion ofthe logical form of auditory reports in a Davidsonian framework.

1994 Holesand Other Superficialities, Cambridge, MA,and London: MIT Press/ Bradford Books.

1996a ‘Introduction’,in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp. xi-xxxviii.

1996b ‘TheStructure of Spatial Localization’, Philosophical Studies

, 82, 205-39.

Discusses the thesis that events are among those entities thatdo not occupy the spatial region at which they are located.

1996 Events

, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing (InternationalResearch Library of Philosophy, 15).

Includes J. Bennett (1996) along with unabridged reprints ofAnscombe (1979a), E. Bach (1986a), K. Bach (1980), J. Bennett (1973), Brand(1977), Chisholm (1970), Cleland (1991), Cresswell (1986), Cutting (1981),Davidson (1967a, 1967c, 1969a, 1970a), L. H. Davis (1970), Dretske (1967), Gill(1993), Goldman (1971), Hacker (1982a, 1982b), Higginbotham (1983), Horgan(1978), Kim (1973a, 1976), D. K. Lewis (1986b), Lombard (1979a), Mourelatos(1978), T. Parsons (1989), Peterson (1989), Quine (1985), Thomson (1971a).

1960 ‘Outlineof a Theory on the General Logical Structure of the Language of Action’, Theoria

, 26, 151-82.

1965 ‘TheLogic of Change, Action and Norms’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 62, 333-44.

A critical examination of von Wright (1963), with someclarifications and developments.

1967 ‘Commentson D. Davidson’s "The Logical Form of Action Sentences"’, in Rescher, ed.(1967), pp. 104-12.

Accepts Davidson’s (1967a) analysis of action sentences butsuggests to revise it (i) by further separating out the event participants, and(ii) by treating prepositions linking verbs to nominal expressions as forming one

predicate together with the verb. Thus, a sentence such as "I flew my spaceshipto the Morning Star" is analysed as having the logical form "($e

)(Flew(I,e)

& Flew(e,my spaceship) & Flying-to(e,the Morning Star))". Both suggestions are rejected by Davidson in his(1967b) reply. (ii) is admittedly a minor point, but the idea in (i) has laterbeen taken seriously by various authors. See T. Parsons (1980, 1985, 1989,1990), Carlson (1984), and Dowty (1989) inter alia

1979 ‘Intensionalityand Identity in Human Action and Philosophical Method’, Noûs

, 13, 235-60.

Critical review of the 1977 reissue of Goldman (1970).Suggests that the unifier-multiplier controversy is a non-issue.

1980 ‘ConventionalAspects of Human Action, Its Time, Its Place’, Dialogue

, 19, 436-60.

"(i) What are the conventions involved in timing and locatingactions? (ii) What is the rationale for those conventions? (iii) Is that rationalesufficient to show the usefulness of those conventions? (iv) Can and shouldthose conventions be improved upon?" [p. 436].

1985 ‘AspectualActions and Davidson’s Theory of Events’, in E. LePore and B. P. McLaughlin,eds. (1985), pp. 294-328.

Advocates aspects of events to solve deontic paradoxes (suchas Forrester’s (1984) paradox: killing gently can be permissible even if killing is not).

1974 ‘Eventsand Past Events: Some Ontological Considerations’, in R. Severens, ed. (1974),pp. 111-34.

On whether there is an existent past. Holds that "to assertthe occurrence of an event and to use warrantably an event concept must betaken to be the same thing" [p. 119]. Events do not exist--they occur; theyhappen. But "to say events occur is not to say something general ormetaphysical about events; it is to say something about the manner in whichevent assertions are justified and what sort of implications can be drawn froman event assertion" [p. 122]. Comments in Berersluis (1974).

1963 ‘Causationand the Identification of Action. Comments on Donald Davidson’s "Actions,Reasons, and Causes"’, The Journal of Philosophy, 60, 700-01.

Issues a plea for "the criteria of identity for actions, thegrounds for distinguishing them both from one another and from their reasonsand consequences, and the extent to which these reasons and consequences inturn determine the identity, specific if not numerical, of actions" [p. 701].

An extensive study, aiming "to bring Aristotle’s pioneeringcontribution into direct and detailed contact with contemporary work" [p. ix].Chapter 1 argues that "Aristotle’s treatment of the identity and individuationconditions for processes offers an intermediate position between that occupiedby Davidson and Goldman" [p. 31]. Chapter 2 focuses on Aristotle’s use of hisontology of processes to discuss the identity and location of actions. See alsoChapter 5 on Aristotle’s account of action explanation.

Argues that one of the basic axioms in Segerberg’s system(1989a, 1989b) is too strong.

1984 Topicsin the Syntax and Semantics of Infinitives and Gerunds

, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Massachusettsat Amherst; published New York: Garland, 1989.

1989a ‘Introduction’,in G. Chierchia, B. H. Partee, and R. Turner, eds., Properties,

Types and Meaning,

Volume II: Semantic Issues

, Dordrecht,Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 1-20.

1989b ‘StructuredMeanings, Thematic Roles and Control’, in G. Chierchia, B. H. Partee, and R.Turner, eds., Properties, Types and Meaning, Volume II: Semantic Issues

, Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer AcademicPublishers, pp. 131-66.

Following the property exemplification approach of Kim (1966,1969, 1973a), construes eventualities as atomic units of information.

1995a ‘Individual-levelPredicates as Inherent Generics’, in G. N. Carlson and F. J. Pelletier, eds., TheGeneric Book, Chicago and London:University of Chicago Press, pp. 176-223.

In contrast to Kratzer (1995), argues that all predicates(stage-level as well as individual-level) have a Davidsonian extra argumentranging over eventualities; however, in individual-level predicates thisargument is bound by a generic operator, and that accounts for the difference.

1995b Dynamicsof Meaning. Anaphora,Presupposition, and the

Theory of Grammar

, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Includes a discussion of adverbs of quantification and if/when

-clauses as involving quantification over eventlikeentities [pp. 99ff].

1991 Meaningand Grammar. An Introduction to Semantics,Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press.

Chapter 8 ("Word Meaning") includes a presentation of anevent-based theory of semantic roles along the lines set forth in Carlson(1984) and Dowty (1989).

1964 ‘TheDescriptive Element in the Concept of Action’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 61, 613-24.

Maintains that an action is the bringing about of an event.Compare von Wright (1963) and K. Bach (1980) for related views.

1965 ‘Queryon Substitutivity’, in R. S. Cohen and M. W. Wartofsky, eds., Boston Studiesin the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II, NewYork: Humanities Press, pp. 275-77.

Singular causal statements are not extensional with respect tothe contained singular terms. Discussion in L. H. Davis (1974).

1966 ‘Freedomand Action’, in K. Lehrer, ed., Freedom and Determinism

, New York: Random House, pp. 11-44.

1967a ‘Commentson D. Davidson’s "The Logical Form of Action Sentences"’, in Rescher, ed.(1967), pp. 113-14.

Offers linguistic evidence to support the view that events fallinto a category close to universals (e.g., they can recur) by analysingsentences such as "There is a stroll that he takes every afternoon". Davidson’sreply in (1967b).

1967b ‘"HeCould Have Done Otherwise"’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 44, 409-18; revised version reprinted in J. H.Gill, ed., Philosophy Today No. 1,New York: Macmillan, 1968, pp. 236-49.

Gives an analysis of the conditions under which "undertakingto make a certain event happen" is in the agent’s power.

1969a ‘SomePuzzles About Agency’, in K. Lambert, ed., The Logical Way of Doing Things.Philosophical Essays in Honor of Henry S. Leonard, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 199-218.

In the case of actions, causation relates persons to events.Consequently actions are caused, but determinism, which concerns causation byevents, is supposed not to touch the belief that actions are free (compareChisholm 1976a and Hornsby 1980a).

1969b ‘Language,Logic, and States of Affairs’, in S. Hook, ed., Language and Philosophy

, New York: New York University Press, pp. 241-48.

Outline of the theory of events as states of affairs furtherdeveloped in (1970, 1971a, 1976a).

1970 ‘Eventsand Propositions’, Noûs, 4, 15-24;reprinted in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp. 89-98.

A debate with Davidson on the ontology of events. Moving fromthe assumption that "any theory of events should be adequate to the fact of recurrence

, to the fact that there are some things that recur,or happen more than once" [p. 15], puts forward a theory of events as a speciesof states of affairs: "A proposition could be defined as any state of affairswhich is necessarily such that either it or its negation always occurs [...] Anevent is any contingent state of affairs which is not a proposition and whichimplies change (i.e., which implies that there is some state of affairs p

such that p occurs and not-poccurs)" [p. 20]. The account also includes an outline of how talk ofparticular occurrences of events can be reduced to talk of the occurring andfailing to occur of such general recurring events. Reply in Davidson (1970a).Compare also Wierenga (1976) and Lombard (1977) for critical discussion.

A reply to Davidson (1970a), and a new challenge: "Considerthat entity which, according to Davidson’s analysis, Sebastian is said tostroll. Could some other person have strolled it? Could Sebastian have strolledit in Florence instead of in Bologna? Or, had he not strolled it, could he havedone something else with it instead? It would be unphilosophical [...] to rejectsuch questions--if one assumes that there really is a certain concrete thingthat Sebastian strolls" [p. 182]. Davidson’s reply in (1971b). Furtherdevelopments in Chisholm (1985a).

1971b ‘Onthe Logic of Intentional Action’, in R. Binkley, R. Bronaugh, and A. Marras,eds. (1971), pp. 38-69.

An improvement over the system of concepts set forth in (1964,1966, 1969), including a summary of the underlying ontology of states ofaffairs, which "is quite different from that which is presupposed by DonaldDavidson’s account of agency" [p. 41, n.5]. For instance, "We should resist thetemptation to say such things as that the inauguration of Mr. Johnson’ssuccessor and the inauguration of Mr. Nixon are ‘the same individual state ofaffairs’. For they are different states of affairs" [p. 41]. Commented by Aune(1971).

1971c ‘Reply’,in R. Binkley, R. Bronaugh, and A. Marras, eds. (1971), pp. 76-80.

A reply to Aune (1971), clarifying issues about agentcausation, the definition of "basic action", and the iterability of "He makesit happen that" discussed in (1971b).

Chapter 4 defends the view that events, like propositions,constitute a subspecies of states of affairs. The following characterization isgiven: "p is an event =

df p

is a state of affairs which is such that: (i) itoccurs; (ii) it is not a proposition; and (iii) it entails a property g which is such that (a) only individualthings can exemplifiy g, (b) it ispossible that no individual things exemplify g,and (c) g is not such that it maybe rooted outside the times at which it is had" [p. 128]. On causality: "there are events thatcause the events that agents cause, but [...] these events, unlike other events,are not sufficient conditions for their effects" [p. 69] (see Chisholm 1969a).

1976b ‘TheAgent as Cause’, in M. Brand and D. Walton, eds. (1976), pp. 199-212.

Defines agent causation in terms of event causation and of theundefined concept of "undertaking": "Scontributes causally at t to p

=dfEither (a) S does something at t

that contributes causally to p

, or (b) there is a q

such that S undertakes q at t

and S-undertaking-q

is p,or (c) there is an r such that S

does something at t

that contributes causally to r

, and pis that state of affairs which is Sdoing something that contributes causally to r

" [p. 205]. See Thalberg’s (1976) comments.

1978 ‘Commentsand Replies’, Philosophia, 7 [SpecialIssue on "The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm"], 597-636.

Includes replies to Corrado (1978), Goldman (1978), Lombard(1978c), Thalberg (1978d), and van Inwagen (1978b).

1979a ‘Events,Propositions and States of Affairs’, in P. Weingartner and E. Morscher, eds., Ontologieund Logik · Ontology and Logic. Vorträge und Diskussion eines InternationalenKolloquiums · Proceedings of an International Colloquium

, Berlin: Duncker & Humblodt, pp. 27-47.

Restatement of the view that events "constitute a certainsubspecies of the genus states of affairs" [p. 41]. Definition D17 states that"e is an event =Df There is a nonemptyset P of properties such that allthe members of P can be had onlyby contingent things and none of the members of P

may be rooted outside the times at which they arehad; e is necessarily such thatit obtains if and only if all members of P are exemplified" [p. 41]. Lists 22 definitions and 5 principlesexpressing Chisholm’s position on states of affairs, propositions, and events[pp. 46-47]. Compare the "Discussion" on pp. 48-51.

1979b ‘Possibilityand States of Affairs’, in P. Weingartner and E. Morscher, eds., Ontologieund Logik · Ontology and Logic. Vorträge und Diskussion eines InternationalenKolloquiums · Proceedings of an International Colloquium

, Berlin: Duncker & Humblodt, pp. 53-57.

Reply to a conference discussion of (1979a). Includes aclarification of the relation between possibility and states of affairs.

1979c ‘Austin’sPhilosophical Papers’, in K. T. Fann, ed., A Symposium on J. L. Austin

, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 101-26.

Includes a criticism of Austin (1950), reconstructing thecontroversy with Strawson (1950) on the thesis that facts are things in theworld. Chisholm sides with Strawson.

1979d ‘Objectsand Persons: Revisions and Replies’, Grazer philosophische Studien

, 7/8 [special issue "Essays in the Philosophy of R.M. Chisholm", also published as E. Sosa, ed. (1979)], 317-88.

Includes replies to Anscombe (1979b), Donagan (1979), Kim(1979a), Pollock (1979), Wolterstorff (1979). Cfr. especially Section B [pp.342-61] on the state-of-affairs theory of events and Section C [pp. 362-72] onaction and causation.

1980 ‘Brentanoals analytischer Metaphysiker’ [‘Brentano as an Analytic Metaphysician’, inGerman], Conceptus, 28/30, 77-82;reprinted with revisions as ‘Beginnings and Endings’, in P. van Inwagen, ed.(1980), pp. 17-25; further revised version in Chisholm’s Brentano andMeinong Studies, Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA:Editions Rodopi, 1982, pp. 114-24.

1985a ‘Adverbsand Subdeterminates’, in E. LePore and B. P. McLaughlin, eds. (1985), pp.324-28.

Contrasts the relation of property subdetermination (holdinge.g. between the property color and theproperty red: only red

can instantiate the formula color

+ X = red

) to the more common case of properties falling underother properties (e.g. brother’sfalling under male) and appliesthe distinction to adverbs. Thus "strollingswiftly is a subordinate under strolling

", whereas "strolling in Bologna

is equivalent to the coordinate pair strolling

and being in Bologna

" [p. 328].

1985b ‘TheStructure of States of Affairs’, in B. Vermazen and M. B. Hintikka, eds.(1985), pp. 107-14.

Going back to the debate with Davidson (1970a, 1971b) on thenature of events : "I hope that I can persuade Davidson that the concept [of astate of affairs] is a powerful one and that he might do well consider it whenhe completes his theory of recurrence and possibility" [p. 107]. Definition: "p

is a state of affairs =df p is possiblysuch that there is someone who accepts it; and there is something which obtainsand which is necessarily such that whoever conceives it conceives p

" [p. 109]. Characterizes the internal structure ofstates of affairs in terms of conjunctions, negations, and disjunctions, andtheir "intentional criteria of identity" in terms of mutual involvement andentailment.

1985/6 ‘On thePositive and Negative States of Things’, Grazer philosophische Studien

, 25/26, 97-106; reprinted with revisions as Ch. 16of Chisholm 1989 (entitled ‘States and Events’), pp. 150-55.

Outlines new ontological foundations for a theory of events,centered on a twofold dichotomy between contingent/non-contingent anddependent/independent. "x is an event"is defined as "there is a y suchthat y is a contingent substanceand x is a contingent state of y

" [p. 103].

1986 ‘Self-Profile’,in R. J. Bogdan, ed., Roderick M. Chisholm,Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 3-77.

Section F [pp. 56-64] reviews and updates Chisholm’s views onactions and events.

Chapter 16 (‘States and Events’) is a revised version(1985/6). Chapter 18 (‘The Categories’) is a summary "of the ontology here setforth" [p. vii].

Developing on the account of (1985/6), marks a departure fromthe early theory of events as states of affairs in favor of a theory of eventsas "contingent states of contingent things". This view is argued to be in thespirit of Kim’s (1969, 1973a, 1976) except that times are not assumed to beconstitutive elements of events. In fact, "everything we know about the natureof events and everything we know about any particular event may be expressedwithout presupposing that there are such things as ‘times’. There seems to meto be no sufficient reason, therefore, to suppose that this temporal worldincludes such entities as ‘times’" [p. 425].

1990b ‘Referringto Things That No Longer Exist’, in J. Tomberlin, ed. (1990), pp. 545-56.

1992 ‘TheBasic Ontological Categories’, in K. Mulligan, ed., Language, Truth andOntology, Dordrecht, Boston, and London:Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 1-13.

Further thoughts on the new (1985/6, 1990a) theory of eventsas contingent states of contingent things. A beginning is a state that neitherdid nor will exemplifiy anything; a process is a state that will include abeginning, and a change is either a process or a beginning.

1994 ‘OntologicallyDependent Entities’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

, 54, 499-507.

Includes an outline of the theory of events as contingentstates (see 1985/6, 1990a, 1992): events are either first-order states, i.e.,states of substances, or second-order states (states of first-order states),where it is assumed that "for every x,there is the state, x-being-F

, if, and only if, x

is F"[p. 504].

1995 ‘Agents,Causes, and Events: The Problem of Free Will’, in T. W. O’Connor, ed. (1995),pp. 95-100.

1996 ARealistic Theory of Categories. An Essay in Ontology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thorough presentation of Chisholm’s recent views, including anelaboration of the conception of events as contingent states (see 1985/6,1990a, 1992, 1994). See especially Chapter 10 ("States and Events", pp. 71-84).

1994 ‘Skepticaland Credulous Event Calculi for Supporting Modal Queries’, in A. Cohn, ed., Proceedingsof the 11th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 94)

, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 361-65.

On dealing with partially ordered sequences of events inKowalski and Sergot’s (1986) event calculus.

1970 ‘Remarkson Nominalization’, in R. A. Jacobs and P. S. Rosenbaum, eds., Readings inEnglish Transformational Grammar, Waltham,MA: Ginn and Co., pp. 184-221; reprinted in N. Chomsky, Studies onSemantics in Generative Grammar, The Hague:Mouton, 1972, pp. 11‑61.

Analyses three types of nominals: gerundive (John’srefusing the offer), derivative (John’srefusal of the offer), and mixed (John’srefusing of the offer).

Some action verbs (such as ‘learn’, ‘find’) imply anattainment of the desired goal; others (‘study’, ‘look for’) do not imply suchan achievement but presuppose an active attempt. It is suggested that thecontroversy over such verbs as ‘kill’might profit from an analysis in terms of these features.

1970 ‘TheLogical Character of Action-Explanations’, The Philosophical Review

, 79, 214-36.

Elaborates on the view that explanations of human actionconform to the deductive-nomological pattern.

A defense of the view that facts exist based on a rebuttal ofthe view that they are the objects of singular reference.

Seminal paper. Gives an account of adverbial modification thatdoes not require the postulation of events in the domain of quantification(unlike Davidson’s 1967a analysis): predicate modifiers are first-orderoperators interpreted semantically as mappings from properties to properties[p. 132]. Compare T. Parsons’s similar account in (1970).

Outline of an "adverbial logic" in the spirit of (1970)(though no reference to the earlier paper is made) as an answer to thequestion: "Is it possible to analyse sentences with predicate modifiers in sucha way that the analysis satisfies the [requirements] of Kenny’s problem butdoes so without invoking references to events, states, and the like?" [p. 32].Comments in Kleiner (1974).

1975 ‘Facts,Fact-Correlates, and Fact-Surrogates’, in P. Welsh, ed., Fact, Value, andPerception: Essays in Honor of Charles A. Baylis, Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 3-17.

Suggests that Baylis’s (1948) fact-based analysis of asentence such as ‘Mary is making pies’ matches (and anticipates) Davidson’s (1967a)event-based analysis of action sentences.

1986a ‘Predicationand Paronymous Modifiers’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 27,376-92.

In the framework of Clark (1970) suggests a way of dealingwith the invalidity of inferences such as "This is a fake Picasso. Ergo

, this is a Picasso".

1986b ‘MurderersAre Not Obliged to Murder: Another Solution to Forrester’s Paradox’, PhilosophicalPapers, 15, 51-57.

Argues that the distinction introduced by Sinnot-Armstrong(1985) to solve Forrester’s (1984) paradox can be preserved within an"adverbial" theory without commitment to Davidson’s (1967a) analysis of actionsentences.

1989 ‘Deeds,Doings, and What is Done: The Non-Extensionality of Modifiers’, Noûs

, 23, 199-210.

1973 Leibniz’sDoctrine of Individual Accidents (StudiaLeibnitiana, Sonderheft 4), Wiesbaden:Franz Steiner.

Individuates in Leibniz the first traces of a doctrine ofevents as particular accidents (as discussed by J. Bennett 1988, § 36). CompareLeibniz’s New Essays, IV-vi-42.

1987 ‘Change,Process and Events’, Stanford: Center for the Study of Language andInformation, Report No. CSLI-87-95.

Argues against the idea that a change can be represented by asequence of durationless entities. Proposes an account which distinguishesbetween events, processes, and states: "Like a phase, a state is a timelessentity (a universal) which may or may not be instantiated. In contrast,processes and events are concrete particulars: a process may be thought of ason-going activity of changing (aninstance of a way of becoming different); an event may be thought of as a realchange, where a real change involves the termination of a process in an actualstate" [p. 23].

1990 ‘TheDifference Between Real Change and Mere Cambridge Change’, PhilosophicalStudies, 60, 257-80.

A discussion of Geach’s (1969) notion of "mere Cambridgechange", leading to an account of "real" change which takes seriously the ideathat changing objects actually becomedifferent.

1991 ‘Onthe Individuation of Events’, Synthese,86, 229-54; reprinted in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp. 373-98.

An account of events in terms of time-ordered exemplificationsof differing states by particularized determinable properties, or "concretephases": events are "unrepeatable individuals whose identity conditions can beformulated in terms of sameness of concrete phase, time-ordered pair ofdiffering states and times" [p. 245]. This position agrees with Lombard (1986)in taking events to be first and foremost changes, but resembles the approachadumbrated by Quinton (1979) and J. Bennett (1988) in analysing events in termsof particularized properties, or "tropes".

Offers an explication of causation based on a generalizationof D. K. Lewis’s (1973) notion of nomic dependence between events.

1977 ‘AnEssential Difference between Momentary and Durative Events’, in W. A. Beach, S.E. Foz, and S. Philosoph, eds., Papers from the Thirteenth Regional Meetingof the Chicago Linguistic Society, Chicago:Chicago Linguistic Society, pp. 93-103.

Argues that there are verbs that denote truly instantaneousevents (as opposed to extended events treated as instantaneous for pragmatic reasons).

1967a ‘Cana Single Action Have Many Different Descriptions?’, Inquiry

, 10, 164-80.

Answers the title question in the negative. For, "can there bejustice in our praise or blame when everything depends upon which descriptionwe select to judge a man’s action under?" [p. 165]. Comments in Dowling (1967)and reply in Cody (1967b). Compare also Rayfield (1970).

Accepts the analogy between descriptions of actions anddescriptions of material objects pointed out by Dowling (1967), but rejects thecontention that there are many truedescriptions of material objects. Concludes that the claim that there are notmany true descriptions of an action is not affected by the analogy.

"I am tempted to conclude that there is no category of humanaction. But before drawing such a conclusion an ancient but terrible questionmust be faced: What sort of things happen in the world? This ancient questionis faced but not answered. It is brought up because the failure to find asatisfactory answer to the question, Is human action a category? is a failureeven to find a satisfactory assumption about what kind of reference the term‘human action’ is supposed to have" [p. 386, Abstract].

1969 ‘The Same Action’, Proceedingsof the Aristotelian Society, 70, 75-90.

Rich discussion of various issues that have dominated theliterature in the years to follow. Argues that Davidson’s (1967a) analysis ofaction sentences, when combined with the idea that one action can be describedin different ways, generates "absurdities". Example: If x

’s pulling the trigger and x

’s shooting the victim with a revolver are the sameaction, the analysis implies that xpulled the trigger with a revolver. (See T.Parsons 1980, B. Taylor 1985,Wiggins 1985/6, Widerker 1988 for similar criticisms; Davidson 1985b forreplies.) Discusses identity criteria, especially sameness of spatio-temporallocation (Lemmon 1967). Argues that it is impossible to speak of an eventwithout referring to an event of some kind. Also, one must draw "a distinctionbetween an expression which says what an action is, and an expression whichdescribes an action already identified" [p. 84].

Argues that knowledge of singular causal statements does notrequire knowledge of causal laws.

1984 ‘Action,Causality, and Teleological Explanation’, in P. A. French, T. Uehling, and H.K. Wettstein, eds. (1984), pp. 345-69.

Argues against Davidson’s (1963) thesis that reasons arecauses. Includes a discussion of teleological explanations of events that arenot actions.

1995 ‘TwoKinds of Action: A Phenomenological Study’, Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, 4, 799-819.

Distinguishes between "mimeomorphic actions", which actors try(or are satisfied) to carry out in the same way (in like situations), and"polymorphic actions" (all other actions). "The importance of the distinctionlies in the possibility of mimicking mimeomorphic action through thereproduction of behaviour alone, whereas polymorphic actions can only bereproduced by those who understand them sufficiently to comprehend the subtleinterplay of situation and appropriate behaviour" [p. 800].

1976a ‘TheSyntax of Action Nominals: A Cross-Language Study’, Lingua

, 40, 177-201.

Analyses action nominal constructions in their relationship tocorresponding full sentences, drawing examples from a number of languages.

1976b Aspect:An Introduction to the Study of Verbal Aspect and Related Problems

, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Puts the distinction between events and processes in aspectualperspective: "The term ‘process’ means a dynamic situation viewedimperfectively, and the term ‘event’ means a dynamic situation viewed perfectively" [p. 51].

An extensive study. Characterizes tense as the grammaticalizedexpression of the location in time of "situations", general term used to cover"events, states, processes, etc." [p.5].

1986 ‘Tenseand Discourse Location in Situation Semantics’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 9, 17-36.

Exploits some notions of Barwise and Perry’s situationsemantics (1981b, 1983) for a treatment of tense and discourse.

1971 ‘Comments’,in R. Binkley, R. Bronaugh, and A. Marras, eds. (1971), pp. 26-37.

On Davidson (1971a). Objects to the characterization of aperson P being the agent of an event a

in terms of P’s intentions and descriptions of a

. Also discusses Davidson’s argument to the effectthat agent-causality conceived as something irreducibly different fromevent-causation is of no value for an account of agency.

1978 ‘TheCase for States of Affairs’, Philosophia,7 [Special Issue on "The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm"], 523-35.

A discussion of Chisholm’s views on states of affairs.Includes an argument to the effect that the existence of de re

beliefs suggests that the objects of belief are notstates of affairs but rather Davidsonian concrete events. Reply in Chisholm(1978).

1981 Seeingand Other Complex Events, DoctoralDissertation, Ohio State University.

Argues "that a theory of events is needed to uncover theconstituents of an event as seeing, and that unless an event of seeing isanalysable into constituents, it is difficult to explain how a scientificaccount of seeing and a philosophical account can be about the same event"[Abstract]. Urges an account of the event-part relation. Actions are complexevents (a variety of causings). Includes a defense of the propertyexemplification theory of Kim and Goldman against the views of Davidson,Anscombe, Brand, Thomson.

1992 Agencyin Action. The Practical Rational Agency Machine, Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Argues that the B‑theory of time (Mellor, Oaklander)"violates the implication relations in its truth conditions of tensed sentences[...] and conflates the truth conditions with the grounds of truth of tensedsentences" [p. 26].

Examines the "final line of defense" available to theendorsers of the B‑theory of time, presenting it as a tu quoque

argument: "If the A-theorist’s argument for thereality of tense are correct, then there must be spatially ‘tensed’ facts aswell, which no one will admit" [p. 249].

1982 ‘MentalEvents Must Have Spatial Location’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

, 63, 270-74.

Mental events must have spatial location (unless one adopts asolipsistic view) because the special theory of relativity implies that eventsoccurring in public time must occur in public space.

1995 ‘Causation’,in A. C. Grayling, ed., Philosophy. A Guide through the Subject

, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 184-93.

Treats adverbs, adjectives, and prepositions as predicatemodifiers along the lines of R. Clark (1970) and T. Parsons (1970).

1974 ‘Adverbsand Events’, Synthese, 28, 455-81;reprinted with minor revisions in Cresswell (1985b), pp. 13-39.

Proposes a way of incorporating Montague’s and Davidson’streatments of adverbs into the framework of l-categoriallanguages set forth in Cresswell (1973). Gives some arguments in support ofboth approaches.

1977 ‘IntervalSemantics and Logical Words’, in Rohrer, ed. (1977), pp. 7-29; reprinted with anew Appendix in Cresswell (1985b), pp. 67-95.

On analyzing logical connectives and quantifiers within theframework of "interval semantics", where the meanings of sentences are sets ofworld-time pairs, in which the time is an interval rather than a single point.

1979a ‘Adverbsof Space and Time’, in F. Guenthner and S. J. Schmidt, eds., FormalSemantics and Pragmatics for Natural Languages,Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 171-99; reprinted in Cresswell (1985b), pp. 41-66.

A return to the view of adverbs as modifiers, after the"flirtation" with Davidson’s (1967a) account in Cresswell (1974). Arguments arecentered on an analysis of the adverb ‘quickly’.

1979b ‘IntervalSemantics for Some Event Expressions’, in R. Bäuerle, U. Egli, and A. vonStechow, eds., Semantics from Different Points of View

, Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, pp. 90-116;reprinted in Cresswell (1985b), pp. 143-71.

Further developments of the predicate modifier account ofadverbials. Against Davidson’s (1967a) approach, argues that "the basic problemis the question of whether events stand in certain logical relations" [p. 144];for instance, what is the relation between an event such as the arrival of thetrain and a non-event (whatever that is) such as the non-arrival of the train?

1981 ‘Adverbsof Causation’, in H.-J. Eikmeyer and H. Rieser, eds., Words, Worlds, andContexts, Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 21-37;reprinted in Cresswell (1985b), pp. 173-92.

Analyses the semantics of adverbs whose meaning contains acausal element; the analysis exploits D. K. Lewis’s (1973) possible-worldsaccount of causality.

1985b AdverbialModification: Interval Semantics and Its Rivals, Dordrecht: Reidel.

A collection of essays on adverbial modification withintruth-conditional semantics. Includes reprints of Cresswell (1974, 1977, 1978a,1979b, 1981) as well as an introductory survey and a previously unpublishedchapter on "Adverbial Modification in Situation Semantics" [pp. 193-220].

1985c StructuredMeanings: The Semantics of Propositional Attitudes, Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

"Events, if needed at all, are needed because certain phrasesdo not behave like sentences or otherinflected clauses. To be sure, the question then arises whether events shouldbe taken as unanalysed particulars or should, as I would prefer to do, bethemselves analysed in terms of, say, possible worlds, times, individuals, andthe like" [p. 174].

1985d Reviewof Barwise and Perry (1983), The Philosophical Review

, 94, 293-96.

1986 ‘WhyObjects Exist but Events Occur’, Studia Logica, 45, 371-75; reprinted in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp.449-53.

Within the framework of Interval Semantics, argues that thedifference between events (on the one hand) and states and objects (on theother) is that the former lack, while the latter have, the "sub-intervalproperty" (stative sentences are true at an interval t

only if they are true at every sub-interval of t

; eventive sentences need not). This feature isreflected in the existence/occurrence distinction: "Things which have thesub-interval property do or do not exist; while things that lack that propertydo or do not occur" [p. 373]. Compare Hacker (1982b).

1987 Reviewof B. Taylor (1985), Australasian Journal of Philosophy

, 65, 214-16.

1988 ‘TheWorld Situation (It’s a Small World after all)’, in Semantical Essays.Possible Worlds and Their Rivals,Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 65-77.

A criticism of situation semantics based on the view that "theso-called ‘situations’ are made to play roles that in possible-worlds semanticsare played by entities of several quite different kinds", viz. possible worlds,propositions, individuals (among which events). Includes an argument againstthe existence of disjunctive events.

1991 ‘AdverbialModification in l-CategorialLanguages’, in A. von Stechow and D. Wunderlich, eds., Semantics. AnInternational Handbook of Contemporary Research, Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, pp. 748-57.

1994 Languagein the World. A Philosophical Inquiry, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

1984 ‘TheRepresentation of Adverbs, Adjectives and Events in Logical Form’, Menlo Park,CA: SRI International, AI Center, Technical Note No. 344.

Addresses the criteria for relating surface forms to logicalform representations, focusing on issues that have bearing on the relation ofproperties to events.

1991 SyntacticCategories and Grammatical Relations. The Cognitive Organization of Information

, Chicago and London: Chicago University Press.

1992 ‘Counterfactualsand Event Causation’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

, 70, 307-23.

An attempt to "rehabilitate and clarify" the connectionbetween counterfactual dependence and event causation, assuming that "almostevery event has an unimaginably complicated lattice of causes extendingindefinitely into the past" [p. 307]. Includes criticisms of D. K. Lewis’s (1973)original account.

1988 ‘Autonomy,Predication, and Thematic Relations’, in W. Wilkins, ed., Syntax andSemantics, Volume 21, Thematic Relations,New York: Academic Press, pp. 37-60.

"Thematic relations are grounded in the elements that constituteour mental representation of events" [p. 37].

1972 ‘Onan Argument for Truth-Functionality’, American Philosophical Quarterly

, 9, 265-69.

A criticism of the "slingshot" argument. It is argued thatsingular causal statements provide a counterexample to the thesis that areferentially transparent context allowing substitution of logically equivalentsentences salva veritate istruth-functional.

1981 ‘SixTenets for Event Perception’, Cognition,10, 71-78; reprinted in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp. 509-16.

Some important structural invariants ground event perception.To perceive an event is to pick out these invariant structures in theenvironment. Some of these invariants are spatial, and concern eventlocalization, spatial distribution, and relation to an observer; otherinvariants are dynamic, and concern the flow of event phases. More importantly,some invariants are present in the coordination of event phases to one another,and are hierarchically organized.

1981 ‘Onthe Definition of the Telic-Atelic (Bounded-Nonbounded) Distinction’, in P.Tedeschi and A. Zaenen, eds. (1981), pp. 79-90.

An analysis of the telic-atelic distinction and itsramifications. Compare the instructive table on p. 80, where 15 alternativeversions of the distinction (including e.g. the activity-accomplishment and activity-performancedistinction of Vendler 1957 and Kenny 1963, respectively) are tabulated.Includes a discussion of questions such as: What is the distinction about(e.g., processes and actions or the verb phrases used to express them)? What isthe relevant notion of boundedness, or goal-reaching, in terms of which thedistinction is often formulated?

A general study of tense-aspect systems in natural languages.Chapter 3 on "Aspectual Categories". The introductory chapter includes someontological remarks to the effect that the taxonomy of "situations" (generalcover term for the "events, processes, states, etc. that verbs signify") "isnot one of situations but rather one of descriptions or characterizations ofsituations [...] since one and the same (individual) situation may be describedin different ways" [pp. 27-28].

1988 NaiveSemantics for Natural Language Understanding,Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Chapter 4 ("Verb interpretation", pp. 79ff) containsinteresting material on Vendler’s classification of events and Aktionsarten

1995 ‘ALinguistic Ontology’ International Journal of Human-Computer Studies

, 43 [special issue on "The Role of Formal Ontologyin the Information Technology", N. Guarino and R. Poli, eds.], 809-18.

1978 ‘Reference,Truth-Functionality, and Causal Connectives’, Analysis

, 38, 99-106.

An extended act is "an act done by doing other acts, wheredoing it takes longer than doing any of those other acts [...] and where each ofthose acts is done in order to do it" [p. 258]. Argues that the parts of anextended act are variable and alterable. Discusses some applications of theconcept.

1963 ‘WhatWe Can Do’, The Journal of Philosophy,60, 435-45; reprinted in N. Care and C. Landesman, eds. (1968), pp. 113-26.

A gloss on the tenet that not every action is a basic action(in the sense made clear in Danto 1965).

1965 ‘BasicActions’, American Philosophical Quarterly,2, 141-48; reprinted in A. R. White, ed. (1968), pp. 43-58; in N. Care and C.Landesman, eds. (1968), pp. 93-112; and in M. Brand, ed. (1970), pp. 255-66.

"If there are any actions at all, there must be two distinct kindsof actions: those performed by anindividual M, which he may besaid to have caused to happen;and those actions, also performed by M, which he cannot be said to have caused to happen. The latter I shalldesignate as basic actions" [p.256].

1966 ‘Freedomand Forbearance’, in K. Lehrer, ed., Freedom and Determinism

, New York: Random House, pp. 45-65.

1969 ‘ComplexEvents’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 30, 66-77.

Persons are complex entities in that complex events typicallyconstitute portions of their characteristic histories. Definition: "a complex

event [...] will contain at least one distinct eventas a proper part, without being non-residually resoluble into events of thelowest-order externally conjoined by event-connectives. Rather, in addition toits atomic parts, the complex event will contain a non-eventival remnant" [p.71]. For instance, "the event described as "m

does a"[mDa

]--an action performed by m

--is a complex event. It is, to begin with, an event.It contains another event as a proper part, namely a

. Finally, if a is subtracted from mDa

there is left a non-eventival remnant in the respectthat there can be no event whichcan stand on its own and be truly described with m

D: there is no doing which is not the doing of

something [...] no atto puro

, mental or otherwise" [p. 71].

1970 ‘Causationand Basic Actions. A Reply En Passant toProfessor Margolis’, Inquiry, 13[Special Issue on "Action"], 108-25.

A detailed reply to Margolis (1970), including arguments tothe effect that "basic actions can be caused, even by actions of their ownagent: they are basic only in not having distinct actions of his as components"[p. 108].

"One strain which runs throughout my book is that these twotypical ways of relating to the world--acting upon and coming to know it--havefrequently parallel structures--that what I term here the ‘logical architecture’of knowledge and action are of a piece, or nearly of a piece" [p. xi]. In thecase of actions, "that which corresponds to the object

in knowledge is an event

" [p. 31].

1979 ‘BasicActions and Basic Concepts’, The Review of Metaphysics

, 32, 471-85.

Given a characterization of what it means for an action to bea basic one, focuses on the question ofwhat makes a basic action an action.

1963 ‘Actions,Reasons, and Causes’, The Journal of Philosophy, 60, 685-700; reprintedin Davidson (1980b), pp. 3-20. Also in B. Berofsky, ed., Free Willand Determinism, New York: Harper and Row,1966, pp. 221-40; in M. Brodbeck, ed., Readings in the Philosophy ofthe Social Sciences, New York: Macmillan,1968, pp. 44-58; in J. Margolis, ed., An Introduction toPhilosophical Inquiry. Contemporary and Classical Sources

, New York: Knopf, 1968, pp. 199-211 (2nd edition1977); in N. Care and C. Landesman, eds. (1968), pp. 179-98; in A. R. White,ed. (1968), pp. 79-94; in M. Brand, ed. (1970), pp. 67-79; in S. Gendin and R.Hoffman, eds., Introduction to Philosophy: a Contemporary Perspective

, New York: Scribner’s, 1970; in H. S. Broudy, ed., PhilosophicalDimensions of Educational Research, NewYork: John Wiley and Sons, 1971; in S. Davis, ed., Causal Theories ofMind. Action, Knowledge, Memory, Perception, and Reference

, Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1983, pp. 58-72.

Seminal article. Argues that some reasons are causes, and thatthe cause of an action A is the "primaryreason" why an agent performed A,i.e., the pair consisting of a pro attitude of the agent towards actions with acertain property and the agent’s belief that A

has that property. The view is defended thatteleological explanation of action does not essentially involve laws but can,and sometimes must, invoke causal connections.

1967a ‘TheLogical Form of Action Sentences’, in N. Rescher ed. (1967), pp. 81-95;reprinted in D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds., The Logic of Grammar

, Encino, CA: Dickenson, 1975, pp. 235-45; inDavidson (1980b), pp. 105-22; and in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996),pp. 3-17.

Seminal semantic analysis of sentences containing verbs ornoun phrases that seem to refer to events or actions. The proposal is that"verbs of action [...] should be construed as containing a place, for singularterms or variables, that they do not appear to" [p. 92]. For instance, asentence like ‘Shem kicked Shaun’ is given the form ($x)(Kicked

(Shem, Shaun, x)),i.e. "There is an event x suchthat x was a kicking of Shaun byShem". Adverbial modification is then accounted for in terms of predication ofevents, so that, for instance, "Jones buttered the toast at midnight" isanalysed as "($x

)(Buttered (Jones, the toast, x

) & at midnight (x))". This provides away of solving Kenny’s (1963) problem of the "variable polyadicity" of actionverbs. The analysis marks a veryinfluential step in the discussion on events and event-based semantics and isreferred to widely in the subsequent literature.

1967b ‘Repliesto Comments’, in N. Rescher, ed. (1967), 115-20; reprinted (somewhat edited) inDavidson (1980b), pp. 123-29.

Replies to Lemmon (1967), Chisholm (1967a) and Castañeda(1967) on Davidson (1967a).

1967c ‘CausalRelations’, The Journal of Philosophy,64, 691-703; reprinted in Beauchamp, ed. (1974), pp. 190-99; in E. Sosa, ed.(1975), pp. 82-94; in M. Brand, ed. (1976), pp. 355-67; in Davidson (1980b),pp. 149-62; in E. Sosa and M. Tooley, eds. (1993), pp. 75-87; and in R. Casatiand A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp. 401-13.

Application of the (1967a) theory to the analysis of thelogical form of singular causal statements. A sentence like ‘Brutus’s stabcaused Caesar’s death’ is analysed as an existential quantification ($e)(

$e')(Stab(Brutus,e

) & Death(Caesar,e') & Caused(e,e'

)), where the bound variables range over events. Itfollows that "We must distinguish firmly between causes and the features we hiton for describing them, and hence between the question whether a statement saystruly that one event caused another and the further question whether the eventsare characterized in such a way that we can deduce, or otherwise infer, fromlaws or other causal lore, that the relation was causal" [p. 697]. See Vendler(1967c), Travis (1973), and Vision (1979) for early discussion.

1969a ‘TheIndividuation of Events’, in N. Rescher, ed., Essays in Honor of Carl G.Hempel, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 216-34;reprinted in Davidson (1980b), pp. 163-80, and in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds.(1996), pp. 265-83.

Formulation of the thesis according to which "events areidentical if and only if the have exactly the same causes and effects" [p. 231;see Nagel (1965)]: the causal nexus "provides for events a ‘comprehensive andcontinuously usable framework’ [quoting from Strawson (1959), p. 53] for theidentification and description of events analogous in many ways to thespace-time coordinate system for material objects" [p. 232]. Since Davidsonmaintains that all causes and effects are events (1967b), many authors havehastened to object that this criterion is open to a charge of circularity: seeBeardsley (1975), Brand (1977, 1984), Quine (1985), Tiles (1976), Tye (1979),and N. L. Wilson (1974) inter alia.

1969b ‘OnEvents and Event-Descriptions’, in J. Margolis, ed. (1969), pp. 74-84;reprinted as ‘Reply to Martin’ in D. Davidson (1980a), pp. 129-37.

1970a ‘Eventsas Particulars’, Noûs, 4, 25-32;reprinted in Davidson (1980b), pp. 181-87, and in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi,eds. (1996), pp. 99-106.

Defends and elaborates the event ontology proposed in Davidson(1967a) in reply to Chisholm (1970). Argues that even if one accepts that thereare event types, there still have to be singular, spatio-temporal locatedoccurrences of particular events.

1970b ‘MentalEvents’, in L. Foster and J. W. Swanson, eds., Experience and Theory

, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, pp.79-101; reprinted in Davidson (1980b), pp. 207-27. Also in M. Burnyeat and T.Honderich, eds., Philosophy As It Is,Harmondsworth and New York: Penguin Books, 1979, pp. 213-38; in N. Block, ed., Readingsin Philosophy of Psychology. Volume One,Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, pp. 107-19; in D. M. Rosenthal,ed., The Nature of Mind, New Yorkand Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 247-56; in B. Beakley and P.Ludlow, eds., The Philosophy of Mind: Classical

Problems/Contemporary Issues

, Cambridge, MA, and London: MITPress/Bradford Books, 1992, pp. 137-49; and in P. K. Moser and J. D. Trout,eds., Contemporary Materialism. A Reader,London and New York: Routledge, 1995, pp. 107-21.

Articulation of the identity theory of the mental and thephysical known as "anomalous monism": each particular (token) mental event is aphysical event in spite of the fact that mental types or properties are notnomologically correlated with physical ones. The assertion of supervenience ofthe mental on the physical reads: "There cannot be two events alike in allphysical respects but differing in some mental respects" [1980b, p. 214].

1970c ‘Actionand Reaction’, Inquiry, 13 [SpecialIssue on "Action"], 140-48; reprinted as ‘Reply to Cargile’ and ‘Reply toHedman’ in Davidson (1980a), pp. 137-48.

Reply to Cargile (1970) concerning the notion of logical formunderlying Davidson’s (1967a) account; reply to Hedman (1970b) elaborating onthe view that "one and the same action may be correctly said to be intentional(when described in one way) and not intentional (when described in another)"[p. 147, following Anscombe (1957)].

1971a ‘Agency’,in R. Binkley, R. Bronaugh, and A. Marras, eds. (1971), pp. 3-25; reprinted inDavidson (1980b), pp. 43-61.

An examination of some central questions concerning agency:"What events in the life of a person reveal agency; what are his deeds and hisdoings in contrast to mere happenings in his history; what is the mark thatdistinguishes his actions?" [p. 3]. No definite answers are given, but onelearns that there is no analysis of the relation between a person and an event,when it is her/his action, that does not appeal to the notion of intention.Originally commented by Cornman (1971).

1971b ‘Eternalvs. Ephemeral Events’, Noûs, 5, 335-49;reprinted in Davidson (1980b), pp. 189-203.

Continues the debate with Chisholm on the ontology of events:events are not recurrable entities. See Chisholm (1970), Davidson (1970a),Chisholm (1971a).

1973 ‘TheMaterial Mind’, in P. Suppes, L. Henkin, G. C. Moisil, and A. Joja, eds., Logic,Methodology and Philosophy of Science IV,Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 709-22; reprinted in Davidson (1980b), pp.245-59, and in J. Haugeland, ed., Mind Design

, Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books, 1981, pp. 339-54.

"Suppose that we understand what goes on in the brainperfectly [...] The question is, what would all of this knowledge of physics (anda fortiori of neurophysiology) tell us about psychology? Much less than mightbe expected, I shall argue" [pp. 245-46]. Elaborates on the views put forwardin (1970b).

1974 ‘Psychologyas Philosophy’, in S. C. Brown, ed., Philosophy of Psychology

, New York: Macmillan, pp. 41-52, 60-67; reprinted inJ. Glover, ed., The Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976, pp. 101-110, and in Davidson(1980b), pp. 229-44.

Development of the arguments put forward in (1970b) againstthe possibility of strict psychophysical laws between mental and physicalevents.

1976 ‘Hempelon Explaining Action’, Erkenntnis

, 10, 239-53;reprinted in Davidson (1980a), pp. 261-75.

A criticism of Hempel’s suggestion that intentional actionsmust be explained by referring inter aliato an empirical law according to which rational agents maximize expected value.

Brings together a number of comments and replies to commentsconcerning the analysis of action sentences introduced in Davidson (1967a). Itincludes Davidson (1967b) (with replies to Lemmon 1967, Chisholm 1967a, andCastañeda 1967), Davidson (1969b) (with comments on R. M. Martin 1969a), andDavidson (1970c) (with replies to Cargile 1970 and Hedman 1970b).

A reprint (with additions and corrections) of Davidson’spapers on actions and events, including (1963, 1967a, 1967b, 1967c, 1969a, 1969b,1970a, 1970b, 1970c, 1971a, 1971b). Reviewed by Burge (1983), Carrier (1981b),Gryz (1983), Heal (1982), Hornsby (1982b), Lombard (1982b), White (1981).

1980c ‘Towarda Unified Theory of Meaning and Action’, Grazer philosophische Studien

, 11, 1-12.

"Intention and intentional action won’t directly explainmeaning. Rather, meaning, belief, and desire will be treated as fullycoordinate elements in an understanding of action" [p. 2].

1985a ‘Replyto Quine on Events’, in E. LePore and B. P. McLaughlin, eds. (1985), pp.172-76.

Withdrawal of the causal criterion of event identity (1969a)in favor of the criterion put forward by Quine (1950) and Lemmon (1967)criterion: "events, like physical objects, are identical if they occupy thesame places at the same times" [p.175]. But this does not imply an assimilationof events with material objects: "For events and objects may be related tolocations in space-time in different ways; it may be, for example, that events occur

at a time in a place while objects occupy

places at times". Thus, "the undulations of theocean cannot be identified with the wave or the sum of waves that cross thesweep of ocean [...] One is an object which remains the same object throughchanges, the other a change in an object or objects. Spatio-temporal areas donot distinguish them, but our predicates, our basic grammar, our ways ofsorting do" [p. 176].

1985b ‘Adverbsof Action’, in B. Vermazen and M. B. Hintikka, eds. (1985), 230-41.

A refined restatement of the (1967a) theory along with a lucidaccount of how it can meet various objections put forward in the literature.Thus, adverbs such as ‘deliberately’ are best treated as adsentences, andcontextual adverbs such as ‘slowly’ are argued to be on a par with familiarattributive adjectives such as ‘large’ and ‘tall’. On the time-of-a-killingissue (Goldman 1971, Thomson 1971a): her pulling of the trigger was her killingof the victim--even if he died later--because that action of hers resulted in hisdeath (compare J. Bennett 1973). Likewise, the identity between Jones’ alertingthe burglar and Jones’ turning on the light does not imply that Jones turned onthe burglar and alerted the light (paceT. Parsons 1980; an objectionalso raised by M. Cohen 1969): Jones’ alerting the burglar was his doingsomething (= his turning on of the light) that caused the burglar to bealerted.

1985c ‘Repliesto Essays I-IX’, in B. Vermazen and M. B. Hintikka, eds. (1985), pp. 195-229.

Includes replies to Chisholm (1985b), Strawson (1985),Thalberg (1985), Vermazen (1985).

1985d ‘Repliesto Essays X-XII’, in B. Vermazen and M. B. Hintikka, eds. (1985), pp. 242-52.

1986 ‘KnowingOne’s Own Mind’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association

, 60, 441-58.

1987 ‘Problemsin the Explanation of Action’, in P. Pettit, R. Sylvan, and J. Norman, eds., Metaphysicsand Morality. Essays in Honor of J. J. C. Smart, Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, pp. 35-49.

Includes further thoughts on action description andexplanation, emphasizing the fact that actions are often identified byreferring to their consequences. On the identity thesis: "Suppose I thanksomeone [...] by telephoning and leaving a message on her answering machine [...]Although my telephoning and my thanking here were the same action, what I didcan’t be described in both ways until long after the performance. In the sameway, my great-great-grandfather in the paternal line could not have been describedin just these terms during his lifetime, but that does not show he was not thesame person as Clarence Herbert Davidson of Inverness" [p. 38]. Compare J.Bennett (1973). Much of the paper is a discussion of the idea that theintention is not part of the action, but a cause of it. Includes replies toHonderich (1982) and Føllesdal (1985).

The form which makes fullyexplicit the semantics of ‘Oedipus intentionally killed the reckless driver’ ismore complex than suggested by Künne (1993). It is something like: ‘Thecontents of an intention of Oedipus’s is given by my next utterance. Oedipuskilled the reckless driver’ [p. 23].

Ad Stoecker (1993): "Mymain reasons are semantical: I accept an ontology of events because thatontology provides the only account I find persuasive of the semantics of alarge category of sentences and the entailment relations of those sentences. Ido not think the lack of a perfectly general and useful criterion of eventidentity is any more serious for events than for objects; one only gets fairlysolid criteria when one considers sorts: sorts of objects or sorts of events.States are another matter. Not only do we have no good idea how to individuatethem, but, more important, there seems no clear semantic need to treat them asentities" [p. 288]. Further clarifications (in the spirit of 1985b, 1987) ofthe non-multiplying treatment of such puzzles as the-time-of-a-killing.

A clarification and a defense of the (1970b) identity theoryof the mental and the physical ("anomalous monism"). See replies by Kim (1993c),McLaughlin (1993), and Sosa (1993).

1994 ‘Davidson,Donald’, in S. Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind

, Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, pp. 231-36.

A self-profile, including an overview of the thesis that‘"mental events are physical (which is not, of course, to say that they are notmental)" [p. 231].

Traces out some conceptual relations among the concepts ofevent, law, and object in an attempt to clarify and defend the claim that everytrue singular causal statement relating two events is backed by a law thatcovers those events when they are appropriately described.

Includes Ross (1972) and Kripke (1972) along with reprints ofFodor (1970a), Harman (1970), Parsons (1970).

1991 ‘Actsand Scenes’, in N. Cooper and P. Engel, eds., New Inquiries into Meaning andTruth, Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf;New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 41-82.

A comparison of Davidson’s (1967a) theory of action sentenceswith the accounts of Barwise and Perry (1983) and B. Taylor (1985), with anapplication to the semantical analysis of perceptual reports. Includes newarguments in favor of Davidson against the predicate modifier view.

1996 ‘Philosophyof Language’, in N. Brunnin and E. P. Tsui-James, eds., The BlackwellCompanion to Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell,pp. 90-139.

Includes a section on semantic theories and metaphysics, witha discussion of event-based semantics and theories of adverbs [pp. 112-14].

Chapter 5 (‘Time’) presents an account of temporal reasoningbased on a representational system reifiying time-varying facts as "states" and"events", which in turn are subcategorized according to a type-tokendistinction.

1970 ‘Individuationof Actions’, The Journal of Philosophy,67, 520-30; reprinted in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp. 351-61.

A mereological account, treating an act as a sequence or sumof events. "My pulling the trigger and my shooting the prisoner [are] two

different acts, since

they occupied different (though overlapping)stretches of time. There is a tendency to object that I was doing only onething [...] but we can invoke the relation of ‘amounting to’ [...] I pulled thetrigger, and this act amounted to--quickly became a case of, grew

to be a case of--my shooting the prisoner" [p. 525].

1974 ‘Extensionalityand Singular Causal Sentences’, Philosophical Studies

, 25, 69-72.

1975 ‘Action’,Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Suppl.Vol. 1, Part 2 ("New Essays in the Philosophy of Mind"), 129-44.

A systematic introductory text, presenting the main rivalviews on various topics selected for chapter-length treatment: the nature ofaction, the relation between actions and events, intention, explanation, andmore. The book also presents Davis’s own theory of action--a version of thevolitional theory: a doing of type K is an action iff a corresponding event oftype K occurred as a result of a "volition" (roughly, a mental event "which isnormally a cause of the agent’s belief that he is acting in a certain way, and

which normally causes such doing-related events asto make it true that he is actingin that way" [p. 16]). Chapter 2, on "Actions and Events", includes adiscussion of identity and individuation criteria, focusing mostly on "theprolific theory" (discussed in connection with Goldman), "the austere theory"(Davidson) and "the moderate theory" (a version of which is Davis’s 1970 mereologicalaccount).

1980 ‘WaywardCausal Chains’, in M. Bradie and M. Brand, eds. (1980), pp. 55-65.

Argues that some causal analyses of action can accommodatecounterexamples involving wayward causal chains. "But I am not thereby tryingto defend the causal theory of action [...] there are at least a half a dozendifferent concepts of interest to actiontheory for which causal or partly causal analyses seem appropriate, and theconcept of action itself is not one of them.So the phrase ‘the causal theory of action’ is highly misleading" [p. 55].Applications to the view that actions are volitions.

1994 ‘Action(1)’, in S. Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind

, Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, pp. 111-17.

A survey of the main issues in the metaphysics of action,including their nature and individuation criteria.

"How can one admit, for the sake of a legal argument, theexistence of such actions [in which responsibility is neither ascribed norexcused] and yet be understood to mean, not merely that the claim has yet to beproved, but that what occurred was not even an action?" [p. 94].

1979 ‘Perlocutions’,Linguistics and Philosophy, 3, 225-43;reprinted in J. R. Searle, F. Kiefer, and M. Bierwisch, eds., SpeechAct Theory and Pragmatics, Dordrecht:Reidel, 1980, pp. 37-55.

Includes a discussion of identity and individuation criteriafor speech acts [pp. 230-31]. See 1984 for a more extensive discussion.Includes also a brief discussion of the analysis of ‘kill’ as deriving from‘cause to die’ (McCawley 1968 and Lakoff 1970).

1983 ‘Introduction’,in S. Davis, ed., Causal Theories of Mind. Action, Knowledge, Memory,Perception, and Reference, Berlin and NewYork: de Gruyter, pp. 1-41.

Section II (pp. 3-18) gives an extensive analysis of Goldman’stheory of action, focusing on his views on level-generation and theindividuation of actions.

An application of a "multiplier" theory of events (in thespirit of Kim and Goldman) to illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. (See alsothe brief remarks in 1980.)

1980 ‘Swain’sCounterfactual Analysis of Causation’, Philosophical Studies

, 38, 169-76.

1988 ‘ReasoningAbout Partially-Ordered Events’, Artificial Intelligence

, 36, 375-99; reprinted in D. Weld and J. de Kleer,eds., Readings in Qualitative Reasoning About Physical Systems

, San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann, 1990, pp. 382-93.

Examines a class of temporal reasoning problems involvingevents whose order is not completely known. The complexity of the problems withregard to various restricted classes of cause-and-effect relationships is alsoanalysed.

1979 ‘Onthe Progressive and the "Imperfective Paradox"’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 3, 267-72.

Argues that there is no such linguistic problem as Dowty’s(1977) "imperfective paradox", and that the distinction between accomplishmentsand non-accomplishments is not necessarily that the former, but not the latter,involve the coming about of a result state.

1989 ‘Boundednessand the Structure of Situations’, Leuvense Bijdragen

, 78, 275-308.

A criticism of van Voorst’s (1986) account of aspect asdependent on the spatial (rather than temporal) structure of actions, events,states, and processes (globally referred to as ‘situations’).

1991 ‘Voirun événement’ [‘To See an Event’, in French], in J.-L. Petit, ed. (1991), pp.97-122.

Strarting from features of events that mark them out of facts,scrutinizes the role of perception in the individuation of events.

1992 ‘IndefiniteObjects’, in R. Bok-Bennema and P. Coopmans, eds., Linguistics in theNetherlands, Dordrecht: Foris, pp. 91-100.

Individual-level predicates may have an eventuality argument(though the boundary between event and state reading is flexible).

Argues that a dynamic formulation of Discourse RepresentationTheory can account for the phenomenon of "existential disclosure" (= "thepossibility of addressing (dynamic) existentially closed (implicit) argumentsas if they were free variables" [p. 562]) characteristic of adverbialmodification (understood as in Davidson 1967a).

Argues that the semantic category of Agent must be describedin terms of prototype feature representations which include volition as animportant and generally sufficient, but not necessary, component.

1985 ‘Agentivityand Syntax’, in W. H. Eilfort, P. D. Kroeber, and K. L. Peterson, eds., CLS21: Papers from the Twenty-First Regional Meeting of the Chicago LinguisticSociety, Part 2, Chicago: ChicagoLinguistic Society, pp. 1-12.

Developments and applications of the (1984) view about thesemantic category of Agent.

1990 ‘Ergativityand the Cognitive Model of Event Structure in Lhasa Tibetan’, CognitiveLinguistics, 1, 289-321.

Includes a discussion on how volition can be represented incomplex event schemata used in the semantic characterization of case roles.

1991 ‘EventConstrual and Case Role Assignment’, in L. A.Sutton, C. Johnson, and R. Shields, eds., (1991), pp. 338-53.

Aims at a minimalist, event-based account of the semantics of"a set of core case roles".

1992 ‘TemporalReasoning with Abductive Event Calculus’, in B. Neumann, ed., Proceedings ofthe 10th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 92)

, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 384-88.

Presents an abductive extension of the event calculus ofKowalski and Sergot (1986), with applications to various temporal reasoningproblems.

Develops a unified ontology of objecthood, essences, andcausation. Sections 2.1.2-2.1.3 discusses and rejects the view that events arethe fundamental elements out of which all objects are construed. Chapter 8 oncausation.

1968 ‘Featuresof Intentional Actions’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

, 29, 232-44.

Criticism of Anscombe’s argument (in 1957) to the effect that"an action is not called intentional in virtue of any extra feature whichexists when it is performed".

1995 ‘Onthe Necessity of Distinguishing between (Un)boundedness and (A)telicity’, Linguisticsand Philosophy, 18, 1-19.

"It is argued that two different types of concept are oftenintermingled in discussions of Aktionsart. The most common type ofclassification is one of situation types, relating to the potentialactualisation of a situation, although some of the definitions have to do withthe actual realization of the situation. This distinction, adequately capturedby the notions of (a)telicity and (un)boundedness

(Declerck 1989), is explored and it is shown howNPs, PPs and tense influence a sentence’s classification as (un)bounded."[Author’s abstract]

1989 ‘State,Event, Process, and Topology’, General Linguistics

, 29, 159-200.

A topological account of the state-event-process trichotomy:states (characterized by absence of change or discontinuity) are represented byopen intervals; events (which mark discontinuities against the staticbackground) by closed intervals; and processes (which are changes from aninitial state toward a final state) are represented by intervals closed on theleft (beginning) but possibly open on the right (end). Discusses variousproperties of events thus defined (e.g., non-punctual events are bounded,commensurate with a duration); distinguishes different kinds of processes(e.g., completed vs. non-completed, progressive vs. non-progressive), anddifferent kinds of states (permanent, contingent). Different meanings connectedwith the categories of tense and aspect are defined accordingly.

1990 ‘TheConcepts of State, Process and Event in Linguistics’, Forum Linguisticum

, 8.

Argues that the trichotomy state/process/event is basic andontological, and cannot be reduced to a conceptual dichotomy like state/action.

1990 ‘DiscourseAnalysis of Aorist and Imperfect in Bulgarian and French’, in N. B. Thelin,ed., Verbal Aspect in Discourse, Contributions to the Semantics of Time andTemporal Perspective in Slavic and Non-Slavic Languages

, Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, pp.237-61.

It is claimed that Bulgarian provides a counterexample to theview (defended e.g. by Mourelatos 1981) that the perfective denotes eventswhile the imperfective denotes states and processes.

1995 ‘Isthe Notion of Process Necessary?’, in P. M. Bertinetto, V. Bianchi, J.Higginbotham, and M. Squartini, eds. (1995), pp. 55-70.

Argues that it is essential to take the trichotomystate/event/process as basic when analysing aspectual constructions in naturallanguage. In particular, the notion of process cannot be derived from those ofstate and event, even if it is closely related to them.

1990 ‘Non-QuantificationalReadings of Adverbs’, in M. Stokhof and L. Torenvliet, eds., Proceedings ofthe 7th Amsterdam Colloquium, Amsterdam:ITLI, pp. 509-28.

Argues that in additional to event-based quantificationalreadings (see 1993), adverbs such as ‘often’ and ‘sometimes’ also admit of non-quantificationalreadings.

1993 Adverbsof Quantification: A Generalized Quantifier Approach, New York: Garland.

An investigation into the semantics of adverbs ofquantification such as ‘always’ and ‘sometimes’. The proposed account treatsthem as generalized quantifiers, rather than modifiers--specifically, asexpressions that establish relations between sets of eventualities (= states,processes, or events). Contains extensive review of the relevant literature,including connections with Reichenbach’s and Davidson’s work.

1996 ‘(In)definitesand Generality’, in M. Kanazawa, C. Piñón, andH. de Swart, eds., Quantifiers,Deduction, and Context, Stanford: CSLILecture Notes No. 57, pp. 171-94.

"An analysis of adverbs of quantification as generalizedquantifiers over events combined with an interpretation of indefinite NPs asdynamic existential quantifiers and of definite NPs as context-dependentquantifiers yields the right interpretation of generic sentences" [p. 171].

1976 ‘ConceptualConnection and Causal Relation’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

, 54, 3-13.

1994 ‘VerbalSemantics in Functional Grammar’, in C. Bache, H. Basbøll, and C.-E. Lindberg,eds. (1994), pp. 23-42.

Includes a brief typological analysis of the notion of "stateof affairs", understood as a general term covering both situations (positionsand states, which are static) and events (actions and processes, which aredynamic).

1990 ‘Perspectiveson van Voorst’s Theory of Event Structure’, Papers and Studies inContrastive Linguistics, 26, 167-86.

1992 ‘Laforme logique des phrases adverbiales et la nature des événements’ [‘TheLogical Form of Adverbial Phrases and the Nature of Events’, in French], Linguae Stile, 27, 183-98.

"The choice of a particular logical form can have non-trivialconsequences upon our ontological choices concerning event identity; on theother hand, metaphysical theses on the nature of events may constrain thelogical form appropriate to the sentences describing them" [p. 198]. Thecorrect theory lies in a "reflective equilibrium" between metaphysicalprinciples and semantical constraints. Reviews the work of Davidson (1967a),Higginbotham (1983, 1985), T. Parsons (1985), Dowty (1979).

1977 ‘Chisholm’sTheory of Agency’, The Journal of Philosophy, 74, 692-703.

A discussion of various issues including Chisholm’s notion ofevents as states of affairs and the resulting account of agent causation.

1979 ‘Chisholm’sTheory of Agency’, Grazer philosophische Studien, 7/8 [special issue "Essays in the Philosophy of R. M. Chisholm", alsopublished as E. Sosa, ed. (1979)], 215-29.

1987 Choice.The Essential Element in Human Action,London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

1967 ‘Reasonsand Causes’, in P. Edwards, ed. in chief, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy

, New York: Macmillan and Free Press, Vol. 7, pp.85-88.

A compact survey of the main positions concerning the viewthat reasons are causes.

Commenting on Cody (1967a), points out that the claim that theclaim that an action cannot have many descriptions is parallel to the claimthat there are not many true descriptions of material objects. Since the latteris false, the former must also be false.

1972a Studiesin the Logic of Verb Aspect and Time Reference in English

, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Texas atAustin.

1972b ‘Onthe Syntax and Semantics of the Atomic Predicate cause’, in P. M. Peranteau, J. N. Levi, and G. C. Phares,eds., Papers from the Eighth Regional Meeting of the Chicago LinguisticSociety, Chicago: Chicago LinguisticSociety, pp. 62-74.

Argues that the atomic predicate cause always takes a sentential subject rather than anindividual (contra McCawley’s 1973a).The semantic analysis is given in terms of counterfactuals (independently of D.K. Lewis 1973).

1975 ‘TheStative in the Progressive and Other Essence/Accident Contrasts’, LinguisticInquiry, 6, 579-88.

Some remarks on the semantic characterization of agency and ofthe distinction between stative/nonstative verbs, and on the more subtlesubcategorizations that only superficially appears to be captured by that distinction.

1977 ‘Towarda Semantic Analysis of Verb Aspect and the English "Imperfective" Progressive’,Linguistics and Philosophy, 1, 45-77.

A discussion of the "imperfective paradox" (concerning e.g.the oddity of sentences such as ‘The rains are destroying the crops, butperhaps they will stop before the crops are destroyed’) which revises Dowty(1972a).

1979 WordMeaning and Montague Grammar. TheSemantics of Verbs and Times in Generative Semantics and Montague’s PTQ

, Reidel: Dordrecht.

Gives an account of progressive that makes a progressivesentence true at a given time t iff thecorresponding non-progressive sentence is true at all "inertia worlds", i.e.,possible worlds which are exactly like the actual world up to t

and "in which the future course of events after thistime develops in a way most compatible with the past course of events" [p.148].

1982 ‘Tenses,Time Adverbs, and Compositional Semantic Theory’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 5 [Special Issue on "The Semantics of TemporalElements", R. Wall and R. E. Grandy, eds.], 23-55.

1986 ‘TheEffects of Aspectual Class on the Temporal Structure of Discourse: Semantics orPragmatics?’, Linguistics and Philosophy,9 [Special Issue on "Tense and Aspect in Discourse", D. R. Dowty, ed.], 37-61.

"We do not understand the perceived temporal ordering ofdiscourse simply by virtue of the times that the discourse asserts

events to occur or states to obtain, but rather alsoin terms of the additional larger intervals where we sometimes assume

them to occur and obtain" [p. 59].

1989 ‘Onthe Semantic Content of the Notion of "Thematic Role"’, in G. Chierchia, B. H.Partee, and R. Turner, eds., Properties, Types and Meaning, Volume II:Semantic Issues, Dordrecht, Boston, andLondon: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 69-129.

A discussion of the formal foundations of a theory of thematicroles (agent, patient, goal, etc.). Section 3 develops a "neo-Davidsoniansystem" based on Davidson’s (1967a) theory of adverbs in action sentences. Theproposal is that "to construct a thematic role system, we should stipulate thatnot only the modifiers but also the arguments of verbs are actually predicatesof events; more precisely, thematic roles are relations between individuals andevents" [p. 83]. For instance, a sentence like Jones buttered the

toast at midnight

is analysed as ($e)[Buttered(e

) & Agent(Jones, e

) & Patient(the-toast, e

) & at-midnight (e

)]. Compare Parsons (1980) and Carlson (1984).

Argues that traditional role types are not discrete categories,but cluster concepts, only two of which are needed: "Proto-Agent" and"Proto-Patient". Includes a defense of the view that "the familiar way in whichthe aspect of telic predicates (or accomplishments

and achievements

) depends on their NP arguments (Verkuyl 1972, Dowty1979) can be captured formally by the principle that the meaning of atelic predicate is a homomorphism from its (structured) Theme argumentdenotations into a (structured) domain of events, modulo its other arguments" [p. 367]. Compare also Krifka (1989a).

1993 ‘Excalibur: A Program for Planning andReasoning with Processes’, Artificial Intelligence

, 62, 1-40.

On a planner designed to interact with a constantly changingworld. The knowledge base involves a distinction between processes, actions,and facts: "Events represent change, and events can be actions or processes. Anaction event [e.g., "open the door"] is an event caused by an agent and has aknown duration. A process event [e.g., "water flows"] is self-sustaining and maybe infinite in duration [...] A fact [e.g., "the door is open"] describes theresults or preconditions of an event" [p. 17].

1962 ‘MustEffects Have Causes?’, in R. J. Butler, ed., Analytical Philosophy

, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 20-21.

A criticism of Vendler (1962a), contending that "causes, too,can be events and processes" [p. 24]. Rejoinder in Vendler (1962b).

1961 ‘Particularsand the Relational Theory of Time’, The Philosophical Review

, 70, 447-69.

On the possibility of reformulating temporal statements in atense-free language in which temporal determination is expressed by relationsamong particulars. Concludes that this would make space and time a meredifference between the relations which particulars exemplify, while there is infact a difference in the sorts of entities that exemplify those relations.

A criticism of Mayo (1961). Conclusion: "We use time (alongwith the objects to which the events happen) in our individuation andreidentification of events. We cannot "revisit" the same event because thenotion of a "revisit" and the notion of "the same event" are, within ourconceptual system, mutually incompatible. The notion of a revisit carries withit the implication of temporal succession, and temporal succession is one ofour criteria for marking off, when necessary, the emergence of new events" [p.98].

1967 ‘CanEvents Move?’, Mind, 76, 479-92;reprinted in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp. 415-28.

In order for an entity xto move, it has to be wholly at one place and then wholly at another place. Butan event is never wholly at two different places (at most, some phases of theevent occur at some place, other phases at other places). Therefore, eventscannot move.

Section 4.3 on "Events and States": "That the book is tatteredis [...] a fact; the tattered condition ofthe book is a state". "When there is an alteration in a state, we have an occurrence

or a happening. We sometimes speak of the occurrence or happening as an event

, although it seems that this latter term is reservedfor those occurrences which are particularly significant to those who aredescribing it [...] Roughly speaking, we can say that an event is a change ofsome sort; it is constituted by a succession of different

states" [pp. 163-64].

1977 ‘Referringto Events’, in P. A. French, T. Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein, eds., Studiesin the Philosophy of Language (MidwestStudies in Philosophy, Vol. II), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,pp. 90-99; reprinted in P. A. French, T. Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein, eds., ContemporaryPerspectives in the Philosophy of Language,Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979 [revised and enlarged editionof the 1977 volume], pp. 369-78.

Argues that the causal relata are not events but "facets

or features of events themselves" [p. 375]. Compare Achinstein (1975a, 1979). Morediscussion in Kim (1977), Boër (1979), Sanford (1985), Ehring (1987) interalia.

1988 Explaining

Behavior. Reasons in a World of Causes

, Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press/BradfordBooks.

"I do not think a cause of X is the same thing as a causing of X

. The former is typically over before X

occurs; the latter cannot exist until X

occurs" [p. 18, fn. 11].

Argues that if reasons are explanatorily relevant to behavior,they cannot simply be causes of behavior: their content must be a causallyrelevant property.

1990 ‘DoesMeaning Matter?’, in E. Villanueva, ed., Information, Semantics, andEpistemology, Cambridge, MA: BasilBlackwell, pp. 5-17; reprinted in C. A. Macdonald and G. Macdonald, eds.(1995), pp. 107-20.

Argues that although meaning does not supervene on theintrinsic physical properties of an event (and is therefore screened off fromexplanations of the event’s effects), nevertheless meaning can figure in theexplanation of behavior, i.e., in the explanation of the event’s causing

its effect.

1993 ‘MentalEvents as Structuring Causes of Behavior’, in J. Heil and A. R. Mele, eds.(1993), pp. 121-36.

Refines the distinction between triggering and structuringcauses introduced in (1988) and argues that mental events can be viewed asplaying a structuring causal role in the behavior, explanation of behavior.

1995 ‘Reply:Causal Relevance and Explanatory Exclusion’, in C. A. Macdonald and G.Macdonald, eds. (1995), pp. 142-51.

Reply to Kim (1990) criticisms of Dretske (1990). The problemof how mental content can explain something that is already explained byphysical facts (the "explanatory exclusion" problem) is to be solved byidentifying "content" with the relational (physical) facts that constitute it(or on which content supervenes).

Causal judgments can be empirically verified and do notinvolve postulation of unobservable ties between events. Causality is "arelation between two concrete, individual events and a set of concretecircumstances: the definition of the relation does not employ the notion ofcollections or kinds of events" [p. 118]. Views already put forward in (1924,1926) (see infra, Appendix). An event iseither a change or an unchange in a state of affairs.

1960 ‘InDefense of Dualism’, in S. Hook, ed., Dimensions of Mind

, New York: New York University Press, pp. 85-90.

"The causality relation [...] does not presuppose at all thatits cause-term and its effect-term both belong to the same ontologicalcategory, but only that both of them be events" [p. 88].

Argues that the concept of an event is central and forms thebasis for Dewey’s concept of an object.

1960 ‘ADefense of ’s Proof of the Unreality of Time’, The Philosophical Review

, 69, 497-504; reprinted in M. Dummett, Truthand Other Enigmas, London: Duckworth, 1978,pp. 351-57; also in J. Westphal and C. Levenson, eds., Time

, Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1993, pp.112-18.

"To say that time is unreal is to say that we apprehendrelations between events or properties of objects as temporal when they are nottemporal at all. We have therefore to conceive of these events or objects asstanding to one another in some non-temporal relation which we mistake for thetemporal one" [p. 117].

1990 ‘Eventualitiesin a Natural Language System’, in K. Bläsius, U. Hedstück, and C. Rollinger,eds., Sorts and Types for Artificial Intelligence (Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, 418), Berlin andHeidelberg: Springer-Verlag, pp. 209-39.

On representing "eventualities" (in the sense of E. Bach1986a) in a formal language with sorted domains. It is argued that therepresentation of structured sets of eventualities ("individualities can bepartitioned into subevents, and be grouped together to form episodes", p. 209)is needed to deal with certain plural phenomena without resorting to secondorder variables.

1991 Ereignisse:Ihre Logik und Ontologie aus textsemantischer Sicht [Events: Their Logic and Ontology from the Viewpoint of TextSemantics, in German], Doctoral Dissertation,University of Stuttgart.

1995 ‘TheIntergressive as a New Category of Verbal Aktionsart’, Journal of Semantics

, 12, 311-56.

On classifying such eventive predicates as "coughed", "playeda sonata", or "sang for five hours", which pose problems for certain accountsof Aktionsarten insofar as they do notintroduce any change of state.

Argues in defense of the view that agency can be explained interms of causality.

Gives an account of causation to the effect that event e

causes event e' if and only if there are some events (conditions) which are causallyconnected to e' but not to e

[p. 770]. Criticism in Bassham (1986).

Argues that Dretske’s (1977) account of the causal relata asfeatures of events runs into trouble in causal contexts involving "higherorder" emphasis.

1995 ‘Causesand Nested Counterfactuals’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

, 73, 574-78.

1976 ‘IndividuatingActions: A Reply to McCullagh’s "The Individuation of Actions and Acts" andThalberg’s "When Do Causes Take Effect?"’, Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy, 55, 209-12.

Chapter 3, on ‘Events and Non-events’, sides with Davidson’saccount versus Kim’s: events must be characterized as "something happening

to something, and not just exemplifiying itsconstitutive property" [p. 21]. Chapter 4 is on ‘Event Causation’.

1995 ‘NonreducibleSupervenient Causation’, in E. E. Savellos and Ü. D. Yalin, eds. (1995), pp. 168-86.

Includes a discussion of the question: which properties ofevent-cause e are causally relevant tothe occurrence of event-effect e'?

1994 ‘CoarseningBrand on Events, while Proliferating Davidsonian Events’, Grazerphilosophische Studien, 47, 155-83.

"A coarse-grained theory of event individuation is defended byarguing that events are spatio-temporal particulars with an ontologicalaffinity to coarse-grained physical objects and by demonstrating that themetalinguistic correlate to one set of adequate identity conditions for eventsis most plausibly interpreted as coarsely individuating events. Suchcoarse-grained events [...] admit of divisibility proliferation, much like the proliferationof physical objects entailed by Goodman’s calculus of individuals. This [...] isthen used to resolve Davidson’s paradox concerning the poisoned space travellerwho is killed long before he dies" [Author’s abstract].

1986 ‘Structuresémantique et forme logique d’après l’analyse aristotélicienne des phrasesd’action’ [‘Semantic Structure and Logical Form According to the AristotelianAnalysis of Action Sentences’, in French], in H. Joly, ed. Philosophie dulangage et grammaire dans l’antiquité,Bruxelles: OUSIA; Grenoble: Université des Sciences Sociales, pp. 181-202.

An analysis of Aristotle’s distinction between energeia

and kinêsis and of its bearing on modern accounts of the distinction betweenactivity and accomplishment verbs.

1991 ‘Adverbes,événements et structure sémantique’ [‘Adverbs, Events, and Semantic Structure’,in French], in J.-L. Petit, ed. (1991), pp. 229-49.

"For adverbs, treated as predicates of events by classicalsemantics (Davidson), other authors have preferred a treatment with predicatemodifiers in an intensional semantic context with desired fidelity togrammatical intuition. The equivalence of all those theories from the point ofview of their descriptive adequacy tends to show that semantic structure inlanguage has no marked preference for an ontology of events and therefore thisoption implies a metaphysical involvement." [Abstract, on p. 286].

1982 ‘Quelquesremarques sur la logique des phrases d’action’[‘Some Remarks on the Logic ofAction Sentences’, in French], Logique et Analyse, 99, 291-319.

An analysis of the logical form of action sentences as aparadigm case study for a comparison between extensionalist (à la

Davidson) and intensionalist (à la

Montague) programs in semantics. Argues that "thechoice of an ontology belongs to the definition of the language whichdescribes, not to that of the described language" [p. 316]. Includes criticaldiscussion of T. Parsons (1970), Borowski (1974), Cresswell (1974).

1986 ‘L’anomaliedu mental’ [‘The Anomaly of the Mental’, in French], Critique

, 474, 1125-40.

1967 ‘States,Activities and Performances’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

, 45, 292-308.

A useful introduction to Davidson’s views, from the conceptionof events as particulars to the treatment of agency, causality, and mentalevents [pp. 25-67]. The Appendix [pp. 180-82] gives a terse presentation of the"slingshot" argument in causal contexts (Davidson 1967c).

1986/7 Review ofVermazen and Hintikka, eds. (1985), Theoria(Spain), 2, 214-17.

Argues that situations in which "a certain event occurs at agiven time and place, and later another event occurs, perhaps at a differentplace, and there is no common individual involved in the description of theevents" run afoul of the "covering-law"model of explanation.

Takes events, construed as property exemplifications, asrelata of the causal relation. (Property exemplifications are understood as a"special combination" of a particular and a universal.) Includes a discussionof the "slingshot" argument and detailed criticism of Davidson’s (1969a)identity criteria for events. Most relevant material is in Chapter 2, "AnOntological Analysis of Causation".

1990b CriticalNotice of Tooley (1988), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

, 50, 605-10.

1984 AStudy of Davidsonian Events, DoctoralDissertation, University of California at Irvine; revised version publishedwith the same title, Nankang (Taipei): Institute of American Culture, AcademiaSinica, 1985.

Includes a defense of Davidson’s identity claims against thetime-of-a-killing problem (criticisms of Thomson 1971a and Thalberg 1971a interalia). Final chapter on the notion ofcausally necessary condition, focusing on the assumption that the causalancestry of an individual event is not essential to that event. (The assumptionis argued to underlie, but also to be in conflict with, J. L. Mackie’saccount).

1994 ‘Introduction’,in J. Faye, U. Scheffler, and M. Urchs, eds., Logic and Causal Reasoning

, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, pp. 1-25.

A critical survey of the literature on the logic of causalreasoning, focusing on theories that analyse singular causal statements interms of sentential causal connectives.

1965 ‘Actionand Responsibility’, in M. Black, ed., Philosophy in America

, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 134-60;reprinted in A. R. White, ed. (1968), pp. 95-119.

Argues that "we can, if we wish, puff out an action to includean effect" and call the expansion itself an action [p. 146]. An action can be"squeezed down to a minimum or else stretched out" by the accordion effect. SeeAtwell (1969) and Strasser (1987) for criticisms.

1980 ‘Identity,Necessity, and Events’, in N. Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy ofPsychology. Volume One, Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, pp. 148-55.

Argues that Kripke’s (1972) argument against the mind-bodyidentity theory does not apply if the theory is construed as a theory about"concrete" events in Davidson’s sense.

Argues that Thalberg (1978a) "has given no good reason tothink that Chisholm’s theory is not an effective event-language reduction[i.e., a reduction of event language to states of affairs language] or that avariation on the Kim-Goldman property exemplification theory is not an adequateevent-reduction theory [i.e., a reduction of events to a species of some other,more familiar, kind of entity]" [p. 16]. Reply in Thalberg (1980a).

1975 ‘OnThe Historical Explanation of Unique Events’, Theory and Decision

, 6, 87-97.

On the dispute between the philosopher’s conception of anevent as of something unique and yet explainable insofar as it happens to beone "of a certain kind" versus thehistorian’s emphasis on the particularity of every individual event and on thepossibility that it be the only one of its "kind".

"Since an occasion sentence is a sentence that is true on someoccasion and false on others, while events [...] occur on some occasions (but noton others) [...] an eternal sentence is an event description if and only if thatsentence itself is the eternal form of an occasion sentence, i.e., occasionsentences are the basic elements of language for the description of events" (aneternal sentence being one whose truth value does not change upon time orspeaker) [p. 403].

1963 ‘MentalEvents and the Brain’, The Journal of Philosophy, 60, 295-96; reprinted in D. M. Rosenthal, ed., The Natureof Mind, New York and Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1991, pp. 266-67.

A criticism of the identity hypothesis concerning mentalevents and brain processes (if formulated as "X is a mental process of kind A = X is a central processof kind a").

1982 ‘Acts,Events and Things’, in W. Leinfellner, E. Kraemer, and J. Schank, eds., Language and Ontology. Proceedings of the6th International Wittgenstein Symposium,Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, pp. 97-105.

"What is the relation between an act and the underlying bodilymovement, an event and the underlying occurrences, a material thing and itsmatter? [...] Given an object and any description satisfied by the object, I saythere is a new entity, the object under the description, that results fromcombining the object with the description. The relation between the differentpairs of entities is then roughly that of an object to an object under adescription. Such an answer solves puzzles and reveals uniformities that cannototherwise be readily accounted for" [Author’s abstract].

Elaborates on the theory of causal action: some instances ofcausation involve objects and agents.

1967 ‘ADefence of the Principle of Event Causality’, British Journal for thePhilosophy of Science, 18, 89-108.

Argues that the principle that every event has a cause is notsubject to attack from quantum theory.

1990 Tenseand Narrativity. From Medieval Performance to Modern Fiction

, Austin: University of Texas Press.

Events as the most basic "among the cognitive structures weuse to map experience onto language", and the ones "the most closely involvedwith the categories of tense and aspect" [p. 97]. They are not part of reality,but "a hermeneutic construct for converting an undifferentiated continuum ofthe raw data of experience, or of the imagination, into the verbal structureswe use to talk about experience: narratives, stories" [p. 99].

1979 ADictionary of Philosophy, London: PanBooks; Revised Second Edition, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984.

Event: "An occurrence (as opposed to a material object),usually thought of as happening at a determinable time and place. It need notinvolve the participation of human agents. It is often conceived as subsistingwith other events in causal relationships; one event may be said to causeanother to occur, as its effect" [p. 115]. See also Action, p. 4; Causation, p.58.

1970a ‘Troublesabout Actions’, Synthese, 21, 298-319;reprinted in D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds. (1972), pp. 48-69.

Argues that "Davidson’s theory of action sentences provides nonatural account of distinctions like the one between ["John spoke clearly"] and["John spoke, clearly" or "Clearly, John spoke"]; in particular, thatDavidson’s theory provides for no natural treatment of those adverbs which areconstituent modifiers rather than sentence modifiers" [p. 57]. Compare Wierenga’s(1980) discussion.

1970b ‘ThreeReasons for Not Deriving "Kill" from "Cause to Die"’, Linguistic Inquiry

, 1, 429-38.

A criticism of the view that causative verbs such as ‘kill’are transformationally derived from ‘cause to die’ (compare Lakoff 1970).Reason one: ‘John caused Mary to die and it surprised me that she did so’becomes ill-formed upon substitution of ‘caused Mary to die’ with ‘killedMary’. Reason two: ‘John caused Bill to die on Sunday by stabbing him onSaturday’ becomes unacceptable upon substitution. Reason three: ‘John causedBill to die by swallowing his tongue’ is ambiguous, but it becomes unambiguousupon substitution.

1974 ‘TheSpecial Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)’, Synthese

, 28, 97-115.

Statement of the doctrine of "token physicalism", according towhich any event falling under any scientific law also falls under a physicallaw, and is therefore a physical event (whence it putatively follows thatphysics subsumes the special sciences). See Horgan (1981a) for criticisms.

1965 ‘Quantificationinto Causal Contexts’, in R. S. Cohen and M. W. Wartofsky, eds., BostonStudies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol.2: In Honor of Philipp Frank, Dordrecht:Reidel, pp. 263-74.

Contains a classic formulation of the "slingshot" argument forcausal contexts (parallel to Quine’s 1953 slingshot for modal contexts. CompareDavidson’s formulation in 1967c). Includes remarks on Burks (1951).

1966 ‘AModel-Theoretic Approach to Causal Logic’, Det Kongeliger NorskeVidenskabers Selskabs Forhandlinger, 2,3-13.

Gives a possible worlds semantics for a quantified modal logicwith causality connectives in the spirit of Burks (1951).

1979 ‘Handlungen,ihre Gründe und Ursachen’ [‘Actions, Their Reasons and Causes’, in German], inLenk, ed. (1979), Vol. 2/2, pp. 431-44.

A critical analysis of Davidson’s (1963) argument to theeffect that the causes of actions are the reasons for acting.

1980 ‘Explanationof Action’, in R. Hilpinen, ed., Rationality in Science

, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 231-47.

Includes a criticism of Davidson’s (1963) account of thenotions of causation and explanation; further developments in (1985).

1983 ‘SituationSemantics and the "Slingshot" Argument’, Erkenntnis

, 19, 91-98.

Focusing on the relevant treatment of singular terms, arguesthat "slingshot" arguments such as Quine’s (1953) "do not vitiate situationsemantics or quantification into non-extensional contexts" [p. 97].

1985 ‘Causationand Explanation: A Problem in Davidson’s view on Action and Mind’, in E. LePoreand B. P. McLaughlin, eds. (1985), pp. 311-23.

A criticism of Davidson’s account of the notions of causationand explanation, and of their interrelation. Focuses on Davidson’s use ofphysical laws in the explanation of actions on the connection between actionexplanation and his arguments for the token-identity of the mental and thephysical.

Ch. 8 ("Substances, Properties and Events") treats events asdated, unrepeatable occurrences occupying definite intervals of time. Moreprecisely, "an event consists in a triple of (i) a set of objects; (ii) typesof changes of properties for each object in the set; and (iii) an interval oftime [...] We say that a triple constitutes anevent, rather than is identical to it, to leave it open that one and the sameevent may be constituted by different triples in different worlds" [p. 205-6].Includes a criticism of Lombard’s (1981, 1982a) essentialism: "Lombard has doneno more than isolate three features of events [...] and attribute to the eventthe transwordly identity conditions of the set of those features" [p. 212].Lombard’s reply in (1986, ch. VII).

1993 ‘Time,Events, and Modality’, in R. Le Poidevin and M. Mac Beath, eds. (1993), pp.80-95.

Discussion of the Leibnizian thesis that "facts about when

events occur supervene on facts about ‘thesuccessive order of things’". It is argued that to accommodate the possibilityof changeless time (see Shoemaker 1969) while retaining the idea of arelationist construction of time from events, "the basis of the construction ofthe time-series of a world has to be expanded to allow facts about goings-on inother worlds to play a role" [p. 85]. Thus a way of construing a time-seriesfor a world w out of temporalrelations among events in worlds branching from w

is proposed.

1994 ModernLogic. A Text in Elementary Symbolic Logic,New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

An example of how Davidson’s (1967a) analysis of actionsentences can make its way into standard logic textbooks [pp. 288-89].

1967 ‘Laphilosophie de l’action de J. L. Austin’ [‘The Philosophy of Action of J. L.Austin’, in French], Archives de Philosophie, 30, 36-60.

1984 ‘GentleMurder, or the Adverbial Samaritan’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 81, 193-96.

On the unacceptable deontic implication from "x

murders" to "x is legally obliged to do so". See Sinnot-Armstrong (1985) and Clark(1986b).

1991 TheImmaterial Self. A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind

, London and New York: Routledge.

Includes an examination--from a dualist perspective--of the topicof psychophysical causation [Chapter 6, pp. 158-201]. Against Davidson’s(1970b) argument for anomalous monism, objects that "whatever case he may beable to construct for each of the premises individually, he is not entitled toassert their conjunction" [p. 185].

1994 ‘TheToken-identity Thesis’ in Warner and Szubka, eds. (1994), pp. 299-310.

1986 NoncausalConnections and the Nature of Events,Doctoral Dissertation, Wayne State University.

Argues (against Kim and Goldman) that there is no reason toposit noncausal determinative relations among events.

1992 ‘"HowNot to Flip the Switch With the Floodlight": Causative-Inchoatives, the Instrumental"With", and the Identity of Actions’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

, 73, 31-43.

1983 ‘Onthe Perspectival Ordering of Patient and Causing Event in the Distribution ofFrench and German Verbs of Change: AContrastive Study’, in R. Bäuerle, C. Schwartze, and A. von Stechow, eds., Meaning,Use, and Interpretation of Language, Berlinand New York: de Gruyter, pp. 121-33.

On the speaker’s perspectival choices in ordering syntacticallyand syntagmatically the patient of a verb of change and the event causing thechange referred to by the verb.

1985 ‘Aktionsart,Aspekt und Zeitkonstitution’ [‘Aktionsart,Aspect, and Temporal Constitution’, in German], in C. Schwartze and D. Wunderlich,eds., Handbuch der Lexikologie,Kronberg: Athenaeum, pp. 229-49.

Includes an examination of the telic-atelic(activity-accomplishment) distinction.

1993 ‘Tenseand Aspect: A Mereological Approach’, in Proceedings of the

13th International Joint Conference onArtificial Intelligence (IJCAI-93), Vol. 2,Chambéry: IJCAI [Morgan Kaufmann], pp. 1222-28.

A framework for dealing with tense and aspect phenomena, basedon the view that verbal morphology plays a crucial role in specifying thetemporal meaning of a sentence. For the purposes of semantic representation,the domain of events is modelled within a basic, non-extensional mereologicalframework, allowing for a representation of habituals and of perfective and imperfectiveevents by means of plural quantifiers ranging on collections of events.

1994 ‘AMereological Characterization of Temporal and Aspectual Phenomena’, in C.Martín-Vide, ed., Current Issues in Mathematical Linguistics

, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 269-78.

1986 ‘MutualCausation, Simultaneity, and Event Description’, Philosophical Studies

, 49, 361-72.

Argues against the idea of mutual causation (as in the case oftwo cards leaning against each other to form a card house) and suggests thatdubious cases occur as a result of incomplete event descriptions.

1978 ‘TheProblem of Action’, American Philosophical Quarterly

, 15, 157-62.

1970 ‘SomeRemarks on the Action Nominalization in English’, in R. A. Jacobs and P. S.Rosenbaum, eds., Readings in English Transformational Grammar

, Waltham, MA: Ginn and Co., pp. 83-98.

Puts forward a transformationalist account of actionnominalizations. Contrast Chomsky (1970) and Newmeyer (1970).

Includes Grünbaum (1971) and reprints of Gale (1969), Garson(1969), and Hamblin (1969).

1979 Studiesin Metaphysics (Midwest Studies inPhilosophy, Vol. IV), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Includes Achinstein (1979), Burge (1979), Kim (1979b), Lombard(1979b), Rosenberg and Martin (1979), and Shoemaker (1979).

1984 Causationand Causal Theories (Midwest Studies inPhilosophy, Vol. IX), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Includes Collins (1984), Kim (1984a), Lycan (1984a), Shwayder(1984), Sosa (1984), and Vendler (1984a).

1979 ‘AnIntensional Logic of Predicates’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

, 20, 811-22.

Expands Clark’s (1970) account of predicate modifiers (a) byallowing predicates to be defined for every sentence; (b) by incorporatingadverbial prepositional phrases. Gives also a consistent and complete set ofrules of inferences, showing that the system is "adequate to all tasks of thepredicate calculus". "The semantics of the logical constants corresponding tothose of the predicate calculus will be seen as a special case of the semanticsof modifiers. Thus the disadvantage of a requirement of new rules of inferencewill be to some extent offset by the twin advantages of ontological simplicityand a deeper theory of the nature of sentential operations" [p. 812].

1980 ‘Verbs,Events and the Flow of Time’, in C. Rohrer, ed. (1980), pp. 59-84.

A formal account of the complex system of tense, aspect, andtemporal modifiers that makes "the variety of temporal reference" possible in alanguage like English. The underlying ontology includes states, events, andprocesses: "A state is an instantiation of a temporal property P

of a thing x [...] holding over a certain duration of time [...] without any gaps orinterruptions"; events can be instantaneous, and "among events with duration wedistinguish mere events from processes

on the ground that processes are made up of a seriesof changes that culminate in a state" [p. 63].

1996 ‘FromConceptual Time to Linguistic Time’, Computational Linguistics

, 22, 91-127.

On the mapping between conceptual time, as it is perceived inthe world, and linguistic time, which refers to how time is expressed inlanguage. Includes a discussion of the advantages of taking events as entities"rather than making them subordinate to temporal intervals or points" [p. 95].

Argues that temporal distinctions are objective: events couldbe past, present or future and change with respect to these distinctions evenin a world without perceivers or language-users. See (1969) for refinements andGarson (1969) for a criticism.

1969 ‘"Here"and "Now"’, The Monist, 53, 396-409;reprinted in E. Freeman and W. Sellars, eds. (1971), pp. 72-85.

There are deep dissimilarities between ‘here’ and ‘now’,showing that space and time are "radically different". In the course of theargument, it is argued that sortal events are not the temporal analogues ofsortal objects, for a sortal event is both temporal and spatial.

1967 ThePhilosophy of Time: A Collection of Essays,Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.

A collection of classic and recent works, including reprintsof Smart (1955) and D. C. Williams (1951).

From Tense Logic to Event Logic: moving from the need toformalize the aspectual character of verbs, exploits "the distinction between states

(which are inherently imperfective) and events

(which are inherently perfective)" [p. 4].Informally: "to explain why only states, and not events, can be attributed tothe present, we may remark that since an event in general takes time, it cannotever be wholly present at one time; while a state, although it may endure overa stretch of time, does not change during such a stretch and so is present ateach moment of the stretch" [p. 15]. In any case, "the distinction betweenstates and events is not a distinction inherent in what goes on, but rather adistinction between two different ways we have of describing it" [p. 24].

Syntax and semantics (including completeness results) of thelogic of the aspect operators Perf, Prog

, and Prosexpressing the occurrence of events in time. Roughly: PerfE

is true now if some occurrence of the event denotedby ‘E’ is wholly in the past; ProsE

is true now if some occurrence of E

is wholly in the future; and ProgE

is true now if some occurrence of E

is partly in the past, partly present, and partly inthe future.

1987b ‘TemporalLogic and Computer Science: An Overview’, in A. P. Galton, ed. (1987), pp.1-52.

An extensive and wide-ranging overview, with an eye forconnections with the linguistic and philosophical literature on time, actions,and events.

1990 ‘ACritical Examination of Allen’s Theory of Action and Time’, ArtificialIntelligence, 42, 159-88.

Modifies the temporal ontology underlying J. F. Allen’s (1984)temporal logic by introducing instants in addition to intervals. The range ofpredicates for asserting temporal locations is diversified accordingly: both holds

and occurs are split into three predicates holds-on

, holds-in,holds-at and occurs-on

, occurs-in, occurs-at. In bothcases, the third predicate makes it possible to talk about instantaneousevents. However, it is argued that a separate category of processes--in additionto properties and events--is not necessary.

1991 ‘ReifiedTemporal Theories and How to Unreify Them’, in Proceedings of the

12th International Joint Conference onArtificial Intelligence (IJCAI-91), Vol. 2,Sydney: IJCAI [Morgan Kaufmann], pp. 1177-82.

Argues that reification of propositions expressing states andevents as a means of handling temporal reasoning is both philosophicallysuspect and technically unnecessary. As an illustration, indicates how thereified theories of J. F. Allen (1984) and Shoham (1986, 1988) can beunreified. The resulting "loss of expressive power" can be rectified byadopting Davidson’s (1967a) theory in which event tokens, rather than types,are reified: the procedure is illustrated by means of Kowalski and Sergot’s(1986) event calculus. A general procedure for converting type-reification totoken-reification is also proposed.

1993 ‘Towardsan Integrated Logic of Space, Time, and Motion’, in Proceedings of the

13th International Joint Conference onArtificial Intelligence (IJCAI-93), Vol. 2,Chambéry: IJCAI [Morgan Kaufmann], pp. 1550-55.

Argues that J. F. Allen’s (1984) temporal logic, with themodifications suggested by Galton (1990), can be combined with a spatial logicto yield "a useful framework for reasoning about the motion of a rigid body inspace" [p. 1550]. The notion of perturbation and the distinction between statesof position and states of motion are introduced to provide a qualitativeaccount of continuity, and the resulting system is shown to enable varioustypes of events to be defined in terms of their conditions of occurrence, i.e.,of the elementary positional relations on bodies and regions.

1994 ‘InstantaneousEvents’, in H. J. Ohlbach, ed., Temporal Logic: Proceedings of the ICTLWorkshop, Saarbrücken: Max-Planck-Institutfür Informatik, Technical Report MPI-I-94-230, pp. 4-11.

Distinguishes strictly "instantaneous" events (with zeroduration) from "momentary" events (with a positive--but in some senseminimal--duration). Events are further classified into "transitions"(characterized in terms of the states holding immediately before and after theevent) and "tenures" (characterized in terms of a state holding when the eventactually happens, but neither immediately before nor immediately after it).These categories are then considered in relation to both continuous anddiscrete models of time.

1980 ‘Lafilosofia de la causalidad en Davidson’ [‘The Philosophy of Causality inDavidson’, in Spanish], Diánoia, 26,178-94.

Makes use of an atelic-telic aspectual distinction germane inmany ways to the activity-accomplishment (Vendler 1957) or activity-performance(Kenny 1963) distinctions.

1986 ‘CausalEmpiricism and Mental Events’, Philosophical Studies

, 49, 393-403.

Points out a conflict between common materialist views aboutmental events and the empiricist ("Humean") approach to causation.

1972 ‘ChangingEvents in Dewey’s "Experience and Nature"’, Journal of the History ofPhilosophy, 10, 439-55.

Historical analysis of Dewey’s thesis that events--not onlysubstances--change.

1969 ‘Hereand Now’, The Monist, 53, 469-77;reprinted in E. Freeman and W. Sellars, eds. (1971), pp. 145-53.

A criticism of Gale’s (1968) thesis of the disanalogy betweenspatial, object-based principles and temporal, event-based concepts (see alsoGale 1969). Argues that the differences pointed out by Gale are biased by afailure to eliminate tense in the formation of spatial analogues of temporalprinciples.

1955 ‘Causationand Recipes’, Mind, 54, 479-87;reprinted in Beauchamp, ed. (1974), pp. 126-32, and in Brand, ed. (1976), pp.215-23.

A defense of the "production theory" of causation: weunderstand causal explanations only insofar as we imagine ourselves doing thething explained. Argues that some causes are simultaneous with their effects.

1965 ‘SomeProblems about Time’, Proceedings of the British Academy

, 51, 321-36; reprinted in P. F. Strawson, ed., Studiesin the Philosophy of Thought and Action,London, Oxford, and New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 175-91, and inP. Geach, Logic Matters, Oxford:Blackwell, 1972, pp. 302-17.

Against the Quinean view that time is a fourth dimension inwhich things extend ("a view that really abolishes change, by reducing changeto a mere variation of attributes between different parts of a whole" [p.304]). Amply discussed by Noonan 1976, 1980. Urges that discourse about eventsneeds to be "demythologized": "Any sentence in which an event is represented bya noun-phrase like ‘Queen Anne’s death’ appears to be easily replaceable by anequivalent one in which the onomatoid [= seeming name] is paraphrased away; wecould use instead a clause attaching some part of the verb ‘to die’ to thesubject ‘Queen Anne’" [p. 313].

1968 ‘WhatActually Exists’ (Symposium with R. H. Stoothoff), Proceedings of theAristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 42, 7-16.

A discussion of the principle "x is actual if and only if xeither acts, or undergoes change, or both" [p. 7] in relation to some entianon grata, among which events. See R. H.Stoothoff’s (1968) reply.

Introduces the notion of a mere "Cambridge Change"--a changeoccurring in an object if there is a predicate true of it at a time but falseof it at a later time [p. 71], which could be the case even if the object doesnot undergo a "real" change.

1975 ‘TheLogical Connection Argument and De Re Necessity’, American PhilosophicalQuarterly, 12, 349-54.

Argues that normal formulations of the "logical connectionargument" (to the effect that factors that appear causally connected can beshown not to be so, at least when described in certain ways, if these factorsare logically connected when so described) confuse propositions and events.

1979 ‘Überlegungenzu einer perspektivischen Handlungstheorie’ [‘Reflections on a PerspectivalAction Theory’, in German], in H. Lenk, ed. (1979), Vol. 1, pp. 351-71.

1977 ‘Action,Behavior, and Bodily Movement: A Sketch of a Theory of Action’, Auslegung

, 5, 43-57.

1983 AStudy in the Ontology and Explanation of Action, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Kansas.

Defends Davidson’s view concerning action identity, but arguesthat it does not provide us with an ontology of events: Davidson has not shownthat all actions are basic, and that all basic actions coincide with bodilymovements; rather, he has shown "that all action expressions are coreferentialwith some expression of the form ‘his causing of such and such a bodily state’,and that these are basic action-descriptions" [Abstract]. Also suggests thatthe denotation of such basic descriptions is a species of mental event (avolitional thought-episode).

1984 ‘Davidsonand Prichard: Actions as Bodily Movements and Volitions’, SouthwesternPhilosophical Review, 1, 107-18.

1985 ‘AProcedural Logic’, Proceedings of the 9th International Joint Conference onArtificial Intelligence (IJCAI-85), Vol. 1,Los Angeles: IJCAI [Morgan Kaufmann], pp. 516-23.

Presents a formalism based on the notion of process

to represent common-sense knowledge of procedures orsequences of actions for achieving particular goals.

1986 ‘TheRepresentation of Events in Multiagent Domains’, Proceedings of AAAI-86,Fifth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 1, Philadelphia: AAAI [Morgan Kaufmann], pp. 70-75.

Sets forth a model of actions and events for reasoning aboutdynamic domains involving multiple agents.

1987 ‘Actions,Processes, and Causality’, in M. P. Georgeff and A. L. Lansky, eds. (1987), pp.99-122.

Further elaborating on the model set forth in (1986), arguesthat "the concept of causality can beemployed to simplify the description of actions" and that "sets of causallyinterrelated actions can be grouped together in processes

" [p. 99, Abstract].

1987 ReasoningAbout Actions and Plans: Proceedings of the 1986 Workshop

, Los Altos, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.

1993 ‘Eventsand Processes in Situation Semantics’, in P. Aczel, D. Israel, Y. Katagiri, andS. Peters, eds., Situation Theory and Its Applications

, Stanford: CSLI Lecture Notes No. 24, pp. 119-40.

A theory of events in which the "domain of influence of eachevent" is explicitly represented. Based on the framework of Barwise and Perry’ssituation semantics (1981, 1983). Includes applications to the analysis ofdynamic domains involving multiple agents.

1975 ‘Eventsare Perceivable but Time Is Not’, in J. T. Fraser and N. Lawrence, eds., TheStudy of Time II. Proceedings of the Second Conference of the InternationalSociety for the Study of Time, Berlin,Heidelberg, and New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 295-301.

Argues that "there is no such thing as the perception of time,but only the perception of events and locomotions" [p. 295]. "Time is not areceptacle for events, just as space is not a receptacle for objects. A bettermetaphor would be to suggest [...] that time is the ghost of events and thatspace is the ghost of surfaces" [p. 299]. In any case, "events can be well orill perceived, and there is no assumption that there must exist a sequence ofphenomenal events corresponding to the physical events and running parallel tothem" [p. 298].

1979 TheEcological Approach to Visual Perception,Boston: Houghton Mifflin; reprinted Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1986.

Chapter VI [pp. 93-110] on "Events and the Information forPerceiving Events", deals with "ecological events" that "as distinguished frommicrophysical and astronomical events, occur at the level of substances and thesurfaces that separate them from the medium" [p. 93]. Classifies "terrestrial"events into changes of layout (such as rigid translations and rotations of anobject, collisions, nonrigid deformations, surface disruptions), changes ofcolor and texture, changes of surface existence. Asserts that "we should beginthinking of events as the primary realities and of time as an abstraction fromthem" [p. 100]; that "time and space are not empty receptacles to be filled;instead, they are the ghosts of events and surfaces" [p. 101]. Furtherdistinguishes between recurrence and nonrecurrence and between reversible andnonreversible events, and analyses the nesting of events.

1986 ATheory of Events, Doctoral Dissertation,Indiana University at Bloomington.

An event is a series of momentary states of affairs. Amplediscussion of event identity.

1988 ‘TheOntological Status of Refraining’, The Journal of Value Inquiry

, 22, 307-12.

Commenting on P. G. Smith (1986), argues that the ontologicalstatus of refraining is not as mysterious as it might seem. "[Refraining] seemsto form some sort of middle ground between occurrence and nonoccurrence" [p.307], but in the end "it is a thoroughly occurrent action" [p. 311].

1993 ‘Onthe Metaphysical Distinction Between Processes and Events’, Canadian Journalof Philosophy, 23, 365-84; reprinted in R.Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp. 477-96.

Examines Mourelatos’s (1978) claim that events (= performances) and processes (= activities) form distinct categories, arguingthat the differences between the two "cannot provide the basis for anontological subcategorization of occurrences" [p. 366]. Argues that the issueis epistemological, not ontological. Reply in Mourelatos (1993).

Defends a volitional theory of action: actions are events withthe property of having at their core "a mental event possessing an actishphenomenal quality" [p. x]. Actions are therefore a special kind of personalevents, with canonical description ‘S’s V

-ing at t’(S a an agent designator, V

a verb phrase, t

a time). Chapter 3 discusses action individuation,with critical analysis of extant accounts. The proposed criterion is moderately"multiplying": x and y

are the same action iff they have the same agent S

, occur at the same time t

, and either (i) x

is semantically equivalent to y

, or (ii) x consists in y (e.g., viaa by-relation), or (iii) forevery action z, Gen(z

,x) iffGen(z,y

), where Gen is a "general generating relation"suitably extending the by-relation(for instance, Gen(a1,a2) holds when a

1 can bedescribed as ‘S’s V

-ing at t1’ and a

2 as ‘S

’s W-ingat t2 by V-ing at t

1’ forsome W).

1995 ‘ActionTheory’, in J. Kim and E. Sosa, eds., A Companion to Metaphysics

, Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, pp. 3-7.

A compact survey of the main topics in action theory,including identity and individuation.

A detailed study from an AI perspective. Says that "it isdifficult to imagine how counterfactual implication can capture a causalrelation that remains asymmetric" in cases such as (i) "If John had measles,he’d have koplic spots", and (ii) "If John had koplic spots, he’d havemeasles", both of which are valid [p. 69].

1987a ‘ReasoningAbout Action I: A Possible World Approach’, in F. M. Brown, ed., The FrameProblem in Artificial Intelligence. Proceedings of the 1987 Workshop

, Los Altos, CA:Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 233-58; revisedversion reprinted in Artificial Intelligence, 35 (1988), 165-95.

An AI approach to "reasoning about action" based on the ideaof keeping a single model of the world that is updated when the action is performed.Germane to the strips approach(Lifschitz 1987a).

1987b ‘ReasoningAbout Action II: The Qualification Problem’, in F. M. Brown, ed., The FrameProblem in Artificial Intelligence. Proceedings of the 1987 Workshop

, Los Altos, CA: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 259-87; revisedversion reprinted in Artificial Intelligence

, 35 (1988), 311-42.

An application of the (1987a) theory to the problem ofdescribing all the preconditions of an action.

On a consequence of Kim’s criterion for event identity. Astatue rotates. The bronze it is made of rotates too. If the statue and thepiece of bronze are distinct, then so are the rotating of the statue and therotating of the piece of bronze. "This seems counter-intuitive and perhapsunacceptable [...] Our unwillingness to think that there are two rotations can benicely explained by the Davidsonian view which individuates events by causalconsiderations. Since these supposedly distinct rotations have exactly the samecauses and the same effects, there are no good reasons for thinking that thereare two rotations" [p. 16].

1990 ‘Onthe Location of Actions and Tryings: Criticism of an Internalist View’, Erkenntnis

, 33, 39-56.

Argues (contra Hornsby)that actions are not internal events and that this is nevertheless compatiblewith the causal theory of action. One can reject the internalist thesis thatthe relationship between actions and bodily movements is that of cause andeffect without rejecting the essentials of the causal view.

1993 ‘DistinguishingBetween Events and Times: Some Evidence from the Semantics of Then

’, Natural Language Semantics

, 1, 285-312.

Distinguishes (within the frame of Discourse RepresentationTheory) between two uses of sentence-final then: (1) as a temporal anaphor referring back to a previously establishedexplicit temporal referent, and (2) as a way of expressing relations betweenstates/events (where no such referent is required).

1994a EventStructure in Natural Language Discourse,Doctoral Dissertation, University of Edinburgh.

1994b ‘Progressives,Events, and States’, in P. Dekker and M. Stokhof, eds., Proceedings of the9th Amsterdam Colloquium, Amsterdam:Institute for Language, Logic and Computation, pp. 313-32.

Rejects the treatment of the progressive as a "stativiser"(Vlach 1981a) and develops an alternative account inspired by the analysis ofC. S. Smith (1991) revisited in the framework of situation-theoretic discourserepresentation theory.

1995 ‘"When",Discourse Relations and the Thematic Structure of Events’, in P. Amsili, M.Borillo, and L. Vieu, eds. (1995), Part A, pp. 91-104.

A study of constructions of the form "When event

1 event

2" (as in "WhenJohn arrived at the airport, he went to the check-in desk"). The proposedaccount exploits the notion of a "subjective state transition".

1979 ‘Davidsonand the Anomalismof the Mental’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy

, 17, 163-74.

Argues that Davidson’s (1970b) argument for anomalous monismequivocates two senses of the term ‘physical’. "In one sense, that in whichevery physical event falls under a law, it is not clear that mental events docause physical events. In the other, that in which there are clear cases ofmental events causing physical ones, it is not clear that the physical eventsfall under any law" [p. 178].

1970 ATheory of Human Action, Englewood Cliffs,NJ: Prentice-Hall; reissued Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976;partly reprinted in S. Davis, ed., Causal Theories of Mind. Action,Knowledge, Memory, Perception, and Reference,Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1983, pp. 73-127.

A very influential text, representative of the propertyexemplification account of the nature of events (compare Kim’s works). Aparticular act (or "act token") is "the exemplifiying of a property [or acttype] by an agent at a time" [p. 10]. It follows that "two act-tokens areidentical if and only if they involve the same agent, the same property, andthe same time" [p. 10]. Chapter 2, "The Structure of Action", introduces thenotion of "level-generation" (by-relation) to explicate the nature of theintimate connection between pairs of distinct acts such as John’s moving hishand and John’s moving his queen to QN7 (which a unifier would rather treat asidentical). Reviewed by Brand (1972), Holborow (1973), Margolis (1974).

1971 ‘TheIndividuation of Action’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 68, 761-74; reprinted in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi,eds. (1996), pp. 329-42.

Criticisms of Anscombe and Davidson on the identity ofactions. "In the light of such difficulties, the units of actions must besliced more thinly". Actions--or "act tokens"--are characterized asexemplifications of act types by persons at times (following the account putforward in Goldman 1970); hence their identity conditions are straightforward:actions are the same iff their internal constituents--agents, times ofoccurrence, and properties exemplified--are the same. The notion of an "acttree" is introduced to account for the intuitive unity among acts that aredistinguished by this criterion (such as Boris’s squeezing his finger and hispulling of the trigger) as well as to capture the natural ordering among suchacts. Discussion in Thomson (1971b), Hornsby (1979a, 1980a, Ch. I), J. A. Smith(1978), Lombard (1974, 1986, pp. 53-62), Pfeifer (1981a, 1982, 1989), and J.Bennett (1988, Chapters 5 and 13, 1995) inter alia

1976 ‘TheVolitional Theory Revisited’, in M. Brand and D. Walton, eds. (1976), pp.67-86.

A critical review aimed at remodeling the doctrine of volitioninto "plausible form".

1978 ‘Chisholm’sTheory of Action’, Philosophia, 7[Special Issue on "The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm"], 583-96.

1982 ‘TheLogic of the English Progressive’, Linguistic Inquiry

, 13, 79-89.

Based on the assumption that "aspect in language never dealswith a mental representation having the structure of a line, and consequentlythe attempts made by many linguists and philosophers to map the simple presentand the progressive aspect in terms of events and states marked on the realtime line, extending into the past and future, are necessarily inadequate toaccount for natural language semantics" [p. 83].

1951 TheStructure of Appearance, Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press; revised edition, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1962; third edition 1977.

A statement of the thesis that there is no qualitativedistinction between things and events. "What we think of as a phenomenal thingis distinguished from what we think of as a phenomenal event or process only inthe pattern of differences among its temporal parts. A thing is a monotonousevent; an event is an unstable thing" [1951, p. 286].

1984 ‘SpecialRelativity and the Location of Mental Events’, Analysis

, 44, 126-27.

1979 ‘Omissions’,Tulane Studies in Philosophy, 28 [Issueon "Studies in Action Theory", ed. by R. C. Whittemore], 93-102.

Reformulates Brand’s (1971) criterion for omissions. "S

omits to perform a

at tif and only if (i) it is not the case that S

performs a at t; and (ii) S

had the ability and the opportunity to perform a

at t."[p. 97]. Further defines the special cases of intentional, unintentional, andlegal omissions. See discussion in Morillo (1979).

1982 ‘Intentionaland Unintentional Actions’, Philosophical Studies, 41, 251-62.

A "theoretically well grounded" account of the differencebetween intentional and unintentional actions is proposed and argued to becompatible with Davidson’s account of act individuation.

1976 ‘AMethod for Ontology, with Application to Numbers and Events’, The Journal ofPhilosophy, 73, 637-51.

Suggests a substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers inDavidson’s (1967a) logical form of action sentences so as to avoid ontologicalcommitment to events.

1978 ‘NoEntity Without Identity", Southwestern Journal of Philosophy

, 9, 79-96.

Includes an argument to the effect that Davidson’s (1969a)criterion for event identity is inadequate to ground reference to events.

1980 OntologicalEconomy: Substitutional Quantification and Mathematics

, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Chapter 3, on the criterion of ontological commitment,includes a discussion of the ontological import of logical analyses involvingcommitment to events via quantification.

1974 ‘Extensionalityand Singular Causal Sentences’, Philosophical Studies

, 25, 69-72.

Defends the extensionality of the context "...

caused ---" by arguing that failure ofsubstitutivity in sentences of the form "x caused y’s becoming e

" is due to the opacity of the context "y

’s becoming".

1980 ‘Statesand Performances: Aristotle’s Test’, The Philosophical Quarterly

, 30, 117-30.

A defense of Aristotle’s original test for classifying actionsinto energeiai and kinêseis

, with comparisons to the analyses/classifications ofRyle (1949), Kenny (1963), Vendler (1957), and Ackrill (1965). Compare alsoMourelatos (1993).

Includes an application of predicate functor logics (which areregarded as a better vehicle for formalizing natural languages than standardpredicate logic) to the analysis of action sentences.

1994 ‘ArgumentDeletion Without Events’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

, 34, 607-20.

Describes a sound and complete formal language (obtained froma standard first-order language by adding a denumerable stock of "thematicrole" markers for singular terms) within which polyadic properties and argumentdeletion can be dealt with without recourse to events. An exploitation of theideas of Dowty (1989) following in the footsteps of Grandy (1976). The systemallows for unrestricted argument deletion.

1996 ‘Asymmetricaland Symmetrical Dependency: A Particular Problem’, Aporia

, 6, 17-34.

A critical analysis of Moravcsik’s (1965) criticism ofStrawson’s (1959) views on the asymmetric relation of dependency between eventsand objects.

1979 ‘Refrainingand Responsibility’, Tulane Studies in Philosophy, 28 [Issue on "Studies in Action Theory", ed. by R. C. Whittemore],103-13.

1995 ‘AreMental Events Preceded by Their Physical Causes?’, Philosophical Psychology

, 8, 333-40.

Argues that mental events need not be preceded by theirphysical causes--at least, not for the reasons put forward by Libet (1985).

A detailed examination of Davidson (1967a). The final partputs forward a "constructivist" account of events exploiting the conception ofa basic event as "one which consists of transitions of a subject item betweencontradictorily opposed states, like being fat and not being fat" [p.21]. Discusses the possibility of a "coherently formulated distinction" betweenactions and events.

1977 ‘EventualChange and Action Identity’, American Philosophical Quarterly

, 14, 221-29.

Argues that the identity of actions such as the shooting andthe killing of the victim can be accounted for in terms of eventual change: theshooting becomes a killing (by becomingthe cause of a death). Compare J. Bennett (1973), Vollrath (1975), Anscombe(1979a), and Davidson (1985b, 1987) for similar accounts; compare also Thalberg(1975) and A. R. White (1979/80) for misgivings.

Argues that not all actions are purposive, and thatpurposiveness does not distinguish actions from mere behavior.

Works with the hypothesis that a verb has always associatedwith it an event structure which, when combined with other elements in therelevant clause, provides an event structure for an entire sentence.

1992 ‘ObligatoryAdjuncts and the Structure of Events’, in E. Reuland and W. Abraham, eds., Knowledgeand Language. Volume II: Lexical and Conceptual Structure

, Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer AcademicPublishers, pp. 143-55.

Using the notion of event structure ("the aspectual structureof the eventuality denoted by the verbs"), offers an account of the occurrencesof obligatory adjuncts (such as by-phrases)with passives and accomplishment verbs.

1997 ‘Logicand Language: A Glossary’, in J. van Benthem and A. G. B. ter Meulen, eds., Handbookof Logic and Language, Amsterdam: Elsevier;Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 1179-1213.

Includes an entry on events. Basic characterizaton: "An eventis a unit of change in the external world, whose duration is measured in aninterval of time" [p. 1189].

1971 ‘TheMeaning of Time’, in E. Freeman and W. Sellars, eds. (1971), pp. 195-228.

Denies that "belonging to the present is a physical attributeof a physical event E which is independentof any judgmental awareness

of the occurrence of E

itself or of another event simultaneous with it" [p.209]. On the other hand, "the temporal relations of earlier than, later than,and simultaneity do, of course, obtain among physical events in their own rightin the sense familiar from the theory of relativity" [p. 228].

1989 ‘WhyThematic Kinships between Events Do Not Attest Their Causal Linkage’, in J. B.Brown and J. Mittelstrass, eds., An Intimate Relation

, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 477-94; reprinted in Epistemologia

, 13 (1990), 187-208.

Argues that the existence of a thematic connection between twoevents does not by itself justify the assertion of the existence of a causallinkage. Based on evidence from psychoanalysis.

1992 ‘TheRole of Tense in Perceptual Reports’, in E. Fava, ed., Proceedings of theXVII Meeting of Generative Grammar. Volume Presented to Giuseppe Francescato onthe Occasion of His 70th Birthday, Torino:Rosenberg & Sellier, pp. 233-47.

Argues that the complement of ‘see’ in a sentence like "Johnsaw Mary laugh" refers to an event, whereas in a sentence like "John saw thatMary laughed" it refers to a proposition. Following Higginbotham (1983), arguesthat "the event interpretation is ensured by the lack of a referential tense inthe complements of perception verbs" [p. 233].

1977 ‘Remarkson the Present Perfect in English’, in C. Rohrer, ed. (1977), pp. 83-98.

1979 ‘TimeSchemes, Tense Logic and the Analysis of English Trees’, in F. Guenthner and S.J. Schmidt, eds., Formal Semantics and Pragmatics for Natural Languages

, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 201-22.

An investigation into the adequacy of various tense logics indescribing and explaining tensed constructions in natural language.

1987 ‘Agent-Causationand Event-Causation’, Indian Philosophical Quarterly

, 14, 409-30.

1973 ‘ACritical Survey of the Reasons vs. Causes Argument in Recent Philosophy ofAction’, Metaphilosophy, 4, 269-97.

Embeds the philosophy of action in a naturalized account ofagents. Brief discussion of the unifier/multiplier debate on action identity[pp. 179-81]; endorses Castañeda’s view that "multipliers and unifiers differin how they use the word ‘action’" [p. 179].

1991 ‘Prichard,Davidson and Action’, Philosophical Investigations

, 14, 205-30.

An examination of the structural similarities betweenDavidson’s and Prichard’s theories of action.

1994 ‘AnomalousMonism’, in S. Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind

, Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, p. 122.

1985 ‘PossibleEvents, Actual Events, and Robots’, Computational Intelligence

, 1/2, 59-70.

1981 ‘Eventsand the Exemplifications of Properties’, The Philosophical Quarterly

, 31, 242-7.

Criticizes Kim’s analysis for understating any distinctionsbetween events and states. Maintains that the central and "self-evidentlyessential" feature of events is "that they are changes", whereas "our conceptof a state of an object is not the same as our concept of a change to anobject" [p. 243]. Other differences: "Events take place, happen, occur orbefall [...] States, on the other hand, obtain rather than take place, persistrather than occur [...] Events happen to objects,whereas objects are in certainstates" [ibid.].

1982a ‘Events,Ontology and Grammar’, Philosophy, 57,477-86; reprinted in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp. 79-88.

Argues that the question of the existence of events issurrounded by a cloud of conceptual confusion. For one thing, events cannot be"introduced" or "eliminated" by philosophical discussions. Moreover, the veryquestion ‘do events exist?’ is suspect, for "the esse

of events is to take place, happen or occur, but notto exist" [p. 479]. (More worthy are questions of ontological priority: areobjects ontologically prior to events, or is it the other way around? Or areboth categories equally "basic"?) Objects to Davidson’s overall program toaccount for the logical articulations of our language by exhibiting the"logical form" of ordinary sentences in a first-order calculus.

1982b ‘Eventsand Objects in Space and Time’, Mind,91, 1-19; reprinted in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp. 429-47.

Develops on Quinton (1979) on the dissimilarities betweenevents and material objects. Much of the difference is apparent from theirrespective relation to space. Both have spatial location, but objects, notevents, occupy space. Thus events have no dimensionality, no shape, no size.

1991 RepresentingPlans under Uncertainty: A Logic of Time, Chance, and Action

, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Illinois atUrbana; revised version published with the same title, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1994; partly reprinted inHaddawy (1996).

1996 ‘ALogic of Time, Chance, and Action for Representing Plans’, ArtificialIntelligence, 80, 243-308.

Section 2 on theunderlying ontology. Distinguishes events from facts (a fact, but not an event,holds over every subinterval of any interval over which it holds) as well asbetween event types and event tokens, and treats actions as events broughtabout by agents. The representation system is based on Goldman’s (1970) theoryand exploits the notion of "level-generation".

1994 Continuityand Change in the Development of Russell’s Philosophy

, Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer AcademicPublishers; Warszawa: Polish Scientific Publishers.

Chapter 4, on causality, includes a brief discussion of the"slingshot" argument [pp. 91-92].

An attempt to characterize the distinction between acts (suchas killing) and omissions (such as letting die).

1982 Urteileund Ereignisse. Studien zur philosophischen Logik und Erkenntnistheorie

[Judgments and Events. Studies inPhilosophical Logic and the Theory of Knowledge, in German], Freiburg and München: Alber.

1969 ‘Startingand Stopping’, The Monist, 53, 410-25;reprinted in E. Freeman and W. Sellars, eds. (1971), pp. 86-101.

In what state is an object when it starts to move or tochange? From the untenability of some standard accounts in terms of instants,Hamblin develops a logic on change based on intervals; over an interval a thingcan be--without contradiction--in two different states.

Includes a discussion of topics such as ontological commitmentto events and the relation between time and events. An event is defined as "anitem corresponding [...] to a non-continuous-tensed verb, as opposed to a processor state where there is the reflection of a continuous-tensed verb of one kindor another. A fact is what is statable by means of a true proposition orstatement" [p. 56].

1986 ‘DefaultReasoning, Nonmonotonic Logics, and the Frame Problem’, Proceedings ofAAAI-86, Fifth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

, Vol. 1, Philadelphia: AAAI [Morgan Kaufmann], pp.328-33.

A discussion of the so-called "frame problem": "given aninitial description of the world (some facts that are true), the occurrence ofsome events, and some notion of causality (that an event occurring can cause afact to become true), what facts are true once all the events have occurred?"[p. 330]. As a case-study, what has come to be known as the "Yale shootingproblem" is introduced.

1987 ‘NonmonotonicLogic and Temporal Projection’, Artificial Intelligence

, 33, 379-412; reprinted in J. F. Allen, J. Hendler,and A. Tate, eds. (1990), pp. 624-40.

Expanded version of (1986), including reports on variouscriticisms and responses.

1981 ‘SingleCase Propensities and the Explanation of Particular Events’, Synthese

, 48, 409-36.

On a dilemma for theories of statistical explanation.Relevance of the dilemma to the traditional conception of an explanandum eventas a "static" attribute, outcome, or state of affairs.

1987 ‘Sobrela filosofia de Donald Davidson’ [‘On the Philosophy of Donald Davidson’, inSpanish], Critica, 19, 97-115.

1989 ‘Onthe Representation of Events: A Study of Orientation, Recall, and Recognition’,Journal of Experimental Psychology, General,118, 136-47.

An experimental psychological study of how orientation towardan event affects both its perception of the memory of it.

1975 Causing,Perceiving and Believing. An Examination of the Philosophy of C. J. Ducasse

, Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel.

Chapter 2, "Causality and Necessity", includes a criticalanalysis of Ducasse’s "inclusive" view of events as changes or unchanges instates of affairs [pp. 15ff].

1970 ‘DeepStructure as Logical Form’, Synthese,21, 275-97; reprinted in D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds. (1972), pp. 25-47.

Sec. 4 examines "what sort of theory results if deep structureis identified with logical form in the analysis of action sentences and causalsentences" [p. 38]. The account is based on Davidson (1967a) and concludes that"one cannot say that the deep structure of [Jack opened the door with thekey at ten o’clock] is embedded in that of[Fear caused Jack to open the door with the key at ten o’clock

] and the usual syntactic analysis of these sentencesmust be rejected" [p. 41].

1975 ‘LogicalForm’, in D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds., The Logic of Grammar

, Encino, CA: Dickenson, pp. 289-307.

1981 ‘TheEssential Grammar of Action (and Other) Sentences’, Philosophia

, 10, 209-16.

Argues that a Strawsonian (1959) framework in which referenceto objects is more basic than reference to events makes it difficult to providea satisfactory account of adverbial modification.

1973 ‘InDefense of Natural Agents’, The Philosophical Quarterly

, 23, 117-32.

1981 ‘Causesand Events’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

, 42, 236-53.

Argues that causation is best accounted for within a descriptiveframework based on the notion of a temporally extended event (as opposed to,e.g., a more traditional framework based on spatial manifolds made up ofobjects and voids).

Chapter XI, "Events, Individuals and Predication: A Defense ofEvent Pluralism", contends that thing- or substance-way of speaking is only ashorthand for the metaphysically more fundamental event talk. Critical reviewin R. M. Martin (1971b).

1985 Change,Persistence and Explanation, DoctoralDissertation, Stanford University.

Against the token-identity theory of the mental and thephysical, promotes weak supervenience as a variety of physicalist monism whichimplies no identity theory and yet preserves a primacy for physical events.Includes critical discussion of Davidson’s (1970b) argument.

1984a ‘OntologicalSupervenience’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy

, 22, Suppl. Vol., 1-12 [Spindel Conference 1983,"Supervenience", ed. T. Horgan].

Macro-causal relations as well as causal relations involvingpsychological events are explained in terms of supervenient causation, which inturn is characterized as a case of "strong supervenience".

1984b ‘Response:Phenomenal Causes’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy

, 22, Suppl. Vol.,63-70 [Spindel Conference 1983, "Supervenience",ed. T. Horgan].

1992 ‘Thresholds,Transitivity, Overdetermination, and Events’, Analysis

, 52, 159-63.

Argues that "in circumstances involving causal thresholds orcausal overdetermination one cannot consistently hold both that causation is atransitive relation and that its relata are ‘coarse-grained’ eventsindividuated by their spatial and temporal boundaries" [The Philosopher’sIndex Abstract].

1971 ‘TheLogic of Actions’, in B. Meltzer and D. Michie, eds., Machine Intelligence 6

, Edimburgh: Edimburgh University Press, pp. 495-520.

Early AI approach to the modelling of actions (= means formoving from one situation to another). Discussion of the "frame problem" (whichfacts remain unchanged when actions are performed).

1979 ‘TheNaive Physics Manifesto’, in D. Michie, ed., Expert Systems in theMicro-Electronic Age, Edimburgh: EdimburghUniversity Press, pp. 242-70; reprinted in M. A. Boden, ed., ThePhilosophy of Artificial Intelligence,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 171-205.

Inaugurates a vast research program aimed at describing thesalient features of our naive way of conceptualizing the physical world andimplementing them on computers, so that these can better interact with humanagents. A special place is dedicated to actions, changes, and processes.

1985a ‘TheSecond Naive Physics Manifesto’, in J. R. Hobbs and R. C. Moore, eds., FormalTheories of the Commonsense World, Norwood:Ablex, pp. 1-36; reprinted in G. F. Langer, ed., Computation andIntelligence. Collected Readings, MenloPark, CA: AAAI Press, and Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995, pp. 567-86.

"Events happen in time, but also in space--they have a where aswell as a when. They are four-dimensional spatio-temporal entities" [p. 24].

1985b ‘NaivePhysics I: Ontology for Liquids’, in J. R. Hobbs and R. C. Moore, eds., FormalTheories of the Commonsense World, Norwood:Ablex, pp. 71-107.

Makes use of the notion of a "history": "a connected piece ofspace-time in which ‘something happens’, more or less separate from other suchpieces" [p. 90] (for instance, "the inside of a room during an afternoon").Histories contain events, isolating them temporally and spatially from otherevents.

1979 ‘Counterpart-TheoreticSemantics for Modal Logic’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 76, 319-38.

Remarks that if the death of Caesar were essentially of

Caesar (i.e., if "it could not have occurred withoutbeing the death of Caesar"), thenLewis’s counterpart-theoretic semantics for modal logic "would have theconsequence that Caesar and his death could have at most one counterpart apiecein any world" [pp. 328-29].

1970b ‘Onthe Individuation of Actions’, Inquiry,13 [Special Issue on "Action"], 125-28.

A discussion of Davidson (1967a) focusing on some problemsabout identity criteria for actions. Oedipus struck the rude old manintentionally, but he did not strike his father intentionally--yet on Davidson’stheory there was just one striking (the old man being the same as Oedipus’sfather). Davidson’s reply in (1970c), following Anscombe (1957).

1972 ‘OnWhen There Must Be a Time-Difference between Cause and Effect’, Philosophyof Science, 39, 507-11.

"An adequate view of what is to be an event must illuminatethe enterprise of seeking to establish a singular causal statement". Objects that Kim’s property exemplificationaccount of events does not permit redescriptions of events, since any change(addition or deletion) in a given event description would alter theconstitutive property of the described event. Kim’s reply in (1976).

1973 ‘On"Redescribing" Cause and Effect in Action Contexts’, Noûs

, 7, 299-307.

A criticism of Davidson’s account of the causal relationsbetween wants and actions in terms of redescriptions in neurological terms.

Contains Audi (1993b), L. R. Baker (1993), Burge (1993),Davidson (1993c), Dretske (1993), Hornsby (1993), Kim (1993a, 1993b), McLaughlin (1993),and Sosa (1993).

1983 ‘House-Cleaningand the Time of a Killing’, Philosophical Studies, 44, 381-89.

Discussion of Thomson (1971b): the action of killing does notextend beyond the time of the shooting even if the victim dies at a later time.

1984 ‘TemporalParts and Four-Dimensional Objects’, Philosophical Studies

, 46, 323-34; reprinted in M. Rea, ed., MaterialConstitution. A Reader, Lanham, MD: Rowman& Littlefield, 1997, pp. 320-30.

1990 TheOntology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter

, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Study of "an ontology of four-dimensional hunks of matter".Argues "that every filled region of space-time is exactly filled by one suchobject and that any one of these objects has its actual spatiotemporalconfiguration and location at every world at which it exists. This ontologyshould be contrasted with [...] our standard ontology, according to which one andthe same three-dimensional object exists in its entirety at several times andat several worlds, having a different spatiotemporal shape and location at manyof these other worlds" [p. ix].

1992 ‘ThingsChange’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52, 695-704.

A defense of the doctrine of temporal parts (given any periodof time during which a material object exists, there are parts of the objectthat exist at that and at no other time). Criticisms in Lombard (1994).

Contra Kim (1974)argues that "Cambridge" events (e.g. Xanthippe’s becoming a widow) "are notevents, and a fortiori cannotstand in a relation of dependence to other events, whether of causal ornon-causal dependence" [p. 140].

1965 Aspectsof Scientific Explanation, New York: TheFree Press; London: Collier-Macmillan.

Distinguishes between "sentential" events and "concrete"events [pp. 421ff]. The former are those fact-like entities that can beexplained by answering questions of the form ‘Why is it the case that p

?’. The latter are not described by sentences but bynoun phrases: individual names or definite descriptions.

1973 ‘ModelingSimultaneous Actions and Continuous Processes’, Artificial Intelligence

, 4, 145-80.

Outlines an AI methodology "which makes possible the modelingof (1) simultaneous, interactive processes, (2) processes characterized by acontinuum gradual change, (3) involuntarily activated processes (such as thegrowing of grass), and (4) time as a continuous phenomenon" [Author’sAbstract].

1973 ‘Sentenceand Predicate Modifiers in English’, in J. P. Kimbal, ed., Syntax andSemantics, Volume 2, New York: SeminarPress, pp. 217-45.

Argues that "if we are content to deal with modifiers at thelevel where they appear simply as primitive operators on predicates [assuggested e.g. by Clark (1970), Montague (1970a), T. Parsons (1970), Thomasonand Stalnaker (1973)], we lose access to all their linguistically interestingand perhaps too many of their logically interesting properties. Thealternative, I suppose, is to leap into the uncharted swamp that lies out theresomewhere beyond tense logic" [pp. 243-44].

1982 ‘Tense,Aspect and Time Adverbials, II’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 5 [Special Issue on "The Semantics of TemporalElements", R. Wall and R. E. Grandy, eds.], 109-154.

A plea for "the embedding of the semantics of Part I [B.Richards (1982)] in a framework in which pragmatic considerations can interactfreely with the semantics, to restrict the domains within which quantificationis permitted" [p. 154].

1991a ‘Perfectiveand Imperfective Aspect and the Theory of Events and States’, Linguistics

, 29, 969-1010.

Develops a formal theory of states, events, and event typeswhich "gives the conceptual foundations for the semantics of aspect, accordsevents the logical status of individuals characterized by heterogeneous typepredicates but treats states as homogeneous properties of times" [p. 969,Abstract]. The analysis of states exploits the fact that "states are notindividuals from the logical point of view".

1991b ‘TemporaleKonjunktionen und Aspekt. Der sprachliche Ausdruck von Zeitrelationen zwischenSituationen’ [‘Temporal Conjunctions and Aspect. The Linguistic Expression ofTemporal Relations among Situations’, in German], Kognitionswissenschaft

, 2, 51-90.

Uses the theory of times, events, event types, and states of(1991a) to provide an account of temporal and durational conjunctions inGerman.

1990 ‘Passageand the Presence of Experience’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

, 50, 537-52.

1988 ‘Thingsin Space and Time’, in J. S. Petöfi, ed., Text and Discourse Constitution.Empirical Aspects, Theoretical Approaches,Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, pp. 377-418.

A nominalistic approach "construing everything needed withinthe interpretation of natural language texts [...] exclusively by means ofreference to individuals" [p. 380]. The slogan: "no space-time without things,no things without space-time" [p. 388]. With the help of a rich mereologicalapparatus, events are construed as virtual classes of virtual classes with twoindividuals as members: a mereological atom and a so-called conglomerate (see §3.3 for details). The construction is such that "although it is not the casegenerally that every object is an event or that every event is an object, eachobject or event comprises objects as well as events as parts. In some modelsthere is even no difference between objects and events at all" [p. 413].

1983 ‘TheLogic of Perceptual Reports: An Extensional Alternative to SituationSemantics’, The Journal of Philosophy,80, 100-27; reprinted in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp. 19-46.

In response to Barwise (1981), proposes a first-orderextensional semantic analysis of naked infinitive perceptual reports asinvolving quantification over individual events in the spirit of Davidson’s(1967a) analysis of action sentences. For instance, ‘John saw Mary leave’ isanalysed as having the logical form ($e

)(Leave(Mary,e) & See(John,e))).See Vlach (1983) for a similar account. Critical discussion in Asher andBonevac (1985a) and Neale (1988).

Includes a discussion of event-based analyses of perception verbs[pp. 554ff], adverbial modification [pp. 562ff], naked infinitives [pp. 588ff].

1986 ‘LinguisticTheory and Davidson’s Program in Semantics’, in E. LePore, ed., Truth andInterpretation. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson

, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 29-48.

Argues that a Davidsonian analysis of action sentences allowto account for the inference from ‘John does anything that Bill does’ and ‘Billjogs’ to ‘John jogs’ within classical first order logic (based on a problemfrom Chierchia 1984).

1989 ‘Elucidationsof Meaning’, Linguistics and Philosophy,12 [Special Issue on "Studies on Logical Form and Semantic Interpretation", R.May, ed.], 465-517.

Argues that what have come to be called "semantic postulates"of a language reduce to "elucidations" of lexical meanings that are tacitlyknown by native speakers. Includes an elaboration of the thesis advanced inHigginbotham (1985) that "reference to events is the appropriate way to viewproperties of subordinate clauses and modification" [p. 465].

Some mental states that arise when one locates a sentence’scontent as belonging to one’s present or past are reflexive

, i.e., they include themselves as constituents oftheir contents. "That content is then a tensed thought, ordering one’s presentstate with respect to the content. Anaphoric cross-reference between an eventor state (understood as in Davidson [1967a]) and a constituent of its contentis responsible [...] for the phenomenon of sequence of tense in English.Conversely, the fact that some states are necessarily reflexive supports theview that the elaborations of logical form that account for sequence of tenseare no mere artefact of semantics, but even intrinsic to some of our utterancesand thoughts" [p. 226, Abstract].

1995 ‘SomePhilosophy of Language’, in L. R. Gleitman and M. Liberman, eds., AnIntroduction to Cognitive Science. Vol. I: Language, Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press/Bradford Books, pp. 399-427.

1986 ‘Plurals’,in J. Carter and R.-M. Déchaine, eds., Proceedings of the Sixteenth AnnualMeeting, North-Eastern LinguisticSociety, University of Massachusetts atAmherst: GLSA, pp. 161-75.

An account of plurals as referring "not to objects, but topredicates, or to concepts in the senseof Frege". This view is "intimately connected with the thesis that thepredicates of natural language are first of all classifiers of events

, in the sense of Davidson [...] The concepts to whichplurals refer put conditions on the nature of the participants in events. Thusa sentence like John and Mary lifted the piano (together)

does not report the exploits of a ‘plural object’,but an event that had more than one agent" [p. 162]. Full developments inSchein (1986, 1993).

Critical review of Mellor (1995), with Mellor’s replies in(1997). Suggests that "if Don’s rope broke and he failed to fall, then hisfailing to fall, his floating there in space, would be a surprising andsignificant event in his life" [p. 4].

1983 ‘TheSemantics of the English Progressive: A Study in Situation Semantics’, in A. Chukerman,M. Marks, and J. F. Richardson, eds., CLS19: Papers from the NineteenthRegional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society, pp. 171-82.

Argues that an adequate account of the progressive mustcombine Dowty’s (1977) "modal analysis" with M. Bennett’s (1981) and T.Parsons’s (1980) "non modal analysis". This is done within the framework ofBarwise and Perry’s situation semantics (1981, 1983), which "allows forpartially defined courses of events and structural constraints obtainingbetween courses of events" (both features being crucial for the proposedaccount). Includes an discussion of the "imperfective paradox".

1985 ACompositional Semantics for Aktionsarten and NP Reference in English

, Doctoral Dissertation, Ohio State University.

A semantic account of English Aktionsarten

exploiting the analogy between the mass-countdistinction and the distinction between atelic and telic events.

1986 ‘TemporalAnaphora in Discourses of English’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 9 [Special Issue on "Tense and Aspect inDiscourse", D. R. Dowty, ed.], 63-82.

Applies the system of event structures of Kamp (1979) to theanalysis of anaphoric relationships between temporal expressions.

1982 ‘TemporalDiscourse and Semantical Games’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 5 [Special Issue on "The Semantics of TemporalElements", R. Wall and R. E. Grandy, eds.], 3-22.

Proposes a game-theoretical semantical account for Englishtenses and time adverbs, including an account of the distinction betweendistributive and collective uses of verbs, which is meant to show "that we donot need the collective-distributive contrast in any shape, size or form, andhence do not need Davidson’s ontology either. [...] Thus our theory tells againstthe reification of events" [pp. 6-7].

There can be no identity of mental and physical events becausethere are no events.

1971/2 ‘InanimateAgency’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 72, 195-213.

Offers "an account of non-human agency which [...] does notrequire us to abandon the claim that in some way statements about non-humanobjects causing things to happen imply statements about a causal relationbetween events" [p. 196]. In short, "agency statements imply causal statements(for non-human actions)" [p. 212]. More generally, in regard to action theorybroadly understood: "we may be misled into thinking that the action is an event[...] Although an event occurs when the agent acts, the action is not that event[...] Because the event is caused in acertain way the agent is said to produce the effect and its

action is the producing or causing of this effect"[pp. 212-13].

1996 ‘TheRole of Contrast in Causal and Explanatory Claims’, Synthese

, 107, 395-419.

Outlines a unified account of the role of contrastive stressin various contexts, including of causal statements (in the spirit of Dretske1977).

1991 ‘Aspectand Adverbials’, in S. Moore and A. Z. Wyner, eds., Proceedings of the FirstSemantics and Linguistics Theory Conference (SALT I), Ithaca, NY: Cornell Working Papers in Linguistics, n. 10, pp. 107-26.

Proposes a treatment of the prepositions heading temporaladverbials as binary operators that select aspectual properties of theirarguments (extending the characterization of Dowty 1986 to include such basicproperties of events as culmination) and that order the arguments temporally.

1995 ‘Sketchof an Ontology Underlying the Way We Talk about the World’, InternationalJournal of Human-Computer Studies, 43[special issue on "The Role of Formal Ontology in the Information Technology",N. Guarino and R. Poli, eds.], 819-30.

Section 6 treats causality as a relation among events as wellas states (as in ‘The slipperiness of the ice caused John to fall’) or agents(as ‘John lifted his arm’: "we probably don’t want to coerce this argument intosome imagined event taking place inside John" [p. 827]). States arecharacterized generally as predications; events are changes of states; actionsare causing of events by intentional agents; and processes are sequences ofevents or actions.

1987 ‘CommonsenseMetaphysics and Lexical Semantics’, Computational Linguistics

, 13, 241-50.

An influential AI project for developing common-sense theoriesof various domains of discourse, including time and causality. "There are two possibleontologies for time. In the first [...] there is a time line [...] In the secondontology, the one that seems more deeply rooted in language, the world consistsof a large number of more or less independent processes, or histories, orsequences of events" [p. 244]. The latter ontology is axiomatized using aprimitive relation of change betweenevents.

1991 TheMind Matters. Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World

, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Chapter 2 [pp. 38-62] on mental events and their relationshipswith physical events.

1978 ‘ATreatment of Activity Verbs in a Montague-Type Grammar: A First Approximation’,in F. Guenthner and C. Rohrer, eds., Studies in Formal Semantics:Intentionality, Temporality, Negation,Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 121-65.

An attempt to account for Vendler’s (1957) fourfoldclassification of verb types (states, activities, accomplishments, andachievements) within the framework of Montague grammar (1973). Focuses onactivity verbs. Compare also Vlach (1981b).

1980 ‘Onthe Mass-Count Distinction and the French Imparfait and Passé Simple’, in C.Rohrer, ed. (1980), pp. 85-112.

Presents a semantics of the French imparfait and passé simplewhich "provides a formal basis for the intuition that the imparfait hasaffinity to mass expressions and the passé simple to count expression" [p. 85].

1981 ‘Remarkson Noch and Schon

in German’ in P. Tedeschi and A. Zaenen, eds.(1981), pp. 103-26.

Proposes a way of establishing a link between a verbclassification in the spirit of Vendler (1957) and different meanings of‘still’ and ‘already’ (in German).

Chapter 4 contains an argument for the claim that the categoryof events (among others) is necessarily such that it is instantiated eithermultiply or not at all.

1970 Identities,States, and the Mind-Body Problem, DoctoralDissertation, University of Michigan.

1981 ‘PsychophysicalLawlike Connections and Their Problem’, Inquiry, 24, 277-304.

1982 ‘TheArgument for Anomalous Monism’, Analysis,16, 59-64; reprinted with revisions as Chapter 1 of (1988).

"Donald Davidson’s principle of the nomological character ofcausality needs to be supplemented by the truth that the nomological connectiongoes with causally relevant properties. Are mental events causally relevant asmental or as physical events? Either answer is bad news for anomalous monism" [ThePhilosopher’s Index Abstract].

1983 ‘AnomalousMonism: Reply to Smith’s "Bad News for Anomalous Monism"’, Analysis

, 43, 147-49.

1988 ATheory of Determinism. The Mind, Neuroscience, and Life-Hopes

, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Offers a materialist model for action explanation based on theHypothesis of Psychoneural Nomic Correlation: "Foreach mental event of a given type there exists some simultaneous neural eventof one of a certain set of types. The existence of the neural event necessitatesthe existence of the mental event, the mental event thus being necessary to theneural event" [p. 107].

1992 ‘Causation:One Thing Just Happens After Another’, in L. E. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy ofA. J. Ayer [The Library of LivingPhilosophers], Peru, IL: Open Court, pp. 243-70.

1994 ‘Functionalism,Identity Theories, the Union Theory’, in Warner and Szubka, eds. (1994), pp.215-35.

Defends the view "that a mental event and the simultaneousneural event are nomically related, as specified by the correlation hypothesis[in the sense of (1988)], and that they constitute a single effect, and thateach event may be causal with respect to an action or later mental event" [p.230].

1971 ‘TheRelational Doctrines of Space and Time’, British Journal for the Philosophyof Science, 22, 97-130.

Examines the implications of relational theory of time, i.e.,the view that time is a logical construction out of events and relations amongthem.

1988 Quine.Language, Experience and Reality, Stanford:Stanford University Press.

1978 ‘The Case Against Events’, ThePhilosophical Review, 87, 28-47; reprintedin R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp. 243-62.

A representative formulation of the non-realist position withregard to events. "I will show that despite the initial appearances, there isno real theoretical need to postulate events. So, since their eliminationyields an important simplification of ontology, we should banish them fromexistence" [1978, p. 28]. The "no real theoretical need" is tested against (i)Davidson’s remarks on causality ("slingshot" argument), (ii) the notion of"same action under different descriptions", (iii) the mind-body problem, and(iv) adverbial modification (pro semantics à la Clark 1970). Compare Altman, Bradie & Miller (1979) for a criticalassessment. Developments in (1981b).

1980a ‘Non-rigidEvent-Designators and the Modal Individuation of Events’, PhilosophicalStudies, 36, 341-51.

A critical analysis of Brand’s (1976a, 1977) account of eventidentity, concluding that "it needlessly complicates the metaphysics of events--bygenerating gratuitous obstacles to a Humean treatment of causation, bymultiplying distinct events beyond necessity, and by introducing unnecessarynoncausal dependence-relations among events" [p. 350].

1980b ‘HumeanCausation and Kim’s Theory of Events’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy

, 10, 663-79.

Suggests that Kim’s account of causation in terms of lawfulconstant conjunction between the constitutive properties of thecausing and caused events requires limiting the class of such properties(in the property exemplification conception of events) to those countenanced byexceptionless laws. Thus, not every event-denoting nominalized sentence(‘John’s thinking of Vienna’) expresses the constitutive property of the eventdenoted.

1981a ‘TokenPhysicalism, Supervenience, and the Generality of Physics’, Synthese

, 49, 395-413.

A criticism of Fodor’s (1974) doctrine of "token physicalism",moving from Fodor’s own theory of events.

Exploiting the idea that the basic definitions of Goldman’s(1970) action theory can be transformed so as to preserve their conceptualcontent without any ontological commitment to actions. For instance, Goldman’snotion of "level-generation" is expressed by a non-truthfunctional causalconnective (‘and thereby’) and the notion of "basic action" can be expressed byan adverbial modifier, as in "John coughs in a basic-acting manner

1982 ‘Substitutivityand the Causal Connective’, Philosophical Studies, 42, 47-52.

A defense of the claim put forward in(1978) that singular causal statements have the logical form "A

because B",where ‘because’ is a sentential connective. There is also a defense of theappeal to Occam’s razor against "Russell’s razor" (contra

Altman, Bradie and Miller 1979).

Argues that a positive account of"quausation" (4-place relationexpressed by locutions of the form "c quaF causes e qua G") makes itplausible to answer the question of the causal efficacy of the mental qua

mental. Argument and underlying analysis areformulated within a Davidsonian event-based account, though these are"expository fictions".

1991 ‘Actions,Reasons, and the Explanatory Role of Content’, in B. P. McLaughlin, ed., Dretske and His Critics

, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 73-101.

1993 ‘From Supervenience to Superdupervenience:Meeting the Demands of a Material World’, Mind, 102, 555-86.

A state-of-the-art overview of theconcept of supervenience, including its uses in relation to the problem ofmental causation.

1994 ‘Nonreductive Materialism’, in Warner and Szubka, eds. (1994), pp. 236-41.

A defense of a nonreductive form ofnaturalism that is "robustly realist" about mental causation.

1985 ‘Againstthe Token Identity Theory’, in E. LePore and B. P. McLaughlin, eds. (1985), pp.427-43.

Criticizes Davidson’s anomalous monism using inter alia

the principle that "quite often there is no suchthing as ‘the cause’ (at a given time) of a particular event [...] Which eventone calls ‘the cause’ is normally a contextually determined affair" [p. 430].Argues further that mental events do not exist, distinguishing this view from eliminative materialism.

A criticism of Thalberg (1977) on the individuation ofactions: one should not confuse questions about particulars (people’s doings ofthings) with questions about universals (the things that people do).

"If there is to be any hope of truth in an identification ofactions with bodily movements, then they must be movementsT, not movementsI, that are actions--hismovingsT of hisbody, not his body’s movingsI"[p. 3; ‘T’ for transitive, ‘I’ for intransitive]. "This provides an explanationof why we do not answer the question ‘What did he do?’ with ‘His body moved’.We can always answer with ‘He movedT his body’. But that rules out giving ‘His body movedI’ as answer" [p. 13]. Onaction and causation: "Event causality is prior to agency in respect toexplanation, and [...] an account of human action does not require some othernotion of causality" [p. 89].

1980b ‘Verbsand Events’, in J. Dancey, ed., Papers in Logic and Language

, Keele: Keele University Library, pp. 88-111.

1980c ‘Actionand Ability’, in R. Haller and W. Grassl, eds., Language, Logic, andPhilosophy: Proceedings of the 4th International Wittgenstein Symposium

, Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, pp. 387-91.

Distinguishes two notions of basicness corresponding to twodistinct roles that the concept of basic action has been supposed to fill: (i) to elucidate ‘the structure’ of action,and (ii) to give an account of what it is to do something ‘directly’ or ‘justlike that’. Claims that no single concept will fill both roles.

"A man’s trying toraise his arm is a necessary condition of his raising his arm intentionally,and [...] this--that he tried to raise it--in conjunction with the facts that hisarm goes up and that it goes up because he tried to raise it, may take us toward a sufficient condition for hishaving intentionally raised his arm" [p. 73].

1980/1 ‘WhichPhysical Events are Mental Events?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

, 81, 73-92.

The answer involves a challenge of the mereological and"Humean" conception of event in favor of the view of events as genuineparticulars.

1981a ‘Replyto Weil’s and Thalberg’s "Basic and Non-Basic Actions"’, Analysis

, 41, 18-21.

On Lowe (1981); compare the rest of the exchange in Lowe(1983, 1984) and Hornsby (1983).

1985 ‘Physicalism,Events, and Part-Whole Relations’, in E. LePore and B. P. McLaughlin, eds.(1985), pp. 444-58.

Criticizes the construal of continuants and events by means ofmereological fusions. The fusion of two continuants need not be a continuant;likewise in the case of events, one should not tolerate "the extraordinaryevents" which the fusion axioms commit us to, for "these putative events lackany conceivable value to us in giving explanations [...] Inasmuch as it is in thenature of events to cause and to be caused, we expect individuals events to bemembers of kinds that pull their weight in illuminating accounts of how onething followed another" [pp. 453-54]. Events differ from continuants, though,insofar as parthood has a clear spatialsignificance for continuants but not for events, ultimately because there is nomatter, "no event stuff out ofwhich occurrences are constructed" [p. 456].

1986b ‘BodilyMovements, Actions, and Mental Epistemology’, in P. A. French, T. Uehling, andH. K. Wettstein, eds., Studies in the Philosophy of Mind

(Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. X),Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 275-86.

Defends the view that the relation between an action and thecorresponding bodily movement is causal--and that the agent’s body’s moving isnot part of the agent’s moving her body--against the objection that this viewimplies that we do not see actions. Includes a more general discussion of thevisibility of events.

1986c Reviewof Vermazen and Hintikka, eds. (1985), The Philosophical Quarterly

, 36, 296-300.

A rebuttal of Wreen’s (1987) discussion of the ‘by’ locution.Reply in Wreen (1988).

1988 ‘Sartreand Action Theory’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

, 48, 745-51.

Includes a defense of the view that actions are events andthat a distinction between actions and movings does not distort thephenomenology of the agent’s perspective.

1993 ‘Agencyand Causal Explanation’, in J. Heil and A. R. Mele, eds. (1993), pp. 161-88.

Argues for the view that actions are not accessible from theimpersonal world of causes, even assuming that actions are events (Section 2)and that reason explanation is causal explanation (Section 3).

1995a ‘Action’,in T. Honderich, ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy

, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp.4-5.

1995b ‘Event’,in T. Honderich, ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy

, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp.253-54.

1990 AsTime Goes By. Tense and Universal Grammar,Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

A theory of natural language tense based on a revision ofReichenbach’s (1947) approach.

1986 Reviewof Barwise and Perry (1983), The Journal of Philosophy

, 83, 168-84.

1987 Asymmetriesin Time. Problems in the Philosophy of Science,Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

Suggests that "the act one does owing to ignorance [...] is theresult of some other causally related act which one believed himself to bedoing" [p. 20]. Discussion in Jager (1967).

Huff, D., Turner, S.1981 ‘Rationalizationsand the Application of Causal Explanations of Human Action’, AmericanPhilosophical Quarterly, 18, 213-20.

1994 ‘Essentialityof Origin and Individuation of Events’, The Philosophical Quarterly

, 44, 26-44.

Argues against the view that events have their causesessentially (compare van Inwagen 1978a, 1983).

1971 ‘NonlogicalNecessity and C. J. Ducasse’, Ratio, 13,119-38; reprinted in Beauchamp, ed. (1974), pp. 163-78.

1989 ‘ScientificExplanation: The Causes, Some of the Causes, Nothing but the Causes’, in P. Kitcherand W. S. Salmon, eds., Scientific Explanation [Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XIII],Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 283-306.

Construes causal explanations employing an ontology à la

Kim where events are taken "as concrete, specificentities, actual instantiations of or changes in worldly properties of asystem, these properties being possessed by specific structures, themselves apart of the world, with these structures persisting through the change in propertieswhich constitute an event" [p. 289]. In short: "An event is thepossession of, or change in, a property of a system on a given occasion

(trial)" [ibid.].

1962 ‘Timein the Earlier and Later Whitehead’, in D. R. Griffin, ed., Physics and the UltimateSignificance of Time, Albany: StateUniversity of New York Press, pp. 87-109.

1947/8 Spór oistnienie s wiata

[The Controversy over the Existence of theWorld, in Polish], 2 vols., Kraków:Polskiej Akademii Umiejetnosci (Second Edition, Warszawa1960); German edition published as Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt

, 2 vols., Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1964/5; EnglishTranslation of parts of Vol. 1 in

Time and Modes of Being

(ed. H. R. Michejda), Springfield, IL: Thomas, 1960.

1991 ‘Actionsand Movements’, in Proceedings of the 12thInternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-91)

, Vol. 2, Sydney: IJCAI [Morgan Kaufmann], pp.1061-65.

An account of actions as "content properties that agents havein virtue of (i) the bodily movements they effect and (ii) the widercircumstances in which those movements are effected" [p. 1061, Abstract].Movements are viewed as concrete particulars.

1993 ‘Executions,Motivations, and Accomplishments’, The Philosophical Review

, 102, 515-40.

Assuming that acts are motivated--and therefore"rationalized"--by some complexes of cognitions, tries to provide a sufficientcondition for rationalization based on the idea that one of the cognitions mustbe a desire that a certain result be accomplished.

Sets out an analysis of the role of the notions of Agent,Patient, Location, etc. for semantic analysis.

1976 ‘Towardan Explanatory Semantic Representation’, Linguistic Inquiry

, 7, 89-150.

Develops the (1972) analysis of thematic roles and attempts to"show that it forms the basis for a genuinely explanatory theory of semanticrepresentation" [p. 89].

Argues that "the distinctions among ontological categories mustbe represented at the level of conceptual structure" [p. 51], and at this levelone must consider the feature [thing]as well as the features [event]and [action] (among others). "Whatthe conditions of individuation are, and how clear-cut a result they provide,are empirical issues" [p. 54].

1987 ‘TheStatus of Thematic Relations in Linguistic Theory’, Linguistic Inquiry

, 18, 369-411; incorporated in Jackendoff (1990),Chapters 2-4, Section 7.1.

Thematic roles are not part of syntax, but structural configurationsin conceptual structure.

Following the analysis of Jackendoff (1983), treats events,actions and states as major categories of conceptual semantics.

A Conceptual Semantics approach to various problems in eventstructure, including an analysis of Vendler’s (1957) classification of verbtypes, the meaning of the progressive, and Aktionsarten

such as the syntactically unexpressed sense ofrepetition in such sentences as ‘The light flashed until dawn’. The basicfeatures and functions used in the account may be syntactically expressed"either by being part of lexical conceptual structure, or by use of amorphological affix, or by being associated with the meaning of a constructionsuch as N of NP or nominalcompounding" [p. 9].

1990 ‘Causationin the Philosophy of Mind’, Philosophy and Phenomenology Research

, 50, Suppl. Vol., 195-214; reprinted with revisionsin A. Clark and P. J. R. Millican,eds., Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology. The Legacy of AlanTuring. Volume 2, Oxford: Clarendon Press,1996, 75-99.

On the general question of how to understand the causal roleof mental properties. Moves from the remark that "in addition to asking whichevents are causally relevant to which other events, we can and must ask whichproperties of events are causally relevant to which other properties" [p. 197].

1993 AUnified Semantic Analysis of Serialization: Intensionality of EventIndividuation, Doctoral Dissertation, BallState University.

Argues that the sense of inseparable connection betweenserialized event descriptions corresponds to a relation of a counterfactualdependence.

1989 OntologicalInvestigations. An Inquiry into the Categories of Nature, Man and Society

, London: Routledge.

1972 ‘Davidsonon Primitive Actions that Cause Deaths’, Analysis, 33, 36-41.

A formalization of Davidson’s argument in (1971a) to theeffect that "x does A

by doing B" involves reference to a single action under two descriptions. Theformalization relies on Davidson’s analysis of action sentences in (1967a) andit is found defective in view of Davidson’s account of the relation betweencauses and descriptions in (1967c).

1971 AContribution Toward a Non-substantial Theory of Times

, Ph.D. Dissertation, Brown University.

1975 ‘Eventsas Recurrables’, in K. Lehrer, ed., Analysis and Metaphysics

, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 209-26.

Develops a system (first presented in 1971) for dealing withevents as recurrables (here conceived broadly as events or states of affairs[p. 225 fn. 1]), which logically includes the system proposed in Chisholm(1970). The system uses a mereotopological machinery and purports to show theuselessness of Chisholm’s thesis that there are truth-functional events, forthe question of event-recurrence is instead "essentially concerned withtemporal relations among events" [p. 221].

1981 ‘AUnified Temporal Theory of Tense and Aspect’ in P. Tedeschi and A. Zaenen, eds.(1981), pp. 145-75.

Develops a theory of the temporal categories of tense andaspect (and of the auxiliary temporal category of "existential status") basedon the intuition that "these categories are concerned with the ebb and flow ofevents through time" [p. 146].

1972a ‘Actionand Result: Two Aspects of Predication in English’, in J. P. Kimball, ed., Syntaxand Semantics, Volume 1, New York: SeminarPress, pp. 117-24.

Argues that the ambiguity of a sentence like ‘John almostkilled Fred’ is not an ambiguity on the scope of ‘almost’, but an ambiguity inthe word ‘kill’ between an action sense and a result sense. Also objects to theanalysis of ‘kill’ as deriving from ‘cause to die’ (as suggested by McCawley1968 and Lakoff 1970; see Fodor 1970b, Katz 1970 and Wierzbicka 1975 forrelated material on this point).

1972b ‘Replyto McCawley’, in J. P. Kimball, ed., Syntax and Semantics, Volume 1

, New York: Seminar Press, pp. 151-56.

1993 Holism,Language and Persons. An Essay on the Ontology of the Social World

, Aldershot: Avebury.

1979 ‘Events,Instants, and Temporal Reference’, in R. Bäuerle, U. Egli, and A. von Stechow,eds., Semantics from Different Points of View, Heidelberg and New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 376-417.

Argues that understanding a discourse involves building up asequence of event structures reflecting the temporal relations between theevents mentioned in the discourse. An event structure is defined formally as anordered tuple based on a set of events (a primitive category) along with aprecedence relation and an overlap relation.

1980 ‘SomeRemarks on the Logic of Change. Part I’, in C. Rohrer, ed. (1980), pp. 135-179.

An analysis of change in terms of event structures whosemembers are observer-independent events.

1981 ‘Événements,représentations discursives et référence temporelle’ [‘Events, DiscourseRepresentations, and Temporal Reference’, in French], Langages

, 6, 39-64.

A detailed overview of the treatment of tense and adverbs inDiscourse Representation Theory, dealing among other things withadverb-dropping inferences, the "imperfective paradox", and the construction oftime from events.

1993 FromDiscourse to Logic. Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of NaturalLanguage, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory

, Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer AcademicPublishers.

Chapter 5 [pp. 483-689] is a detailed exposition of anevent-based treatment of tense and aspect phenomena within the framework ofDiscourse Representation Theory. It includes a discussion of the distinctionbetween events and states (both from an ontological and from a linguisticperspective, i.e. "How are we to tell sentences which describe events fromsentences which describe states?", p. 510), as also an analysis of the relationbetween events (or event structures) and times (instant structures) in terms ofthe overlap and precedence relations [pp. 664ff].

1983 ‘Tensein Texts’, in R. Bäuerle, C. Schwarze, and A. von Stechow, eds., Meaning,Use, and Interpretation of Language, Berlinand New York: de Gruyter, pp. 250-69.

Builds on the idea that "the significance of the tenses liesprimarily in the temporal relations which they establish between the sentencesin which they occur and the sentences which precede those in the texts ordiscourses in which those sentences occur" [p. 250] (see Kamp 1979). Usesevent-based representations.

1967 ‘OnConfirmation and Verification of Events, Names, and Statements’, Methodos

, 1, 317-43.

1977 ‘Davidsonon the Identity Theory’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy

, 7, 81-90.

Argues that Davidson’s (1970b) argument for thepsycho-physical identity theory relies on an implausible account of mental andphysical events: the assumptions underlying Davidson’s linguistic test fordetermining whether a given event is mental or physical are either false orpresuppose the truth of the identity theory.

A criticism of Kim’s principles of event existence and eventidentity, both of which are found "incompatible with several plausibleassumptions about reference and identity" [p. 427]. In particular, the latteris found inadequate insofar as (i) each event is supposed to have a certainpolyadicity (how can "Oedipus’ killing of his father" be the same event as"Oedipus’ committing patricide" if ‘killing’ is dyadic whereas ‘committingpatricide’ monadic?), and (ii) adverbial modification induces implausibledistinctions (if the table in the room = the brown table in the room, why notthe death of Caesar at t = the violentdeath of Caesar at t

?).

1978b ‘Isthe Causal Criterion of Event Identity Circular?’, Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy, 56, 225-29.

A defense of Davidson’s (1969a) criterion of event identity interms of sameness of causes and effects against the charge of circularity: "theidea that it is [circular] rests on misunderstandings about what identitycriteria are supposed to accomplish" [p. 226].

Against the idea that if a piece of discourse can be rephrasedso as to avoid any reference to or quantification over events, then there is noreason to suppose that it says that there are events. As a case-study, thesentences (1) "The eruption of the Vesuvius occurred during A.D. 79", (2) "Theeruption of the Vesuvius was violent", and (3) "An eruption of the Vesuviuswhich was violent occurred during A.D. 79" are considered; it is argued thatwhen it comes to explaining the logical behavior of their paraphrases, we mustlook for the logical form of sentences much like the originals, hence we mustrefer to a domain of events.

1970 InterpretiveSemantics vs. Generative Semantics’, Foundations of Language

, 6, 220-59.

Includes a criticism of the analysis of causative verbs suchas ‘kill’ as meaning ‘cause to die’ (analysis put forward e.g. by McCawley 1968and Lakoff 1970). The six-shooter of the sheriff is faultily repaired by thelocal gunsmith; as a result the weapon jams at the critical moment and thesheriff is gunned down. "Clearly, the gunsmith caused the death of the sheriff,but equally clearly, the gunsmith did not kill him" [p. 253]. Compare Fodor(1970b), Kac (1972), Shibatani (1972), Wierzbicka (1975) for related material.

1985 ‘ADecompositional Approach to Modification’, in E. LePore and B. P. McLaughlin,eds. (1985), pp. 207-34.

The approach exploits the structure revealed in analyses ofthe senses of syntactic simples, which is argued to provide the elementsrequired to state the laws governing the contribution of the meaning ofmodifiers to that of their heads.

1991 ‘AFormal Theory of Plan Recognition and Its Implementation’, in J. F. Allen, H.A. Kautz, R. N. Pelavin, and J. D. Tenenberg (1991), pp. 69-125.

From the author’s own overview: "The Recognizer’s knowledge isrepresented by a set of first-order statements called an event hierarchy

, which defines the abstraction, specialization, andfunctional relationships between various types of events. The functional [...]relationships include the relation of an event to its component

events. There is a distinguished type End

which holds of events that are not components of anyother events. Recognition is the problem of describing the End events thatgenerate a set of observed events" [p. 72].

1985 BooleanSemantics for Natural Language, Dordrecht,Boston, and Lancaster: Reidel.

1976 ‘Robinson’sIndividuation of Speech Acts’, Philosophical Quarterly

, 26, 261-66.

Chapter 7 contains what may be regarded the first explicitarguments against the traditional identification of action verbs and relationalpredicates (but see also Mayo 1950). Among other things, "actions [...] exhibit avariable polyadicity which is foreign to relations [...] A sentence reporting anaction not only can be shorn of one of its terms without making nonsense [aswhen we deduce ‘Caesar was killed’ from ‘Brutus killed Caesar’]; it can alsohave further terms added to it in various ways [‘Brutus killed Caesar inPompey, with a knife, ...]" [pp. 157-59]. The argument is taken up by Davidson(1967a). Chapter 8 [pp. 171-86] articulates Aristotle’s classification ofaction verbs into states, performances, and activities. Compare Vendler’s(1957) fourfold classification, where the category of performances is splitinto achievements and accomplishments. Fundamental for much subsequentliterature on tense and aspect.

Works with a general notion of an event which includes "themovements of human bodies and the passing of thoughts through human minds" [p.141].

1966 ‘Onthe Psycho-Physical Identity Theory’, American Philosophical Quarterly

, 3, 277-85.

Outlines one of the most widely discussed event theories,based on the view that events are particulars with a uniform internal structureconsisting in the exemplification of a property P by a physical object xat a time t (their canonicaldescriptions being singular terms of the form [x,

t, P

]). Basically the same account to be found in R. M.Martin (1969b) and A. I. Goldman (1970, 1971). Identity conditions areformulated in terms of sameness of constituent properties, times and objects(more precisely, in terms of co-reference of the corresponding designatingexpressions), yielding a very fine grained (highly multiplying) account:"Brutus’s killing Caesar is not the same as

Brutus’s stabbing Caesar. Further, to explainBrutus’s killing Caesar [...] is not the same as to explain Brutus’s stabbingCaesar" [p. 232n]. See Davidson (1969a), Rosenberg (1974), Brand (1877), Katz(1978), R. M. Martin (1980), Hacker (1981), Gjelswik (1988) interalia for discussion. See also Peterson(1989) for extensions.

1969 ‘Eventsand Their Descriptions: Some Considerations’, in N. Rescher, ed., Essays inHonor of Carl. G. Hempel, Dordrecht:Reidel, pp. 198-215.

Refinement of the event theory adumbrated in (1966). Thiscovers "not only what we ordinarily call ‘events’ but also such entities as‘states’, ‘states of affairs’, ‘phenomena’, ‘conditions’, and the like. Perhaps‘fact’ is more appropriate" [p. 213].

1971 ‘Causesand Events: Mackie on Causation’, The Journal of Philosophy,

68, 426-41; reprinted in E. Sosa, ed. (1975), pp.48-62, and in E. Sosa and M. Tooley, eds. (1993), pp. 60-74.

A critical examination of J. L. Mackie’s (1965) analysis ofcausation, moving from the premise that "coherent causal talk is possible onlywithin a coherent ontological and logical framework of events and perhaps alsoother entities of appropriate categories; and the adequacy of an analysis ofcausal relations may very much depend on the sort of ontological and logicalscheme underlying it" [p. 427]. Includes a redefinition of INUS conditions interms of events referred to by nominals in canonical form [x

, P, t

1973a ‘Causation,Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of an Event’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 70, 217-36; reprinted in Kim (1993d), pp. 3-21.

Includes a generalization of the theory introduced in (1966,1969), allowing events to involve more than one object and, correspondingly, apolyadic property.

1973b ‘Causesand Counterfactuals’, The Journal of Philosophy, 70, 570-72; reprinted in E. Sosa, ed. (1975), pp. 192-94.

Comments on D. K. Lewis (1973), giving examples of events thatare counterfactually related without being cause and effect. See Yagisawa(1979) for a suggestion on how to handle these cases.

1974 ‘Non-CausalConnections’, Noûs, 8, 41-52; reprintedin Kim (1993d), pp. 22-32.

"Cambridge" changes (e.g., Xanthippe’s becoming a widow) areevents that stand in a relation of non-causal dependence to other events (e.g.,Socrates’ death). See Helm (1976) and Lombard (1978b, 1986) for some dispute.

1976 ‘Eventsas Property Exemplifications’, in M. Brand and D. Walton, eds. (1976), pp.159-77; reprinted in Kim (1993d), pp. 33-52, and in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi,eds. (1996), pp. 117-35.

A defence and clarification of the property exemplificationtheory. "[It] is not an ‘eliminative’ or ‘reductive’ theory of events; that is,it does not attempt to show that events are in some eliminative sense‘reducible’ to substances, properties, and times" [p. 162]. "In a sense knowingwhat the constitutive object, property, and time of an event are is

to know what that event is

[...] my canonical description of an event [...] givesan ‘intrinsic description’ of an event" [p. 166]. "My events are ‘particulars’and ‘dated’" [p. 165]. "Overall [...] there are no irreconciliable doctrinaldifferences between Davidson’s theory ofevent discourse as a semantical theory and the property-exemplification accountof events as a metaphysical theory" [p. 167]. Considers also the possibility ofextending the theory by allowing for complex events, as in Peterson’s (1989)developments.

1977 ‘Causation,Emphasis, and Events’, in P. A. French, T. Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein, eds., Studiesin the Philosophy of Language (MidwestStudies in Philosophy, Vol. II), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,pp. 100-3; reprinted in P. A. French, T. Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein, eds., ContemporaryPerspectives in the Philosophy of Language,Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979 [revised edition of the 1977volume], pp. 379-82.

Critical discussion of Dretske (1977) and Achinstein (1975a),pointing at a "mid-course" between the two.

1979a ‘Statesof Affairs, Events, and Propositions’, Grazer philosophische Studien

, 7/8 [special issue "Essays in the Philosophy of R.M. Chisholm", also published as E. Sosa, ed. (1979)], 147-62.

A critical examination of Chisholm’s theory of events asstates of affairs, pointing out various difficulties and suggesting suitablemodifications.

1979b ‘Causality,Identity, and Supervenience in the Mind-Body Problem’, in P. A. French, T.Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein, eds. (1979), pp. 31-49.

Includes a discussion of the relation of supervenience betweenfamilies or properties of events, causal connections between supervenientevents being explained in terms of causal connections between the events onwhich they supervene. Event [x, P

, t]supervenes on event [x', P'

, t']iff x=x'

, t=t'

, and Psupervenes on P'. Formulation anddefense of the thesis that mental events are supervenient upon physical events.

1980 ‘TheRole of Intention in Motivational Psychology: Comments on Brand’, in M. Bradieand M. Brand, eds. (1980), pp. 20-26.

1981 ‘Causesas Explanations: A Critique’, Theory and Decision, 13, 239-309.

Criticizes the view that causation can be analysed in terms ofexplanation, also because it reflects a form of "causal idealism" according towhich causal connections are not among the "objective features" of the world.

Formulation and defense of the thesis that an organism’sinternal psychological states are supervenient upon its physical states andprocesses.

1984a ‘Epiphenomenaland Supervenient Causation’, in P. A. French, T. Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein,eds. (1984), pp. 257-70; reprinted in D. M. Rosenthal, ed., The Nature ofMind, New York and Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1991, pp. 257-65, and in Kim (1993d), pp. 92-108.

"The general schema for reducing a macrocausal relationbetween two events, x’s having F

and y’shaving G, where F

and Gare macroproperties, is this: x’shaving F supervenes on x

’s having m(F), y

’s having G supervenes on y’s havingm(G

), where m(F

) and m(G

) are macroproperties relative to F

and G,and there is an appropriate causal connection between x

’s having m(F) and y

’s having m(G)" [1993d, p. 99]. "Epiphenomenalcausal relations involving psychological events [...] are no less real or substantial than those involvingmacrophysical events. They are both supervenient causal relations

. It seems to me that this is sufficient to redeemthe causal powers we ordinarily attribute to mental events" [p. 107].

1984b ‘Supervenienceand Supervenient Causation’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy

, 22, Suppl. Vol., 45-56 [Spindel Conference 1983,"Supervenience", ed. T. Horgan].

Macro-causal relations and causal relations involving psychologicalevents are explained in terms of supervenient causation, which is characterizedas a case of "strong supervenience". Reply in McLaughlin (1984).

1984c ‘Conceptsof Supervenience’, Philosophy andPhenomenological Research, 45, 153-76;reprinted in Kim (1993d), pp. 53-78.

A general study of the supervenience relation, including adiscussion of the supervenience of the mental on the physical.

1985 ‘PsychophysicalLaws’, in E. LePore and B. P. McLaughlin, eds. (1985), pp. 369-86; reprinted inKim (1993d), pp.194-215.

An examination of Davidson’s (1970) arguments against thepossibility of psychophysical laws.

1988 ‘ExplanatoryRealism, Causal Realism, and Explanatory Exclusion’, in P. A. French, T.Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein, eds., Realism and Anti-Realism

(Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. XII),Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 225-39.

Develops the notion of "explanatory realism" and considers howsuch an attitude toward explanations might be based on a realist conception of causal relations.

1989a ‘Mechanism,Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion’, in J. Tomberlin, ed. (1989), pp. 75-108.

Argues for the principle of "explanatory exclusion", to theeffect that no single event can have more than one "complete" and "independent"explanation (in particular, causal explanation). Discusses implications andapplications. See also (1990).

1989b ‘Honderichon Mental Events and Psychoneural Laws’, Inquiry

, 32, 29-48.

Discusses Honderich’s "hypothesis of psychoneural correlation"and his response to Davidson’s arguments for psychophysical anomalism.

1989c ‘TheMyth of Nonreductive Materialism’, Proceedings and Addresses of the AmericanPhilosophical Association,

63, 31-47;reprinted in Kim (1993d), pp.265-84; in Warner and Szubka, eds. (1994), pp. 242-60;and in P. K. Moser and J. D. Trout,eds., Contemporary Materialism.

A Reader, London and New York: Routledge, 1995, pp. 133-49.

Argues that a physicalist concerning the mental/physicalrelation can only be either an eliminativist or a reductionist--nomiddle-of-the-road position is available. Ample discussion of Davidson (1970b).

1990 ‘ExplanatoryExclusion and the Problem of Mental Causation’, in E. Villanueva, ed., Information,Semantics, and Epistemology, Cambridge, MA:Basil Blackwell, pp. 36-56; reprinted in C. A. Macdonald and G. Macdonald, eds.(1995), pp. 121-41.

Defends the principle of "explanatory exclusion" introduced in(1990) and discusses it in connection with the problem of mental causation: ifevery mental event is in principle explainable in physicalistic(neurophysiological) terms, what explanatory job can there be for its supposedmental causes? See discussion in Worley (1993) and Dretske (1995).

1991 ‘Events:Their Metaphysics and Semantics’, Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research,51, 641-46.

Part of a symposium on J. Bennett (1988) (with replies in J.Bennett 1991b). Focuses on the charge of having inferred a false semantics ofevent names from a true metaphysics: "Bennett’s denial notwithstanding, a‘bridge’ from the metaphysics of events to the semantics of event names isavailable: [...] An event name of the form ‘the exemplification by S

of Pat T’ names (if it namesanything) the event which is the exemplification of the property ‘P

’ names by the substance ‘S

’ names at the time ‘T

’ names" [p. 643].

1993a ‘CanSupervenience and ‘Non-Strict Laws’ Save Anomalous Monism?’, in J. Heil and A.R. Mele, eds. (1993), pp. 19-26.

Commenting on Davidson (1993c), argues that in embracing"non-strict laws" one may end up losing anomalism from anomalous monism.

1993b TheNonreductivist’s Troubles with Mental Causation’, in J. Heil and A. R. Mele,eds. (1993), pp. 189-210; reprinted in Kim (1993d), pp. 336-57.

Argues that the positions of non-reductive physicalism(physicalist ontology with dualist ideology) and of emergentism (mentalproperties appear as emergent qualities) involve violation of the causalclosure of the physical.

Dealing with some difficulties in the view of mental causationas supervenient causation, suggests that the "standard"property-exemplification account of events defended in earlier works mightrequire a revision "especially if mental properties, in spite of their multiplephysical realizability, are accepted as legitimate event-generating properties.For on the standard account two property instances count as distinct events ifthe properties instantiated are distinct. I believe, though, that this is aproblem about properties, not one directly about events" [p. 364, n. 5].

1993d Supervenienceand Mind. Selected Philosophical Essays,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Includes Kim (1993c) and reprints of Kim (1973a, 1974, 1976,1983c, 1984a, 1985, 1993b).

Includes a discussion of the token-identity theory of themental and the physical (Ch. 5) and of mental causation (Ch. 6).

1985 ADefense of the No Event Theory of Events: An Inquiry into Event-ReductionMethodology and Its Applications, DoctoralDissertation, Brown University.

A defense of the view that there is no need to posit events asan independent basic ontological category insofar as they can be reduced toother basic entities such as properties and individual things. Includes atreatment of adverbial modification, causation, and level-generation.

1971 ‘Fact’,in D. Steinberg and L. Jakobovits, eds., Semantics. An InterdisciplinaryReader in Philosophy, Linguistics, and Psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 345-69.

Distinguishes between factive and non-factive clauses andcorrespondingly between facts and propositions.

1995 Causalité,loi, représentation [Causality,Law, Representation, in French] DoctoralDissertation, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris.

Proposes a realist theory which reduces causation to atransfer of some conserved quantity between events. Events are construed asparticulars identified by the space-time zone they occupy. The role of laws,realistically understood as universal regularities involving propertyinstantiations, in event causation and in a more complex relation of causalresponsibility is analysed. Causal explanations rely directly on the latter,and only indirectly on the former.

On reconciling supervenience with the anomalism of the mentalin Davidson’s theory. Argues that although "Davidson tends to speak of mentalevents as though they are things in the world [...] the mental becomes more a wayof seeing people than it is something in people that can be seen" [p. 342].

On why it is not possible to make the event time of "Chris hasleft York" more explicit by adding an adverbial, as in "*Yesterday at ten,Chris has left York". A compositional analysis is proposed, and it is arguedthat the incompatibility of the present perfect and most past tense adverbialshas neither syntactic nor semantic causes but follows from a pragmaticconstraint.

1959 ‘Broadon Mental Events and Epiphenomenalism’, in P. A. Schilpp, ed., ThePhilosophy of C. D. Broad, New York: Tudor,pp. 437-55.

1970 ‘DoesBecoming Entail a Contradiction?’, American Philosophical Quarterly

, 7, 357-63.

Becoming is not merely paradoxical but positivelycontradictory (on the assumption that events become).

"My action is my response to objectivity [...] the action is nota bodily movement plus a mental state [...]; it is on the contrary the action ofmind, a synthetic unity" [p. 103].

Thorough linguistic investigation on the mechanisms ofnominalization (including comparative linguistic aspects).

Defines action as purposeful bringing about of an effect by acause. Every action is either elementary or consists of elementary actions.

1994 ‘TheSituation Calculus and Event Calculus Compared’, in M. Bruynooghe, ed., LogicProgramming. Proceedings of the 1994 International Symposium (ILPS ’94)

, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 539-53.

Shows that with minor modifications the event calculus ofKowalski and Sergot (1986) entails the situation calculus of McCarthy and Hayes(1969), while the latter entails the former if augmented with induction.

1986 ‘ALogic-Based Calculus of Events’, New Generation Computing

, 4, 67-95.

Outlines an approach for reasoning about events and timewithin a logic programming framework (the main intended applications beingnarrative understanding and database updating). "The notion of event is takento be more primitive than that of time and both are represented explicitly [...]Because events are differentiated from times, we can represent events withunknown times, as well as events which are partially ordered and concurrent"[p. 67, Abstract]. See Sadri and Kowalski (1995) for variants.

1995 ‘Stage-leveland Individual-level Predicates’, in G. N. Carlson and F. J. Pelletier, eds., TheGeneric Book, Chicago and London:University of Chicago Press, pp. 125-75.

Argues that stage-level predicates (such as is dancing

) have an extra argument position for events (in thesense of Davidson 1967a), whereas individual-level predicates (such as hasbrown hair) lack this position. CompareChierchia (1995a).

1989a ‘NominalReference, Temporal Constitution and Quantification in Event Semantics’, in R.Bartsch, J. van Benthem, and P. van Emde Boas, eds., Semantics andContextual Expression, Dordrecht: Foris,pp. 75-115.

On the similarities between the meanings of nominal and verbalexpressions insofar as the mass-count distinction in the nominal domain(nominal reference) is reflected in the atelic-telic distinction in the verbaldomain (temporal constitution). Gives a rigorous model-theoretic account in thespirit of E. Bach’s (1986) approach, defining a mereological lattice structureon the domain of events to match a corresponding structure on the domain ofobjects. Verb arguments and adverbial attributes are represented by means ofprimitive thematic relations, following the neo-Davidsonian approach of T.Parsons (1980), Carlson (1984), and Dowty (1989).

1989b Nominalreferenzund Zeitkonstitution: zur Semantik von Massentermen, Pluraltermen undAspektklassen [Nominal Referenceand Time Constitution: On the Semantics of Mass Terms, Plurals, and AspectualClasses, in German], München: Fink.

Ch. 2 (on "Time constitution") is a thorough survey of theliterature on time, tense, aspect, Aktionsarten and event semantics. Application of the semantics proposed to afragment of German.

1990 ‘FourThousand Ships Passed Through the Lock: Object-Induced Measure Functions onEvents’, Linguistics and Philosophy, 13,487-520.

A formal analysis of the event-related reading of suchsentences as "Four thousand ships passed through the lock last year" (meaningthat there were four thousand events of passing through the lock by a ship lastyear--possibly the same ship in each case--as opposed to an object-relatedreading presupposing the existence of four thousand distinct ships).

1991 ‘ThematicRelations as Links between Nominal Reference and Temporal Constitution’, in I.Sag and A. Sabolcsi, eds., Lexical Matters,Stanford: CSLI Lecture Notes No. 24, pp. 29-54.

On the correspondence between the reference type of nounphrases (mass nouns, count nouns, plurals) and the temporal constitution ofverbal predicates, i.e., activities and accomplishments. Based on an eventsemantics with lattice structures and thematic roles as primitive relationsbetween events and objects.

1995 ‘Telicityin Movement’, in P. Amsili, M. Borillo, and L. Vieu, eds. (1995), Part A, pp.63-75.

1972 ‘Namingand Necessity’, in D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds. (1972), pp. 253-355, addendapp. 763-69; reprinted with revisions as Naming and Necessity

, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Contains an argument against the identity of the mental andthe physical which, although spelled out with regard to type-type accounts, isalso meant to cover token-token versions (such as Davidson’s 1970a) based "onthe supposed impossibility ofcorrelating psychological properties with physical ones. The argument againsttoken-token identification in the text does

apply to these views" [p. 144, n. 73; the lastsentence is missing in the 1972 edition]. Compare McGinn (1977) and F. Feldman(1980) for rejoinders.

1989 ‘Tenseand Time’, in D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, eds., Handbook of PhilosophicalLogic, Volume IV (Topics in the Philosophy of Language

), Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 513-52.

An overview of the semantics of tense in linguistics,philosophy, and logic, including critical analyses of Bennett and Partee(1978), Dowty (1979), T. Parsons (1980, 1985), Tichy (1980a), and Vlach (1981a).

1975 ‘PeterF. Strawson: Deskriptive Metaphysik’ [‘Peter F. Strawson: DescriptiveMetaphysics’, in German], in J. Speck, ed., Grundprobleme der großenPhilosophen, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht (second revised edition, 1984), pp. 168-207.

Overview of Strawson’s descriptive endeavour in metaphysics.Pp. 185ff especially devoted to the Strawson-Moravcsik debate on the asymmetricrelation of dependency between events and objects. Holds that it is natural tothink that processes undergo change (as reported in ‘the movement of thependulum was slower and slower’); however, even if "things are not the onlysubjects of change [...] they are the primary subjects of change" [1984, p. 185].

1983 AbstrakteGegenstände. Ontologie und Semantik [AbstractObjects. Ontology and Semantics, inGerman], Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Formulates a criterion for ‘individual moments’ that issatisfied, among other things, by entities such as the Equator and Socrates’death. "One can distinguish events [...] as dynamic individual moments fromstatic individual moments such as the equator" [pp. 73-74].

1991 ‘Handlungs-und andere Ereignissätze. Davidsons Frage nach ihrer "logischen Form"’ [‘ActionSentences and Other Event Sentences. Davidson’s Query on Their "Logical Form"’,in German], Grazer philosophische Studien,39, 27-49.

Extensive analysis and criticism of Davidson’s views on thelogical form of action sentences with some examples from German.

1993 ‘Truth,Meaning and Logical Form. Reflections on Davidson’s Philosophy of Language’, inR. Stoecker, ed. (1993), pp. 1-20.

Section 6 suggests a "demonstrative" account of attributiveadverbs, whereby a sentences such as ‘David crosses the lake slowly’ isanalysed as ‘($x

)(x isa crossing of the lake by David& in this respect x

is slow)’ [with ‘this’ harking back to ‘crossing’].Moreover, the same treatment is applied to such adverbs as ‘intentionally’,‘deliberately’, and the like: ‘Oedipus intentionally killed the recklessdriver’ becomes ‘($x

)(x isa killing of the reckless driverby Oedipus & in this respect x

is intended by Oedipus)’. See Davidson’s opinion in(1993a).

1976 ADictionary of Philosophy, London, Henley,and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

1988 ‘Towarda Nongrammatical Account of Thematic Roles’, in W. Wilkins, ed., Syntax andSemantics, Volume 21, Thematic Relations,New York: Academic Press, pp. 61-73.

Maintains that "the phenomena which purport to show thatthematic roles are relevant to the grammar have their ultimate etiology infacts about the world" [p. 62]. For instance, "What makes Fido an agent in theevent described by [Fido chased Felix]and [Felix was chased by Fido] isinformation about Fido and his role in the event, not about the grammaticalcategory or function of anything in the sentence" [p. 63].

Includes an analysis of causative verbs such as ‘kill’ asmeaning ‘cause to die’, or ‘cause to become not alive’. Compare McCawley (1968,1973a) for a similar account. Objections in J. J.Katz (1970), Fodor (1970b), Kac (1972), Shibatani (1972), Wierzbicka (1975).

1973 ‘Noteson What It Would Take to Understand How One Adverb Works’, The Monist

, 57, 328-43.

Argues that neither event-based analyses in the spirit ofDavidson’s (1967a) account, nor predicate-modifier analyses in the tradition ofClark (1970), have come close to "a full understanding" of adverbs like slowly

. Critical discussion in Reeves (1977).

1978 ‘Times,Clocks, and the Ordering of Events in a Distributed System’, Communicationsof the ACM, 21, 558-65.

The intuition is that the concept of time derives from that ofthe order in which events occur; but in a distributed artificial system it maybe impossible to say that one of two events occurred first--hence the relation"happened before" is only a partial ordering. The paper argues that therelation can, however, be extended to a consistent total ordering and adistributed algorithm for doing so is presented. Applications tosynchronization problems are considered.

1964 ‘MentalEvents’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 24, 307-17.

Mental events can sometimes be distinguished from other sortsof events by the property of "privacy".

1965 ‘Replyto Professor Whallon’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

25, 404-5.

Replies to Whallon (1965), maintaining a skeptical attitudetowards the existence of unconscious mental events.

1969 ‘Actionsas Universals: An Inquiry into the Metaphysics of Action’, AmericanPhilosophical Quarterly, 6, 247-52.

Rejects the distinction between actiontypes and action tokens.Actions are to be categorized as repeatable universals, like colors or shapes.They are "attributes of persons".

1985 ‘TheRealist Theory of Meaning’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 8 [Special Issue on "Situations and Attitudes", R.Cooper and R. E. Grandy, eds.], 1‑32.

Against the sort of realism embodied in Barwise and Perry’ssituation semantics (1981, 1983): "The realist theory of meaning seeks meaningin the world through constraints on factual courses of events. The distinctionbetween essential and accidental constraints that is presented in Situationsand Attitudes is unconvincing and [...] leadsto other problems as well" [p. 36].

1991 Structuresfor Semantics, Dordrecht, Boston, andLondon: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Includes an extensive study of temporal and event structuresbased on mereotopological relations in the spirit of Kamp (1979, 1980) and vanBenthem (1983).

Develops an analysis of the progressive based on the"classical wisdom" that in a sentence like "Mary is building a house", thefunction of the -ing form is to presentthe event of Mary’s building a house from an internal perspective: as anincomplete event, an event in progress. Events are construed as entitiesordered by a relation ‘part-of’ and a relation ‘stage-of’.

1996 ‘Plurality’,in S. Lappin, ed., The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory

, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 425-57.

Section 6, "A Neo-Davidsonian Theory of Events and Plurality"[pp. 437-39], outlines an event-based account of plurals close to that ofSchein (1986, 1993) and Higginbotham and Schein (1986). Compare also Lasersohn(1995).

1982 ‘Remarkson English Aspect’, in P. J. Hopper, ed., Tense-Aspect: Between Semanticsand Pragmatics, Amsterdam and Philadelphia:John Benjamins.

Examines various aspectual phenomena in natural language fromthe perspective of so-called "space grammar". The three main aspectual classesare said to describe "imperfective processes", "perfective processes", and"states".

1987 ‘ARepresentation of Parallel Activity Based on Events, Structure, and Causality’,in M. P. Georgeff and A. L. Lansky, eds. (1987), pp. 123-59.

Presents an AI domain representation based on anevent-oriented (as opposed to state-oriented) model: events are "reified" inthe spirit of Davidson’s theory and their causal and temporal relationships areexplicitly represented; states are then defined in terms of past eventactivity. It is then argued that "temporal logic constraints on event histories(records of past activity) can facilitate the description of many of thecomplex synchronization properties of parallel, multiagent domains" [p. 123,Abstract].

1988 ‘LocalizedEvent-Based Reasoning for Multiagent Domains’, Computational Intelligence

, 4, 319-40.

Describes a concurrency model (and a corresponding multiagentplanner) in which world domains are modeled as sets of regions composed ofinterrelated events, each region being associated with event-based temporal logicconstraints.

1987 ‘Davidsonon Explaining Intentional Actions’, Grazer philosophische Studien

, 36 [special issue also published as J. Brandl andW. L. Gombocz, eds. (1989)], 33-45.

Argues that there are reasons for thinking that Davidson’sposition concerning the explanation of intentional actions (beliefs and desiresare causes of actions, but mentalistically described antecedents of intentionalactions cannot be subsumed under strict laws) is sound.

1988 ‘ImplicitArguments in Situation Semantics’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 11, 169-201.

Presents an analysis of so-called implicit arguments(expressions that seem to share properties of adjuncts and arguments alike, asin "John cut the salami (with a knife)") within the framework of Barwise andPerry’s situation semantics (1981, 1983): "these elements are neither argumentsnor adjuncts in the usual sense. Rather, they are phrases licensed by a form ofextragrammatical "inference" involving knowledge about events and therelationships holding between them" [p. 169].

1995 Knowledgeof Meaning. An Introduction to Semantic Theory,Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

Includes a detailed presentation of recent work on events insemantics and the philosophy of language. See especially Chapter 12 [pp.465-524] on the motivations for expanding the ontology of a semantic theory toinclude entities "of a less familiar kind" such as events, states, and timeinstants. "Our goal is to illustrate how these new entities make their way intosemantic theory and propagate through it, and to raise the kinds of conceptualquestions that they bring in their wake" [p. 465]. Topics include inter alia

: a modified version (called "event calculus") ofDavidson’s (1967a) account of action sentences and adverbial modification;thematic roles; nominalization; Aktionsarten

; tense and aspect; naked infinitive perceptualreports.

1988 AFormal Semantic Analysis of the Progressive,Doctoral Dissertation, University of Edinburgh.

An analysis of Dowty’s (1977) "imperfective paradox". Theproposed solution (which exploits a distinction between process sentences andevent sentences in terms of homogeneity) is based on an interval-based temporallogic and employs some ideas of Moens and Steedman’s (1988) model of temporalreference.

1992 ‘Knowledge,Causality, and Temporal Representation’, Linguistics

, 30, 941-73.

Proposes a semantic account of the simple past tense in textin which "the contributions [...] made by the text’s syntactic structure,semantic content, aspectual classification, world knowledge of the causalrelation between events, and Gricean pragmatic maxims are all representedwithin a single logical framework. This feature of the theory gives rise tosolutions to several puzzles concerning the relation between the descriptiveorder of events in text and their temporal relations in interpretation" [p.941, Abstract].

1988 ASemantics for Groups and Events, DoctoralDissertation, Ohio State University.

On the semantics of sentences reporting events involving groupaction, as with John and Mary’s lifting of the piano together. Includes aformal account of the mereological structure of events.

1990 ‘GroupAction and Spatio-Temporal Proximity’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 13, 179-206.

Elaborates on the account put forward in (1988), arguing that"events of group action and events of spatially or temporally proximate actionshow systematic similarities, therefore allowing to construct a model-theoreticsemantics in which restrictions to group action and to spatially and temporallyproximate action are parallel in logical structure" [pp. 203-4].

1992 ‘GeneralizedConjunction and Temporal Modification’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 15, 381-410.

Argues that constructions in which conjoined predicates aremodified by temporal adverbials such as ‘alternately’ require a semantics inwhich sentences denote sets of events, in the spirit of E. Bach (1986), G. Link(1987), M. Krifka (1989). Intuitively, events are meant to include "states andatelic processes as well as events in the ordinary sense", and are assumed tobe partially ordered by a part-whole relation.

1995 Plurality,Conjunction and Events, Dordrecht, Boston,and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

A theory of plural and conjoined noun phrases within theframework of event-based semantics: such expressions are all unambiguouslygroup-denoting, and the distinction between plural, collective and distributivereading is represented in the part-whole structure of the events appearing ashidden arguments as in Davidson (1967a). Compare Schein (1986, 1993),Higginbotham and Schein (1986), and Landman (1996).

1987 ‘SingularCausal Statements and Strict Deterministic Laws’, Pacific PhilosophicalQuarterly, 68, 29-43.

Working with the notion of an event individuated solely interms of spatio-temporal regions, examines the kind of strict deterministiclaws there are and the ways of formulating what it is for a pair of events tofall under a strict deterministic law. Conclusion: there is no necessary orsufficient condition for the truth of singular causal statements in terms ofstrict deterministic laws that does not hold also of singular statements of"absolute precedence".

1950a ‘Whitehead’sMethod of Extensive Abstraction’, Philosophy of Science

, 17, 142-63.

Exposition and critical assessment. Includes detailedsummaries of Whitehead’s views on events as the natural primary entities ofreality.

1950b ‘Lockeand Whitehead on Individual Entities’, The Review of Metaphysics

, 4, 215-38.

Argues that "Whitehead’s philosophy is an attempt from thevery beginning to dispose of any theory of nature which bifurcates it [as withLocke’s two-fold treatment of substance...] by removing the category of‘substance’ from its position of fundamental importance, substituting for itthe notion of an ‘event’" [p. 223]. However, "when he comes to examine thespatio-temporal limits of an event, without which it could hardly be said to bean individual, he tells us both that events are given in sense-awareness ashaving definitely limited extent and that our experience does not

yield events having definite boundaries--rather, thisis the outcome of an arbitrary act of thought", and this "entails its own formof ‘bifurcation’" [p. 237].

1961 ‘Whiteheadand the Problem of Extension’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 58, 559-64.

On extensiveness as a relation between events understood asessentially spatio-temporal entities.

1988 ‘TheNontransitivity of Causation’, American Philosophical Quarterly

, 25, 87-94.

An argument against the transitivity of the causal relation.The argument is held to be compatible with both the Kimian and the Davidsoniantheory of events, as well as with Dretske’s (1977) supposition that the causalrelata are not events but features of events.

Includes a discussion of the analogy between the mass-countdistinction and the distinction between events verbs (win

, explode)and state or process verbs (run, grow

1963 TheGrammar of English Nominalizations,Bloomington: Indiana University Press; The Hague: Mouton.

A transformational grammar study of the mechanisms ofnominalization in English, including a comparative analysis of factive andaction nominals (Ch. 3, Part B).

1979 ‘Onthe Dramatic Stage in the Development of Kotarbinski’s Pansomatism’, in P.Weingartner and E. Morscher, eds., Ontologie und Logik · Ontology and Logic.Vorträge und Diskussion eines Internationalen Kolloquiums · Proceedings of anInternational Colloquium , Berlin: Duncker& Humblodt, pp. 197-214.

An assessment of Kotarbinski’s theory, summarized bythe three theses that "(1) All objects are things, (2) No object is a propertyor a relation or event or any other of the alleged objects belonging allegedlyto an ontological category other than the category of things, (3) The terms‘property’, ‘relation’, ‘event’ and any other would-be names of alleged objectsbelonging to an ontological category other than the category of things arepseudo-names or onomatoids" [198]. See also the "Discussion" on pp. 215-18.

1967 ‘Commentson D. Davidson’s "The Logical Form of Action Sentences"’, in N. Rescher, ed.(1967), pp. 96-103.

Argues that some of the adverb-dropping inferences discussedby Davidson (1967a) are not valid due to the referential opacity of tense(which should be made explicit in the account). Secondly, points out the needfor identity criteria for events, suggesting to take space-time as a suitablecoordinate system: two distinct events cannot occupy the same spatio-temporalregion (the so-called "Lemmon-Quine" criterion; compare Quine 1950). Theresulting account is strongly unifying: for instance, it does not distinguishbetween the rotating and the becoming warm of a metal ball which is simultaneouslyrotating and becoming warm (Davidson’s 1969a example). See Brand (1976a-1989b)for a refining of this account. Davidson’s original replies in (1967b).

1988 MetaphysicalInvestigations, Rutheford, Madison andTeaneck: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press; London and Toronto: AssociatedUniversity Press.

Acts and events have "formal reality", but they are not"existent entities" [pp. 137-38].

1979 ‘Handlungals Interpretationskonstrukt’ [‘Action as an Interpretive Construct’, inGerman], in H. Lenk, ed. (1979), Vol. 2/2, pp. 279-350.

Puts forward an account of action as an interpretiveconstruct, a "semantically interpreted entity" (as opposed to an "ontologicalentity"). It is the interpretation or description which is to be added to getan action out of a physical event (movement). Compare Gebauer (1979).

1982 ‘InterpretiveAction Constructs’, in J. Agassi and R. S.Cohen, eds., Scientific Philosophy Today.Essays in Honor of Mario Bunge,Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 151-58.

1979 Handlungstheorieninterdisziplinär, Band II. Handlungserklärung und philosophischeHandlungsinterpretation [ActionTheories. An InterdisciplinaryOutlook, Volume II: Action Explanation and Philosophical Interpretation ofAction, in German], München: Fink.

1994 ‘Reasonsand Causes’, in S. Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind

, Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, pp. 531-35.

1990 ‘Relationismand Temporal Topology: Physics or Metaphysics?’, The Philosophical Quarterly

, 40, 419-32; reprinted with a new postscript in R.Le Poidevin and M. Mac Beath, eds. (1993), pp. 149-67.

Includes a discussion of the relationist account of time interms of possible events: "there existsa time t which is n

units before/after some actual event e

if, and only if, it is possible that there shouldexist an event n unitsbefore/after e" [p. 152]. The1993 postscript deals with complications arising from the possibility that timebe two-dimensional, or that, in some world, time is closed.

1991 Change,Cause and Contradiction. ADefence of the Tenseless Theory of Time,Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Develops a causal account of change. Maintains thatevents/processes are changes, hencethere is no such thing as change inan event/process. "A consequence of meeting this requirement would be arefutation of the common suggestion that Tenseless theory [...] must regardthings as extended processes. If things change and processes don’t, they musthave different identification conditions" [p. 77]. Includes a brief discussionof adverbial modification, favoring R. Clark’s (1970) approach [pp. 73-75].Chapter 6 also contains an argument to the effect that ordinary assumptionsabout causality imply the possibility of changeless time (compare Shoemaker1969).

On the question, "Should we think of the ‘tenseless’ relationsbetween events, such as today’s breakfast being before tomorrow’s tea, asdependent upon, or determined by, ‘tensed’ facts about those events, such astoday’s breakfast being past and tomorrow’s breakfast being future?" [p. 467].The issue is explored by considering two thought experiments concerning thetopological structure of time.

Includes G. Forbes (1993) and reprints of Le Poidevin (1990),Mellor (1981a, Ch. 6), Prior (1968), and Shoemaker (1969).

1985 ‘TheSemantics of Action, Event, and Singular Causal Sentences’, in E. LePore and B.P. McLaughlin, eds. (1985), pp. 151-61.

A survey of the role played by the concept of an event inDavidson’s philosophy (with reference to the mind-body problem, causation,explanation, action theory, and the semantics of natural language). Discussesthe differences between providing an analysis of a statement and giving itslogical form (158 ff.).

1991 ‘Davidson,Donald’, in H. Burkhardt and B. Smith, eds., Handbook of Metaphysics andOntology, Vol. 1, Munich: Philosophia, pp.196-98.

Includes brief review of Davidson’s views on the logical formof action sentences and on anomalous monism.

1987 ‘MindMatters’, The Journal of Philosophy, 84,630-42; reprinted in Warner and Szubka, eds. (1994), pp. 261-73.

Argues that "many of our intuitions about what is required fora mental property of an event to be causally relevant for that event’s effectsare consistent with the metaphysics of anomalous monism, specifically, with theidea that singularly causal statements must be backed by strict laws (ofphysics)" [The Philosopher’s Index Abstract].

1985 ‘Actions,Reasons, Causes and Intentions’, in E. LePore and B. McLaughlin, eds. (1985),pp. 3-15.

A survey (and reconstruction) of Davidson’s theory of actionand intention, with emphasis on rationalizing explanations.

1985 Actionsand Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson

, Oxford: Blackwell.

Includes J. Bennett (1985), Bratman (1985), Castañeda (1985),Chisholm (1985a), Davidson (1985a), Føllesdal (1985), Horgan and Tye (1985),Hornsby (1985), Katz, Leacock, and Ravin (1985), Kim (1985), LePore (1985),LePore and McLaughlin (1985), Lombard (1985), McCawley (1985), McLaughlin(1985), T. Parsons (1985), Quine (1985), Sanford (1985). Reviewed by Petit(1986), Spencer-Smith (1987), Stahl (1986), Teichmann (1987), Trainor (1989).

1976 ‘TheExtensionality of Causation in Causal Explanatory Contexts’, Philosophy ofScience, 43, 266-77.

Argues that both statements reporting causal relations andcausal explanatory statements are extensional. Discussion in Stern (1978).

1983 ‘MightEvents Be Propositions?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

, 44, 169-88.

Develops a propositional theory of events. Defines contingenteventual states of affairs as propositionalobjects that can contingently occur at a given time and can be changes inconcrete individuals. An event is thus defined as a contingent eventual stateof affairs that does occur at a given time and is a change in a concreteindividual [pp. 174-75]. Other definitions include that of a propositionalevent (a propositional object including a specific temporal parameter) and of arepeatable event.

Argues that "the view that temporal passage is a genuinefeature of the world is consistent with an ontology of concrete events" [pp.341-42].

1969 ‘Essentialand Causal Explanation of Action’, Mind,78, 91-101; reprinted with revisions under the title ‘Are There Non-causalExplanations of Actions?’ in Thalberg (1972), pp. 73-86.

Distinguishes between general causal explanation and essentialexplanation: "to propose an essentialaccount of some incident is to delineate those qualities or aspects of theincident which figure in our criteria for saying what kind

of occurrence it is" [p. 92].

1973 ‘Causation’,The Journal of Philosophy, 70, 556-67;reprinted in E. Sosa, ed. (1975), pp. 180-91; in Lewis (1986d), pp. 159-72; andin E. Sosa and M. Tooley, eds. (1993), pp. 193-204.

Defends an analysis of some sorts of causation in terms ofcounterfactual dependence between events ("in the everyday sense of the word:flashes, battles, conversations, impacts, strolls, deaths, touchdowns, falls,kisses, and the like", p. 161). Thus, event e causes event e' iffthere exists a "causal chain" from e to e', a causal chainbeing a finite sequence of particular events áe1,...,enñ with theproperty that, for each i ≥ 1, whether e

+1 occurs or not depends on whether e

i occurs or not.Compare the lengthy Postscripts (1986c).

1975 ‘Adverbsof Quantification’, in E. L. Keenan, ed., Formal Semantics of NaturalLanguage, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, pp. 3-15.

On the range of quantification of such adverbs as ‘always’,‘sometimes’, ‘often’, ‘seldom’, and the like.

1986a ‘CausalExplanation’, in Lewis (1986d), pp. 214-40; reprinted in D.-H. Ruben, ed., Explanation

, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 182-206.

Maintains that "to explain an event is to provide some informationabout its causal history" [p. 217]. More generally, "to explain a kind of eventis to provide some general explanatory information about events of that kind",i.e., information about what is common to all the parallel causal histories ofthose events [p. 225].

1986b ‘Events’,in Lewis (1986d), pp. 241-69; reprinted in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds.(1996), pp. 213-41.

Combining Quine’s and Lemmon’s account with Montague’s andCresswell’s theory of events as properties of times, treats events as propertiesof spatio-temporal regions, i.e., in the end, classes of individuals fromvarious worlds. It follows that events are the same whose members are the samespatio-temporal regions: events "have their essences built in, in the form ofnecessary conditions for their occurrence" [p. 247]. The mereology of events isaccounted for in two ways: (i) insofar as events are classes, "they have amereology is the way classes do: the parts of a class are its subclasses" [p.258]; (ii) insofar as the mereology of the members carries over to the classes,"small events that occur in subregions are parts of the big event that occursin the big region" [ibid.].

Expands on the counterfactual analysis of causation putforward in (1973), discussing such issues as piecemeal causation, chancycausation, causation insensitive to circumstances (such as killing, as opposedto letting die), causation by omission (= occurrence of any event of a certainsort), redundant causation, essentialism, and self-causation.

"I see no reason for distinguishing between an event and theproperty of being a spatio-temporal region, of this or another world, wherethat event occurs" [p. 95]. Includes a discussion of the counterfactualanalysis of causation; there is no causation from one world to another.

1985 ‘Isthe Mental Supervenient on the Physical?’, in B. Vermazen and M. B. Hintikka,eds. (1985), pp. 159-72.

A discussion of supervenience as holding either betweenevents, or facts, or properties.

1985 ‘UnconsciousCerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action’, TheBehavioural and Brain Sciences, 8, 529-66.

Reports interesting experimental findings supporting the claimthat physical events cause and are explanatory prior to mental events (of acertain sort). Criticisms in Green and Gillett (1995).

1987a ‘Onthe Semantics of strips’, in M. P.Georgeff and A. L. Lansky, eds. (1987), pp. 1-10; reprinted in J. F. Allen, J.Hendler, and A. Tate, eds. (1990), pp. 523-30.

A semantic discussion of how the effect of an action can bedescribed by a problem solver (strips)by a rule defining how the current world model should be changed when the actionis performed.

1987b ‘FormalTheories of Action’, in F. M. Brown, ed., The Frame Problem in ArtificialIntelligence. Proceedings of the 1987 Workshop,Los Altos, CA: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 35-57.

Gives an axiomatic description of causal connections betweenactions and changes. Applications to the "Yale shooting problem" of Hanks andMcDermott (1986).

1996 ‘LocalizedTemporal Reasoning Using Subgoals and Abstract Events’, ComputationalIntelligence, 12 [Special Issue on"Temporal Representation and Reasoning", S. D. Goodwin and H. J. Hamilton,eds.], 423-49.

On temporal reasoning problems where there is uncertainty onthe order of occurrence of some events.

1978 ThePhilosophy of Mind. A Bibliography. Part II: Philosophy of Action

, Oxford: Oxford University, Sub-Faculty ofPhilosophy [distributed by J. Hannon].

Over 800 entries (including a few classics) organized bytopic: the nature of action, explanation, mental acts, etc.

1983 ‘TheLogical Analysis of Plurals and Mass Terms: A Lattice-Theoretical Approach’, inR. Bäuerle, C. Schwarze, and A. von Stechow, eds., Meaning, Use, andInterpretation of Language, Berlin and NewYork: de Gruyter, pp. 302-23.

Describes a first-order predicate calculus called the "Logicof Plurals and Mass Terms" which has been used by some authors (most notably,E. Bach 1986a) to analyse the distinction between processes and other"eventualities".

1987 ‘AlgebraicSemantics for Event Structures’, in J. Groenendijk, M. Stokhof, and F. Veltman,eds., Proceedings of the 6th Amsterdam Colloquium, University of Amsterdam: Institute for Language, Logic andComputation, pp. 243-62.

An application of algebraic methods to an event-basedrepresentation of language (events being understood in a broad sense--as in E.Bach’s 1981 "eventualities"--comprising happenings as well as states).

1995 ‘AlgebraicSemantics for Natural Language: Some Philosophy, Some Applications’, InternationalJournal of Human-Computer Studies, 43[special issue on "The Role of Formal Ontology in the Information Technology",N. Guarino and R. Poli, eds.], 765-84.

Argues that structuring the domains of linguistic ontologyinvolves recognizing also events along with plural and mass entities. These arestudied from a common perspective using mereological and lattice-theoreticalnotions.

Distinguishes between action and bodily movement not byreference to the agent’s intentions or consciousness, but by reference to theagent as a cause of the movement (this being understood in a way thatundermines the usual distinction between agent causation and event causation).

"It seems impossible to deny that if mental events are to bepart of a causal order that include physical events, they must belong to thesame temporal order [...] If Einstein was right about space and time, they mustbelong to the same spatial order as well" [p. 25].

1974 ‘CausalTheories and Causal Overdetermination’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 71, 525-44.

Introduces the technical notion of an event e

being a ‘C-condition’ of an event e’

iff eis either a cause or a causal overdeterminant of e’

--these notions being in turn analysed in the contextof various approaches to the analysis of singular causal statements (analysesin terms of counterfactuals, of natural laws, and of necessary and sufficientconditions). See J. O’Connor’s (1976) remarks.

1977 ‘CausalOverdetermination and Counterfactuals Revisited’, Philosophical Studies

, 31, 211-14.

Defends the theory according to which time consists of thechanging tense-determinations--past, present and future--of events. Points out that"we have to distinguish the way in which an event type stands to its tokensfrom the way in which an event universal stands to its instances. Thus while particularrevolutions might be protracted, swift,violent or non-violent, Revolution(the universal) cannot itself be spoken of as swift, protracted, violent ornon-violent; on the other hand, if I say of a Sonata [...] that the AdagioCantabile is followed by the Allegro Moderato, then what I have said is trueboth of the type itself and of all tokens of the type" [pp. 10-11]. "Events towhich the type-token distinction is applicable, in some sense necessarily havethe internal ordering that they have" [p. 100].

1974 ‘ANote on Level-Generation and the Time of a Killing’, Philosophical Studies

, 26, 151-2.

Argues that the time-of-a-killing objection raised against thecoarse-grained approach to event identity (Goldman 1971, Thomson 1971a) cannotbe used in favor of Goldman’s level-generational fine-grained account: sinceactions that are related by the ‘by’ relation are supposed to occur at the sametime, the same problem arises on this view: how can Jones have killed thevictim by shooting at him if the victim dies at a later time than the time ofthe shooting? Compare also Pfeifer (1982).

1975 ‘Events,Changes, and the Non-Extensionality of "Become"’, Philosophical Studies

, 28, 131-36.

In sentences of the form ‘x became y at t

’, the position held by ‘y

’ may be regarded as extensional if the sentences areviewed as being about changes (albeit possibly only "Cambridge" changes).

1978a ‘Actions,Results, and the Time of a Killing’, Philosophia, 8, 341-54.

Defends the identification of shootings and killings; uses acausal analysis of sentences containing verbs of action (‘x

fed y

’ is rewritten as ‘x

caused yto be fed’).

1978b ‘RelationalChange and Relational Changes’, Philosophical Studies

, 34, 63-79.

A defense of the view that all it takes for an object tochange is for it to have a property at one time which it lacks at some othertime. This includes purely relational, "Cambridge" changes (such as Xantippe’sbecoming a widow) as bona fide changes.

1978c ‘Chisholmand Davidson on Events and Counterfactuals’, Philosophia

, 7 [Special Issue on "The Philosophy of Roderick M.Chisholm"], 515-22.

Argues against Chisholm’s argument (in 1970, 1971a) that suchevents as Nixon’s becoming president and Johnson’s successor’s becomingpresident are distinct (in spite of the identity Nixon=Johnson’s successor)insofar as the former, but not the latter, would not have occurred had Humphreywon the elections. The argument is valid only if ‘Johnson’s successor becomingpresident’ is construed as a rigid designator, which begs the question. Replyin Chisholm (1978).

1979a ‘Events’,Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 9,425-60; reprinted in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp. 177-212.

Events as changes thatphysical objects undergo when they change--more precisely, as "movements" byphysical objects (from the having of one to the having of another quality) throughsome portion of a quality space (class of contrary properties the mere havingof any member of which does not imply any change) during a stretch of time. Thecanonical descriptions of such events (at least the atomic ones) is essentiallya Kimean triple [x

, P

, t

], where P "is to be replaced by the atomic event verb which expresses thedynamic property the having or exemplifying of which [...] is that atomic event"[p. 446].

1979b ‘TheExtensionality of Causal Contexts: Comments on Rosenberg and Martin’, in P. A.French, T. Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein, eds. (1979), pp. 409-15.

A reply to Rosenberg and Martin (1979). What makes explanatorycontexts non-extensional and causal ones extensional has to do with the factthat the former are about facts (orother propositional entities) whereas the latter are about events.

1981 ‘Eventsand Their Subjects’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

, 62, 138-47.

Given the theory of (1979a), argues that it is essential foran event to have the minimal subject that it actually has (where the minimalsubject of an event e is the smallestobject a change in which is identical to e). Criticisms in Forbes (1985), pp. 208ff.

1982a ‘Eventsand the Essentiality of Time’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy

, 12, 1-17.

Given the theory of (1979a), argues that it is essential foran event to occur when it does. Criticisms in Forbes (1985), pp. 210ff.

1985 ‘HowNot to Flip the Prowler: Transitive Verbs of Action and Identity of Actions’,in E. LePore and B. P. McLaughlin, eds. (1985), pp. 268-81.

An analysis of sentences involving transitive verbs that is inline both with Davidson’s semantics and with its metaphysics of actions.Provides an account of transitive action sentences "that explains what it isfor an action to be a flipping insofar as it affects the switch, but notinsofar as it affects the prowler" [p. 276] (thus eschewing the problem arisingwhen, if flipping the switch is the same event as alerting the prowler, one canderive a statement to the effect that one flipped the prowler).

Full formulation of the theory outlined in (1979a, 1981, 1982a),with systematic exposition of the thesisof the supervenience of events. Reviewed by Brand (1989c), Kuo (1990), McCann(1987), Teichmann (1987), Wilkerson (1987).

1989 ‘"Unless","Until", and the Time of a Killing’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

, 70, 135-54.

"An attempt is made to show how a number of different views onthe time-of-a-killing problem is derivable from the same obvious claim--that onecannot kill another "unless" the other dies--by inferring from it the claim thatone cannot kill another "until" the other dies. It is then shown that this inferenceis fallacious" [The Philosopher’s Index Abstract].

1990 ‘Causes,Enablers, and the Counterfactual Analysis’, Philosophical Studies

, 59, 195-211.

Discusses the asymmetry between hasteners (that are generallycauses of what they hasten) and delayers (that are generally not causes of whatthey delay) towards a reformulation of the counterfactual analysis of eventcausation (D. K. Lewis 1973).

1991a ‘Change’,in H. Burkhardt and B. Smith, eds., Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology

, Vol. 1, München: Philosophia, pp. 137-39.

1991b ‘Events’,in H. Burkhardt and B. Smith, eds., Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology

, Vol. 1, München: Philosophia, pp. 256-59.

1992a ‘Events,Counterfactuals, and Speed’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

, 70, 187-97.

Against Bennett’s (1988) argument to the effect thatcounterfactual claims about events bear relations to essentialist claims aboutevents: if sound, the argument would show that events can occur more quicklythan they actually do.

1992b ‘Causesand Enablers. A Reply to Mackie’, Philosophical Studies

, 65, 319-22.

Defends the concept of an enabler introduced in (1990) againstthe criticisms of P. Mackie (1991).

1994 ‘TheDoctrine of Temporal Parts and the "No-Change" Objection’, Philosophy andPhenomenological Research, 54, 365-72.

On the topic of whether the temporal features of events areessential to them (assuming that every event has some interval for its time ofoccurrence, and therefore that no event can occur instantaneously).

1995c ‘EventTheory’, in J. Kim and E. Sosa, eds., A Companion to Metaphysics

, Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, pp. 140-44.

1996 ‘EventTheory’, in D. M. Borchert, ed. in chief, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Supplement, New York: Simon & SchusterMacmillan, pp. 158-60.

Contends that Hornsby’s (1980a) view that all actions occurinside a body stems from a misconception of the relationship between thenotions of action and causation.

In reply to Hornsby (1982a), claims that it makes no sense toassert something of the form ‘A’scausing x caused y

’, where xis an event, for A’s causing x

is doubtfully an event (at least in the case where A

is an inanimate object).

A clarification of the point made in (1983) in response toHornsby’s rejoinder in (1983).

1988 ‘Substance,Identity and Time’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

, Suppl. Vol. 62, 61-78.

Argues that time essentially involves change, "by which I meanthat time essentially involves happenings orevents [...] and events orhappenings are to be understood as changes--although not necessarily changes to

something or in something [...] When a change occurs, something begins to be the casewhich was previously not the case" [p. 74].

1989a ‘ImpredicativeIdentity Criteria and Davidson’s Criterion of Event Identity’, Analysis

, 49, 178-81.

Comments on Quine (1985) on Davidson’s (1969a) criterion ofevent identity in terms of sameness of causes and effects. Concludesthat "(strong) impredicativity does not of itself condemn an identity criterionlike Davidson’s to failure, but only does so in the absence of an appropriatesupporting framework of theory concerning the entities whose individuation isat issue" [p. 181]. (Compare Tiles 1976).

1989b Kindsof Being. A Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms

, Oxford: Blackwell.

Criticizes [p. 113] Davidson’s (1969a) identity criterion forevents as viciously circular, following Tiles (1976). Moreover, maintains that"there seems [...] to be no more sense in the idea that one might set aboutcounting the events that have occurredin this room during the last hour than there is in the idea that one might setabout counting the things now init. What one may intelligibly countare sorts of event, e.g., onemight well count how many door-shuttings have occurred during the last hour. (The search for a generalcriterion of identity for actions issimilarly misconceived, even if one does not construe actions to be events, asI do not.)" [p. 114n.].

1989c ‘Whatis a Criterion of Identity?’, The Philosophical Quarterly

, 39, 1-21.

Includes a restatement of the (1989a) criticism of Davidson’s(1969a) criterion of event identity. "What is lacking is an axiomatic theoryof events providing for Davidson’scriterion the sort of framework that axiomatic set theory provides for [the]criterion of set-identity" [p. 8].

1994 ‘PrimitiveSubstances’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

, 54, 531-52.

Events are non-substantial concrete particulars, whoseexistence and identity depends on the existence and identity of otherparticulars. Against Strawson (1959) argues that it might turn out that "Aflash occurred" entails "Something Flashed". Holds further that "Had the Saxonsfought the Danes instead of the Normans at Hastings in 1066, the ensuing battlewould not have been the very battle that we identify with the Battle ofHastings" [p. 540].

1994 ‘Conditionals,Events and Unbound Pronouns’, Lingua e Stile, 29, 165-83.

Argues that a theory of conditionals with implicitquantification on events can be used to support a descriptive theory of discourseanaphoras.

1970 ‘Identifiability-Dependenceand Ontological Priority’, The Personalist,51, 502-13.

Argues against Strawson (1959): ontological priority is not aconsequence of identifiability dependence, and Strawson does not make any goodcase for the latter.

1984a ‘ASyntactically Motivated Theory of Conditionals’, in P. A. French, T. Uehling,and H. K. Wettstein, eds. (1984), pp. 437-55.

Outlines an event-based theory of indicative conditionals,‘events’ being understood as roughly equivalent to ‘cases’ or ‘circumstances’.("Intuitively, they are not unlike Perry and Barwise’s ‘situations’" [p. 440].)The account exploits formalizations of such paraphrases as: "P

if Q =P in any event in which Q

; Ponly if Q = P

in no event other than one in which Q

; Peven if Q = P

in any event including any in which Q

; P unlessQ = P

in any event other than one in which Q

1984b LogicalForm in Natural Language, Cambridge, MA,and London: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

Remarks that Davidson’s (1967a) account of action sentencesviolates condition T (‘p’ is true iff p), or at least yields "impure"T-sentences (‘John walked in the street’ is true iff there exists an event e

such that e is a walking and ... etc.) [pp. 30-33].

"Events as such simply do not have

individual essences unless their essences are veryrarefied and elusive haecceities" [p. 17]. Thus, "Kripke’s essentialism ishopeless regarding events" [p. 79].

Gives an analysis of singular causation in terms ofcounterfactual dependence between events. Germane to the account of D. K. Lewis(1973).

"The conceptual framework within which we organize anddescribe our perceptions of the physical world, whatever language we speak, isone in which we can identify, not only states-of-affairs of shorter or longerduration, but also events, processes and actions" [p. 483]. Uses "situation" toinclude these categories. Section 15.6 on aspect and events and processes [esp.pp. 706ff].

1995 LinguisticSemantics. An Introduction, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Section 10.4 ("The Grammatical Category of Aspect") includes abrief discussion of event ontology in semantics [esp. pp. 324ff].

1986 ‘TheProblem of Aspectual Classification: A Two-Level Approach’, in A. M. Farley, P.T. Farley, and K.-E. McCullough, eds., CLS 22. Papers from the 22th RegionalMeeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society,Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society, pp. 216-30.

Proposes a two-level taxonomy of aspectual constructions,classifying both the "basic situation types" represented by verbs and the"synthetic situation types" represented by sentences. Verbs are classified interms of the oppositions: durativity/punctuality, presence/absence of a culmination point,presence/absence of a result state.

1978 ‘Onthe Unifier-Multiplier Controversy’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy

, 8, 707-14.

Objects to J. Bennett(1973) and Thalberg (1975) that the considerations they adduced to reject theunifier’s account of event identity (and consequently motivate the search foran intermediate, compromise position) are "based on a fundamental confusionbetween actions and their effects in cases where one and the same descriptioncan be used to refer to either" [p. 709]. Discussion in Thalberg (1981).

Argues against certain attempts to find a third positionintermediate between the unifying and the multiplying view, particularly withrespect to the question of the identity/distinctness of non-basic actions andcorresponding bodily movements.

1985a ‘Mind-BodyIdentity and the Subjects of Events’, Philosophical Studies

, 48, 73-82.

Outlines a way of dealing with certain objections totoken-identity theories of the mental and the physical within the confines of aproperty exemplification account of events.

1985b Reviewof B. Taylor (1985) and Vermazen and Hintikka, eds. (1985), Mind

, 94, 632-37.

1986 ‘ConstitutiveProperties, Essences, and Events’, Philosophia, 16, 29-43.

Argues that failure to specify what properties areconstitutive of events (e.g., properties indicative of change) "obscures thedistinction between the ontological categories of events and substances byallowing properties which an essentialist account of substance would hold arekind-determining essences of substances to be considered as kind-determiningessences of events" [p. 38].

Chapter 4 [pp. 107-55] deals with the metaphysics of eventsand their identity conditions, examining and defending a version of theproperty exemplification account (à laLombard) and arguing that it is compatible with a non-reductive view of the token-identityof mental and physical events.

1995 ‘PsychophysicalSupervenience, Dependency, and Reduction’, in E. E. Savellos and Ü. D. Yalin, eds. (1995), pp. 140-57.

Remarks that, on the property exemplification account, theasymmetry of the dependency relation between the mental and the physical doesnot concern the causal efficacy of mental and physical events [pp. 143ff].

1986 ‘MentalCauses and the Explanation of Action’, The Philosophical Quarterly

, 36 [Special Issue on "Mind, Causation and Action",J. Haldane, R. Squires, and L. Stevenson, eds.], 145-58.

A defense of non-reductive monism against charge ofepiphenomenalism: an event can be a single instance of both a mental and aphysical property.

More arguments in defense of the non-reductive view of thetoken-identity between mental and physical events: the charge ofepiphenomenalism stems from assuming a view of events as tropes, whereasnon-reductive monism takes events as property exemplifications.

1995a ‘Introduction:Supervenient Causation’, in C. A. Macdonald and G. Macdonald, eds. (1995), pp.4-28.

Surveys recent positions and problems about supervenientcausation and epiphenomenalism.

1995b ‘Howto Be Psychologically Relevant’, in C. A. Macdonald and G. Macdonald, eds.(1995), pp. 60-77.

Develops on the position of non-reductive monism put forwardin (1986, 1991) and in C. A. Macdonald(1989).

1995c ‘Introduction:Causal Relevance and Explanatory Exclusion’, in C. A. Macdonald and G.Macdonald, eds. (1995), pp. 86-106.

An introduction to the issues raised by Kim (1989a, 1990) andDretske (1990, 1995).

1995 Philosophyof Psychology. Debates on Psychological Explanation, Volume 1

, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Includes Dretske (1995), Macdonald and Macdonald (1995a,1995b, 1995c), and reprints of Dretske (1990) and Kim (1990).

1992 ‘Adverbs,Identity and Multiple Personalities’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy

, 22,301-21.

Discusses an adverbial account of multiple personality(according to which "some of the terms which appear, syntactically, to be namesare in fact not so: an expansion shows them to be functioning as integral partsof an adverbial phrase" [p. 321], even though "Miss B is making love as Sally"resists rendering as "There is an event which is the event of Miss B makinglove, and it (the event) is as Sally" [p. 317].

1997 ‘TheIndividuation of Actions’, The Philosophical Quarterly

, 47, 38-54

A critical re-examination of the state of the debate on actionidentity, concluding that the case against the unifier’s approach (Anscombe,Davidson) is "much stronger than typically supposed" [p. 39]. Includes adiscussion of the status of the ‘by’ locution, focusing on Hornsby’s (1980a)treatment.

1965 ‘Causesand Conditions’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 2, 245-64; reprinted in E. Sosa, ed. (1975), pp. 15-38, and M. Brand,ed. (1976), pp. 308-44.

Introduces the notion of an INUS condition (Insufficient butNecessary part of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient forthe result) and applies it to the analysis of singular causal statements. SeeMarc-Wogau (1962) for a similar treatment focusing on the historians’ use ofsuch statements. Discussion in R. Martin (1972).

1974 TheCement of the Universe. A Studyof Causation, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.

Chapter 10 argues that we mention facts as causes if ourpurpose is explanatory (to allude to the law connecting the explanandum to itscircumstances), whereas we mention events as causes if our aim is simply toidentify the causal conditions we are interested in.

1991 ‘Causing,Enabling, and Counterfactual Dependence’, Philosophical Studies

, 62, 325-30.

Argues that the concept of an enabler introduced by Lombard(1990) fails to pick out a group of events that are not causes of the eventscounterfactually depending on them: whether an event is a cause or an enableris a question that in some cases seems to depend exclusively on temporalconsiderations. Reply in Lombard (1992b).

1992 ‘Causing,Delaying, and Hastening: Do Rains Cause Fires?’, Mind

, 101, 483-500.

Argues that an event that delays the occurrence of anotherevent is to be regarded as one of its causes (along with those events thathasten its occurrence). See reply in Lombard (1995b).

1995 ‘Event’,in T. Honderich, ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy

, Oxford and New York: Oxford Universty Press, pp.253-54.

1967 ‘Actions,Consequences, and Ethical Theory’, The Journal of Value Inquiry

, 1, 72-80.

"There are clear cases of a break in the chain of action andconsequence such that we cannot recast certain consequences as redescription ofthe action". Criticism in H. J. Allen (1967).

Argues that the distinction between what one does and whathappens to one is unclear and therefore of questionable value in action theory.

"To call any apprehended change an ‘act’ is to refer it to anagent as its source. To call it an event is to refer it to a non-agent. Weexpress the distinction between acts and events, therefore, if we say: for eachevent there is a cause; for each act there is a reason [...] No act can have acause; and no event a reason" [pp. 148-49].

1992 ‘BareCommon Nouns and their Relation to the Temporal Constitution of Events inHungarian’, in P. Dekker and M. Stokhof, eds., Proceedings of the 8thAmsterdam Colloquium, University ofAmsterdam: Institute for Language, Logic and Computation, pp. 347-65.

Supports with data from Hungarian the view that there is aclose connection between the structured domains of objects and events. Includesa sketch of the interdependencies between the temporal constitution of eventsand their participants.

An account of singular causal statements with particularreference to their use by historians: "When historians in singular causalstatements speak of a cause or the cause of a certain individual event b, then what they are referring to is anotherindividual event a which is a moment ina minimal sufficient and at the same time necessary condition post factum

b" [pp. 226f]. Accountsimilar to J. L. Mackie’s (1965). Discussion in R. Martin (1972).

1970 ‘Dantoon Basic Actions’, Inquiry, 13 [SpecialIssue on "Action"], 104-8.

Against Danto (1965), argues that either there are no basicactions, or else Danto’s criterion for identifying them is untenable. Reply inDanto (1970).

Chapter 6, "Actions and Events" [pp. 146-79], addressesvarious issues concerning the identification, explanation, and description ofactions and events. "There are no actions without agents [...] and, normally atleast, there are no events that are not undergone by something", and yet "itturns out to be extremely helpful to treat events themselves (includingactions) as if they were individual things; for then, we may describe them inwhatever convenient way we wish" [p. 148]. This leads to a Davidsonian account:"‘Sebastian strolled through the streets of Bologna at 2’ may be added to byway of an endless variety of modifications without obliging us to deny that oneand the same event is being referred to" [p. 172].

1978 Personsand Minds. The Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism, Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel.

A defense of a nonreductive materialist account of therelationship between the mental and the physical. Views events and states as"would-be entities" ontologically dependent on the admission of morefundamental entities such as persons and material objects: "One may identify aperson without regard to any particular event or state [...] But we cannotnormally identify events or states [...] except as the events or states of this or that person or body" [p. 43]. Includesalso a critical discussion of Davidson’s views on reasons as causes in relationwith the thesis that an action can have different descriptions [pp. 250ff].

Includes Davidson (1969b), R. M. Martin (1969b), Butler(1969), and Salmon (1969).

1975 ‘Factsand the Semantics of Gerunds’, Journal of Philosophical Logic

, 4, 439-54.

Outlines a factual semantics for gerunds exploiting the ideathat "the presuppositional properties of gerunds may be explained analogouslyto the existential use of singular terms" [p. 439].

1981 ‘Factsand Events as Semantic Constructs’, Theoretical Linguistics

, 8, 259-85.

Proposes an account of facts and events as "complex structuresmirroring the surface syntax of gerunds and infinitives" [p. 283]. Thus, ‘Thesinking of Atlantis started the tidal wave’ has the logical form ‘G[Fa]b’,where ‘[Fa]’ is the gerund standing for the event of Atlantis’s sinking.(References are made to Kim’s canonical representation of event names.) Theaccount is contrasted to Davidson’s (1967a), which "requires a non-syntacticdistinction that is by no means easy to draw" [p. 280]. The analysis isultimately used to argue for the general thesis that "ontology is bestunderstood as disguised semantics" [p. 259].

1972 ‘BasicActions and Simple Actions’, American Philosophical Quarterly

, 9, 59-68.

1972 ‘Marc-Wogauand Mackie on Singular Causal Statements’, Philosophical Forum

, 5, 145-51.

A criticism of the views of Marc-Wogau (1962) and Mackie(1965). Discussion in Beauchamp and Rosenberg (1974).

1967 ‘Facts:What They Are and What They Are Not’, American Philosophical Quarterly

, 4, 269-80.

There is simply no room for [facts] in the admissiblefurniture--or rather, there is no furniture for them in the admissible room" [p.269].

1969a ‘OnEvents and the Calculus of Individuals’, Akten des XIV. InternationalenKongresses für Philosophie, Vienna: Herder,Vol. 3, pp. 202-8.

Argues that mereology is "a perhaps indispensable [logicaltool] if we are to try to gain some clarity concerning physical objects and events

and their relations with each other" [p. 203].Outlines a formal account based on a two-sorted language: "When we speak ofevents it is to happenings or occurrences in time that we refer. When we speakof physical objects, we refer to objects with a definite spatiality [...] Buthappenings involve spatial location and physical objects endure through time,so that the two kinds of entities are interrelated in significant ways"[ibid.]. First formulation of the analysis of event-descriptions furtherdeveloped in (1969b).

1969b ‘OnEvents and Event-Descriptions’, in J. Margolis, ed. (1969), pp. 63-73, 97-109.

A property exemplification approach to the ontology of events:an event is an ordered (n+1)-tuple madeup of the denotations of the nsingular terms and the n-adicpredicate of a true sentence. (Compare the theory put forward by Kim beginningin 1966.) Moreover, "events are clear-cut extensional entities [that] can bereferred to directly", and must therefore be kept separate from facts, whichare "intensional entities having a nominal structure [and] can be referred toindirectly" [p. 73]. Discussed byButler (1969) and Davidson (1969b).

1969c Belief,Existence, and Meaning, New York: New YorkUniversity Press; London: University of London Press.

Chapter IX, ‘On Events and Propositions’, puts forward aformulation of the conception of events as "virtual ordered n

-tuples" anticipated in (1969b).

Chapters VII and VIII on the problem of formulating a logic ofevents--more precisely, a two-sorted logic with one kind of variables rangingover physical objects and another over events. Based on the conception ofevents put forward in (1969b, 1969c), includes a formal account of the theirmereology and causal relations.

1971b ‘OnHartshorne’s "Creative Synthesis" and Event Logic’, The Southern Journal ofPhilosophy, 9, 399-410.

Critical review of Hartshorne (1970). "The main point of thepresent paper is to show that a somewhat nominalized form of event logic seemsto provide also precisely what is needed by way of logical background forHartshorne’s metaphysics" [p. 399].

1976 ‘Eventsand Actions: Some Comments on Brand and Kim’, in M. Brand and D. Walton, eds.(1976), pp. 179-92; reprinted with revisions as ‘Events and Actions: Brand andKim’ in R. M. Martin (1979b), pp. 144-59.

On Brand (1976a) and Kim (1976). Focuses on Brand’s identitycriteria ("Just what kind of necessity is involved here we are not told" [p.181]) and on Kim’s notion of an event (asking for a clarification: "Just whatis this ‘complex’ [x, P

, t]?Clearly it is not itself a substance, a property, or a time" [p. 188]). Kim’sidentity criteria are also examined.

1977 ‘Tense,Aspect, and Modality’, Philosophia, 19,69-87; reprinted in R. M. Martin (1979b), pp. 110-29.

An attempt to accommodate tense, aspect, and modality withinthe framework of Martin’s event logic.

1978a ‘OnExistence, Tense, and Logical Form’, in N. Rescher, ed. Studies in Ontology

(American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series,No. 12), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 27-41; reprinted with revisions as‘Existence and Logical Form’ in R. M. Martin (1979b), pp. 95-109.

Outlines a general framework for the study of logical form inwhich "a realm of events, including states, acts, processes, and the like, isrecognized, so that the various existence predicates introduced for virtualclasses and relations of individuals may be extended to apply also to virtualclasses and relations of events" [p. 40].

1978b Events,Reference, and Logical Form, Washington:Catholic University of America Press.

From the Author’s Preface: "The main novelty of the book isthe outline of a systematic theory of events, which are construed so broadly asto embrace all kinds of entities whatsoever, physical objects, acts, states,processes, mental events, linguistic events, natural numbers, and so on" [p.i]. Thus, in the first chapters a logico-metaphysical theory is developed inwhich "events and events only are taken as values for variables, and everythingin heaven or earth is then construed in terms of them" (constructs being "merelogical fictions handled as manières de parler").

1978c Semioticsand Linguistic Structure. A Primer of Philosophical Logic

, Albany: State University of New York Press.

Chapter IV, "Events, Acts, States, and Processes’ [pp. 57-72],gives "a sketch of a logical analysis of the internal structure of events",including part-whole and other formal ontological principles.

Includes R. M. Martin (1979a) along with revised reprints of(1976, 1977, 1978a).

1980 Primordiality,Science, and Value, Albany: StateUniversity of New York Press.

Chapter XVIII, ‘On Peirce’s Analysis of Events’, argues infavor of a treatment of action sentences along the lines suggested by Peirce (CollectedPapers, 3.492). A sentence of the form "A

gives Bto C" is analysed as "(

$e)(Giving(e

) & AAgent e & B

Object e& C Patient e

)". The analysis resembles that of T. Parsons (1980,1985, 1989, 1990), Carlson (1984) and Dowty (1989). See also Martin’s furtherdiscussion in (1981).

Chapter I on Peirce’s analysis of events (examined in detailin Martin 1980). Chapter X (‘On the Analysis of Action Sentences’) is acriticism of Davidson’s (1967a) account. The Peircean alternative is preferredon account of its "simplicity and greater depth of analysis" [p. 157]: Davidsonincreases the degree of the predicates,while Peirce decreases them.Other theories examined include Rescher’s (1967).

1983 Mind,Modality, Meaning, and Method, Albany:State University of New York Press.

"Our protometaphysical talk of beings might seem ratherrestricted if explicit provision is not allowed for events, happenings,processes, acts, states, and the like" [p. 23]. Includes applications ofMartin’s theory of events and event descriptions to various topics.

1987 ‘Toward a Logistic Grammar:Relations, Roles, Representations and Rules’, Journal of Chinese Philosophy

, 14, 261-83; reprinted with the title ‘On LogicalSemiotics and Logistic Grammar: Relations, Roles, Representations, and Rules’as Chapter 2 of R. M. Martin (1992), pp. 15-32.

A sketch of a "logistic grammar" of natural language as basedon Martin’s event logic. The leading feature is that the "semantic role" ofwords (agent, patient, goal, result, etc.) are explicitly indicated, normallyas relations. For instance, ‘p Agent e

’ is to express that person p

is the/an agent of action e

1988 MetaphysicalFoundations: Mereology and Metalogic,München: Philosophia Verlag.

1992 LogicalSemiotics and Mereology, Amsterdam andPhiladelphia: John Benjamins.

Contains a reprint of (1987) as well as further materialrelevant to the general program of Martin’s event logic.

1984 ‘ALogical Form Based on the Structural Descriptions of Events’, in L. Vaina andJ. Hintikka, eds., Cognitive Constraints on Communication. Representationsand Processes, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp.201-28.

Contra Ryle (1949, p. 108), argues that "there seems to be nogood reason for insisting that a man said to enjoy what he is doing is said todo one thing rather than two. To say Sam has been enjoying digging is, if youlike, to say that Sam has been both digging and enjoying what he was doing" [p.208].

1968 ‘CanThere Be Necessary Connections between Successive Events?’, British Journalfor the Philosophy of Science, 19, 1-25.

A defense of the view that "It may be, it is possible, as far aswe can ever know for certain, that logically necessary connections do existbetween successive events" [p. 1].

1950 ‘Eventsand Language’, Analysis, 10, 109-14;reprinted in M. Macdonald, ed., Philosophy and Analysis. A Selectionof Articles Published in ‘Analysis’ between 1933-40 and 1947-53

, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954, pp. 173-80.

A criticism of the standard way of dealing with "sentencesreferring to events" in classical logic, where nouns and adjectives are "moreprominent" than verbs and adverbs. An anticipation of the remarks of Kenny(1963, ch. 7) and Davidson (1967a) on variable polyadicity and adverb-droppinginferences. Argues also that Russell’s theory of descriptions is inadequate fordealing with event-referring definite descriptions.

Argues that certain descriptions of events and objects can beinterchanged modulo interchange of spatial and temporal determinants (forinstance, the same object cannot be at two different places at the same time,and the same event cannot be at two different times at the same place). Seecriticisms in Dretske (1962).

An introductory text. Gives a semantic analysis based on theidea that the earlier/later relation should be "a relation on temporal worldstates, and not on the more abstract temporal intervals. For we have no means(in general) of specifying a temporal interval apart from those events andstates of affairs which take place during the interval, i.e., [...] a worldstate" [p. 9].

Unlike individual substances, abstract individuals depend fortheir existence upon the existence of other individuals. Examples includeparticularized properties such as "the stupidity of George I" along with eventssuch as "the sound of an individual shoe falling on the floor" and "the sinkingof the Bismarck" [p. 217]. Develops afree logic for dealing with the relevant notion of existence.

1994 AModel of the Universe. Space-Time, Probability, and Decision

, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

On distinguishing things and events in a four-dimensionalmetaphysics: "Both are four-dimensional objects. But the difference betweenthem consists in the fact that while things can be redescribed asthree-dimensional objects which are wholly present at each moment, eventscannot" [p. 216].

1972 ‘IsRaising One’s Arm a Basic Action?’ The Journal of Philosophy

, 67, 235-49.

Argues that they are not. The argument exploits a moderatelyunifying account of action identity.

Argues that a theory of causally basic mental actions ofvolitions can explain the difference between raising one’s arm and merelyhaving it rise.

1979 ‘Nominals,Facts, and Two Conceptions of Events’, Philosophical Studies

, 35, 129-49.

Argues that there are two distinct ways of conceiving events,on one of which the job of naming events is done via

structures that Vendler’s (1962a, 1967a) classicalaccount "mistakes" for fact designators, viz. imperfect gerundives whose verbalelement signify change. These are events conceived as temporally extendedwholes. By contrast, "in order to keep track of change through time, we mustconceive of something temporally persistent, which is intrinsically tied to thetemporally extended event, but which unlike it is wholly present throughout thestretch of time the temporally extended entity occupies. It is this temporallypersistent item [...] that is designated by perfect nominals" [p. 142].

On some inadequacies of Goldman’s theory of level-generationfor the fine-grained approach to action individuation, concluding that "we haveseen no convincing reason to believe that any ontological relationship ofgeneration obtains between acts such as shooting and killing" [p. 500].

1983 ‘IndividuatingActions: The Fine-Grained Approach’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy

, 13, 493-512.

Fine-grained actions are individual accidents (abstractparticulars, or "tropes").

1959 ‘Programswith Common Sense’, in D. V. Blake and AA. M. Uttley, eds., Proceedings ofthe Teddington Conference on the Mechanization of Thought Processes

, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, pp. 75-91;reprinted with revisions in M. Minsky, ed., Semantic Information Processing

, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968, pp. 403-18; inMcCarthy (1990), pp. 9-20; and in G. F. Langer, ed., Computation andIntelligence. Collected Readings, MenloPark, CA: AAAI Press, and Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995, pp. 479-92.

Seminal paper on reasoning about actions from the standpointof Artificial Intelligence. Presents a "situation calculus" in which statementsabout the effects of actions are expressed by formulas such as P

(Result(x,

S)asserting that P is true in thesituation (state of affairs) that results from agent x

’s performing action A

in situation S.

1977 ‘EpistemologicalProblems of Artificial Intelligence’, Proceedings of the 5th InternationalJoint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-77)

, Vol. 2, Cambridge, MA: IJCAI [Morgan Kaufmann], pp.1038-44; reprinted in McCarthy (1990), pp. 77-92.

"How to express rules that give the effects of actions andevents when they occur concurrently" is regarded as "the most difficultunsolved epistemological problem for AI" [1990, p. 80].

1990 FormalizingCommon Sense. Papers by John McCarthy (V.Lifschitz ed.), Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

1969 ‘SomePhilosophical Problems from the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence’, in B.Meltzer and D. Michie, eds., Machine Intelligence 4

, Edimburgh: Edimburgh University Press, pp. 463-502;reprinted in B. L. Webber and N. J.Nilsson, eds., Readings in Artificial Intelligence

, Palo Alto, CA: Tioga, 1981, pp. 431-50, and in M.J. Ginsberg, ed., Readings in Nonmonotonic Reasoning

, Los Altos, CA: Morgan Kaufmann, 1987, pp. 26-45;also in McCarthy (1990), pp. 21-63.

Presents an extension of McCarthy’s (1959) "situationcalculus". The fact that the calculus quantifies over "strategies" (which haveactions as a special case) is presented as germane to Davidson’s (1967a) adviceto quantify over individual actions. [p. 498].

1968 ‘LexicalInsertion in a Transformational Grammar without Deep Structure’, in B. J.Darden, C.-J. N. Bailey, and A. Davison, eds., Papers from the FourthRegional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society, pp. 71-80.

Includes an analysis of causative verbs such as ‘kill’ asderived by predicate raising and lexicalization from a semantic structurefeaturing phrases such as ‘cause to die’. Compare also (1972, 1973a) and Lakoff(1970). Contrasting view in Katz (1970), Fodor (1970b), Kac (1972), Shibatani(1972), Wierzbicka (1975).

1971 ‘Tenseand Time Reference in English’, in C. J. Fillmore and D. T. Langendoen, eds., Studiesin Linguistic Semantics, London: Holt,Rinehart and Winston, pp. 96-113.

Distinguishes between "existential" and "universal" presentperfect: the former serves to indicate the existence of events; the latterindicates "that a state of affairs prevailed throughout some interval" [p.104].

1972 ‘Kacand Shibatani on the Grammar of Killing’, in J. P. Kimball, ed., Syntax andSemantics, Volume 1, New York: SeminarPress, pp. 139-49.

1973a ‘Syntacticand Logical Arguments for Semantic Structures’, in O. Fujimura, ed., ThreeDimensions in Linguistic Theory. Proceedings of the Fifth International Seminaron Theoretical Linguistics, Tokyo: TECCorporation, pp. 259-376.

Includes a restatement of the (1968) analysis of causativeverbs such as ‘kill’.

A criticism of Fodor’s (1970a) criticism of Davidson’s (1967a)analysis of action sentences.

1976 ‘Remarkson What Can Cause What’, in M. Shibatani, ed., Syntax and Semantics, Volume6, The Grammar of Causative Constructions,New York: Academic Press, pp. 117-29.

"Having come to the conclusion that several distinct notionsof causation can play a role in the meaning of sentences, I should raise thequestion of whether it is merely accidental that the word cause

is used with reference to all of them" [p. 125].Answers that "Each proposition A cause B, whatever the sense of cause and whatever the nature of the A and the B, can be associated in anatural way with a proposition S1 causes S

2, which it implies andwhich involves the sense of cause thatis analysable in terms of local entailment [i.e. D. K. Lewis’s counterfactualconditional]" [pp. 125-26].

1985 ‘Actionsand Events Despite Bertrand Russell’, in E. LePore and B. P. McLaughlin, eds.(1985), pp. 177-92.

A criticism of Russell’s theory of descriptions and anassessment of its role in Davidson’s theory of actions and events.

1982 ‘Adverbsand Logical Form: A Linguistically Realistic Theory’, Language

, 58, 144-84.

"‘Ad-verbs’ modify (i.e. ‘change’) verbs. Adverbs internal toa VP are Ad-Verbs modifying the verb that heads that VP. VP-external adverbsmay be interpreted as Ad-Verbs only with respect to some higher verb (e.g. anauxiliary or a ‘verb’ in the translation into an interpreted logic). BasicAd-Sentences also exist; but neither they nor Ad-Verbs are adequatelytranslated as functional operators applying to independently evaluatedarguments. Adverbs typically translate into expressions like variable-bindingoperators which introduce the ‘variables’ which they ‘bind’. Adverbs signalre-evaluation of the expressions on which they operate, helping to ‘build’logical form" [p. 145, Author’s Abstract].

1976 ‘TheIndividuation of Actions and Acts’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

, 54, 133-39.

Argues that the apparent impasse between Davidson’s views andthose of Goldman and L. H. Davis stems from a diversity of concerns: Davidson’sconcern is with the individuation of actions (= doingsof things) whereas Goldman and Davis are concerned with the individuation ofacts (= what is done). For instance, the‘by’ relation holds between acts, not between actions. See comments in Elliotand Smith (1976).

1978 ‘Planningand Acting’, Cognitive Science, 2,71-109; reprinted in J. F. Allen, J. Hendler, and A. Tate, eds. (1990), pp.225-44.

Views problem solving as part of the general study of action:"A problem is a difficult action. Solving a problem is the construction andsuccessful execution of a plan to carry it out" [p. 72]. Includes a discussionof events and processes as abstract entities to be included in the universe ofdiscourse.

1982 ‘ATemporal Logic for Reasoning about Processes and Plans’, Cognitive Science

, 6, 101-55; reprinted in J. F. Allen, J. Hendler,and A. Tate, eds. (1990), pp. 436-63.

Seminal paper on the application of temporal logic toartificial intelligence (compare J. F. Allen 1981). The proposed logic is basedon a many-sorted predicate calculus with variables ranging over a basicontology of times, states ("instantaneous snapshots of the universe"), facts(sets of states), and events (sets of time intervals).

1985 ‘Reasoningabout Plans’, in J. R. Hobbs and R. C. Moore, eds., Formal Theories of theCommonsense World, Norwood: Ablex, pp.268-317.

Elaborates on the logical formalism introduced in (1982) forreasoning about the relationships between actions, plans, and time. The logic"allows events to come in many varieties", e.g., instantaneous vs. extended, ordiscrete vs. uncountable [pp. 277ff].

1994 Mindand World, Cambridge, MA, and London:Harvard University Press; second edition with a new Introduction, 1996.

Includes a criticism of Davidson’s ontological claims aboutmental events [pp. 74ff].

A critical discussion of Sellar’s metaphysics of pure process,stating among other things that "just as Spinoza’s radical monistic metaphysicscould be seen to rely on a subject-predicate logic, a monistic processmetaphysics could rely on a properly refined verb-adverb logic" [p. 245].

A defense of Davidson’s version of the token-identity theoryof the mental and the physical (anomalous monism) against Kripke’s (1972) modalargument.

1979 ‘Actionand Its Explanation’, in N. Bolton , ed., Philosophical Problems inPsychology, London: Methuen, pp. 20-42.

Ch. 1 discusses different types of dependence (linguistic,conceptual, metaphysical, epistemological) in relation to events and materialobjects (compare Strawson 1959, ch. 1).

McGowan, R., Gochnauer, M.1971 ‘A Bibliography of the Philosophy of Action’ in R. Binkley, R.Bronaugh, and A. Marras, eds. (1971), pp. 167-99.

An attempt to develop an account of agency able to accommodatenegative acts (acts of omission), which are argued to run afoul of anevent-oriented approach. Acts of omission are facts, not events.

1984 ‘Response:Event Supervenience and Supervenient Causation’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy

, 22, Suppl. Vol., 77-91 [Spindel Conference 1983,"Supervenience", ed. T. Horgan].

An examination of Kim’s account (especially as given in Kim1984b) of how macro-causal transactions are dependent on micro-causaltransactions, objecting that macro-causal transactions are not instances ofsupervenient causation.

1985 ‘AnomalousMonism and the Irreducibility of the Mental’, in E. LePore and B. P.McLaughlin, eds. (1985), pp. 331-68.

Critical survey of Davidson’s theory of anomalous monism inthe light of his theory of events, causation, and nomic subsumption.

1989 ‘Typeepiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical’, in J.E. Tomberlin, ed. (1989), pp. 109-35.

Distinguishes between token epiphenomenalism (physical eventscause mental events, but the latter don’t cause anything) and typeepiphenomenalism (events are causes in virtue of falling under physical types,but no event can be a cause in virtue of falling under a mental type).

1993 ‘OnDavidson’s Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism’, in J. Heil and A. R.Mele, eds. (1993), pp. 27-40.

1994 ‘Epiphenomenalism’,in S. Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind

, Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, pp. 277-88.

1995 ‘Varietiesof Supervenience’, in E. E. Savellos and Ü. D. Yalin, eds. (1995), pp. 16-59.

Looks at event supervenience as a counterexample to the viewthat a global supervenience thesis (in the sense, e.g., of Kim 1984c) fails toimply the corresponding weak supervenience thesis [pp. 42-44].

Early interval-based analysis of the puzzle of the temporalboundary between two states (how can there be a last instant when an object isstill before starting to move?)

1977 AnalytischeHandlungstheorie. Band 1: Handlungsbeschreibungen [Analytic Action Theory. Volume I: Action Descriptions

, in German], Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

An anthology of classic papers on action theory (in Germantranslation), focusing on the topic of action description. Useful introductorythematic bibliography. See Beckermann, ed. (1977) for volume 2 (on actionexplanation).

1987 Handlung,Zeit, Notwendigkeit. Eine ontologisch-semantische Untersuchung

[Action, Time, Necessity. AnOntological-semantical Investigation, inGerman], Berlin and New York: de Gruyter.

A formal ontological account. Events are a kind of happening(punctual happenings, as opposed to extended happenings such as processes),happenings being a kind of situation (temporally localized situations).Includes a lengthy formalized Appendix with logical axioms, definitions, andtheorems.

Outline of a set-theoretical framework for theorizing about(possible) events; statement of some "analytical and synthetical" principlesdescribing "the way in which the concept of reality

(or actuality) applies to them" [p. 24].

1986 ‘What’sWrong with Anomalous Monism?’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 83, 265-74.

Argues against those critics who accuse Davidson’s anomalousmonism of epiphenomenalism (e.g., H. Robinson 1982 and T. Honderich 1982,1983). "If there is something wrong with anomalous monism, it is locatedelsewhere" [p. 265]. "The mental properties of events are not left danglinginefficaceously, for the reason that there aren’t any distinctive mentalproperties in the world" [p. 274].

1956 ‘Action’,The Philosophical Review, 65, 529-41;reprinted in D. A. Gustafson, ed., Essaysin Philosophical Psychology, New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1964, pp. 58-76, and in N. Care and C. Landesman, eds. (1968),pp. 27-47; partially reprinted in Brand, ed. (1970), pp. 91-99.

Maintains that "the attempt to distinguish bodily movementsthat do, from those that do not, count as actions in terms of occurrentpsychological processes is doomed to failure. What passes through my mind as Inow act may be anything or nothing; it may be that all that happens is thatwithout anything relevant passing through my mind, I just act" [p. 33].

Contains influential arguments against naive behaviorism ("onedoes not raise one’s arm by performing another doing which has the motion ofone’s arm as effect--one simply raises one’s arm" [p. 65]) and against therevised behaviorist formula: action = bodily movement + motive ("the presenceof a motive is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition" [p. 81]).

1992a Springsof Action. Understanding Intentional Behavior,New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Argues for an explanatory model of intentional behavior thatplaces mental phenomena in the etiology of intentional action. Compareespecially Chapter 2 on mental causation.

1992b Reviewof Ginet (1990), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

, 52, 488-91.

1996 ‘ActionTheory’, in D. M. Borchert, ed. in chief, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Supplement, New York: Simon & SchusterMacmillan, pp. 3-4.

A compact survey of the main positions in action theory,focusing on questions about the nature and the explanation of human action.

"If a thing is [acausal sequence of events] it has temporal parts (‘phases’), namely the eventsin the sequence; the ontological distinction between things (substances) andevents is destroyed, since it is just lack of temporal parts that distinguishesa thing from temporally extended events".

1975b ‘Commentson Wesley C. Salmon’s "Theoretical Explanations"’, in S. Körner, ed., Explanation

, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 146-52.

"Once we see that cause-effect relations results from featuresof events rather than from their bare occurrence, we can see that e

being F1 may cause e

' being F1' without e

being F2 causing e

' being F2'" [p. 151].

1980 ‘Thingsand Causes in Spacetime’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

, 31, 282-88.

Distinction between objects and events: "Events take time, andnone is wholly present at any one time [...] Things, on the other hand, arewholly present at every time at which they exist at all" [p. 283]. On change:"Events [...] do not change at all, although they may be

changes, namely changes in things" [ibid.].

1981a RealTime, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress; Chapter 6, ‘The Unreality of Tense’, reprinted with revisions in R. LePoidevin and M. Mac Beath, eds. (1993), pp. 47-59, and in L. N. Oaklander andQ. Smith, eds. (1994), pp. 163-75.

Treats causation as a relation between events (see revisedview in Mellor 1987a, 1987b, 1995) and argues that the temporal order of eventsis fixed by their causal order. Chapter 6 on the "tenseless theory of time",denying the reality of changing tense without imperilling the reality of changeand hence of time itself.

1981b ‘McTaggart,Fixity, and Coming True’, in R. Healey, ed., Reduction, Time and Reality.Studies in the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 79-97; reprinted in Mellor(1991b), pp. 183-200, and in R. C. Hoy and L. N. Oaklander, eds., Metaphysics.Classic and Contemporary Readings, Belmont,CA: Wadsworth, 1991, pp. 64-75.

Includes a characterization of events as particularsindividuated by their causes and effects (following Davidson 1969a).Distinguishes between events and things in terms of their having/not havingtemporal parts. Compare (1980) for an early formulation; (1995) fordevelopments.

1987a ‘FixedPast, Unfixed Future’, in B. Taylor, ed., Michael Dummett: Contributions toPhilosophy, Dordrecht: Nijhoff, pp. 166-86.

Includes a discussion of causation that marks a revision ofthe view defended in (1981a). "Causation between facts is what matters toagents, not causation between events; and causation relates events only becauseit relates facts, not vice versa. And it relates far more facts than it relatesevents [...] What we call causal relations between events only arise whensuitable subjunctive conditionals, made true by propensities, happen to havetheir existential antecedents and consequents instantiated by events" [pp. 179f].

1987b ‘TheSingularly Affecting Facts of Causation’, in P. Pettit, R. Sylvan, and J.Norman, eds., Metaphysics and Morality. Essays in Honor of J. J. C. Smart

, Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, pp. 111-36;reprinted in Mellor (1991b), pp. 201-24.

Further thoughts on causation, facts, and events, including acriticism of Davidson’s account. "Don’s fall [caused] his death, but onlybecause Don died because he fell. Causation relates those events only becauseit relates those facts; and most causation relates facts without relatingevents at all" [p. 112]. Compare Smart’s reply.

1988/9 ‘I andNow’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 89, 79-94; reprinted in Mellor (1991b), pp. 17-29.

A defense of the tenseless view of time, and a restatement ofthe view that "most causation connects facts, and is rightly reported by aconnective" [p. 85].

1991a ‘Propertiesand Predicates’, in Mellor (1991b), pp. 170-82; reprinted in J. Bacon, K.Campbell, and L. Reinhardt, eds., Ontology, Causality and Mind. Essays inHonour of D. M. Armstrong, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, pp. 101-13.

Includes a restatement of the thesis that causation is not auniversal and should not be represented by an event-predicate (‘caused’) but bya connective (‘because’).

A study in the metaphysics of causation, including an accountof how events could figure as causal relata (causation being essentially arelation linking facts). Elaborates on the (1980, 1981b) view that events areparticulars and differ from objects in this: "Events do [have temporal parts]:each course of meal is a temporal part of it. But things do not. An omelettehas no temporal parts, only spatial ones [...] Things, such as omelettes andtheir spatial parts, are wholly present at any instant of time at which theyexist at all. Whereas extended events, like meals and the courses that aretheir temporal parts, are never wholly present at any instant" [pp. 122-23].(Only things, therefore, can be reidentified.)As for the need for identity criteria, events are "no worse off in that respectthan things are" [p. 125]. Chapter 9 contains a discussion of the

"slingshot" argument. Critical Notice in Hinckfuss (1997).

"Causation’s relata are more-finely individuated thanDavidson’s coarse-grained events", so that if sameness of causal role issufficient for singling out "any particular conception of events, it seems tofavour a fine-grained as opposed to a coarse-grained conception" [p. 570].Besides, the ‘coherent core’ of the coarse-grained conception "can only becaptured within the framework of a fine-grained conception" [p. 571]. GeneralizesGoldman’s act-trees to event-trees, suggesting that "a Davidsoniancoarse-grained event is a class consisting of all the events on a givenevent-tree" [p. 571].

1989 ‘AUnified Account of Causal Relata’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

, 67, 59-83.

The account develops the idea that the causal relata are"situations" (denotations of a certain class of true statements), of whichevents and states of affairs are a subclass. Also causal statements involvingfacts and features of events are characterized in terms of causal relationsbetween situations. The first part of thepaper includes a criticism of Davidson’s views, and the final part defends theaccount against slingshot-type arguments.

1993 ‘Causationas a Secondary Quality’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

, 44, 187-203.

Defends the agency account of causation: event A

is a cause of event B

"just in case bringing about the occurrence of A wouldbe an effective means by which a free agent could bring aboutthe occurrence of B " [p.187], the notion of an effective means being explained in probabilistic terms.

1995 ‘Onthe Incompatibility of Enduring and Perduring Entities’, Mind

, 104, 523-31.

Argues for the "striking claim" that "a single world cannotcontain both temporally extended, perduring events and three-dimensional,enduring objects" [p. 524].

1996 ModerateRealism and Its Logic, New Haven andLondon: Yale University Press.

Argues that "instance ontology provides an elaboration andboth material and formal simplification" of the property exemplificationaccount of events [see pp. 78-80]. An event is defined as "a structure, more orless complex, whose substructures consist in temporal or causal relationinstances that are sequentially related" [p. 78].

1987 ADefense of Donald Davidson’s Theory of Events,Doctoral Dissertation, State University ofNew York at Albany.

Focuses mostly on the ‘by’ relation and on the allied notionsof causation and explanation. Chapter 5 examines how Davidson’s theory can beapplied to solve some metaphysical puzzles about event recurrence and negativeevents.

1984 ‘Allowing,Refraining, and Failing: The Structure of Omissions’, Philosophical Studies

, 45, 57-67.

An analysis of omissions in terms of the three categoriesmentioned in the title.

Criticizes the theory of identification of actions of vonWright (1971) and puts forward an alternative account based on Aristotle’s kinêsis/energeiadistinction. This is argued to fare betterin the case of interrupted actions or of actions subsumed under differentdescriptions. An application to the question of whether intentional actions canbe causally explained is also given.

1962 ‘Time,Events, and Substance’, in D. R. Griffin, ed., Physics and the UltimateSignificance of Time, Albany: StateUniversity of New York Press, pp. 115-21.

"I am an Aristotelian who thinks that enduring individualsubstances are ontologically more fundamental than events, in that the latterare features of the former rather than vice versa" [p. 115]. Comments on Hurley(1962); criticisms of Whitehead’s theory of events.

Categorization of verbs into durative vs. non-durative, theformer dividing into telic (terminative) and atelic.

1982 ‘Onthe Difference Between eating and eatingsomething: Activities versusAccomplishments’, Linguistic Inquiry,13, 113-22.

Discusses various differences between activity andaccomplishment verbal constructions.

1988 ‘Aspectsof English Aspect: On the Interaction of Perfect, Progressive and DurationalPhrases’, Linguistics and Philosophy,11, 203-54.

On the truth conditions for perfect and progressive, with arevision of Dowty’s (1977) account.

1987 Tense,Aspect and Temporal Reference,

Doctoral Dissertation, University of Edinburgh.

Develops a semantics for temporally referring expressionsbased on the assumption that "categories like tense, aspect, aspectualadverbials and propositions refer to a mental representation of events that isstructured on other than purely temporal principles, and to which the notion ofa nucleus or consequentially related sequence of preparatory processes, goalevent and consequent state is central" [Abstract].

1988 ‘TemporalOntology and Temporal Reference’, Computational Linguistics

, 14/2 [Special Issue on "Tense and Aspect"], 15-28.

It is argued that "a semantics of temporal categories innatural language and a theory of their use in defining the temporal relationsbetween events both require a more complex structure on the domain underlyingthe meaning representations that is commonly assumed". The proposed ontology isbased on the notion of an elementary event-complex (called "nucleus"), to bethought of as "an association of a goal event, or ‘culmination’, with a‘preparatory process’ by which it is accomplished, and a ‘consequent-state’,which ensues" [p. 15, Abstract].

1989 ‘Nominaland Clausal Event Predicates’, in C. Wiltshire, R. Graczyk, and B. Music, eds.,CLS 25. Papers from the 25th Regional Meeting of the Chicago LinguisticSociety, Chicago: Chicago LinguisticSociety, pp. 300-14.

Argues that not only prepositional phrases and adverbs can actas predicates over the event argument of an action verb (as in Davidson’s 1967aaccount), but also certain noun phrases (as in ‘John died a painful death

’) as well as certain clauses (as in ‘John sighed thatthe ghost died’).

1991a ‘TheMultidimensional Part Structure of Events’, in A. L. Halpern, ed., Proceedingsof the Ninth West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics [WCCFL9]

, Stanford:Center for the Study of Language and Information, pp. 361-78.

Argues that "there is a crucial difference between the partstructure of objects (i.e., individuals like chairs, groups of individuals, ormasses like quantities of water) and the part structure of events (in thegeneral sense of the term including actions and states). Objects have simplepart structures, which consist of parts only in the spatial dimension. Events,however, may have multidimensional part structures [...] for instance, a temporalpart structure, a spatial part structure and a part structure corresponding toa participant in the event" [p. 361]. The account is then applied to variousnatural language phenomena apparently involving quantification over the partsof ("abstract" or "concrete") events.

On treating adverbials such as ‘for two hours’ or ‘until noon’as part quantifiers ranging over the parts of some measuring entity (e.g., aninterval of two hours) rather than as event predicates à la

Davidson (1967a).

1992a ‘Reciprocalsand Same/Different: Towards a SemanticAnalysis’, Linguistics and Philosophy, 15, 411-62.

A semantic account of constructions with ‘same’ or ‘different’(as in John and Mary bought the same book/different books

) in which the relevant semantic antecedent is anevent, namely the event argument of the relevant verb in Davidson’s (1967a)sense.

1992b Individuationund Lokalität. Studien zur Ereignis- undNominalphrasensemantik [Individuationand Locality. Studies on Event and Noun Phrase Semantics

, in German], Munich: Fink.

Explains predication in terms of quantification over "momentsof a verb" [p. 74]--moments being Davidsonian events, states, and processes.Includes a classification of moments in terms of their mereological structure[pp. 81ff].

Chapter 6 ("Dimensions of Parts and Wholes and the PartStructure of Events") gives an analysis of expressions involving partstructures that are "relativized to a particular dimension", for instanceadverbs of completion such as ‘completely’ and ‘partially’, and quantifiersranging over the parts of a concrete event, such as ‘simultaneously’ or‘same’/‘different’. Chapter 7 on "The Mass-Count Distinction for Verbs andAdverbial Quantification over Events".

1969 ‘Onthe Nature of Certain Philosophical Entities’, The Monist

, 53, 159-94; reprinted in R. Montague (1974), pp.149-87. (Abstract also published in Akten des XIV. InternationalenKongresses für Philosophie, Vienna: Herder,Vol. 3, 1969, pp. 201-2).

Suggests "to take as the event corresponding to a formula theproperty expressed by that formula. Thus the event of the sun’s rising will bethe property of being a moment at which the sun rises, and events in generalwill form a certain class of properties of moments of time" (or, moregenerally, properties of intervals or of unions of intervals of time) [pp.149-50]. The corresponding identity criterion for events follows immediatelyfrom the view that "properties are identical just in case they are coextensivein every possible world" [p. 150].

1970a ‘Englishas a Formal Language’, in B. Visentini et al., eds., Linguaggi nella società e nella tecnica

, Milan: Edizioni di Comunità, pp. 189-224; reprintedin R. Montague (1974), pp. 188-221.

Treats adverbs as verb modifiers along the lines of T. Parsons(1970) and R. Clark (1970), with the result that neither ‘Jones kills Smith ina dream’ nor ‘Jones kills Smith with a knife’ logically implies ‘Jones killsSmith’, but ‘Necessarily, if Jones kills Smith with a knife, then Jones kills Smith’"might well turn out to be true (thoughnot logically true) once we provide a proper analysis of ‘if ... then’" [p. 213].Includes also an account of adjectives as predicate modifiers, arguing that itis capable of accommodating non-intersective adjectives such as ‘big’ ("not allbig fleas are big entities" [p. 211]).

1970b ‘UniversalGrammar’, Theoria, 36, 373-98; reprintedin R. Montague (1974), pp. 222-46.

1973 ‘TheProper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English’, in J. Hintikka, J. M.E. Moravcsik, and P. Suppes, eds., Approaches to Natural Language.Proceedings of the 1970 Stanford Workshop on Grammar and Semantics

, Dordrecht: Reidel,pp. 221-42; reprinted in R. Montague (1974),pp. 247-70.

Reformulation of the theory put forward in (1970a, 1970b),confirming the treatment of adverbs as verb modifiers. (The system presentedhere is often referred to as PTQ.)

1974 FormalPhilosophy (ed. by R. H. Thomason), NewHaven: Yale University Press.

Reprint of Montague’s papers in philosophy and linguistics,including (1969, 1970a, 1970b, 1973).

Argues that actions (arm raising) differ from thecorresponding bodily movements (arm rising) insofar as performance of theformer involves the bringing about of the events which cause the occurrence ofthe latter. Compare Owen (1980).

Argues that "all of Davidson’s arguments for events serveequally well to provide proper ontological credentials for states

[...] States are like Davidsonian events in beingunrepeatable particulars; they differ only in not being changes" [p. 251]. Forexample, a statement of the form "John s sitting quietly" can be analysed as "($s)(Sitting(John,s

) & Quiet(s))". Compare T. Parsons(1987/8). Conclusion: "If we need both states and events, then virtually all

predicates, regardless of whether they ascribechange, will receive the semantics Davidson accords event-introducing sentences"[p. 256].

1985 ‘AFormal Theory of Knowledge and Action’, in J. R. Hobbs and R. C. Moore, eds., FormalTheories of the Commonsense World, Norwood:Ablex, pp. 319-58; reprinted in R. C. Moore, Logic and Representation

, Stanford: CSLI Lecture Notes No. 39, 1995, pp.27-70.

An influential attempt at a formalization of "both theknowledge prerequisites of action and the effects of action on knowledge".Based on a view of actions as determining a relation between states of affairs(the performing an action in one state of affairs yielding as a result anotherstate of affairs).

Agent x refrains from A

-ing iff (i) x has decided not to A,(ii) this decision does not deprive x of the opportunity to A,and (iii) because of this decision, x does not A.

1965 ‘Strawsonand Ontological Priority’, in R. J. Butler, ed., Analytical Philosophy

, Second Series, Oxford: Basil Blackwell (reprint New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968), pp.106-19.

Against Strawson (1959), remarks that in some cases we groundthe identity and identification conditions of material objects in the identityand identification conditions for events.

Extends Gabbay and Moravcsik’s (1980) analysis of tense andaspect to the case of negated sentences.

Includes ample discussion of the variety of events and on thedistinction between events and material objects. Eventually characterizesevents as "property instantiations over time, with the temporal structure ofpoints and intervals interacting with the properties to carve out differenttypes of events. The lack of a conceptual link to three-dimensionality and thesole necessary locatability being temporal, as well as the interaction withtemporal structures, separate events from material objects and other types ofparticular" [p. 165].

1979 ‘Commentson Gorr and Green’, Tulane Studies in Philosophy, 28 [Issue on "Studies in Action Theory", ed. by R. C. Whittemore],125-34.

Non-events are the non-occurrences of events. Since theyfunction in much the same way as events, their analysis may help provide asolution to questions concerning the existence of events, their individuationcriteria, and their role in explanations.

1990 ‘ConvergingOperations on the Basic Level in Event Taxonomies’, Memory and Cognition

, 18, 407-18.

Reports on experimental psychology research on the naming ofevents and the rating of event names. Contains instructive empirical data andtaxonomic distinctions.

1996 ‘Domain-IndependentTemporal Reasoning with Recurrent Events’, Computational Intelligence

, 12 [Special Issue on "Temporal Representation andReasoning", S. D. Goodwin and H. J. Hamilton, eds.], 450-77.

Presents a formal theory for modeling patterns of temporalreasoning that involve "a process of abstraction from the number of times anevent is to occur or the number of times events stand in a temporal relation"[p. 450, Abstract].

1969 ‘Extensionaland Non-Truth-Functional Contexts’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 66, 159-64.

Early discussion of the "slingshot" argument. Includes someremarks on the inferential principles governing predicate modifiers.

1995 ‘Physicalism,Supervenience, and Dependence’, in E. E. Savellos and Ü. D. Yalin, eds. (1995), pp. 187-225.

Includes a brief discussion of psychophysical supervenience asa relation between mental and physical events.

1978 ‘Events,Processes, and States’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 2, 415-34; reprinted in P. Tedeschi and A. Zaenen,eds. (1981), pp. 191-212, and in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp.457-76.

An influential study of the classifications of verb types putforward by Ryle (1949), Kenny (1963), and Vendler (1957), with regard to boththeir linguistic evidence and their ontological underpinnings. Eventuallyproposes a generalized trichotomy embedded in a binary classificatory tree,where states are contrasted to occurrences

, which in turn are subcategorized into processes

(=activities) and events

(=performances), the latter in turn beingsubcategorized into developments(= accomplishments) and punctualoccurrences (=

achievements). Emphasizes the analogy betweenthe count/ mass noun distinction and thedistinction between (the nominalized version of) performances and activities.

1993 ‘Aristotle’sKinêsis/Energeia Distinction: A MarginalNote on Kathleen Gill’s Paper’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy

, 23, 385-88.

A defense of the typology put forward in (1978) in response toGill’s (1993) criticisms. Argues also that the distinction between events (= performances) and processes (= activities) should not be conflated with theAristotelian distinction between kinêsisand energeia. Reference to thework of Graham (1980).

1971 ‘ANew Approach Towards a Logic of Imperatives’, The Southern Journal ofPhilosophy, 9, 411-16.

An account of the logic of imperatives based on the suggestionthat formal relationships between imperatives can be expressed within a logicof events.

1990 ThePhilosophy of Action. An Introduction,Cambridge: Polity Press; New York: Basil Blackwell.

Chapter 3, on the ontology of actions, discusses Goldman’s andDavidson’s views. In the end, it is suggested that "ontological theses aboutactions (‘What kind of entity is an action?’) do not have a direct

bearing on the question of what an action is and whatdistinguishes actions from mere happenings [...] Questions about ontology andquestions about agency are largely independent" [p. 35].

Argues that the notion of causality can cover bothprobabilistic and deterministic relations among events.

Develops an event-based correspondence theory of truthaccording to which all true logically simple sentences about the empiricalworld are made true by that simple or complex event which is referred to by therelevant main verb. Contains a discussion also of the perception of events andof the role of such perception in verification and falsification.

Mulligan, K., Smith, B.1982 ‘Piecesof a Theory’, in B. Smith, ed., Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic andFormal Ontology, München: PhilosophiaVerlag, pp. 15-109.

Includes the outline of a two-dimensional, pictorial languagein which the grammatical inferences involved in (adverbially modified) actionsentences are directly represented without need to resort to the"artificiality" of their Davidsonian quantification-theoretical translations[see especially pp. 85ff].

Expands the account of relational and non-relational eventsput forward in B. Smith (1984) to prove a general theory of the differentcategories of real entities and of their interconnections. Includes adiscussion also of Cambridge changes, arguing that the notion of Cambridgechange can be extended to include Cambridge relations and Cambridge states.

1993 TheExplanation of Human Action: A Critical Analysis of Davidson’s Theory of Action

, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Toronto.

Argues that, given the ordinary notion of cause along withcertain presuppositions of ordinary causal explanations, Davidson’s theory ofaction is inconsistent. See also (1995).

1995 ‘IsDavidson’s Theory of Action Consistent?’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy

, 25, 317-34.

Argues"against Davidson’s contention that reason explanations illustrate the samepattern of explanation as do ordinary causal explanations", issuing a plea for(among other things) a "reevaluation of Davidson’s arguments that theconnection between reasons and actions is that of event causality" [p. 333].

1962 ‘PerceptualEvents, States, and Processes’, Philosophy of Science

, 29, 285-91.

Against Ryle (1949) argues that there are legitimate uses ofthe word ‘see’ which allow us to speak of seeing sometimes as an event,sometimes as a state, and sometimes as a process" [p. 286].

Suggests an identity criterion for events according to whichevents are the same which have the same causes and effects. The criterioncoincides with the one put forward by Davidson (1969a).

1988 ‘Aspect,Aspectual Class, and the Temporal Structure of Narrative’, ComputationalLinguistics, 14/2 [Special Issue on "Tenseand Aspect"], 29-43.

A computational linguistic analysis of common-sense knowledgeabout events based on a three-folddistinction: compositional knowledge (concerns"internal structuring of events into preparatory, initial, main (the body),final, and resulting stages"); durational knowledge (concerns "durationalrelations between events and stages of the same event"); and aspectualknowledge (concerns "the aspectual perspective of the sentence determined bythe position of the Reference Time [...] with respect to the event described by afinite clause"). [All quotes from Abstract, p. 29.]

1992 Causee ragioni. Modelli di spiegazione delle azioni umane nella filosofia analitica

[Causes and Reasons. Models of Explanationof Human Actions in Analytic Philosophy, inItalian], Roma: Editori Riuniti.

A critical survey of various issues in analytic action theory,with emphasis on the relationship between reason explanation and causalexplanation.

1991 ‘Evénementet poiesis’ [‘Event and Poiesis’, in French], in J.-L. Petit, ed. (1991), pp.177-201.

"Whether the moderns oppose action and event or assimilatethem, they are always subscribing to the Humean tradition, which imputes theregularity of changes only to physical causes outside the object whichexperiences them [...] Aristotle has sketched the alternative: individualisingthe events as realising the potentiality of a being to acquire a quality whichdetermines its essence" [Abstract, p. 286].

1994 ‘Eventsand Externalism’, in Preyer, G., Siebelt, F., and Ulfig, A., eds. (1994), pp.117-44.

Explores "the relation between Davidson’s theory of events andhis distal theory of meaning" [p. 118]. Argues that an answer to the question‘How are the events determined which figure as causes of our thoughts?’ "mustbe compatible with Davidson’s theory of events" [p. 120] and argues thatevents, necessary to Davidson’s distal approach, are introduced only at toolate a stage, and only as result of a semantic analysis of sentences" [p. 141].

A criticism of Higginbotham’s (1983) treatment of "nakedinfinitive" perceptual reports, arguing that it does not provide a satisfactoryalternative to the account available in situation semantics (Barwise 1981,Barwise and Perry 1981b, 1983).

Discusses the applicability of Russell’s theory ofdescriptions to event descriptions such as "the flood", "the sinking of the Titanic

" or "Mary’s departure" (esp. § 4.6). Also examinesanaphoric phenomena involving quantification over events.

1995 ‘ThePhilosophical Significance of Gödel’s Slingshot’, Mind

, 104, 761-825.

A thorough attempt to "answer all technical questions raisedby slingshot arguments" and to encourage people to face "the genuinephilosophical questions" that they pose. Among these: (i) Which rules ofinference are valid in which linguistic contexts (for example,truth-functional, modal, and causal contexts)? (ii) Is it possible to haveuseful ontologies of propositions, state-of-affairs, situations or facts? [pp.764-65]. Discussion in Oppy (1997).

Arguing that neither Davidson nor Kim offers a satisfactoryaccount of events, advocates an account of singular causal statements in termsof a modal sentential connective in place of the relational view.

1994 ‘TheCausal Connective’, in J. Faye, U. Scheffler, and M. Urchs, eds., Logic andCausal Reasoning, Berlin: Akademie Verlag,pp. 67-89.

Gives a detailed account of singular causal statements interms of a conditional causal connective, ©®, so that e.g. ‘The fact that A caused it to be the case that B’ is analysed as A

& A

©® B.The causal connective in turn is characterized in terms of subjunctiveconditionals.

An annotated bibliography (1957-1981) comprising 149 titles onthe semantics of time and tense in natural languages, and on the neighboringareas of tense logic and linguistics. Annotations in French.

1985 ‘Lathese des descriptions multiples: lieu commun ou paradoxe de la philosophie del’action?’ [‘The Thesis of Multiple Descriptions: A Common Place or a Paradoxof the Philosophy of Actions?’, in French], Dialogue

, 24, 617-38.

Against the thesis that by importing an action’s consequencesinto the action’s description one obtains just as many different descriptionsof that same action.

1990 ‘Expliqueret comprendre: la théorie de l’action de G. H. von Wright’ [‘Explaining andUnderstanding: von Wright’s Philosophy of Action’, in French], RevuePhilosophique de Louvain, 88, 48-79.

A critical examination of von Wright’s action theory. It isargued that some "paradoxical" consequences of the theory could be avoided ifthe presupposition that the bodily movements that form an action are themselvesnatural events.

1993 Philosophiede l’action. Contribution critique à la théorie analytique de l’action

[Philosophy of Action. A CriticalContribution to Analytical Philosophy, inFrench], Brussels: Académie Royale Belgique.

Chapter 1includes an extensive discussion of identity and individuation criteriafor actions. It is argued that Davidson’s thesis that one and the same actioncan be described in many ways cannot support the view that all actions arebodily movements. Reviewed by Kaufman (1995).

Three arguments for the thesis that "events are not the termsof the causal relation".

1970 ‘TheDerivation of the English Action Nominalization’, Papers from the SixthRegional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society, pp. 408-15.

Argues in favor of Fraser’s (1970) "transformationalist"account of nominalization against the "lexicalist" account of Chomsky (1970).

Includes an extensive discussion of the controversy betweenabsolutist and relativist theories of time (i.e., between the view that time isa container for events and that according to which time is a construction fromevents). Chapter 2 gives a revised version of Shoemaker’s (1969) argument forthe coherence of the idea of empty time between events.

1986 ‘Space,Time and Space-Time: A Philosopher’s View’, in R. Flood and M. Lockwood, eds., TheNature of Time, Oxford, Basil Blackwell,pp. 22-35.

Comparative examination of the absolutist (Newtonian)conception of time and the relativist (Leibnizian) conception according towhich "time is nothing over and above an ordered system of events" [p. 25].

Argues that Davidson is wrong in allowing that particularmental events are explainable (as such) when particular identities to physicalevents are known.

1981 ‘PetriNets, Event Structures, and Domains’, Theoretical Computer Science

, 13, 85-108.

Formulation of the mathematical theory of event structures (tobe distinguished from the homonymous notion used by linguists, following Kamp1979). See Winskel (1987, 1989) for an overview.

Defends Quine’s four-dimensional conception of continuantsagainst Geach’s (1965) criticisms.

1980 Objectsand Identity. An Examination of the Relative Identity Thesis and ItsConsequences, The Hague, Boston, andLondon: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Chapter 10, "Events,Continuants and Diachronic Identity" [pp. 82-106],elaborates on Noonan (1976).

Defends an identity principle for objects and personsformulated in terms of events: "If two events are parts of the history of asingle entity of a kind in one situation then they must also be part of thehistory of a single entity of the kind in any situation in which, as judged bythe Cambridge criterion [according to which mere Cambridge changes are notevents], both they, and all the events which are parts of the history of theentity in the first situation, remain present" [p. 164].

"Time is reduced to a simple, annoyingly un-mysteriousdefinition: It is a characteristic of events" [p. 237]. Criticises Biser (1952), with a reply in Biser (1953).

An attempt to construe a general conceptual framework foraction explanation based on the notion of "intentional deterministicexplanation".

Presented as "a study in the philosophy of episodes" [p. 9],suggests "a new conceptual framework inspired both by von Wright and thelinguistic philosophers [...] From the point of view of change involved there arethree kinds of episodes, states, events

, and processes. These episodes can be qualified in two basic ways. They can be causative

[or] agentive [or] both [...] Moreover, episodes can be complex in at least two ways.They can involve more than one episode, and they can involve more than onecause or agent" [pp. 9-10].

1984 ‘Onthe Classification of Verbs and Actions’, Studies in Communication

(Five Studies in Action Theory

), 8, 1-30.

A discussion of Ryle (1949), Kenny (1963), and Vendler (1957)on classifying the verb vocabulary of natural language.

1979 ‘AnomalousMonism, Events, and "The Mental"’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

, 40, 64-74.

A criticism of (a version of) anomalous monism, arguing thatdespite its "prima facie advantages", there are "reasons to doubt itsviability. On the one hand, there are reasons to deny that sensation events canbe distinguished from physical events merely by virtue of their mode ofdescription [...] On the other hand, even if such difficulties could be resolved,there is the added problem of making plausible the thesis that one and the sameevent can fall under mental and physical descriptions" [p. 73].

1981 ‘Causes,Laws, and Law Statements’, Philosophical Studies, 48, 347-69.

Includes a discussion of D. K. Lewis (1973), Swain (1978), andW. A. Davis (1980).

1976 ‘Propositions,Facts, and Becoming’, Philosophical Studies,29, 397-402.

On the incompatibility of objective or absolute becoming withthe reality of timeless facts about temporal objects.

1984 ‘McTaggart,Schlesinger, and the Two-Dimensional Time Hypothesis’, PhilosophicalQuarterly, 33, 391-97; reprinted in L. N.Oaklander and Q. Smith, eds. (1994), pp. 221-28.

Argues that Schlesinger (1980) does not succeed in vindicatingMcTaggart’s "positive" conception of time (eventually rejected by McTaggart asunreal).

1985 ‘AReply to Schlesinger’, Philosophical Quarterly, 35, 93-94; reprinted in L. N. Oaklander and Q. Smith, eds. (1994),pp. 232-33.

1987 ‘McTaggart’sParadox and the Infinite Regress of Temporal Attributions: A Reply to Smith’, SouthernJournal of Philosophy, 25, 425-31;reprinted in L. N. Oaklander and Q. Smith, eds. (1994), pp. 195-201.

Reply to Q. Smith (1986). Argues that the infinite regress oftemporal attributions implied by the tensed theory of time is vicious.

1990 ‘TheNew Tenseless Theory of Time: A Reply to Smith’, Philosophical Studies

, 58, 287-93; reprinted in L. N. Oaklander and Q.Smith, eds. (1994), pp. 77-82.

Reply to Q. Smith (1987) in defense of the view that althoughtensed discourse is necessary for timely action, "tensed facts are not, sincethe truth conditions of tensed sentences can be expressed in a tenselessmetalanguage that describes unchanging temporal relations between or amongevents" [p. 287]. Rejoinder in Smith (1994b).

1991 ‘ADefense of the New Tenseless Theory of Time’, Philosophical Quarterly

, 41, 26-38; reprinted in L. N. Oaklander and Q.Smith, eds. (1994), pp. 57-68.

Further arguments in defense of the tenseless theory of timeagainst Q. Smith (1987). Rejoinder in Smith (1994a).

1992 ‘Zeilicovicion Temporal Becoming’, Philosophia, 21,329-34; reprinted in L. N. Oaklander and Q. Smith, eds. (1994), pp. 252-56.

1994 ‘McTaggart’sParadox Revisited’, in L. N. Oaklander and Q. Smith, eds. (1994), pp. 211-13.

Argues that on Q. Smith’s (1986, 1988/89) analysis of tenses,McTaggart’s paradox is unavoidable.

1996 ‘McTaggart’sParadox and Smith’s Tensed Theory of Time’, Synthese

, 107, 205-21.

Argues that Q. Smith’s tensed theory of time fails because (i)it cannot account "for the sense in which events have their tensed propertiessuccessively", and (ii) it cannot account for the direction of time [p. 205].

Includes Oaklander (1994) and Q. Smith (1994a, 1994b, 1994c)along with reprints of Beer (1988),Mellor (1981a, Ch. 6), Oaklander (1984, 1985, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1992),Schlesinger (1985), Q. Smith (1986, 1987, 1988/9, 1990a, 1990b), C. Williams(1992), and Zeilicovici (1989).

A non-multiplier, moderately unifier view, exploiting the ideaof relying on Kripke’s notion of natural kinds to "bundle-up" event properties.The main thesis is that "a simple physical event is a spatiotemporalexemplifying, by a subject at a time, of a property which belongs to a singlenatural event kind, like motion. So two expressions which pick out the samesubject and time but different properties, like jogging and jogging uphill--bothmotion properties--can nevertheless refer to a single event" [Abstract].

1976 ‘CausalOverdetermination and Counterfactuals’, Philosophical Studies

, 29, 275-77.

Offers a counterexample to Loeb’s (1974) analysis of‘C-condition’ on the counterfactual approach.

1995 Agents,Causes, and Events. Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will

, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

1991 ‘Plaidoyerpour l’événement quelconque’ [‘A Plea for the Undetermined Event’, in French],in J.-L. Petit, ed. (1991), pp. 203-28.

On the role of the semantics of event in contemporary debateson action theory. Drawing on Ricoeur’s critique of Davidson’s theory, arguesthat "the use of agency as a means for distinction between action and eventimplies a ‘primitive’ conception of causality, which is opposed to a discursiveor explicative, one" [Abstract, on p. 286].

1996 Tense,Attitudes, and Scope, Dordrecht, Boston,and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

A model-theoretic account of the semantics of tense in naturallanguage. Chapter 6, on "Tense and de reattitudes" [190-46], follows an eventuality-based approach.

1995 TemporalLogic. From Ancient Ideas to Artificial Intelligence, Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

1967 ‘Choosing,Deciding, and Doing’, in P. Edwards, ed. in chief, The Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, New York: Macmillan and FreePress, Vol. 2, pp. 96-104.

Critical survey of the main positions concerning (i) thequestion of whether ‘choosing’ and ‘deciding’ stand for mental events, and (ii)various issues in the philosophy of action, including causality and thetemporal boundaries of actions.

1993 ‘Accionescomplejas y inferencias adverbiales’ [‘Complex Actions and AdverbialInferences’, in Spanish], in M. J. Palacios, ed., Temas Actuales deFilosofia, Buenos Aires: UniversidadNacional Salta, pp. 423-27.

Argues that Davidson’s (1967a) analysis of action sentences"fails to validate certain intuitively valid inferences. The introduction ofcomplex actions in an analysis of this kind is proposed as a solution to thisproblem. The solution is illustrated by the explanation of why adverbialmodifiers are not always distributive in the context of action sentences" [ThePhilosopher’s Index Abstract].

"Facts belong [...] to the world itself, and not merely to theapparatus by means of which we represent it" [p. 1]. Considers the notion of anevent as "not sufficiently general to serve as a basic ontological category inits own right [...] Individuals, properties, and relations can be conceived of asadjectives of events because events seem to comprise these elements inthemselves. But they do so only if they are construed as a kind of fact" [p.iv]. The final chapter includes an extensive discussion of the "slingshot"argument.

Explores how reference to causal laws allows one todistinguish between specifying a cause and giving a partial description of it.Includes a discussion of Davidson’s (1967c) critique of Mill’s notion of totalcause. Comments in Vision (1982).

1997 ‘ThePhilosophical Insignificance of Gödel’s Slingshot’, Mind

, 106, 121-41.

A criticism of Neale (1995). "I do not believe that anySlingshot arguments have any interesting and important philosophicalconsequences for theories of facts or for referential treatments of definitedescriptions" [p. 121]. Develops a fact-friendly theory in order to suggest"(i) that it isn’t obvious on independent grounds that no theory of this kindcan succeed; and yet (ii) that it is quite clear that this theory will not fallto Gödel’s Slingshot" [p. 123]. Reply in Neale and Dever (1997).

Articulated analysis of the relation between processes andevents and of the distinction between processes that do and processes that donot involve completion. "We shall encounter a tendency to reduce the process tothe discontinuity and thereby a tendency toward the exorcism of time from process.My aim will be to defend it from reduction, and to restore it to the rightfularms of time" [p. 215]. Remarks that "Events take place in time, though notnecessarily at an instant, for events can extend over time as objects do overspace. Processes, on the other hand, advance through time, and necessarilyendure [...] Thus, the process is not a kind of event, and yet the on-going of aprocess is not a distinct phenomenonfrom the happening of the event it constitutively realises [pp. 222-23].

1973 ‘Trying(as the Mental "‘Pineal Gland")’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 70, 365-86.

Gives arguments for the reality of sub-intentional acts;argues that they do not provide a counterexample to the thesis [p. 58] that allphysical actions are identical with some strivings or other.

1984 Causeand Action. A Critical Examination of Three Types of Theories of Human Action

, Doctoral Dissertation, State University of New Yorkat Albany.

Argues that the causal status of action is an (undecided)empirical question. Based on a critical examination of the event-causationmodel (Davidson), the agent-causation view (Chisholm, R. Taylor), and theagency theory of von Wright.

Elaboration of Montmarquet (1978) concerning the argument that"if my action of arm raising is thebringing about of the bodily movement that is the event of my arm goingup, then there is something wrong with [Davidson’s] identifiying the action(the bringing about of an event) with the very event that is brought about" [p.32].

"An event is a coincidence iff it can be naturally dividedinto parts which are such that the (temporally prior) conditions necessary andsufficient for the occurrence of one part are independent of those necessaryand sufficient for the occurrence of the other."

1957 ‘ANote on Causation and the Meaning of "Event"’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 54, 155-58; reprinted in Beauchamp, ed. (1974), pp.160-63.

A criticism of Ducasse’s analysis of causation (in 1951): itfails to analyse the ordinary meaning of ‘cause’ because this "is applied toinstances of definite kinds of events, not to what Ducasse calls ‘concreteevents’. Causal questions do not have the form ‘why did the event withspace-time coordinates x, y

, z, t

happen?’, but ‘why did the event of kind Kwith space-time coordinates x

, y, z

, thappen?’" [p. 163].

1970 ‘SomeProblems Concerning the Logic of Grammatical Modifiers’, Synthese

, 21, 320-33; reprinted in D. Davidson and G. Harman,eds. (1972), pp. 127-41.

After criticizing Reichenbach’s proposal, gives an account ofgrammatical modifiers (adverbs, adjectives, and prepositions) as operatorsadded to a first-order predicate calculus: "Syntactically these operatorsprecede well-formed formulas (frequently atomic), forming more complexwell-formed formulas; semantically they can be construed as functions [...] whichmap the properties expressed by the formulas they modify onto new properties"[p. 132]. Compare R. Clark’s (1970) theory of predicate modifiers.

1973 ‘TenseOperators versus Quantifiers’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 70, 609-10.

1980 ‘Modifiersand Quantifiers in Natural Language’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy

, Suppl. Vol. 6 ["New Essays in Philosophy ofLanguage", F. J. Pellettier and C. G. Normore, eds.], 29-60.

Argues that Davidson’s (1967a) semantic analysis of adverbs aspredicates of events is compatible with a standard syntactic treatment ofadverbs as predicate modifiers. Puts forward additional semantic evidence fortaking sentences such as "Brutus stabbed Caesar" as involving quantificationover events. The analysis exploits an extension of Davidson’s in which theevent participants are separated out yielding the logical form "($e

)(stabbing(e) & Subj(e

,Brutus) & Obj(e

,Caesar))". (Compare Castañeda’s 1967 suggestion.)See Carlson (1984) and Dowty (1989) for similar accounts.

1985 ‘UnderlyingEvents in the Logical Analysis of English’, in E. LePore and B. P. McLaughlin,eds. (1985), pp. 235-67.

Arguments à la Davidson(1967a) towards an ontology of events. Applications of the theory put forwardin (1980) to the analysis of perceptual statements and of adverbials of manner,location, instrument, direction, and motion. The final section addresses theissue of event identity, pointing out connections and differences between theimplications of Davidson’s original theory of logical form and Parsons’ ownrevised formulation.

1987/8 ‘UnderlyingStates in the Semantical Analysis of English’, Proceedings of theAristotelian Society, 88, 13-30.

Gives natural language evidence for quantifiying over statesin addition to events. Proposes to analyse an atomic sentence such as "Brutusis clever" as "($s

)[s isa state of being clever & Subj(s,

Brutus)]". Claims that states are perceivable:if Mary saw John naked, then his being naked was a state, and that is what shesaw. Compare Montmarquet (1978).

1989 ‘TheProgressive in English: Events, States and Processes’, Linguistics andPhilosophy, 12, 213-41; reprinted withrevisions as Chapter 9 of T. Parsons (1990), pp. 167-85; reprinted in R. Casatiand A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp. 47-76.

Accounts for the difference between non-progressive andprogressive sentences in terms of "whether the sentence requires for its truththat the eventuality picked out by the verb culminates, or whether it onlyneeds to ‘go on’ for a while [...] If ‘A’ is an event verb, then ‘be A-ing’ is tobe treated semantically as a state verb; otherwise, ‘be A-ing’ is to be treatedthe same as ‘A’" [p. 222]. On the"category switch" problem of how modification of a verb like ‘run’ by anadverbial like ‘to the store’ can turn a process phrase into an event[accomplishment] phrase. "A process is actually a series or amalgam of events[...] A so-called ‘process verb’ is a verb which has the property that when it istrue of an event e it is typically trueof many culminated ‘subevents’ of ewhich have the same subjects and objects" [p. 235].

1990 Eventsin the Semantics of English. A Study in Subatomic Semantics

, Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press.

An investigation of "subatomic semantics" (the study of those"formulas" of English that are usually treated as atomic in logicalinvestigations) building on the neo-Davidsonian analysis developed in (1980,1985, 1987/8, 1989). The book covers many topics such as the logic of predicatemodifiers, the semantics of perceptual statements, the relations betweenimplicit and explicit reference to events, causatives and inchoatives, and muchmore. Reviewed by Hornstein (1993) and Moens (1994).

1991 ‘Tropesand Supervenience’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

, 51, 629-32.

Part of a symposium on J. Bennett (1988) (with replies in J.Bennett 1991b). Defends a conception of events as tropes understood as "neitherproperties nor things that have the same properties that ordinary individualshave" [p. 631]. The account is couched within a neo-Davidsonian framework that"analyses ordinary predications of general properties to individuals in termsof appeal to events and states", and therefore "does not clearly sit well with[Bennett’s] thesis that events are supervenient on substances and properties" [p. 632].

1973 ‘SomeStructural Analogies Between Tenses and Pronouns in English’, The Journal ofPhilosophy, 70, 601-9.

Argues that there is a significant parallel in the behavior oftenses (Past and Present) and pronouns, at least in English. This shouldencourage an account in which tenses are represented via

quantified variables ranging over times (picking oute.g. the times at which certain relevant events occur).

1984 ‘Nominaland Temporal Anaphora’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 7 [special issue on "Pronouns and Anaphora. PartII", E. Klein, ed.], 243-86.

1991 ‘AdverbialQuantification and Event Structures’, in L. A. Sutton, C. Johnson, and R.Shields, eds., (1991), pp. 439-56.

A study of the expression of quantification and the semanticdistinctions between eventive and non-eventive sentences in the spirit of E.Bach’s (1986b) "natural language metaphysics". Quantification can "help shedlight on where implicit ‘event arguments’ and the like enter the grammarproper" [p. 453].

1988 ‘AComputational Model of the Semantics of Tense and Aspect’, ComputationalLinguistics, 14/2 [Special Issue on "Tenseand Aspect"], 44-60.

Describes a natural-language system that "processes referencesto situations and the intervals over which they hold using an algorithm thatintegrates the analysis of tense and aspect" [p. 44]. Situations taking placein actual time are of three types: states, processes, or transition events.Their temporal structure consist of intervals characterized with reference tothe feature kinêsis (pertaining to theirinternal structure) and boundedness(constraining the manner in which they are located in time).

1967 ‘AreReasons for Actions Causes?’, in A. Stroll, Epistemology. New Essays in theTheory of Knowledge, New York: Harper andRow (reprint Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), pp. 204-28.

Casts doubts on various arguments against the thesis thatreasons are causes for actions.

1971 ‘TwoProblems about Reasons for Actions’, in R. Binkley, R. Bronaugh, and A. Marras,eds. (1971), pp. 128-53.

"Is it possible to take any agent’s reason for his action, andto find a description of his operative desire under which, given his factualbeliefs, it contingently produced his action? And is it possible to find adescription of his action under which it contingently issued from his operativedesire?" [p. 128].

1991 ‘Planningwith Simultaneous Actions and External Events’, in J. F. Allen, H. A. Kautz, R.N. Pelavin, and J. D. Tenenberg (1991), pp. 127-211.

Presents an extension of temporal logic designed for planningsituations that might involve simultaneous actions and interactions withexternal events.

1970 ‘Verbsand the Identity of Actions. A Philosophical Exercise in the Interpretation ofAristotle’, in O. P. Wood and G. Pitcher, eds., Ryle. A Collection ofCritical Essays, Garden City, NY: AnchorBooks, pp. 393-460.

An analysis of Aristotle’s distinction between energeia

and kinêsis, mostly in reply to Ackrill’s (1965) analysis, but including referencesto Ryle’s (1949) parallel account of the distinction between activity andaccomplishment verbs.

1991 ‘Eventsas Theory Operators’, in M. de Glas and D. M. Gabbay, eds., Proceedings ofthe First World Conference on the Fundamentals of Artificial Intelligence(WOCFAI 91), Paris: Angkor, pp. 413-26.

Presents an axiomatic, domain-independent theory of eventsthat captures the principle of minimal change (which says that as little asnecessary changes in the world when an action is performed). Includes alsorepresentation results relating events to belief revision functions. (SeePeppas and Wobcke 1992 for further developments in this direction.)

1992 ‘Onthe Use of Epistemic Entrenchment in Reasoning about Action’, in B. Neumann,ed., Proceedings of the 10th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence(ECAI 92), Chichester: John Wiley &Sons, pp. 403-07.

Extends the results of Peppas, Foo, and Wobcke (1991)concerning the relation between events and belief revision functions.

1993 ‘Hechos,eventos, tropos y el análisis de la causalidad’ [‘Facts, Events, Tropes, andthe Analysis of Causality’, in Spanish], in M. J. Palacios, ed., TemasActuales de Filosofia, Buenos Aires:Universidad Nacional Salta, pp. 477-84.

1994 ‘Davidson,la relación causal y los eventos particulares’ [‘Davidson, the Causal Relation,and Particular Events’, in Spanish], Revista de Filosofía

(Argentina) 9, 29-42.

Against Davidson’s (1967c) view that the relata of the causalrelation are particular events.

1979a ‘OnRepresenting Event Reference’, in C.-K. Oh and D. A. Dinnen, eds., Syntaxand Semantics, Volume 11, Presupposition,New York: Academic Press, pp. 325-55.

Argues "(a) thatreference to events and reference to individuals can be fruitfully representedin the same way; and (b) thatevent phrases are not factive clauses and so are to be associated not withfactive predicates but with eventives"[p. 325].

1979b ‘Onthe Natural Logic of Complex Event Expressions’, in Abstracts of the 6thInternational Congress on Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,Sections 10-12, Hannover: DLMPS, pp.177-81.

Outline of a general theory of events "required for thecomplete explanation of natural language referring expressions, since there aregenuine event-referring expressions" [p. 177]. The theory is a generalizationof Kim’s: in addition to "simple" events of the form [x,

t ](x exemplifying property P

at t ,where x is an object or sequenceof objects), there are three sorts of "complex" events: negative compounds(e.g., Plato’s not drinking hemlock), conjunctive compounds (e.g., Sacco andVanzetti’s execution), and non-compound complex events obtained by letting thefirst term of a triple [x

, P

, t

] be itself an event or sequence ofevents (e.g., the Titanic’s sinking being rapid). The general notion ischaracterized recursively. Illustrative applications are included. See (1989)for a fully developed account.

A criticism of Vendler’s (1962a, 1967c) view that causes arefacts. "Vendler’s linguistic analysis does not support his philosophicalconclusion that cause sequences are heterogeneous (fact-event) while effectsequences are homogeneous (event-event). The correct linguistic analysis ofevents, propositions, and facts reveals that genuine causes are events andsupports a strict distinction between causation and explanation" [ThePhilosopher’s Index Abstract].

1982 ‘AnaphoricReference to Facts, Propositions, and Events’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 5 [Special Issue on "The Semantics of TemporalElements", R. Wall and R. E. Grandy, eds.], 235-76.

"Logically speaking, events, facts, and propositions need not all

be posited in order to assign truth-values to thevarious sentences in which event expressions, fact expressions, and/orproposition expressions occur (i.e., sentences with purported references tofacts, propositions, and/or events)" [p. 239]. "So, if all three kinds ofreferents turn out to be required for natural language semantics, theirpostulation is empirically significant" [p. 235].

1985 ‘Causation,Agency, and Natural Actions’, in W. H. Eilfort, P. D. Kroeber, and K. L.Peterson, eds., CLS 21: Papers from the Twenty-First Regional Meeting of theChicago Linguistic Society, Part 2,Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society, pp. 204-27.

Carries out the analysis of "cause" in the agentive sense setaside in Peterson (1981) and applies it to closely related verbs.

1988 ‘WhichUniversal?’, in A. Fine and J. Leplin, eds., Proceedings of the 1988 BiennalMeeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. I, East Lansing, MI, pp. 24-30.

1989 ‘ComplexEvents’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,70, 19-41; reprinted in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp. 153-75.

Full account of the theory of "complex events" adumbrated in(1979b), obtained by letting the first term of a Kimean triple [x,

t ]to be itself an event (or by letting one or more of the x

’s be events when P

is relational). "Such an event is thought of as theevent of some concrete event e havinga property at some time" [p. 20].Accordingly, "not only is there the event of Caesar crossing the Rubicon and the fact

that makes the proposition expressible by anappropriate use of the sentence‘Caesar crossed the Rubicon’ true [...], there are events like Caesar’s crossingthe Rubicon being beforeNapoleon’s crossing the Alps (an event containing two subevents)" [ibid.].

1990 CriticalNotice of Olson (1987), Philosophy and Phenomenology Research

, 50, 610-15.

1994 ‘Facts,Events, and Semantic Emphasis in Causal Statements’, The Monist

, 77 [Issue on "Facts and Situations", ed. by P. M.Simons], 217-38.

Defends the view (put forward in 1989) that the logical formof a semantically emphasized causal sentence like "Socrates’ drinking hemlock atdusk caused his death" (Dretske 1977) isthat of an attribution of causality in which the logical subject refers to acomplex event. Criticizes Stern’s (1993) account.

1995 ‘AreSome Propositions EmpiricallyNecessary?’, Philosophy and Phenomenology Research

, 55, 251-77.

"By realizing that there arefalse propositions, we come to realizethat propositions in general are clearly distinguishable from actual facts aswell as from states and events" [p. 257].

"The formal semantics of statements with fact-referring,event-referring, and proposition-referring expressions need not, logicallyspeaking, be one which assumes that entities of all three types (facts,propositions, and events) exist. At most, one type alone is absolutely required(and maybe even less [...])" [p. 17].

1984 ‘Lasemantique de l’action de D. Davidson’ [‘Davidson’s Semantics of Action’, inFrench], Archives de Philosophie, 47,449-75.

1986 Reviewof LePore and McLaughlin, eds. (1985), Archives de Philosophie

, 49, 683-85.

1991a L’actiondans la philosophie analytique [Actionin Analytic Philosophy, in French], Paris:Presses Universitaires de France.

1991b ‘Oublierl’événement?’ [‘Forgetting Events?’, in French], in J.-L. Petit, ed. (1991),pp. 259-262.

A critical study of J. Bennett (1988), "in which Bennett takesan opposite view to the philosophical approaches which introduce the concept ofevent to work out problems of a theory of semantics" [from the Abstract on p.287].

1991 L’événementen perspective [Event inPerspective, in French], Paris: Editions del’Ecole des hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales.

Includes de Fornel (1991), Ogien (1991), Engel (1991), Natali(1991), Petit (1991b), Pettit (1991), Ricoeur (1991), and Stahl (1991).

1991 ‘Pertinencecausale et identité événementielle’ [‘Causal Relevance and Event Identity’, inFrench], in J.-L. Petit, ed. (1991), pp. 57-73.

"Is an event a concrete object, or an example of a property?In the first case, one could identify it with the help of a property, but sinceonly physical properties are relevant from the causal point of view, mentalevents, or social ones, must therefore be physical. In the second case, it issufficient for properties of events to have the same result differently, forthe events not to be the same: therefore the mental events can be supervenienton physical ones, without being identified with them. Between these twohypotheses, the criterion of causal relevance is not decided, because a similarresult can depend on a whole hierarchy of causal levels" [Abstract, p. 285].

1980 Events,Individuation and Identity, DoctoralDissertation, University of Calgary.

A defense of Davidson’s unifying approach to event identityagainst the "temporal objection" (time-of-a-killing problem) raised by Goldman(1971) and Thomson (1971a).

1981b ‘Thomsonon Events and the Causal Criterion’, Philosophical Studies

, 39, 319-22; incorporated in Pfeifer (1989), Section8.3.

A defense of Davidson’s (1969a) causal criterion for eventidentity against an alleged counterexample put forward by Thomson (1977).

1982 ‘AProblem of Motivation for Multipliers’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy

, 20, 209-24; incorporated in Pfeifer (1989), Chapter3, Section 2.2.

Argues that the three main objections raised by Goldman (1971)against Davidson’s unifying approach to event identity--the relationalobjection, the temporal objection, and the causal objection--can be raisedagainst Goldman’s own account. Compare Lombard (1974).

1985 ‘AConsideration of Modifications to the Multiplying Account’, PhilosophyResearch Archives, 11, 141-54; reprintedwith modifications as Chapter 4 of Pfeifer (1989).

Examines a way of modifying Goldman’s (1971) theory so as toovercome the objections advanced in (1982).

1988a ‘AShort Vindication of Reichenbach’s "Event-Splitting"’, Logique et Analyse

, 31, 143-52.

Argues that "Reichenbach has available a rather pedestrian wayof avoiding Davidson’s (1967a) objection" [p. 143], thus leaving their accountslargely comparable.

1988b ‘SomeBy the Way Remarks on Wreen’s "By" Ways’, Analysis, 48, 107-9.

1989 Actionsand Other Events: The Unifier-Multiplier Controversy, New York: Peter Lang.

An extensive defense of the "unifying" approach to eventidentity (Anscombe and Davidson) against the criticisms of the rival"multiplying" account (Kim, Goldman, and others). Concludes that, "depending onthe types of events involved, pragmatic considerations such as speakers’interests and purposes will influence what is picked out or left out byevent-describing expressions, and that therefore even utterances of the sameexpression may not identify the same event" [p. 184].This is argued to be in line with Davidson’s remarks in (1969a), Davidson’scausal criterion being regarded as "a general criterion of individuation inprinciple, but not in practice" [p. 186]. Partly based on material alreadypublished in (1981a, 1981b, 1982, 1985). Reviewed by Rankin (1992) and Ripley(1995).

1994a ‘TheMereo-Topology of Event Structures’, in P. Dekker and M. Stokhof, eds., Proceedingsof the 9th Amsterdam Colloquium, Amsterdam:Institute for Language, Logic and Computation, pp. 527-46.

Holds that a combined mereological and topological perspectiveprovides a resourceful framework for the formal-ontological analysis of naturallanguage semantics. The account focuses on event-related phenomena and includesa discussion of present tense sentences along with a tentative characterizationof Aktionsarten-aspectual facts.

1994b ‘MereotopologicalConstruction of Time from Events’, in A. Cohn, ed., Proceedings of the 11thEuropean Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 94)

, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 396-400.

Argues that the formal connection between the way events areperceived to be ordered and the underlying temporal dimension is essentiallythat of a construction of a linear ordering from the mereotopologicalproperties of an oriented structure including events as bona fide

individuals.

1996b ‘RefiningTemporal Reference in Event Structures’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

, 37, 71-83.

Generalizes the notion of an event structure to that of arefinement structure, where various degrees of temporal granularity areaccommodated, and investigates how refinement structures can account for thecontext-dependence of temporal structures in natural language.

Includes a discussion of Davidson’s (1967a) analysis of actionsentences [pp. 190-201].

1979 TheSemantic Interpretation of Aspect and Aktionsarten. A Study of Internal TimeReference in Swedish, Dordrecht: Foris, pp.75-115.

1979 ‘Chisholmon States of Affairs’, Grazer philosophische Studien

, 7/8 [special issue "Essays in the Philosophy of R.M. Chisholm", also published as E. Sosa, ed. (1979)], 163-75.

A criticism of Chisholm’s program to dispense with particularevents by reducing all talk about concrete events to talk about states ofaffairs.

1981 ‘Causes,Conditionals, and Time’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

, 63, 275-88.

An analysis of causation in terms of counterfactuals andtemporal relations. The basic notion is that of a "causal conditional", whichis claimed to exhibit the desired logical properties for a causal relation.

Includes a formulation of a logic of action based on anintensional agency-operator of bringing about. See Åqvist (1974).

1974 ‘SomeBasic Concepts of Action’, in S. Stenlund, ed., Logical Theory and SemanticAnalysis. Essays Dedicated to Stig Kanger onHis Fiftieth Birthday, Dordrecht: Reidel,pp. 93-101.

A formal approach to action theory, based on the (1974)characterization of action in terms of bringing about.

An account of the logic of adverbial (and attributive)modification as belonging to the logic of predicate modifiers.

1991 ‘Gerundsand Types of Events’, in S. Moore and A. Z. Wyner, eds., Proceedings of theFirst Semantics and Linguistics Theory Conference (SALT I)

, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University (Cornell UniversityWorking Papers in Linguistics, No. 10), pp. 189-208.

"What is perhaps the simplest way of letting gerunds denoteproperties of events--by incorporating a special Davidsonian argument andotherwise treating a gerund like an ordinary noun--has difficulty giving aunified treatment of both internally quantified and simple gerunds. Instead, ifthe notion of proposition is reconstructed in situational terms, gerunds can bepropositional expressions that have event-like entities in their denotations"[p. 205].

1994 ‘AUniform Semantics for Aspectual -ing’,in M. Gonzàlez, ed., Proceedings of the North East Linguistic Society(NELS 24), Volume 2, Amherst, MA:University of Massachusetts, pp. 507-17.

Gives an event-based reformulation of Dowty’s (1979) "inertiaworlds" account of the progressive and extends it so as to account for other -ingforms in English.

1995 ‘Quantification,Events, and Gerunds’, in E. Bach, E. Jelinek, A. Kratzer, and B. H. Partee,eds., Quantification in Natural Language,Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 619-59.

Argues that "gerunds are amenable to a treatment that ascribesmuch of their semantic variability to various quantificational operators thatmay be present in the sentence" (including quantification over events).

1965 ‘States,Activities, and Performances’ (Symposium with C. C. W. Taylor), Proceedingsof the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol.39, 65-84.

A closer look at Kenny’s (1963) claim that his distinctionsbetween static, activity and performance verbs correspond to those drawn byAristotle between kinêsis and energeia

, echein andenergeia, poiesis

and praxis. It is suggested that Aristotle’s views actually provide a basis forsimplifying Kenny’s criteria as well as for tense logic. Reply by C. C. W.Taylor (1965).

1975 ‘PhilosophicalLogic and Process Theory in The Work of Richard M. Martin: A Review Article’, ProcessStudies, 5, 204-13.

An exposition of Martin’s theory of first-order logic andsemiotic, augmented by the calculus of individuals and event logic.

1994 Language,Mind and Epistemology. On Donald Davidson’s Philosophy

, Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer AcademicPublishers.

1949 ‘Acting,Willing, Desiring’, in Moral Obligation,Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 187-98; reprinted in A. R. White, ed. (1968), pp.59-69, and in Brand, ed. (1970), pp. 41-49.

Influential defense of the volitional theory of action: "Toact is really to will something" [p. 43]. What we will is a bodily change [p.45]; and the relation between the willing and the change is causal [p. 46].(Thus, the willing does not directly cause a bodily movement, but only thefirst link in the causal chain that culminates in the bodily movement.)

An exposition of the main views in the philosophy of mind,including a discussion of Davidson’s [1970b] argument for anomalous monism [pp.115-22] and Honderich’s [1988] materialist model for the explanation of action[122-32. Includes also an account of Russell’s construction of matter out ofevents [pp. 162ff].

1949 ‘Determinables,Determinates and Determinants (Part I)’ Mind, 58, 1-20.

Early account of events as particular properties (tropes),with remarks on the logical form of event sentences: "[In] ‘Bob is runningswiftly’ it would seem that ‘running’, the generic character of which ‘runningswiftly’ is the specific form, quite plainly characterises the object ‘Bob’ [...],while ‘swiftly’, the specifying term, just as plainly characterises a character[...] We might re-state ‘Bob is running’ as ‘There is a running in Bob’--not‘There is running in Bob’, as if it were like ‘There is goodness in Bob’, but‘There is a running in Bob’, like ‘There is a movement in Bob’. ‘A running’,like ‘a movement’, is not a universal or a quality, but a particular orsubstance, or as Johnson [Logic, PartIII, Intr., 5] would say ‘substantive’, though it is an occurrent substantiverather than a continuant one" [pp. 9-10].

1968 ‘Changesin Events and Changes in Things’, in Papers on Time and Tense

, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-14;reprinted in R. Le Poidevin and M. Mac Beath, eds. (1993), pp. 35-46.

"What looks like talk about changes in events is really justslightly more complicated talk about changes in things. This applies both

to the changes that we say occur in events when theyare going on, like the change in speed of a movement (‘movement’ is a façonthe parler; there is just the moving car,which moves more quickly than it did), and the changes that we say occur in events when they are not going on anylonger, or not yet, e.g. my birth’s receding into the past (‘birth’ is a is a façonthe parler--there’s just me being born, andthen getting older)" [p. 43]. Butthen, "Does Queen Anne’s death gettingmore past mean that she is still‘getting older’?" No: she doesn’t herself enter into the recession of her deathinto the past; "but the recession isstill a change [...] in the sense that it fits the formula ‘It was the case that p

, but is not now the case that p

’" [p. 46, where p

is, e.g., ‘it was the case only 250 years ago thatQueen Anne is dying’].

Develops on the idea, already put forward in (1968), that thepresent is the real.

1996 ‘HypotheticalReasoning about Actions: From Situation Calculus to Event Calculus’, ComputationalIntelligence, 12 [Special Issue on"Temporal Representation and Reasoning", S. D. Goodwin and H. J. Hamilton,eds.], 478-98.

Moving from the consideration that the "situation calculus"(McCarthy and Hayes 1969) cannot represent actual actions while the "eventcalculus" (Kowalski and Sergot 1986) cannot represent hypothetical actions, offersan extension of the latter that overcomes this limitation. Compare Kowalski andSadri (1994).

1974 ‘NeuralPlasticity and the Location of Mental Events’, Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy, 52, 154-62.

Evidence concerning neural plasticity make it doubtful thatthe language of identity will ever be appropriate to address the question oflocating mental events in the brain.

1987 ‘Eventsand VP Modifiers’, in B. G. T. Lowden, ed., Proceedings of the AlveySponsored Workshop on Formal Semantics in Natural Language Processing

, Colchester: University of Essex, pp. 74-80.

1989 ‘TheGeometry of Events’, in C. L. Tenny, ed., Studies in Generative Approachesto Aspect, Cambridge, MA: MIT, LexiconProject Working Papers No. 24.

An examination of the role of events for a lexical semantictheory for natural language, based on the view that "an internal eventstructure can provide a distinct and useful level of representation forlinguistic analysis involving the aspectual properties of verbs, adverbialscope, the role of argument structure, and the mapping from the lexicon tosyntax" [p. 47, Abstract]. It is argued that grammatical phenomena "makereference to the internal structure of events", and that a rather sophisticatedsubevent analysis for predicates "is able to systematically capture theseeffects" [p. 48].

Argues that the "event structure" of a word (in the sense ofPustejovsky 1991a) is one level of semantic specification necessary to capturethe meaning of a lexical item.

Full development of the theory presented in (1991b). Seeespecially § 5.3 [pp. 67-75] on event structures, and § 8.4-8.5 [pp. 157-77] onevent descriptions, propositions, and nominalizations.

1995 ‘Unaccusativityand Event Composition’, in P. M. Bertinetto, V. Bianchi, J. Higginbotham, andM. Squartini, eds. (1995), pp. 159-77.

Within the framework of the Generative Lexicon theory(Pustejovsky 1991b), argues that distinct forms such as ‘The enemies sank theboat’ and ‘The boat sank’ are projected from one underspecified lexical entryby foregrounding different components in the event structure of the predicate(an operation similar to argument changing operations such as passivization).The account includes an reformulation of the notion of an event structure.

1979 ‘Reflectionson Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking’, TheJournal of Philosophy, 76, 603-18;reprinted in H. Putnam, Realism and Reason. Philosophical Papers,

Volume 3,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 155-69.

Includes a discussion of Davidson’s anomalous monism. "But onecan say nothing about the ‘causal powers’ of particulars apart from a relevanttheoretical description of thoseparticulars. The whole idea of saying that a particular

brain event is a sensation

without any ‘type-type’ theory is a chimera" [p. 160]. Also makes a comparison between continuants and events inrelation to their physical status.

1984 Computationand Cognition. Toward a Foundation for Cognitive Science

, Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press/BradfordBooks.

"A theory never explains an entirely unique event, only anevent viewed against a background of distinctions and equivalences defined bythe vocabulary with which the events are described. That is what I mean when Isay that theories address phenomena as ‘events under descriptions’" [pp.16-17].

1950 ‘Identity,Ostension and Hyposthasis’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 47, 621-33; reprinted in Quine’s From aLogical Point of View, Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1953, pp. 65-79.

1953 ‘ThreeGrades of Modal Involvement’, Proceedings of the XIth International Congressfor Philosophy (Brussels 1953), Amsterdam:North-Holland, vol. 14, pp. 65-81; reprinted in Quine’s The Ways ofParadox and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA,and London: Harvard University Press, 1966 (revised and enlarged edition,1976), pp. 158-76.

Contains a classic formulation of the "slingshot" argument(here used to demonstrate that devices of quantification and description yielda collapse of modal distinctions).

"Physical objects, conceived [...] four-dimensionally inspace-time, are not to be distinguished from events, or, in the concrete senseof the term, processes. Each comprises simply the content, howeverheterogeneous, of some portion of space-time, however disconnected andgerrymandered. What then distinguishes material substances from other physicalobjects is a detail: if an object is a substance, there are relatively fewatoms that lie partly in it (temporally) and partly outside" [p. 171]

1970 Philosophyof Logic, Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall; second edition Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986.

A restatement of the four-dimensional conception of materialentities: "We might think of a physical object [...] as simply the whole four-dimensional material content, howeversporadic and heterogeneous, of some portion of space-time. Then if such aphysical object happens to be fairly firm and coherent internally, but coheresonly slightly and irregularly with its spatio-temporal surroundings, we are aptto call it a body. Other physical objects may be spoken of more naturally asprocesses, happenings, events" [p. 30]. Includes also a brief discussion ofDavidson’s (1967a) treatment of adverbs.

1976 ‘OnMultiplying Entities’, Chapter 25 of The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays -Revised and Enlarged Edition, Cambridge,MA, and London: Harvard University Press, pp. 259-64.

"If a man whistled a song all the while he was walking to thebus stop and not a moment more, then presumably the event of his whistling thesong and the event of his walking to the bus would both be identified with thesame temporal segment of the man" [p. 260].

1981 ‘Thingsand Their Place in Theories’, in Theories and Things

, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 1-23;reprinted in P. K. Moser and J. D. Trout, eds., ContemporaryMaterialism. A Reader, London and New York:Routledge, 1995, pp. 193-208.

"A reason for being particularly glad to have accommodatedevents is [that] Davidson has shown to my satisfaction that quantification overevents is far and away the best way of construing adverbial constructions" [p.12].

1985 ‘Eventsand Reification’, in E. LePore and B. P. McLaughlin, eds. (1985), pp. 162-71;reprinted in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp. 107-16.

Objects that Davidson’s (1969a) identity criterion for eventsis circular. (Arguments close to those of Tiles 1976. Davidson conceded in1985a; but see Lowe 1989a for a defense.) Holds that events are individuatedvia spatio-temporal location: "The problem of individuation of events wouldseem to be dissolved now by the assimilation of events to physical objects orto some sort of constructs upon physical objects" [p. 167]. This view goes backto Quine (1950) and Lemmon (1967).

"‘Jones has done something likely to prevent his winning atWimbledon.’ ‘Oh, what?’ ‘Jones has broken his arm.’ The third remark is clearlya further, more specific or intrinsic description of the event reported in thefirst. But the intentionality of the first description, even if it wereirreducible, would not be a sufficient reason for taking it to describe adistinct event from the second" [p. 349].

"While events are particulars, just as much as objects, invirtue of their unique occupancy of space and time, they are not concreteparticulars, but ones. An object is the complete occupant of the spatiotemporalregion in which it is to be found. An event, however, is a selected, abstractedaspect of the content of the region in which it is derivatively and perhapsindeterminately located" [p. 29].

1996 Azione,causalità e razionalità in Donald Davidson[Action, Causality, and Rationality in Donald Davidson

, in Italian], Pisa: Edizioni ETS.

Chapter III, on "Agent, Substance, and Event", discussessubstance-event and event-event relations. See also Chapter IV on "Action andProcess" and Chapter V on "Types of Process", where a distinction is drawnbetween: (i) activities and phenomena; (ii) self-determining andnon-self-determining processes; (iii) prospective and retrospective processes[p. 50]. It is argued that there are "alternative methods of grouping thecontent of what falls within one particular strand of time or spatio-temporallycontinuous region" [p. 52].

1988 ‘MusicalWork and Possible Events’, Acta Philosophica Fennica

, 43, 97-109.

Item f of x

’s behavior is an action iff (i) x

is f-ing / has f-ed; (ii) x is responsible for f-ing / having f-ed; (iii) x would answer Yes to the questions "Are you

f-ing?" or "Did you f?"; and (iv) someone (not necessarily x

) can decide to f.

1970 ‘OnDescribing Actions’, Inquiry, 13[Special Issue on "Action"], 90-99.

Distinguishes between true, correct, and applicabledescriptions of actions and argues--contraCody (1967a)--that a single action can have many correct descriptions. Based ona revised account of the general notion of human action put forward in (1968).

1995 ‘BrokenBottles, Ex- or Future Prime Ministers, Non-Existent Houses, and theProgressive: Time and Modifiers’, in P. Amsili, M. Borillo, and L. Vieu, eds.(1995), Part A, pp. 49-61.

Concerning Dowty’s (1977) Imperfective Paradox, it is arguedthat the progressive, when it regards verbs of accomplishment, should betreated as a modifier acting not on the extension of the verb phrase, but onthe set of contextual implications that can be derived from it.

1977 ‘Logicians,Language, and George Lakoff’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 1, 221-31.

Section 48 (‘The problem of individuals’) is by many authorsregarded as containing a first thorough discussion of the logical form ofaction sentences: a sentence such as "Amudsen flew to the North Pole"

is logically equivalent to "($x)

(xconsists in the fact that Amudsen flew to the North Pole)". Davidson (1967a)has argued (adapting Frege’s "slingshot" argument to the effect that all truesentences name the same thing) that this view implies "that all events thatoccur (= all events) are identical" [p. 117]. Section 53 (‘Functions of highertypes’) examines two ways of dealing with adverbial modification: one based onthe foregoing account of action sentences; the other based on the idea thatadverbs can be viewed as "predicates, like adjectives, not denoting propertiesof things [...] but of properties

" [p. 303].

1956 TheDirection of Time (M. Reichenbach, ed.),Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press.

Time order is reducible to causal order. §22 includes a statementof the view that "A thing is a series of events succeeding one another intime", and that "Speaking of things and speaking of events represents merelydifferent modes of speech". For instance, "the sentence of the thinglanguage, ‘This tree is old’, must betranslated into event language[...] in the form, ‘The first events of the series constituting this tree areseparated by a long time stretch from the present event’" [p. 224]. Comparealso (1947), §48.

1971 ‘Completenessin the Logic of Predicate Modifiers’, Logique et Analyse

, 55, 627-43.

Studies various extensions of predicate calculus that dealwith adverbial modification and proves their semantic completeness

"The appropriate paradigm for ontological discussion is a thing

(most properly a physical object) that exhibits qualities(most properly of a timeless [...]character). Even persons and agents

[...] are secondary and ontologically posterior to proper(i.e. inert or inertly regarded) things. Change, process, and perhaps even timeitself are consequently to be downgraded in ontological considerations to thepoint where their unimportance is so blatant that such subordination hardlywarrants explicit defense. They may, without gross impropriety, be given shortshrift in or even omitted from ontological discussions" [p. 410].

Suggests that individual actions can be given a canonical descriptionbased on a matrix of rubrics under which the essential features of actions canbe classed: Agent, Act Type, Modality of Action, Setting of Action, Rationaleof Action. "If adequate, our survey of the descriptive elements of an actionhas a significant bearing upon Kenny’s (1963) problem of the ‘variablepolyadicity’ of actions. For it suggests that, while the description of anaction can indeed be elaborated more and more (perhaps indefinitely so), thiscan be viewed as the increasingly detailed presentation of a limited andmanageable number of distinctive characteristic aspects of action" [p. 219].

Include a characterization of the notion of a "concrete act"or a "specific action" in the spirit of Goldman’s and Kim’s propertyexemplification account [p. 30].

1970 ‘Onthe Characterization of Actions’, in M. Brand, ed. (1970), pp. 247-54.

1996 ProcessMetaphysics. An Introduction to Process Philosophy, Albany: State University of New York Press.

A general outlook on process metaphysics--the view thatsubstances are "subordinate in status and ultimately inhering in processes".

1967 TheLogic of Decision and Action, Pittsburgh:University of Pittsburgh Press.

Includes Castañeda (1967), Chisholm (1967a), Davidson (1967a,1967b), Lemmon (1967), Rescher (1967).

Early extensive study on temporal logic. Distinguishes betweenhomogeneous, majoritative, occasional, and wholistic processes [p. 160].

"Singular terms and relational expressions have scope just asmuch as quantifiers and connectives. By attending to the property of scope weattempt in this paper to uncover the logical form of sentences containingadverbs [...] To reveal their distinct logical properties we extend first-orderlogic by adding operators of the appropriate sort. However, we do not treat theresulting system as an intensional logic, nor do we resort to an intensionalontology or an ontology of events. As a result, our approach is different fromthose of Davidson, Montague, and Thomason and Stalnaker" [p. 329].

1982 ‘Tense,Aspect and Time Adverbials, I’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 5 [Special Issue on "The Semantics of TemporalElements", R. Wall and R. E. Grandy, eds.], 59-107.

An account of tense, aspect and adverbials as sententialoperators, using an interval-based semantics. See Heny (1982) for Part II.

1976 ‘EPluribus Unum: A Defence of Davidson’sIndividuation of Action’, Philosophical Studies

, 29, 191-98.

Defends Davidson’s unifying approach to event identity againstGoldman’s (1971) three objections: the relational, the temporal, and the causalobjection.

1984 ‘ANote on Smith on Attempts and Internal Events’, Analysis

, 44, 81-83.

1991 ‘Événementet sens’ [‘Event and Meaning’, in French], in J.-L. Petit, ed. (1991), pp.41-56.

"The constitution of an event is indissociably linguistic andontological in character: at whatever level of language an event

has meaning--a semantic reference to ‘that whichhappens’, a pragmatics of the speech act, or the narrative structure of historical discourse--implicationsbeyond language are always intended" [Abstract, on p. 285].

1985 ‘Evidencefor a Basic Level in Event Taxonomies’, Memory and Cognition

, 13, 538-56.

Reports experiments testing the view that "the partonomicorganizations of event knowledge have a "basic" level comparable to thetaxonomic organizations of object knowledge" [p. 538].

1991 ‘ACritique of Mellor’s Argument against "Backwards" Causation’, BritishJournal for the Philosophy of Science, 42,75-86.

Includes a criticism of Mellor’s (1981a) thesis that thetemporal order of events is fixed by their causal order.

"An event is any subjectively differentiated portion of motionor action" [p. 58]. More precisely: "An event is the motion and actionoccurring between an initial situation and a terminal situation such that alland only the movers and actors of the initial situation (or the components intowhich they are subdivided or the constructs into which they are formed in thecourse of the event) are included in the terminal situation", where "asituation is an arrangement and condition of movers and actors in a specified,instantaneous, and spatially extended location" [p. 61]. Ample discussion ofissues of ambiguity (events with two or more beginnings, or two or moreendings).

An analysis of causality based on the account of events putforward in (1957) (and argued to be necessary to improve reasoning in thesocial sciences). Definition: "One event causes another if and only if theterminal situation of the causing event is identical with the initial situationof the caused event" [p. 282]. A detailed argument is given to show that thisdefinition is equivalent to the notion of one event causing another if and onlyif the former is a necessary and sufficient condition of the latter.

"An event [...] may be said to be a change from one state ofaffairs to another" [p. 156].

1979 ‘Actions:Particulars or Properties?’, Philosophy Research Archives

, 5, 120-37.

Actions are properties: "As it is appropriate to regard mentalevents as properties of the subject rather than particulars, so it isappropriate to treat actions as properties of the agent rather thanparticulars" [p. 120, Abstract]. Includes an account of the logical form ofaction sentences based on the possibility of predicating attributing ofattributes: "I washed this shirt yesterday" is rendered as the conjunction of"I washed this shirt" and "Washing occurred yesterday" [p. 135].

Examines "the ways that time-clauses can be used in English toconvey various relationships between events and situations" [Author’s Abstract,p. 87].

1979 ‘Activitiesand Performances Considered as Objects and Events’, Philosophical Studies

, 35, 171-85.

Argues that Kenny’s distinction between activities andperformances "derives from a more fundamental distinction between objects andevents" [p. 171]. In particular, activities have a logical form in which theverb is nominalized to become the subject of a sentence ascribing properties toa continuant at a time, whereas performances have a logical form in which thenominal is made the subject of a sentence ascribing properties to an event.

1988 Action,Intention, and Language: A Davidsonian Study,Doctoral Dissertation, University of Edinburgh.

On incorporating ascriptions of intentional and complex action(such as "x

f-ed deliberately", "x

f-edby y-ing", "x

f-edin order to y", "x

intended to f")into a Davidsonian framework.

1981 ‘DeterminingVerb Phrase Referents in Dialogue’, American Journal of ComputationalLinguistics, 7, 1-16.

On determining the relationship between the actions describedin an utterance and events in the world, and inferring the state of the world.

Includes a criticism of Davidson’s "ingenious but sophistical"anomalous monism as leading to epiphenomenalism [pp. 8-13].

1974 ‘TheIndividuation of Speech Acts’, The Philosophical Quarterly

, 24, 316-36.

Describes (drawing from, but elaborating, Goldman andDavidson) different criteria for act identity (a Synonymy

Criterion [p. 318]; a Co-extension

Criterion [p. 319]; an Inclusion

Criterion [p. 321]; a Conventional

Criterion [p. 334]; and a Causal

Criterion, according to which "A’s f-ing is the same act as B’s causing event e

, iff the [...] f-ingcauses the event e, or it causes anevent which causes the event e,or ... and A=B" [p. 329]. Claims that "an Austinian perlocutionary act is thesame act as a locutionary act in the same sense of the Causal Criterion" [p.333].

1987 ‘Principlesof Abstraction for Events and Processes’, Journal of Philosophical Logic

, 16, 273-307.

"The reference to events and processes made by general nounslike ‘kicking(s)’, ‘swimming’ can be seen as the effect of abstraction appliedto the corresponding verbs. Principles are formulated which support theequivalence of ‘a Fs n

times’ with ‘There are n

F-ingsby a’ and of ‘a G

s much’ with ‘There is much G

-ing by a’.Adverbial modification of verbs are specially considered and semantics forevent verbs and process verbs are outlined" [The Philosopher’s Index

Abstract].

1981 ‘Quelquesremarques sur l’analyse de la forme progressive de l’anglais’ [‘Some Remarks onthe Analysis of the English Progressive Form’, in French], Langages

, 115, 29-38.

1980 Time,Tense, and Quantifiers. Proceedings of the Stuttgart Conference on the Logic ofTense and Quantification, Tübingen:Niemeyer.

Includes E. Bach (1980), Gabbay and Moravcsik (1980),Hoepelman and Rohrer (1980), Kamp (1980), and van Benthem (1980).

1983 ‘DoesLevel Generation Always Generate Act-Tokens?’, Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, 9, 177-92.

1987 ‘Howto Interpret Actions’, in J. Margolis, M. Krausz, and R. M. Buriau, eds., Rationality,Relativism, and the Human Sciences,Dordrecht: Nijhoff, pp. 81-90.

"It is events, indeed events in contexts, rather than isolatedactions that we understand" [p. 81]. Distinguishes various types of actionindividuation of increasing "thickness".

Includes material on the Strawson-Moravcsik debate on theasymmetric relation of dependency between events and objects.

1983 ‘Matterand Event’, in L. S. Ford and G. L. Kline, eds., Explorations in Whitehead’sPhilosophy, New York: Fordham UniversityPress, pp. 68-103.

On the significance of Whitehead’s "taking time seriously" fora discussion of the concept of matter.

1974 ‘OnKim’s Account of Events and Event-Identity’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 71, 327-36.

Argues that (i) "Kim’s claims about the relation of particularevents to generic events and the relation of these latter to constitutiveproperties of particular events is incompatible with the constant-conjunctionview [of causality] he wishes to defend" [p. 328]and (ii) "his criterion of event identity is subject to compellingcounterexamples, and, moreover, is incompatible with the claim that constantconjunction of unique generic events [...] is a necessary condition of causalrelations between particular events" [p. 330]. Proposes alterations of Kim’stheory to overcome these difficulties.

1977 ‘ConcreteOccurrences vs. Explanatory Facts: Mackie on the Extensionality of CausalStatements’, Philosophical Studies, 31,133-40.

Argues that Mackie (1974) reaches false conclusions to theeffect that the most illuminating causal claims are intensional and concernfacts as opposed to events.

1979 ‘Causationand Counterfactuals: Lewis’ Treatment Reconsidered’, Dialogue

, 18, 209-19.

Argues that neither causation nor the similarity relationinvolved in D. K. Lewis’s analysis of counterfactuals is infected by the kindof vagueness Lewis attributes to it, and suggests counterexamples to theresulting account.

1979 ‘TheExtensionality of Causal Contexts’, in P. A. French, T. Uehling, and H. K.Wettstein, eds. (1979), pp. 401-8.

Argues that explanatory contexts are non-extensional, becausethey are "mind-dependent"; but causal ones are extensional, because the are"mind-independent" and "the only reason to suspect that causal statements areintensional is their similarity in form and employment to statements, likeexplanatory ones, whose intensionality does consist wholly in theirmind-dependence" [p. 402]. The paper offers arguments in defense of this lastclaim, together with a revised "test for extensionality" that causal contextspass, but that intensional contexts do not pass: "a sentence-taking context isextensional if the references of the gerundive nominalization of the containedsentences remain the same" [p. 406]. Compare Lombard’s (1979b) reply.

1993 Haecceity.An Ontological Essay, Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer AcademicPublishers.

Events are a species of concreta, along with other speciessuch as substances and tropes; as such, events are ontologically lessfundamental than such abstracta as properties, relations, and propositions.

Critical discussion of Vollrath’s (1975) solution to the time-of-a-killingproblem (Goldman 1971, Thomson 1971a), including an attempt to make it sound "less paradoxical".

Offers "evidence that every verb of action is embedded in theobject complement of a two-place predicate whose subject is identical to thesubject of the action verb, and whose phonological realization in English isdo" [p. 70].

1978 ‘HistoricalActions or Historical Events’, in Y. Yovel, ed. (1978), pp. 69-84.

On the question whether the historical domain should becharacterized as consisting of events or of actions.

1995 ‘AdverbialQuantification over Events’, Natural Language Semantics

, 3, 1-31.

A neo-Davidsonian analysis of the adverbial quantificationinvolved in such sentences as ‘I regretted it every time I had dinner withhim’, interpreting it as a form ofquantification over events. "Sentences of this kind [...] are true if every eventin the denotation of time I had dinner with him

can be matched with an event [of] regretting thatdinner event. They are thus truth-functionally equivalent to sentences of theform ‘There are at least as many As as Bs’" [Author’s abstract].

Against Kim, argues that "mental event [x

, M

, t

] canbe identical with physical event [y,P, t'

] even if M only supervenes on P"[p. 195]. The reason is that Kim’sidentity condition rests on "a confusion of properties with their instances.The condition needs to be weakened to the following: Event [x

, P, t

] = Event [y, Q, t'

] just in case x=y, t

=t',and P=Q

or PÞQ,where ‘Þ’ denotes therelation of necessity determination", i.e., in the mental-physical case, thesupervenience of mental properties on physical properties [p. 195]. Moregenerally, if this weakened criterion is accepted, the property exemplificationaccount does not entail event proliferation.

1977 OnVisual Perception of Dynamic Events,Doctoral Dissertation, University of Uppsala.

Classic reference for the literature on tense and aspect.Chapter 5 outlines a typology of "episodic verbs" similar to those of Vendler(1957) and Kenny (1963). The actual classification is slightly different. Forinstance, Ryle’s achievement verbs fall into all three of Kenny’s categories:"know" is a state, "cure" a performance, and "keep a secret" an activity (cf.Kenny 1963, p. 185, n. 1).

On such (seeming) actions as refraining, postponing, waiting,etc.: such avoidings are not dispositions, but they are of a higher order thanthe actions avoided.

1987 ‘ThreeRecent Approaches to Temporal Reasoning’, in A. P. Galton, ed. (1987), pp.121-68.

Includes an extensive critical overview of Kowalski andSergot’s (1986) event calculus and J. F. Allen’s (1984) temporal logic.

1995 ‘Variantsof the Event Calculus’, in L. Sterling, ed., Logic Programming. Proceedingsof the Twelfth International Conference (ICLP ’95), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 67-81.

Considers advantages and disadvantages of variousmodifications of the event calculus of Kowalski and Sergot (1986).

1973 ‘Onthe State of Progress on Progressives and Statives’, in C. J. Bailey and R. W. Shuy,eds., New Ways of Analyzing Variationin English, Washington, DC: GeorgetownUniversity Press, pp. 83-95.

Argues that "more than mere binary classification" is requiredto explain the actual behavior of stative and non-stative verbs [p. 85].Suggests an implicational hierarchy to the effect that futurate progressive ® process progressive ® habitual progressive.

1991 LogicalForms. An Introduction toPhilosophical Logic, Oxford:

Basil Blackwell.

Includes a short presentation and discussion of Davidson’s(1967a) "roundabout route" for the logical analysis of action sentences andadverb-dropping inferences [pp. 152-54]. Some criticisms in the spirit ofWiggins (1985/6).

1969 ‘Commenton R. Martin’s "On Events and Event-Description"’, in J. Margolis, ed. (1969),pp. 95-97.

Questions the use of time in R. M. Martin’s (1969b)construction of events. "In order even to begin laying the foundations for thelanguage of space and time, we must have already available the concept of anevent" [p. 96].

1984 ScientificExplanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

A section on ‘Processes’ [pp. 139-47] argues that it is them(conceived as causal lines, and not distinct from material objects), ratherthan events, that constitute the best ontology for special relativity [p. 140]. Introduces the notion of a pseudo-process:"Causal processes are those that are capable of transmitting signals;pseudo-processes are incapable of doing so" [p. 141].

1994 Featuresand Fluents. The Representation of Knowledge about Dynamical Systems. Volume I

, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

An artificial intelligence approach to modeling agency in adynamic domain. Events are occurrences characterizing relevant aspects of thedomain.

1990 GrammaticalRelations, Thematic Roles and Verb Semantics,Doctoral Dissertation, University of Edinburgh.

Proposes a unification-based categorial grammar framework"which incorporates the semantic insights of a neo-Davidsonian approach to verbsemantics and predicate-argument combination, where thematic roles are definedas clusters of entailments of verb meanings" [Author’s abstract].

1993 ‘GrammaticalRelations in Unification Categorial Grammar’, Lingua e Stile

, 27, 171-200.

Following Dowty (1991), argues that "regularities concerningthe syntactic realization of verbal arguments [...] should be stated in terms ofselected entailments of verb meanings which characterize thematic properties ofevent participants" [p. 172]. On this basis, an extension of Dowty’s theory isproposed in which such thematic entailments are characterized as "clusters ofproperties" encoded "as sorted thematic predicates within a neo-Davidsoniansystem for semantic interpretation" [ibid.].

1976 ‘TheDirection of Causality and the Direction of Conditionship’, The Journal ofPhilosophy, 73, 193-207.

An account of causation should not assume

that causes must precede their effects. The papertherefore attempts to account for the direction of causation.

1981 ‘Knowledgeand Relevant Alternatives: Comments on Dretske’, Philosophical Studies

, 40, 378-88.

Suggests that quantifying over events in the spirit ofDavidson’s theory may help respond to a certain argument (due to Dretske) onscope differences.

1985 ‘CausalRelata’, in E. LePore and B. P. McLaughlin, eds. (1985), pp. 282-93.

Argues that the causal relation holds not only between events,but also between aspects of events (the blotches on Flora’s skin were caused byher drying herself with a coarse towel).Compare Achinstein (1975a, 1979) and Dretske (1977). More related discussion inKim (1977), Boër (1979), Ehring (1987) inter alia

Discusses the relations between mental and physical eventsfrom the perspective of a theory of causation according to which "there iscausation when and only when mechanisms operate; mechanism distinguishes causalfrom noncausal explanations, laws, necessities, and possibilities. On this viewof causation, mechanism replaces law" [p. 84].

1991a ‘SymposiumContribution on Events and Their Namesby Jonathan Bennett’, Philosophyand Phenomenological Research

, 51, 633-36.

Part of a symposium on J. Bennett (1988) (with replies in J.Bennett 1991b). Focuses on issues concerning causality.

1991b ‘ProperKnowledge’, in B. McLaughlin, ed., Dretske and His Critics

, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 38-51.

Includes some remarks on Dretske’s (1972, 1977) views on theeffect of contrastive stress on the interpretation of causal statements.

On the relational view according to which "passage" and"becoming" are to be understood in terms of relations between events.

A sketch of an ontology of "reducible spatio-temporalparticulars" aiming at combining the merits of Davidson’s (1967a) analysis ofactions as species of events and J. Bennett’s (1985) arguments to the effectthat acceptance of Lemmon’s and Quine’s spatio-temporal criterion for eventidentity allows one to account for the logic of adverbial modification byaccepting only subjects of events.

1992 ‘Criteriaof Identity and the Individuation of Natural-Kind Events’, Philosophy andPhenomenological Research, 52, 807-31.

Argues for a criterion to the effect that e

1 is thesame event as e2 iff "there is an event-sortal ƒ

such that a) ‘e1, e

2 are ƒ

’ tells us what

e1, e

2 areand b) e1 spatio-temporally coincides with e

2 under ƒ

, that is, where DF denotes the subclass of spatio-temporalproperties, all pairs áe

1, e

2ñ that are members of the relation ‘spatio-temporally coincides under ƒ

’satisfy the schema: (F)(F

ÎDF ) ®

(Fe

1 «Fe2)" [p. 830]. The account is supposed to hold for "natural kind" eventssuch as "earthquakes, heart-attacks, high tides, and photosynthesis", asopposed to "such events as shootings, butterings of toast, and philosophicalconventions that are not" [p. 808].

1995 ‘Supervenienceand the Essences of Events’, in E. E. Savellos and Ü. D. Yalin, eds. (1995), pp. 244-63.

Argues that Lombard’s (1986) account of event supervenience isflawed, in that "it neither supports nor is supported by the view that eventshave essences, and it is at conflict with the view that events have individualessences (haecceities)" [p. 245]. Indeed, it is argued that if the view thatevents have individual essences is held on to, then "we might as well abandonhope that any substantive event-supervenience thesis can be formulated"[ibid.].

•Includes Enç (1995), C. A. Macdonald (1995), McLaughlin (1995), Moser and Trout (1995), and Savellos(1995).

1979 ‘Davidson’sPsycho-physical Anomalism’, Nature and System, 1, 203-13.

Argues that Davidson does not and cannot exclude thatscientific research will make psycho-physical laws possible.

1981 ‘TheCausality of Reasons: A Survey of Recent Developments in the Mind-Body Problem’,Metaphilosophy, 12, 13-30.

A dialogue on the difference between asserting that she wouldwed F and making an assertion about that particular event that has (later) beenthe wedding. Holds that "an accident is not a type of happening or occurrencelike a race, wedding, collision or fire. It is what we call

certain of those happenings under certaincircumstances of their occurrences" [p. 261].

A thorough study, with a great amount of linguistic datarelevant to the analysis of action-reporting sentences.

Section 6 of Part I on the ontology of explanation (using theconcept of event). Section 7 on the explanation of psychological and historicalevents.

1993 ‘Onthe Logic of Event Causation. Part I: Fundamental Reflections’, Logic andLogical Philosophy, 1, 129-55.

Causality as a binary relation between singular events (eventtokens). Causal laws as generalizations on sentences about token causation byquantifying over event types.

1994a ‘Eventsas Shadowy Entities’, Logic and Logical Philosophy

, 2, 35-53.

Contains an argument for linguistic conventionalism withrespect to events, in the spirit of van Benthem (1983). Main thesis: "Only theintroduction of some kind of epistemological involvement avoids the two extremeconsequences: an overcrowded ontology with really shadowy entities, or the lackof events in the ontology at all" [p. 37].

1994b ‘Tokenversus Type Causation’, in J. Faye, U.Scheffler, and M. Urchs, eds., Logic and Causal Reasoning

, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, pp. 91-108.

An investigation into the relationship between singular andgeneral causal statements, favoring an "inductive" account to the effect thatevent tokens and token causation have to be "methodologically and ontologicallyprior" to event types and type causation. Events are viewed as entities that"belong to the empirical world", which "can be clustered in kinds" and "mayrecur" [p. 92].

1986 EventLogic and the Interpretation of Plurals,Doctoral Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Preliminary formulation of the event-based treatment ofplurals fully developed in (1993).

Thorough development of the theory advanced in Schein (1986)and Higginbotham and Schein (1986). Combines a second-order treatment ofplurals with Davidson’s treatment of event sentences to account for thesemantics of sentences involving plurals without invoking "plural objects": asentence like John and Mary lifted the piano reports an event that had more than one agent. Includes amplediscussion of mereological issues, quantification, and identity.

Holds a Davidsonian view that "events/situations are the sameif they have the same causes and effects. Or better, to avoid still more issuesof sameness (about these causes and effects), that e

and fare the same event/situation where what causes e

also causes f and what e causes iscaused too by f " [p.76].

1969 ‘ThePassage of Time’, in R. Brown and C. D. Rollins, eds., ContemporaryPhilosophy in Australia, London: Allen& Unwin, pp. 204-13.

"Every physical process consists of stages which are formed bycouples of events" [p. 205].

1976 ‘TheStillness of Time and Philosophical Equanimity’, Philosophical Studies

, 30, 145-59.

A discussion of some problems arising on a Russellian view ofthe nature of temporal relations (in contrast to McTaggart’s).

Includes a discussion of the similarities between space andtime, an analysis of temporal becoming, and a discussion of McTaggart’sargument for the unreality of time.

Criticism of Smart (1949). Presents a thought experimentconcerning two planets in which qualitatively the same events flow at differentrates [pp. 517ff].

A study of identity conditions for events culminating with aproposal [p. 225] which is meant to indicate that "the essence of an event is[...] any sort of change that may occur in physical systems of any degree ofcomplexity and richness" [p. 226].

1985 ‘Howto Navigate the River of Time’, Philosophical Quarterly

, 35, 91-92; reprinted in L. N. Oaklander and Q.Smith, eds. (1994), pp. 229-31.

A novel attempt to vindicate McTaggart’s "positive" conceptionof time in reply to Oaklander’s (1984) criticism of the account put forward inSchlesinger (1980).

Further material on the similarities and differences betweenspace and time. Chapter 3 focuses on the temporal properties of events inrelation to McTaggart’s argument.

An account of the necessary and sufficient conditions forbeing a change. The account validates Kim’s property exemplificationconception.

Stresses the difference between events and states of affairsand argues that events must also be distinguished from states.

1962 ‘ADefinition of Event and Some of Its Applications’, Theoria

, 28, 250-68.

1990 ‘PickingReference Events from Tense Trees: A Formal, Implementable Theory of EnglishTense-Aspect Semantics’, Speech and Natural Language. Proceedings of the1990 DARPA Workshop, San Mateo, CA: MorganKaufmann, pp. 34-41.

Outlines a formal theory for interpreting time adverbials andtense-aspect constructions in a context-dependent way. Makes use of the generalmotion of an "episode" (event, situation, or eventuality).

1989 TheIdea of a Reason for Acting. A Philosophical Argument

, Lewiston, Lampeter, and Queenston: Edwin MellenPress.

Against the view that an account of what it is to have areason for doing something must include a reference to some motive or desire ofthe agent.

Objects to some basic causal-mereological principles inThomson’s theory, e.g., to the assumption that no event causes any of itsparts, or to the unrestricted principle of event-fusion, according to which thefusion of any class of events is itself an event.

Argues that the logic of modifiers is essentially a variant ofthe Standard Logic Textbook theory of the logic of prepositions (pace

Davidson).

1987 ‘ActionTheory and the Frame Problem’, in F. M. Brown, ed., The Frame Problem inArtificial Intelligence. Proceedings of the 1987 Workshop

, Los Altos, CA:Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 121-34.

Presents a modal logic in which actions are representedsemantically as pairs of preconditions and results.The account is argued to solve the "frame problem" (which facts remainunchanged when actions are performed).

Defends the view that, given our present concept of time, talkabout time without any change is "senseless" (contra

Shoemaker 1969 and Teichmann 1991).

Sketch of a theory of action in which the relation ofintention to action is located within a general theory of intentionality.Includes discussion of action description, the accordion effect, and of thenotion of basic action.

1983 Intentionality.An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Full development of the theory sketched in (1979). Mentalstates and events "are as real as any other biological phenomena, as real aslactation, photosynthesis, mitosis, or digestion" [p. 264]. Action is among theprimary forms of intentionality, which can be causally efficient: "When I raisemy arm my intention in action causes my arm to go up. This is a case of amental event causing a physical event [...] The intention in action causes thebodily movement even though both the intention in action and the bodilymovement are caused by and realized in a microstructure at which level termslike "intention in action" and "bodily movement" are inappropriate" [p. 269].See also Section 3.5 on the accordion effect and the notion of basic action.

All mental phenomena are caused by processes going on in thebrain. Mental states and events are "features of the brain" and "have twolevels of description--a higher level in mental terms, and a lower level inphysiological terms" [p. 26]. Thus, "at the higher level of description, theintention to raise my arm causes the movement of the arm. But at the lowerlevel of description, a series of neuron firings starts a chain of events thatresults in the contraction of the muscles [...] The same sequence of events hastwo levels of description" [ibid.]. Presuppositions and consequences of thisview with regard to the structure and explanation of human action areextensively presented in Chapter 4 [pp. 57-70].

1992 TheRediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA, andLondon: MIT Press/ Bradford Books.

Bald restatement and further developments of the thesis that"mental events and processes are as much part of our biological natural historyas digestion, mitosis, meiosis, or enzyme secretion" [p. 1].

Works with a notion of an event as a change (gaining/sheddingof properties) in some object. (See Chapter 8, "Objects, Events, andProperties".) Maintains that a statement such as "The journey was boring", iftrue, is true "only insofar as someonehappens to be bored by the journey" [p. 31].

Presents an account of agency in the spirit of von Wright’s(1963, 1967) theory of action, with a bringing about operator usingpropositions in the description of actions. An influential paper in recent logic-orientedliterature. (Compare Chellas 1995 for useful discussion.)

1989b ‘GettingStarted: Beginnings in the Logic of Action’, in G. Corsi, C. Mangione, and M.Mugrini, eds., Le teorie della modalità: Atti del convegno internazionale distoria della logica, Bologna: CLUEB, pp.221-50.

Traces some efforts to develop a logic of action, understoodas the logician’s rigorous examination of some central notions from thephilosophy of action (most notably those of agency and ability).

1992 ‘RepresentingFacts’, in C. Bicchieri and M. L. Dalla Chiara, eds., Knowledge, Belief andStrategic Interaction, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, pp. 239-56.

Outline of a formal theory in which states of affairs, eventsand processes can be modelled.

Elaborates on the theory put forward in (1992). Among topicsdiscussed are the type/token distinction, the one/many problem, event andprocess generation, and the progressive tense.

1990 Propertiesas Processes. A Synoptic Study of Wilfrid Sellars’ Nominalism

, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.

Includes an examination of Sellars’ "No-Event" Theory.Discusses two ontological criteria for processes: "Spatio-temporal extension

: Unlike objects, which are temporally continuant butspatially bound, processes are temporally bound but spatially continuant. [...] Homeomerity

: Every spatio-temporal part of a process is aprocess of the same kind" [pp. 263f].

1991 ‘Process’,in H. Burkhardt and B. Smith, eds., Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology

, Vol. 2, Munich: Philosophia, pp. 725-27.

1957 ‘Timeand the World Order’, in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell, eds., ScientificExplanation, Space, and Time [MinnesotaStudies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. III], Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, pp. 527-616.

Argues for an ontology based on "things and persons" againstan event-based one: "statements about events are, in principle, translatableinto statements about changeable things" [p. 550], i.e. "events have aderivative status in the sense that singular terms referring to events arecontextually introduced in terms of sentences involving singular termsreferring to things" [p. 572].

1966 ‘Thoughtand Action’, in K. Lehrer, ed., Freedom and Determinism

, New York: Random House, pp. 105-40.

Frames the problem of the compatibilitybetween determinism and "would have doneotherwise" in a formal setting [113ff].

1973 ‘Actionsand Events’, Noûs, 7, 179-202; reprintedin W. Sellars, Essays in Philosophy and Its History

, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974, pp. 189-213.

Critical examination of Davidson (1963). Seeking to answer thequestion "What is an event?", suggests that we can "regard event expressions asa proper subset of that-clauses", that "events are a species of proposition".

1976 ‘VolitionsRe-affirmed’, in M. Brand and D. Walton, eds. (1976), pp. 47-66.

Overview of Sellars’s metaphysics of the mental. "In thedomain of the physical [...] the middle-sized objects of the Manifest Image areprior in the order of knowing to microphysical processes. The latter, to theScientific Realist, are prior in the order of being" [p. 326]. Holds that "the coreconcept of a mental event is that of a representational event" [p. 338].

1981b ‘Lecture2: Naturalism and Process’, The Monist,64 ["The Carus Lectures of Wilfrid Sellars: Foundations for a Metaphysics ofPure Process"], 37-65.

Exploressome issues concerning the ontology of change and process. Proposes that therelation between the sentences ‘Socrates runs at t

’ and ‘A running by Socrates at t

is taking place’ is analogous to the relationbetween ‘Snow is white’ and ‘Being white is exemplified by snow’ [pp. 39-40].In the manifest world, "there are no events in addition

to changing things and persons" [p. 43]. "There areno temporal relations": time is expressed by a temporal connective [p. 44]."Event locutions belong one step up the semantic ladder and refer to linguisticor conceptual items, rather than to items in the world" [p. 52]. Contrasts thistheory, the theory of the manifest image, to Russell’s processual theory inwhich we have "a truly a truly Heraclitean ontology. panta rei. There are no objects

. The world is an ongoing tissue of goings on" [p.57].

1961 ‘CouldMental States Be Brain Processes?’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 58, 813-22.

Argues that mental states cannot be brain processes becausemental states and brain processes do not occur in the same place. (This doesnot prevent one from making the identity theory true by adopting a conventionfor locating mental states, but the usefulness of such a convention woulddepend upon empirical facts presently unknown.)

1963 ‘MentalEvents and the Brain’, The Journal of Philosophy, 60, 160-66; reprinted in D. M. Rosenthal, ed., The Natureof Mind, New York and Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1991, pp. 177-80.

Defends the view that a convention can be adopted for locatingmental events in the brain and describes conditions under which the identitytheory should be empirically refuted.

1990 ‘RepresentingContinuous Change in the Event Calculus’, in L. C. Aiello, ed., Proceedingsof the 9th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence

, London: Pitman, pp. 598-603.

Presents a simplified version of Kowalski and Sergot’s (1986) eventcalculus and extends it so as to deal withcontinuous change. The notion of "autotermination" is introduced. "A period ofcontinuous change autoterminates if it brings about the event which terminatesit. For example, when the increasing level of water in a sink reaches theoverflow, it ceases to increase" [p. 598].

1986 Reviewof Vermazen and Hintikka, eds. (1985), Philosophical Books

, 27, 174-78.

Moving from the view that the difference between action andbodily movement is a difference between the predicates used to describe one andthe same event, examines the problem of how (causal) laws that are couchedsolely in the vocabulary of mere movement can figure in an explanation whoseexplanandum is coached in the vocabulary of action.

Examines (i) Nagel’s (1965) criterion for event identity interms of sameness of causes and effects (= Davidson’s 1969a criterion) alongwith (ii) the thesis that some event identities are merely particular, notgeneral. If the criterion is to avoid circularity, then events must be definedas "sets of instantiated properties with the same causes and effects"; butgiven this conception of an event, criterion (i) and thesis (ii) areincompatible.

1972 ‘ThreeReasons for Not Deriving "Kill" from "Cause to Die" in Japanese’, in J. P.Kimball, ed., Syntax and Semantics, Volume 1, New York: Seminar Press, pp. 125-37.

Offers arguments similar to Fodor’s (1970b), on the basis ofJapanese data, against the analysis of causative verbs such as ‘kill’ offeredby McCawley (1968, 1973a) and Lakoff (1970). Compare also Katz (1970), Fodor(1970b), Kac (1972), and Wierzbicka (1975).

1976 ‘TheGrammar of Causative Constructions: A Conspectus’, in M. Shibatani, ed., Syntaxand Semantics, Volume 6, The Grammar of Causative Constructions

, New York: Academic Press, pp. 1-40.

1969 ‘TimeWithout Change’, The Journal of Philosophy,66, 363-81; reprinted in Shoemaker (1984), pp. 49-66, and in R. Le Poidevin andM. Mac Beath, eds. (1993), pp. 63-79.

A mental experiment purporting to show that there might beintervals of time in which no changes whatever occur. See Newton-Smith (1980,Chapter 2) for a reformulation.

1979 ‘Identity,Properties, and Causality’, in P. A. French, T. Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein,eds. (1979), pp. 321-42; reprinted in S. Shoemaker (1984), pp. 234-60, and inH. W. Noonan, ed., Identity, Aldershot:Dartmouth Publishing, 1993, pp. 123-44.

Identity through time "consists at least in part in theholding of causal relations of certain kinds between momentary entities--events,or momentary thing-stages (phases, slices)--existing or occurring at differenttimes" [p. 234].

1980 ‘Causalityand Properties’, in P. van Inwagen, ed. (1980), pp. 109-35; reprinted inShoemaker (1984), pp. 206-33.

On the relationship between events and properties. The notionof causality as a relation between events involves reference "to the propertiesof the constituent objects of the events"; conversely, the notion of a property"is to be explained in terms of the notion of causality".

1986 ‘ReifiedTemporal Logics: Semantical and Ontological Considerations’, in Proceedingsof the 7th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence

, Brighton: ECAI, pp. 390-97.

1987 ‘TemporalLogics in AI: Semantical and Ontological Considerations’, ArtificialIntelligence, 33, 89-104.

Presents a temporal logic exploiting the approaches of J. F.Allen (1981, 1983, 1984) and D. McDermott (1982), but without resorting to theproperty/event/process trichotomy of the former or the fact/event dichotomy ofthe latter. The proposed theory is actually argued to allow even finerdistinctions, but without forcing any.

1988 Reasoningabout Change: Time and Causation from the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence

, Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press.

What are the participants in the causal relation? Whatdistinguishes events from propositions? "I argue that nothing does [...] and thatif the theory of events were developed to a degree comparable with the theoryof propositions (i.e., logic), the two would become indistinguishable" [p.157].

1990 ‘Non-MonotonicReasoning and Causation’, Cognitive Science,14, 213-52.

Uses the reified logic of Shoham (1987, 1988) to supportinferences about causation.

1962 ‘Facts,Logical Atomism and Reducibility’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

, 40, 283-302.

Includes a criticism of Austin (1950): the phrase ‘thecollapse of France’ is not grammatically identical in the sentences (a) ‘Thecollapse of France occurred in 1940’ and (b) ‘The collapse of France is afact’. "For in (b) we can substitute for it ‘that France collapsed’, whereas in(a) we cannot do so" [p. 287]. So Austin’s alignment of facts and events isungrounded. Compare Vendler (1967a).

Contends that one can imagine a language with expressions fordescribing subjective events, but no expressions for objective ones.

1965 ‘Causation,and a Method of Analysis’, in R. J. Butler, ed., Analytical Philosophy

, Second Series, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 145-57.

Against Vendler’s (1962a) claim that causes have resultsrather than effects, argues that in a sentence like ‘the explosion was thecause of the accident’ "there is, in the nature of the case, no answer to the question‘Is the word "explosion" being used in what Vendler calls an event-like senseor what he calls the fact-like sense?’" [p. 156].

1965 TheStratification of Behaviour, New York:Humanities Press; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Sets up a theory according to which "An act of behaviour is anact if and only if the movements constituting the behaviour might be explainedby mention of the belief that some conditions of success for some purpose aresatisfied" [p. 128]. The first part of the book discusses various issuespertaining to the identification and description of action.

1970 ‘Topicsin the Bordergrounds of Action’, Inquiry,13 [Special Issue on "Action"], 32-53.

1984 ‘HumeWas Right, Almost; and Where He Wasn’t, Kant Was’, in P. A. French, T. Uehling,and H. K. Wettstein, eds. (1984), pp. 135-49.

"I agree with the negative side of [Hume’s] doctrine, thatcausation is not a kind of phenomenon wholly resident in or among happeningsthat may truly be said to be the causes or effects of happenings" [p. 135]. And"Kant was right [...] in holding that identifiability of substances over time isno less essential to our idea of causation than is (say) contiguity" [p. 138].

1992 Statementand Referent. An Inquiry into the Foundations of Our Conceptual Order

, Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer AcademicPublishers.

See Part III, "Categories, Referents and Constructions, withSpecial Attention to Things Met with in Space and Time".

1994 ‘SingularCausal Sentences and Two Relational Views’, in Preyer, G., Siebelt, F., andUlfig, A., eds. (1994), pp. 199-219.

Studies two arguments (one linguistic, one metaphysical) tothe effect that singular causal statements must be analysed as extensional andthus as relational. Discusses Davidson, Strawson, and Kim on causalexplanation.

1964 ‘HumanAction and the Language of Volitions’, Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety, 64, 199-220; reprinted in N. Careand C. Landesman, eds. (1968), pp. 68-92.

Includes a discussion of the identity of actions. Regarding alist of twelve statements describing Lincoln’s assassination: "Can we answerthe question ‘What did Booth really do?’ in any simple, straightforward and yetaccurate way? [...] If there is any unity of action in this example, clearly itis not a logical unity: although all twelve descriptions are true and althoughall are partial descriptions of the activity of one man over a very shortperiod of time, they are, with very few noted exceptions, truth functionallyindependent. The bond of action is not a logical one" [p. 78].

A discussion of the identity criterion proposed by Brand(1976a, 1977). Among other things, it is argued that the criterion makes itimpossible to identify events that are described using logically independentnouns--which brings Brand’s theory much closer to the multiplying propertyexemplification approach of Kim (1969) than to that of Davidson (1967a).

1982 ‘Handlungsontologien’ [‘Ontologies of Action’, in German], Rechtstheorie,13, 303-23.

Includes a defense of an ontology that distinguishes objects(continuants) and events (occurrents) against a unified Quinean ontology offour-dimensional worms (§ 3.4). Argues that events are among those fewcategories of entity relative to which mereological extensionality (accordingto which identity of parts implies identity of wholes) holds. The mereology ofevents, activities, performances and other occurrents is fully examined inChapter 4. There is also a discussion of various specific mereological theoriesof events (see e.g. § 2.9.1 on Whitehead’s theory) and an application to theaspectual analysis of verbs.

1991 ‘Whiteheadund die Mereologie’ [‘Whitehead and Mereology’, in German], in M. Hampe and H.Maassen, eds., Die Gifford Lectures und ihre Deutung. Materialien zuWhiteheads "Prozess und Realität", Volume2, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, pp. 369-88.

Reviews Whitehead’s successive formal treatments of mereology,with emphasis on the change from early account (1919), where the field of themereological relation comprises solely events, to the later system

(1929), where the ontology of events is replaced byone of actual entities (whose "becoming" or "genetic division" is process andwhose "coordinate division" yields the regions they occupy). Whitehead iscriticised for not clearly separating mereological issues from topologicalones.

1970 ‘Actionsand Extensions’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 7, 349-56.

Basic human actions are event-like, and it should be possibleto refer to them without mention of specific intentions. Actions may be viewedas "indivisible complexes" (of agent, object, and tool) which are not named butreferred to by statements.

1990 ‘Rulesof Conceptual Well-formedness and Optional Vs. Obligatory Iterativity’, Lingua

, 80, 253-93.

Argues that "the obligatory iterative interpretation of a widerange of English sentences containing punctual event expressions vs. theoptional iterative interpretation of similar sentences with unbounded eventexpressions can be accounted for in terms of the interaction oflanguage-specific principles of meaning with Jackendoff-type [1983, 1987]universal principles of conceptual structure" [p. 253, Abstract]

An analysis of the substance-quality metaphysical schemeallegedly rejected by Whitehead in his ontology of events.

1975 ‘Logic,Facts, and Events’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

, 36, 253-54.

"There can be logical connections between facts and betweenevents, so that the dogma of empiricism, ‘No logical relations between facts’needs to be reconsidered, along with the concepts of ‘fact’ and ‘event’" [ThePhilosopher’s Index Abstract].

1991 ‘ThePerfective Paradox: Or How to Eat Your Cake and Have It Too’, in L. A. Sutton,C. Johnson, and R. Shields, eds., (1991), pp. 469-79.

A semantic account of such seemingly paradoxical sentences as"I ate my cake today and I will eat the remaining tomorrow", which iscontradictory in English but not in other languages (a phenomenon called herethe "perfective paradox"). The approach is based on a lattice-theoretic accountof event and object structures as developed by Krifka (1991).

1992 ‘AnEvent-Based Analysis of Causatives’, in C. P. Canakis, G. P. Chan, J. MarshallDenton, eds., CLS 28: Papers from the 28th Regional Meeting of the ChicagoLinguistic Society, Vol. 1, Chicago:Chicago Linguistic Society, pp. 515-29.

Puts forward an event-based analysis of morphologicalcausatives motivated by Dowty’s (1991) theory of thematic proto-roles as wellas by action-theoretic considerations. "Causatives refer to events, theimportant subevents of which include the following: (1) the causer causing thecausee to undertake some action, and (2) the causee’s performance of thataction" [p. 518].

1966 ‘Lesniewski’s Analysis ofWhitehead’s Theory of Events’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

, 7, 323-27.

A presentation of Lesniewski’s (1928) arguments tothe effect that Whitehead’s axiomatic basis for the concept of an event isultimately inadequate.

1985 ‘ASolution to Forrester’s Paradox of Gentle Murder’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 82, 162-68.

Solution of Forrester’s (1984) deontic paradox, based on aDavidsonian analysis of the logical form of action sentences inside the scopeof deontic operators. Compare also R. Clark (1986b).

1981 ‘TheOrigins of Grammatical Encoding of Events’, in W. Deutsch, ed., The Child’sConstruction of Language, London and NewYork: Academic Press, pp. 185-99; reprinted in P. J. Hopper and S. A. Thompson,eds., Syntax and Semantics, vol. 15, Studies in Transitivity

, London and New York: Academic Press, 1982, pp.409-22.

Focuses on the encoding of "transitive events", characterizedby "a human-like agent behaving actively, volitionally, and totally to adefinite or referential object" [p. 411].

1993 AnomalousMonism and Epiphenomenalism: The Causal Responsibility of Mental Events

, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Nebraska atLincoln.

A defense of Davidson’s (1970b) token-token identity theoryknown as "anomalous monism" against the charge that it makes the mentalepiphenomenal (causally inefficacious)

1975 Metaphysicsand Essence, New York: New York UniversityPress; Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Chapter 3 on "Changes, Processes and Events". Eventhood isdefined in terms of change: "‘(is) an event’ means approximately the same as‘(is) a change such that there is a t1 before any t

2 whenit exists and a t3 after any t4 when it exists" [p. 22].

1949 ‘TheRiver of Time’, Mind, 58, 483-94;reprinted in A. G. N. Flew, ed., Essays in Conceptual Analysis

, London: Macmillan, pp. 213-27.

"If we think of events as changing, namely, in respect topastness, presentness and futurity, we think of them as substances changing ina certain way. But if we substantialise events, we must, to preserve somesemblance of consistency, spatialise time".

1955 ‘SpatialisingTime’, Mind, 64, 239-41; reprinted in R.M. Gale, ed. (1967), pp. 163-67.

A clarification of the suggestion that time be "spatialised"put forward in (1949).

1972a ‘Space-Timeand Individuals’, in R. Rudner and I. Schaeffer, eds., Logic and Art. Essaysin Honor of Nelson Goodman, New York:Macmillan, pp. 3-20.

Endorses a Quinean conception of events and processes asfour-dimensional entities "I suggest that talk of processes gets replaced bytalk of four-dimensional chunks, and that talk of events gets replaced by talkof boundaries between different temporal chunks: thus, the event of mydemobilization is four-dimensionally to be thought of as a boundary between anarmy serving chunk of me and a later non-military chunk of me" [p. 15].

Says that "ordinary adverbs" should be treated as predicatesof events (à la Davidson 1967a), buttenses should be handled differently, "by means of a tenseless metalanguage"[p. 15].

The difference between events and processes is a contextualone, and not a category difference. "We speak of a process as an event when weare not much concerned with its inner temporal structure, and as a process whenwe are so concerned" [p. 303].

1985 ‘Davidson’sMinimal Materialism’, in B. Vermazen and M. B. Hintikka, eds. (1985), pp.173-82.

Critical discussion of Davidson’s (1970b) argument to theeffect that there are no strict laws relating mental events to one another orto physical events.

1987 ‘Replies’,in P. Pettit, R. Sylvan, and J. Norman, eds., Metaphysics and Morality.Essays in Honor of J. J. C. Smart, Oxfordand New York: Basil Blackwell, pp. 173-95.

Includes replies to Davidson (1987) and Mellor (1987b), thelatter with a defense of the account of causation as a relation between events.

1989 OurPlace in the Universe. A Metaphysical Discussion, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Treats events as "ordered pairs of (1) temporal stages ofobjects and (2) certain classes". For instance, with reference to Davidson’s(1969a) example of a ball that is rotating and heating up: "the heating upstage of the ball is the same temporal stage as the rotating stage, but theclass of heating up stages of objects and the class of rotating stages ofobjects are different, and enable us to distinguish the event of the ballheating up as a different event from the event of the ball rotating" [p. 116].

1988 ‘Agencyand the Essence of Actions’, The Philosophical Quarterly

, 38, 401-21.

Argues that the unifying approach to event identity isincompatible with the view that identity is necessary, since e.g. the flippingof a switch and the turning on of a light, if identical, are contingently so.The only way to retain both doctrines is by distinguishing between accidentaland essential features of actions. In this regard, it is then argued thatbodily movement is inessential to any action, and that the only actions aretryings.

1982 ‘SomeFormal Moments of Truth’, in W. Leinfellner, E. Kraemer, and J. Schank, eds., Languageand Ontology. Proceedings of the 6th International Wittgenstein Symposium

, Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, pp. 186-90.

Sets out axioms for a correspondence theory of truth withevents as truth-makers.

1983 ‘Actsand Their Objects’, in P. Weingartner and H. Czermak, eds., Epistemology andPhilosophy of Science. Proceedings of the 7th International WittgensteinSymposium, Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky,pp. 85-88.

Conceives acts of perception as relational events depending onpersons and physical objects as their relata.

Develops an ontological theory of acts of perception asspecial sorts of relational events. All events are dependent upon their bearers(in this case on the corresponding cognitive subjects). Relational events aredependent in addition on some objectual correlate in the world. The core of thepaper is an account of the relation of ontological dependence that is neededfor such a conception, an account which is derived from Husserl’s third LogicalInvestigation.

1987 ‘Onthe Cognition of States of Affairs’, in K. Mulligan, ed., Speech Act andSachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology

, Dordrecht, Boston, and Lancaster: Nijhoff, pp.189-225.

Generalizes the relational theory of event perception of(1984) to the case of judgement.

1989 ‘Constraintson Correspondence’, in W. L. Gombocz, H. Rutte, and W. Sauer, eds., Traditionenund Perspektiven der analytischen Philosophie. Festschrift für Rudolf Haller

, Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, pp. 415-30.

1990 ‘Onthe Phases of Reism’, in J. Wolenski, ed., Kotarbinski: Logic, Semanticsand Ontology, Dordrecht, Boston, andLondon: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 137-84.

Considers a range of attempts--by Kotarbinski, Brentano, Chisholm,Quine, and others--to reduce the bicategorial ontology of things and events to amonocategorial ontology of concreta, things or thing phases.

1992 ‘Sachverhalt’,in J. Ritter and K. Gründer, eds., Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie

, Stuttgart and Basel: Schwabe, Vol. 8, pp. 1102-13.

A survey of the role of the concept of state of affairs in thehistory of philosophy, starting from its earliest roots in ancientjurisprudence (the status rerum or stateof things as the issue to be resolved by the court) to modern statements of thecorrespondence theory of truth.

1993 ‘Puttingthe World Back into Semantics’, Grazer philosophische Studien

, 44, 91-109.

1991 TheParameter of Aspect, Dordrecht, Boston, andLondon: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

A study of aspectual meaning, based on the assumption that theaspectual categories are not language dependent but based in human cognitiveabilities. Includes rich discussions of theoretical and comparative linguisticphenomena in terms of a five-fold taxonomy of verb types into accomplishments,activities, achievements, states, semelfactives. (Compare Vendler’s (1957)quadripartition; the fifth category is defined here as comprising dynamic,atelic, instantaneous events such as tapping or knocking.)

1995 ‘ActivitySentences in Narrative: States or Events?’, in P. Amsili, M. Borillo, and L.Vieu, eds. (1995), Part A, pp. 193-206.

Evidence is given to the effect that activity sentencesadvance time in narrative discourse, as telic events do (and unlike states).Thus, they should be analysed as events.

1978 ‘Goldmanon Act Individuation’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

, 56, 230-41.

Criticises the view that all tryings are internal events.Rejoined by M. Rickard (1984).

1985 ‘EventChains, Grammatical Relations, and The Semantics of Case in German’, in W. H.Eilfort, P. D. Kroeber, and K. L. Peterson, eds., CLS 21: Papers from theTwenty-First Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society

, Part 1, Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society, pp.388-407.

Uses the notion of an "event chain" (which is meant torepresent "the basic interactional relationships among the profiledparticipants in a conceived event" [p. 390]) to analyse the meanings of theGerman cases.

1984 ‘AnomalousMonism and Epiphenomenalism: A Reply to Honderich’, Analysis

, 44, 83-85.

1986 ThePhilosophy of Mind. An Introduction,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

1986 ‘Ethicsand Action Theory on Refraining: A Familiar Refrain in Two Parts’, Journalof Value Inquiry, 20, 3-17.

Agent A refrains fromperforming action s if and onlyif (i) A believes he or she canperform s, (ii) A

does not perform s

, (iii) Aperforms some mental action t toprevent A’s performing s

[p. 14]. Ontological issued further discussed inGill (1988).

1986 ‘TheInfinite Regress of Temporal Attributions’, Southern Journal of Philosophy

, 24, 383-96; reprinted in L. N. Oaklander and Q.Smith, eds. (1994), pp. 180-94.

A defense of the tensed theory of time against "McTaggart’sparadox": the idea that presentness, pastness, and futurity are attributes ofevents does imply an infinite regress, but the regress "is neither vicious notconstituted of tenseless predications" [p. 383]. Criticism in Oaklander (1994).

1987 ‘Problemswith the New Tenseless Theory of Time’, Philosophical Studies

, 52, 371-92; reprinted in L. N. Oaklander and Q.Smith, eds. (1994), pp. 38-56.

Argues that the tenseless theory of time (Mellor 1981a, 1981b)faces various problems and should be abandoned in favor of the tensed theory.See replies by Oaklander (1990, 1991).

1988/9 ‘TheLogical Structure of the Debate about McTaggart’s Paradox’, PhilosophyResearch Archives, 24, 371-79; reprinted inL. N. Oaklander and Q. Smith, eds. (1994), pp. 202-10.

Continues the debate with Oaklander. See Smith (1986, 1987)and Oaklander (1987, 1994).

1990a ‘TheCo-reporting Theory of Tensed and Tenseless Sentences’, PhilosophicalQuarterly, 40, 213-22; reprinted in L. N.Oaklander and Q. Smith, eds. (1994), pp. 94-103.

1990b ‘TemporalIndexicals’, Erkenntnis, 32, 5-25;reprinted in L. N. Oaklander and Q. Smith, eds. (1994), pp. 136-53.

Argues that the view that times are sets of events isincompatible with the theory that indexicals are rigid designators.

Part I is a lengthy defense of the tensed theory of time:temporal determinations of events include the properties of pastness, presentness,and futurity. Part II includes arguments to the effect that both mental andphysical events are in metaphysical time [pp. 236ff].

1994a ‘TheTruth Conditions of Tensed Sentences’, in L. N. Oaklander and Q. Smith, eds.(1994), pp. 69-76.

1994b ‘Smartand Mellor’s New Tenseless Theory of Time: A Reply to Oaklander’, in L. N.Oaklander and Q. Smith, eds. (1994), pp. 83-86.

1994c ‘Mellorand McTaggart’s Paradox’, in L. N. Oaklander and Q. Smith, eds. (1994), pp.176-79.

Outlines a theory of infinite tensed facts to cope with"McTaggart’s paradox". See also (1986).

An attempt to rehabilitate the Cambridge criterion for change."The criterion may be applied in all cases where we have an expression of theform ‘FI(x

)’ in which ‘FI’ is a non-relational predicate. Where ‘FI

’ is a relational

predicate, that is where we have ‘Ry

(x)’,the criterion may be applied unless ‘R’ is a spatial relationship as between x

and y;but a ‘successful’ application of the criterion will indicate only that eitherx or y has changed, it will not enable usto decide which of the two has changed" [p. 333].

1947 ‘Modalityand Description’, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 12, 139-41.

A criticism of the "slingshot" argument (in the formulationused by Quine 1953 to demonstrate the collapse of modal distinctions inquantified modal logic).

A solution to the time-of-a-killing problem (Goldman 1971,Thomson 1971a) by appeal to the notion of a scattered event. A scattered eventhas parts existing at different times, and it thereby does not change (thus theshooting does not change into a killing).

Develops on von Wright (1963) and provides a richclassificatory table of actions in terms of their conditions, act, and results[p. 115]. Seeks a clarification of the notion of an act and proposes "anamended set of necessary conditions for the performance of an act which help"von Wright’s theory to evade a number of difficulties [p. 125].

1984 ‘Mind-BodyInteraction and Supervenient Causation’, in P. A. French, T. Uehling, and H. K.Wettstein, eds. (1984), pp. 271-81.

The causal relation between events is analysed in terms ofexistence of a causal law that links properties and relations of these events:"Event x causes event y

" is understood as "There are properties P

and Qsuch that the having of property Pby x causes y

to have property Q

", which is true iff "there are properties of x

, including P, and properties of y,and a relation R between x

and y,such that it is nomologically necessary that whenever an event has suchproperties of x and bearsrelation R to some other eventwith such properties as y, thenthat other event also has Q" [p.279]. Applications to Davidson’s (1970a) arguments for anomalous monism.

1987 ‘SubjectsAmong Other Things’, in J. Tomberlin, ed., Metaphysics (Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 1), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, pp.155-87; reprinted in M. Rea, ed., Material Constitution. A Reader

, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997, pp.63-89.

Section I (An Event or Process Ontology?) focuses on the questionwhether ordinary things can be identified with their underlying events (withtheir careers). The answer is skeptical, on account of the fact that an objectcould have had a different career than it actually had. The conclusion is thatwe should "leave open the question of reduction and [...] recognize instead arelation between things and their underlying events which though compatiblewith reduction or identity does not necessarily require reduction or identity"[p. 181].

1993 ‘Davidson’sThinking Causes’, in J. Heil and A. R. Mele, eds. (1993), pp. 41-50.

A defense of the criticisms of anomalous monism put forward in(1984) in reply to Davidson (1993c).

Includes reprints of Davidson (1967c), Ducasse (1926), Kim(1971, 1973b), D. K. Lewis (1973), J. L. Mackie (1965), von Wright (1973), andparts of R. Taylor (1965).

1979 Essaysin the Philosophy of R. M. Chisholm [= Grazerphilosophische Studien, 7/8], Amsterdam andAtlanta, GA: Editions Rodopi.

Includes Anscombe (1979b), Chisholm (1979d), Donagan (1979),Kim (1979), Pollock (1979), Wiggins (1979), Wolterstorff (1979).

1987 Reviewof LePore and McLaughlin, eds. (1985), Philosophical Books

, 28, 65-73.

Proposes the transitive closure of direct causation as theweakest notion of causation.

1988 S.Lesniewski’s Lecture Notesin Logic, Warsawa: PWN - Polish ScientificPublishers; Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Includes notes from a lecture by Lesniewski on Whitehead’s (1919) axiomatic theory ofevents [pp. 171-78]. Compare Lesniewski (1928) (infra

, Appendix) and Sinisi (1966).

1985 ‘SpatialThings and Kinematic Events’, Philosophia Reformata

, 50, 9-20.

A discussion of the reality of such events as waves andperiodic oscillations, which have a "low-level" individuality with respect toplants and animals (as do purely spatial entities such as geometric figures).

1986 Reviewof LePore and McLaughlin, eds. (1985), Revue Philosophique de la France etde l’étranger, 17, 542-44.

1991 ‘Événementset éventualités’ [‘Events and Eventualities’, in French], in J.-L. Petit, ed.(1991), pp. 251-55.

Drawing from Reichenbach, argues that Davidson’s theory "can’tdeal with what is the opposite of events, the ‘antisituations’" [Abstract, onp. 286]. A semantic analysis based on both events and such opposites is outlined.

1967 ‘Events,Periods, and Institutions in Historians’ Language’, History and Theory

, 6, 159-79.

Examines the use of proper names to refer to events. "‘TheAmerican Civil War’ is the name of an event. A lot of smaller events like themoving of armies, people dying, and the government issuing proclamations constitutethis event; but an analysis of the meaning

of ‘the American Civil War’ would not show us whatwas happening in the relevant spatio-temporal region, or even very preciselywhat the relevant spatio-temporal region is; we must investigate the facts" [p.165]. Section 4 on the ontological question, "Do things like

the Renaissance--events, periods, andinstitutions--really exist?"

1983 ‘Supervenienceand Psychophysical Law in Anomalous Monism’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

, 64, 72-79.

On whether Davidson’s denial of psychophysical laws iscompatible with psychophysical supervenience. Defendsthe denial, but has misgivings about the soundness of Davidson’s argument foranomalous monism.

1974 ‘IrvingThalberg’s Component Analysis of Emotion and Action’, The PhilosophicalQuarterly, 24, 150-55.

1997 ‘Temporality’,in J. van Benthem and A. G. B. ter Meulen, eds., Handbook of Logic and Language, Amsterdam: Elsevier; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 895-938.

Section 2, on temporal ontology, discusses approaches thattake events as primitive.

1983 ‘"Undera Description"’, in L. S. Cauman, I. Levi, C. Parsons, and R. Schwartz, eds., HowMany Questions? Essays in Honor of Sidney Morgenbesser

, Indianapolis: Hackett, pp. 120-31.

On Davidson’s view (also attributed to S. Morgenbesser) thatall explanation is relative to a description. Includes a criticism ofDavidson’s account of singular causal statements.

Applies Davidson’s (1967c) views on causal relations to thequestion whether causality continues to play any role in mathematical physics.In the last part argues "that there is no longer any need to restrict thecausal relation to events and thatscientific theories have, in the past, asserted causal relations as holdingamong such entities as chargesand fields.

1974 ‘Towarda Theory of Event Identity’, Philosophy of Science

, 41, 65-83.

An extensional, Davidsonian theory of event identity forapplication to historical sentences.

1978 ‘TheAlleged Extensionality of "Causal Explanatory Concepts"’, Philosophy ofScience, 45, 614-25.

A criticism of Levin (1976). Argues that the referentialopacity of explanation can be accounted for by viewing explanation as a speechact, which may or may not be successful depending on which of severalco-referential expressions is used.

1981 ‘Lewis’Counterfactual Analysis of Causation’, Synthese, 48, 333-46.

With regard to D. K. Lewis’s (1973) analysis, argues thatdetermination of the set of possible worlds "most similar" to the actual onedepends on causal relations.

1982 ‘LogicalFeatures of Reference to Facts in Causal Statements’, Philosophical Studies

, 41, 197-212.

Argues that "substitutivity holds in the case of event-citingbut fails in the case of fact-citing singular causal statements because of thelogical properties of the mechanism for referring to events and facts, ratherthan those of the context ‘--- caused ...’ or of different kinds of causalstatements. That context, or perhaps we should say both of those contexts, areextensional" [pp. 198-99].

1988 ‘TheProspects for Elimination of Event-Talk’, Philosophical Studies

, 54, 43-62.

Argues against the possibility of a language in whichexpressions involving reference to or quantification over events can besystematically avoided. Focuses particularly on singular causal statements.

Discussion of strategies à la Horgan (1978) for avoidingontological commitment to events.

Argues that emphasized causal sentences such as "Socrates’drinking hemlock at dusk caused hisdeath" (Dretske 1977) "conjoin predication of a causal relation between eventswith predication of a relation of causal relevance between states of affairs(or perhaps facts)" [p. 379, Abstract]. Compare Peterson (1994).

1965 ‘FictionalCharacters, Places, and Events’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

, 26, 202-15.

1970 ‘TheConcept of a Human Action’, Inquiry, 13[Special Issue on "Action"], 1-31.

A human action is "something done, such that what is done isan expression of the agent’s meaning" [p. 2].

1992 Wassind Ereignisse? Eine Studie zur Anlytische Ontologie

[What Are Events? A Study on AnalyticOntology, in German], Berlin and New York:de Gruyter

Argues that the fine-grained conception of events (e.g.,Goldman’s) is incompatible with the causal role of events and, more generally,with any materialist ontology.

1993 ‘Actions,Reasons, and Their Relationship’, in R. Stoecker, ed. (1993), pp. 265-86.

Compares Davidson’s criteria for introducing events withparallel putative criteria for introducing states. If sentences such as ‘Doriswas tired’ hide a quantification over states, "there will hardly be anysentence left that does not. And this would [...] shed a strange light onDavidson’s entire semantical project" [p. 273]. Davidson’s reply in (1993b).

1993 ReflectingDavidson. Donald Davidson Responding to an International Forum of Philosophers

, Berlin: de Gruyter.

Includes Künne (1993) and Stoecker (1993) along withDavidson’s replies (1993a, 1993b). There is also a rich bibliography and acomplete listing of Davidson’s publications, reprints and translations up toSpring 1993.

1968 ‘WhatActually Exists’ (Symposium with P. Geach), Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety, Suppl. Vol. 42, 17-30.

Commenting on Geach’s (1968): "Actuality does not compriseonly what actually exists (actual objects); it includes also what actuallyholds (actual attributes) and what actually occurs (actual events) [...] Anactual event is an event which implies change in some actual object. Some, butnot all, actual events are events that happen to actual objects: the melting ofa piece of butter is an actual event that happens to the butter whereas a risein its price is an actual event that does not happen to it (or to any actualobject)" [p. 22].

1996 ThingsThat Happen Because They Should. A Teleological Approach to Action

, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

An externalist approach to the explanation of actions:"actions are the immediate results of causal processes which are sensitive toactual (external) means-end considerations [...] Activity constitutes intentionalaction in virtue of being causally explainable in terms of a teleologicaljustification of it" [p. 3]. "Like Davidson, I claim that an event constitutesan action in virtue of being explained in terms of a justification of it. Whatmakes my Teleological Theory of Action different from Davidson’s account isthat I do not spell out this justification in terms of attitudes and beliefs. Iclaim that the appropriate notion of justification can be spelt out withoutmentioning beliefs and intentions at all" [p. 5].

Presents an original conception of processes "as entitieswhich, like physical objects, do not extend in time and do not have temporalparts, but rather persist in time.Processes and events belong to metaphysically distinct categories" [p. 19].Thus, "at every moment during which a process is happening, the process as awhole is present" [p. 26].

Contests two consequences of Danto’s characterization of thedistinction between basic and non-basic actions, namely (i) that all non-basicactions are cases of causing something to happen, and (ii) that to perform anon-basic action by causing something to happen is always to cause some actionto happen.

1976 ‘TheCausation of Behavior’, Acta Philosophica Fennica, 28 (Essays on Wittgenstein in Honour of G. H. von Wright

), 286-325.

Includes a criticism of Davidson’s account of the notions ofcausation and explanation. Further developed in (1980, 1982).

1982 ‘Philosophyof Action: Davidson, von Wright, and the Debate over Causation’, in G.Fløistad, ed., Contemporary Philosophy. A New Survey. Volume 3. Philosophyof Action, Boston: Nijhoff, pp. 45-72.

A critical review of the debate over the causal theory ofaction in the 70s, focusing on the work of Davidson and von Wright,.

1990 ‘VonWright’s Theory of Action’, in P. A. Schilpp and L. E. Hahn, eds., ThePhilosophy of George Henrik von Wright, LaSalle, IL: Open Court, pp. 305-32.

Argues that von Wright’s (Kantian-Wittgensteinian) theory ofaction has a problem in relating intentional actions and bodily movements.

1987 ‘AccordionEffects Without Accordion Players’, Philosophia, 17, 191-94.

Argues that Davidson (1971a) is wrong to regard Feinberg’s(1965) thesis (an action can be expanded to include its effects and still becalled an action) as philosophically useful.

1950 ‘Truth’(Symposium with J. L. Austin), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

, Suppl. Vol. 24, 129-56.

Contends that Austin’s (1950) assumption that facts are in theworld is based on a type mistake confusing facts with events and things.Compare Shorter (1962) and Vendler (1967a). Critical examination of the debatein Tillman (1966).

Communication is possible even in a language lacking means forreferring to or quantifying over events, whereas concepts for (quantificationover) other individuals such as material bodies are necessary in order forcommunication to be possible. Holds that "A flash occurred" does not entail"Something flashed" [p. 46]. Discussion in Moravcsik (1965), Lycan (1970),Thalberg (1978a), Harman (1981), Tiles(1981), McGinn (1991), and Lowe (1994) inter alia.

1974 ‘OnUnderstanding the Structure of One’s Language’, in Freedom and Resentmentand Other Essays, London: Methuen, pp.198-207; reprinted in G. Evans and J. McDowell, eds., Truth andMeaning: Essays in Semantics, Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1976, pp. 189-98.

A criticism of Davidson’s account of linguistic understandingin terms of mastering of an underlying logical form.

1985 ‘Causationand Explanation’, in B. Vermazen and M. B. Hintikka, eds. (1985), pp. 115-35;reprinted as Chapter 9 of Strawson (1992), pp. 109-31.

On Davidson (1967c). Causation is a natural relation;explanation an intellectual relation, holding between facts or between truths.

1992 Analysisand Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy,Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Remarks that Davidson’s (1967a) analysis of action sentencesis "unrealistic and unnecessary" [pp. 102-6]. Chapter 9 on causation andexplanation.

1991 Proceedingsof the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society. GeneralSection and Parasession on the Grammar of Event Structure

, Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Linguistic Society.

Includes Partee (1991), DeLancey (1991), ter Meulen (1991b),Talmy (1991), and Singh (1991).

The identity criteria for mental events and those for physicalevents are so distinct that the mental/physical identity thesis cannot beestablished.

1978 ‘ACounterfactual Analysis of Event Causation’, Philosophical Studies

, 34, 1-19; partially incorporated in Chapter 2 ofSwain (1981).

Gives an analysis of singular event causation in the spirit ofD. K. Lewis’s (1973) counterfactual account, though giving a different accountof the asymmetry of the causal relation. The final part focuses on the problemof causal overdetermination. Claims that the account remains neutral withrespect to questions such as the possibility of backwards or simultaneouscausation. See comments of W. A. Davis (1980).

1980 ‘Causationand Distinct Events’, in P. van Inwagen, ed. (1980), pp. 155-69; partiallyincorporated in Chapter 2 of Swain (1981).

Chapter 2, "Causation", rielaborates material from Swain(1978, 1980). Events are spatio-temporally located particulars. They are notrepeatable, but "each is, we might suppose, a unique exemplification ofsomething that is repeatable" [p. 47]. Events c and e are identical iff,necessarily, c occurs iff e

occurs [p. 52]. Causation is defined in terms ofcausal chains of occurrent events [final definition on p. 68]. Includes adiscussion of compound events.

1982 ‘AreMental Events Identical with Brain Events?’, American PhilosophicalQuarterly, 19, 173-82.

Answers the title question in the negative. Treating events asproperty exemplifications, argues that "although the instantiation of twodifferent properties in a substance may constitute the same event, that will beso only if (in Goldman’s terminology) the instantiation of the onelevel-generates the instantiation of the other, This does not hold in the caseof mental and brain events" [The Philosopher’s Index

Abstract].

1976 ‘Tatsachenund empirischen Gesetze im Lichte der These von der Existenz objektiverEreignisse’ [‘Facts and Empirical Laws in the Light of the Thesis of theExistence of Objective Events’, in German], Deutsche Zeitschrift fürPhilosophie, 24, 1461-72.

An analysis of the notions of fact and event in the spirit ofReichenbach. Applications to dialectic materialism.

1976 ‘SemanticCausative Types’, in M. Shibatani, ed., Syntax and Semantics, Volume 6, TheGrammar of Causative Constructions, NewYork: Academic Press, pp. 43-116.

A study of (simple and complex) causative situations.Conditions on simple causative situations include their consisting of "simple"events (cause and effect) and the fact that "the caused event functions as the figure and the causing event as the ground of the whole situation [...]; thecausal relation is ‘result from’" [p. 67]. "The term causativein a semantic analysis of language must [...] be distinguished from thescientific notion of causation in the physical world" [p. 47]. In the sentence‘A ball rolling into it broke the vase’, "causality is expressed at presentonly at the moment of interaction between two events, but not also throughoutthe events" [p. 48]. Event-sentences are thus taken to express autonomous

events.

1991 ‘Pathto Realization: A Typology of Event Conflation’, in L. A. Sutton, C. Johnson,and R. Shields, eds., (1991), pp. 480-519.

Among other things, argues that "in the underlying conceptualorganization of language, there is a major inclusive type of eventcomplex--composed of certain kinds of simplex events in certainrelationships--that perhaps universally is also amenable to conceptualization asa single fused event and, accordingly, to expression by a single clause" [p.480].

1976 ‘Statesof Affairs’, in G. Evans and J. McDowell, eds., Truth and Meaning: Essays inSemantics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.263-84.

Set-theoretic construction of states of affairs. Includes adefense of the basic approach against slingshot-type arguments (Davidson 1967a,1967c) to the effect that sentences that are either substitutionally orlogically equivalent refer to the same state of affairs.

1977 ‘Tenseand Continuity’, Linguistics and Philosophy,1, 199-220; reprinted with revisions as Chapter 3 of B. Taylor (1985), pp.51-80.

Extended discussion of the taxonomy of verbs in terms of theproperties they display in their continuous tenses. The account is similar thatof Dowty (1977) and M. Bennett and B. H. Partee (1978). Also germane to Vendler(1957) in proposing "a formal account [within a Fregean tense framework] ofAristotle’s trichotomy of verbs, in terms of properties of their continuoustensing" [Author’s Abstract, p. 199].

1983/4 ‘Eventsand Adverbs’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

, 84, 103-22.

The "predicate modifier" approach is rejected in favor ofDavidson’s (1967a) treatment of adverbs as adjectives of events. Thistreatment, however, is claimed to only work if underpinned by an adequatemetaphysical account of the nature of events. The proposed account views eventsas states of affairs in the spirit of the (1976) treatment. Most materialincorporated in (1985), passim.

An investigation of the problems adverbs pose for systematicsemantics (from the Davidsonian perspective that a recursive theory of truth iscentral to a theory of meaning). The bulk of the theory is an expansion of(1983/4) and builds on (1976, 1977). Events are regarded as "facts whichconstitute temporally continuous changes manifested in some objects" [p. 85].Affinities with the propertyexemplification account of R. M. Martin, Kim, and Goldman. Reviewed by Tiles(1986), Cresswell (1987), C. A. Macdonald (1985b).

Considers languages which contains "flexibly structuredpredicates", i.e., predicates which have a fixed number of predicate places (asin standard first-order logic), each such argument-place being occupied by a variablenumber of terms (as in Grandy’s 1976 anadic logic). Relevant to an assessmentof Kenny’s (1963) problem of the "variable polyadicity" of action verbs.

1973 ‘MentalEvents: Are There Any?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

, 51, 189-200.

Argues that certain grammatical features of mental language donot fit in with the view that there are such things as mental events.Expressions usually taken to refer to mental events are best understood asfactive. And "a fact is not an event".

Discussion of the relation between desires, feelings, etc.,and the actions that flow from them.

1965 ‘States,Activities, and Performances’ (Symposium with T. C. Potts), Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 39,85-102.

Comments on Potts (1965), focusing mainly on the analysis ofAristotle’s views.

1955 ‘Spatialand Temporal Analogies and the Concept of Identity’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 52, 599-612.

Argues against the view that a thing can move back and forthin space, but it cannot move back and forth in time. "Consider, for instance,an aerial disturbance such as a whistle blast, existing non-simultaneously inthree nearby towns, A, B, and C, B being located between the other two. At T1 the disturbance exists in A and C butnot in B, and at T2 it is heard atneither A nor C but is at B" [p. 611].

Further elaborates on the idea that objects are not temporallyimmobile. The opposite, commonplace view rests on the conventional tensing ofverbs: "If we were in the habit of modifying verbs to indicate where

things are [...] instead of when

things are [...], then the notion of things moving

in space would probably appear as a great absurdity,whereas moving in time would seem commonplace" [p. 289]. Critical discussion inThomson (1965).

Chapter 7 includes a discussion of time, change, and thesimilarities between spatial and temporal concepts [pp. 72ff] based mostly on(1955). Chapter 9 on causation, viewed as a relationship "between changes orstates of substances, and only indirectly between the substances themselves"[pp. 92-93].

1963b ‘Causation’,The Monist, 47, 287-313; reprinted inBrand, ed. (1976), pp. 279-313.

Analysis of the necessary-and-sufficient account of causation."It is, at best, simply arbitrary how one divides any process up into events"[p. 312].

1965 Actionand Purpose, Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall; reprint New York: Humanities Press, 1974.

Draws a sharp distinction between actions and mere happenings:John’s moving his finger entails, but is not entailed by, his finger’s moving.Causality can generally be explained in terms of events bringing about otherevents. But when a person acts, the cause of the act is not an event but simplythe person.

1967 ‘Causation’,in P. Edwards, ed. in chief, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy

New York: Macmillan and Free Press, Vol. 2, pp.56-66.

1981 Syntaxand Semantics, Volume 14, Tense and Aspect,New York: Academic Press.

Includes M. Bennett (1981), Dahl (1981), Mourelatos (1978),Hoepelman and Rohrer (1981), M. R. Johnson (1981), and Vlach (1981a).

1987 Reviewof Lombard (1986), LePore and McLaughlin, eds. (1985), and Fang (1985), Mind

, 96, 124-33.

•Events are abstract entities, in the sense that "‘event’ is to be lumped with,and treated in the same way as, some other expressions usually called ‘abstractterms’" [p. 103]. ‘Event’ is a contextually eliminable general term. "Neitherevent-statements nor event-terms refer to/specify events [...] That it is events

that we commit ourselves [...] is shown simply by thesort of predicables which get attached to the bound variables: predicables like‘- is a bark’ and ‘Fido did -’" [pp. 108f]. Includes detailed discussion ofDavidson’s views and arguments. Chapter 5 on identity criteria.

1987 GrammaticalizingAspect and Affectedness, DoctoralDissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

1994 AspectualRoles and the Syntax-Semantics Interface,Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Aspectual structure is part of thesemantic representation of events (event structure) and syntactic phenomena maybe classified as to whether or not they are sensitive to the "core event" ofevent structure. Most material in Chapter 2, with the caveat "this is notmetaphysics; it is not a search for the nature of events as temporal entities inthe world. It is a search for the nature ofevents as temporal entities in natural language

" [p. 131].

1996 ‘IntegratingWorld Knowledge and Linguistic Constraints in the Temporal Interpretation of"When" Sentences’, International Journal of Intelligent Systems

, 11, 367-408.

On determining the qualitative temporal constraints betweenthe eventualities described by when-clauses.

1980 Substances,Quantities, and Individuals, DoctoralDissertation, Stanford University.

1983 ‘TheRepresentation of Time in Natural Language’, in A. G. B. ter Meulen, ed., Studiesin Model-Theoretic Semantics, Dordrecht:Foris, pp. 177-91.

A model-theoretic account of the state/activity/accomplishment/achievementclassification.

1984 ‘Events,Quantities and Individuals’, in F. Landman and F. Veltman, eds., Varietiesof Formal Semantics. Proceedings of the 4th Amsterdam Colloquium

, Dordrecht: Foris, pp. 259-79.

A study of homogeneouslyreferring expressions, i.e., expressions whose denotation is closed under partsof their referents: parts of acts of writing are themselves acts of writing.

1985 ‘Progressiveswithout Possible Worlds’, in W. H. Eilfort, P. D. Kroeber, and K. L. Peterson,eds., CLS 21: Papers from the Twenty-First Regional Meeting of the ChicagoLinguistic Society, Part 1, Chicago:Chicago Linguistic Society, pp. 408-23.

Argues that progressives should not be interpreted by sets ofatomic facts, but by incomplete events which are parts of complete events.Includes a presentation of the required theory of parts and wholes.

1986 ‘Structured Domains forEvents’ (Abstract), The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 51, 857.

"What counts as one uninterrupted event, if we have partialinformation, depends on what other events our representation contains and onthe ‘grain of detail’ of the representation". Develops a situation semanticswith "event-indeterminates", in terms of which the notions of divisible eventand concurrence of events with different internal structure are characterized.

1987a ‘IncompleteEvents’, in J. Groenendijk, M. Stokhof, and F. Veltman, eds., Proceedings ofthe 6th Amsterdam Colloquium, University ofAmsterdam: Institute for Language, Logic and Computation, pp. 263-79.

1987b ‘LocatingEvents’, in J. A. G. Groenendijk, D. de Jongh, and M. Stokhof, eds., Foundationsof Pragmatics and Lexical Semantics,Dordrecht: Foris, pp. 27-40.

Defines "the location of an event as an equivalence-class ofevents in a temporal structure based on a domain structured by [a] generalspatial part-of relation between objects", which entails a negative answer tothe Davidsonian question "if relations may be constituents in events and holdof objects, do they hold of larger objects containing them?" [p. 30].

1991a ‘EnglishAspectual Verbs as Generalized Quantifiers’, in A. L. Halpern, ed., Proceedingsof the Ninth West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics [WCCFL9]

, Stanford: Center for the Study of Language andInformation, pp. 347-60.

Argues that aspectual verbs are essentially quantificationalin nature. "The theory provides a systematic distinction between aspectualverbs which concern the internal structure of an event, quantifying over stagesof one and the same event, and aspectual verbs which govern the externaltemporal relations between events, quantifying over distinct occurrences of thesame type of events" [p. 348]. A contribution to natural language metaphysics.

1991b ‘Shiftingof Reference-Time and Perspective’, in L. A. Sutton, C. Johnson, and R.Shields, eds., (1991), pp. 520-30.

On the way we incorporate descriptions of past events andstates into given information. The ontological structure of the representationsis provided by a non-reductionist conception of events (events cannot bereduced to sets of temporal instants). "Events are part of the world as much aswe are, and they consist of other semantic objects (e.g., relations,individuals, and properties). But event-types are best understood as ways ofclassifying the world into similar parts in which ‘the same thing’ happens" [p.521].

1995 RepresentingTime in Natural Language. The Dynamic Interpretation of Tense and Aspect

, Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press/BradfordBooks.

An original approach (in the spirit of dynamic temporal logic)to the analysis of how temporal information is used to reason about the flow oftime, inferring the order in which events happen.

1967a ‘DoWe Cause Our Own Actions?’, Analysis,27, 196-201; reprinted with revisions in Thalberg (1972), pp. 35-47.

An attempt to understand the notion of agent causation asopposed to event causation. No intelligible instance is found.

1967b ‘Verbs,Deeds and What Happened to Us’, Theoria, 33,259-77; reprinted with revisions under the title ‘How Can We DistinguishBetween Doing and Undergoing?’ in Thalberg (1972), pp. 48-72.

Proposes a quasi-linguistic criterion for distinguishing verbsof action from verbs and verb phrases used to delineate things that befall tous.

1968 ‘OtherTimes, Other Places, Other Minds’, Philosophical Studies

, 20, 23-29.

With many individual events we can imagine that they occur ata different time or in a different location. Can we likewise conceive of oneman’s earache belonging to someone else?

1971a ‘Singlingout Actions, their Properties and Components’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 68, 781-87.

Proposes (against Kim, Goldman and L. H. Davis, collectivelyreferred to as "multipliers") that "My right foot changes position" and "Icareen past a red light" do not mark separate occurrences, and (againstAnscombe and Davidson, the "unifiers") that they do not record the same event."To ask whether ‘x’ and ‘y

’ describe a single action is not to ask whether theydescribe tandem deeds. A negative answer to the former is not a positive answerto the latter" [p. 786]. The proposed account accordingly exploits the idea of‘tallying up the subevents each reported event ‘includes’: its ‘parts’ whichare themselves events". A middle-ground approach in the spirit of Thomson’s(1977) mereological account.

1971b ‘Comments’,in R. Binkley, R. Bronaugh, and A. Marras, eds. (1971), pp. 154-66.

1972 Enigmasof Agency. Studies in the Philosophy of Human Action, London: Allen & Unwin.

Includes revised reprints of Thalberg (1967a, 1967b) andLevison and Thalberg (1969).

1973 ‘Constituentsand Causes of Emotion and Action’, The Philosophical Quarterly

, 23, 1-13.

Proposes to rank some of a person’s beliefs as components ofhis actions. Muscular and neural event ingredients cannot be causes of thebroader event, but they may cause other subevents. Criticism in Staude (1974).

On the by-relation. "From the premise that I carry out actionA by doing B, and the premise [...] that A and B are not identical, you cannotinfer that A and B are numerically distinct individual performances, in theclear sense that tuning and winking are" [p. 589]. See comments in Elliot andSmith (1976).

1976 ‘HowDoes Agent Causality Work?’, in M. Brand and D. Walton, eds. (1976), pp.213-37.

Raises various difficulties for the theory of free actionstemming from Chisholm’s (1976b) account of agent causation.

Full presentation of the "component approach" to actions andevents outlined in previous work (especially 1973, 1975), including adiscussion of the tie between reasons and deeds (Chapter 3), of the bodilycomponents of action (Chapter 4), and of the individuation of events which arebasic and non-basic actions (Chapter 5). The "unifier-multiplier" terminologyintroduced in (1971a) is replaced by a "pluralist-reductive" opposition.

Argues against "the best known schemes for reductivelyanalysing events in material-body and other terms" [p. 3], specifically thepropositional theories of Chisholm and N. L. Wilson and the property-exemplificationtheories of Kim and Goldman. Favours the position of a ‘symmetry’ ontologistlike Moravcsik (1965) vs. Strawson (1959). Criticisms in Feldman and Wierenga(1979).

1978b ‘CouldAffects Be Effects?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

, 56, 143-54.

Our descriptions of two events may be logically linked eventhough the link between the events themselves may be contingent (perhapscausal). Even so, we should be able to distinguish the episode (state) ofemotion from the cognitive goings-on that may have spawned it.

1978c ‘ANovel Approach to Mind-Brain Identity’, Philosophical Studies

, 33, 255-72.

The solution is not to equate mental events with brainprocesses, but to regard the cerebral event as one (localizable) component ofthe larger (possibly incorrigible and intentional) mental state.

1978d ‘AgentCausality and Reasons for Acting’, Philosophia, 7 [Special Issue on "The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm"],555-66.

Asks "whether there is a correlation between [...] a personagent causing his body to move and the event of that person having reasons toperform an action which comprises such a bodily movement. Either a ‘Yes’ or a‘No’ answer will have implications which agent causationists [such as Chisholm]probably wish to avoid" [p. 555]. Reply in Chisholm (1978).

Proposes an adverbial analysis which makes emotion a "way ofthinking" (as opposed to a distinguished event).

1981 ‘DemarcatingActions and Their Effects’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy

, 11, 241-44.

Challenges C. A. Macdonald’s (1978, 1981) Davidsonian claimthat an act of killing someone may be identical with the killer’s bodilymovement which causes the victim’s death: it is not clear how the aggressor cancause a death before the death has occurred.

1985 ‘AWorld Without Events?’, in B. Vermazen and M. B. Hintikka, eds. (1985), pp.137-55.

A defense of pro-event metaphysicians against no-eventmetaphysicians. Summarizes and tries to meet objections by Aune (1977), Horgan(1978), Trenholme (1975, 1978), Chisholm (1976a), Kim, and others.

1986 ‘TheImmateriality of "Abstract Objects" and the Mental’, Analysis

, 46, 93-97.

The analogy between the alleged immateriality of mental eventsand the immateriality of numbers (or other abstract objects) is "promising, butultimately unhelpful".

1990a ‘Perception,Conception and Linguistic Reproduction of Events and Time: the Categoryof Verbal Aspect in the Light of Charles Sanders Peirce’s Theory of Signs’, inK. L. Ketner, ed., Proceedings of Charles S. Peirce SesquicentennialInternational Congress, Cambridge, MA:Harvard University.

1990b ‘VerbalAspect in Discourse: On the State of the Art’, in N. B. Thelin, ed., VerbalAspect in Discourse, Contributions to the Semantics of Time and TemporalPerspective in Slavic and Non-Slavic Languages,Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, pp. 3-88.

A useful survey particularly concerned with the notion ofevent and its role in aspect semantics.

A discussion of the meaning of ‘accident’ and ‘chance’ inrelation to events that happen--or doings that are done--accidentally or bychance.

Following Montague (1970a, 1970b), predicate adverbs can beformalized using the abstraction operator and interpreted as functions takingpropositional functions into propositional functions. This account "producesfewer logical consequences than one might desire" [p. 715]. For instance, itdoes not validate adverb dropping inferences. But what criteria can be used toestablish when such an inference shouldbe validated? As a problematic example, the pattern ‘Otto closed the doorpartway. Therefore Otto closed the door’ is considered.

1984 ‘SomeIssues Concerning the Interpretation of Derived and Gerundive Nominals’, Linguisticsand Philosophy, 8 [Special Issue on"Situations and Attitudes", R. Cooper and R. E. Grandy, eds.], 73-88.

Classic discussion of the semantical problems stemming fromthe connection between derived nominals (‘the revolution of the wheel’) andgerundive nominals (‘the wheel’s revolving’).

Adverbs as functions from predicates to predicates (predicatesbeing functions from possible worlds into sets of individuals). Complexpredicates are analysed with the help of the abstraction operator. Criteria areformulated for distinguishing sentence and predicate adverbs.

1986 ‘OnConstructing Instants from Events’, Journal of Philosophical Logic

, 13, 85-96.

Shows that Walker’s (1947) construction of instants from anevent ordering forms a complete linear ordering; if the events are dense andcountably infinite, the instants form a continuum.

1989 ‘FreeConstruction of Time from Events’, Journal of Philosophical Logic

, 18, 43-67.

A category-theoretic account of the "fundamental step" in themental construction of time, whereby we come to suppose that all events occupyintervals of some underlying temporal dimension. "What is the mathematicalconnection between the way events are perceived to be ordered (on the one hand)and linear orderings (on the other) which permits, or even compels, observersto regard events as occupying intervals of some linear ordering? The answer [...]must be this: there are a pair of adjoint functors connecting a category of‘event orderings’ and a category of linear orderings. In other words, there isa free construction of linear orderingsfrom event orderings" [p. 43].

On R. Taylor’s (1955, 1959) arguments that an object can moveback and forth in time just as it can in space.

1971a ‘TheTime of a Killing’, The Journal of Philosophy, 68, 115-32; reprinted in R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, eds. (1996), pp.285-302.

Influential discussion of the difficulties involved in theidentification of somebody’s shooting of a victim with his/her killing of thevictim. For instance, how can these be the same act, if they occurred atdifferent times, and if the former but not the latter can be said to have beenfollowed n hours later by the victim’sdeath?

A criticism of Goldman (1971). Themain objection is that one cannot have Goldman’s criterion for act identity andalso take a typical by-sentence ‘x

verb1ed by verb2ing’as meaning ‘($e

1)($e2)(verb1ing (x,e

1) &verb2ing (x,e

2) &by(e

1 ,e

2))’(plus suitable tense conditions). For the latter is intrinsically Davidsonianand sanctions the inference from ‘e is averb1ing byverb2ing’ to ‘e

is a verb1ing’, which Goldman must reject. The paperconcludes with a plea for a "middle ground" position between Davidson’s viewand Goldman’s view: "we may not identify a replenishing with a pumping, butmay, and indeed should, identify a replenishing with a replenishing by pumping,and that with a replenishing with a pump" [p. 780]. This view eventuallydeveloped into the mereological account elaborated in (1977).

Fully developed mereological approach to the ontologicalanalysis of actions and, more generally, of events: agrees with Davidson’sperspective, but highlights the possibility that an event occurs as part ofanother. Thus, assuming that a shoots b

at t,and that b dies at t'

>t,the relation between a’s shootingand a’s killing of b

is not identity. Rather, the former is part of thelatter, where an event x is partof an event y iff, intuitively, x

"plays a part in" y

. (This notion is given a rigorous--and rathercomplex--characterization in terms of the relation of causality.) The account isthen applied to provide an analysis of such notions as agency, method, andintentionality. Reviewed by Annas (1980), Brand (1981b), Bratman (1982), Cameron (1981), Horgan (1979),Hornsby (1979b, 1981b), Olen (1985), Schwartz (1979). On the mereologicalapproach to event identity, see also L. H. Davis (1970), Thalberg (1971a), andBeardsley (1975).

1983 ‘Parthoodand Identity Across Time’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 80, 201-20; reprinted in H. W. Noonan, ed., Identity

, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1993, pp. 171-90,and in M. Rea, ed., Material Constitution. A Reader

, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997, pp.25-43.

"Unlike physical objects, events really do have temporal parts[...] hence there is no need to use tenses in ascribing parthood relations toevents. We can take events to be a model of the Cross-temporal Calculus ofIndividuals (reading [x exists at t

] as: xis occurring at t). But the eventidentities so obtained would be the same as those I obtained [in 1977] bytaking events to be a model of the simpler Calculus of Individuals" [p. 218,fn. 10].

Classifies verbs of action into intransitive and transitive(which further divide into legal causal, causal, and noncausal) [p. 118].Contrasts verbs such as ‘kill’ to verbs such as ‘cause’. "‘x

causes y’does not merely accept an event or state of affairs as direct object; itrequires an event or state of affairs as direct object. [...] To cause an event isto cause it to occur, and to cause a stateof affairs is to cause it toobtain. It follows that if you cause anything, you cause it to occur orobtain--and thus that ‘x causes y

’ does entail ‘x causes y’ to occur orobtain" [p. 108].

1980a ‘TheLogic of Temporal Discourse’, Linguisticsand Philosophy,

3, 343-69.

Outlines an account of tenses as propositional modifiers.Objects to McCawley’s (1971) distinction between existential (event-related)and universal (fact-related) present perfect.

1980b ‘TheSemantics of Episodic Verbs’, Theoretical Linguistics

, 7, 263-96.

An alternative to Cresswell’s (1977) interval semantics, basedon a notion of event defined as the conjunction of a class consisting of a timeproposition (such as "it is 1/1/1981, 12 noon") and a number of shifts of basicpropositions (where the k-shift of aproposition p is the propositionthat p will be true in k

seconds).

1985 ‘DoWe Need Interval Semantics?’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 8, 263-82.

A criticism of Interval Semantics. Argues for instance that"an adequate description of [such activities as drawing a circle] must take theform of a function associating each individual not with the (continuous orbroken) time stretches he spends drawinga circle but with those of his behaviours which amount [...] to drawing a circle", where "a behaviour is a kind ofepisode" and where in turn "anepisode is best conceived as a series of momentary basic events happening oversome stretch of time" [pp. 270-71].

Argues that Davidson’s (1969a) identity criterion is of nomore value than if it had been formally circular: for (i) it is not usablewithout a great deal of analytic work on the relation of causality (andDavidson’s account of causality in 1963, 1967c rests on the availability ofadequate identity criteria for events), (ii) the criterion is only usable bycreatures capable to determine causal relations without the mediation of causallaws, in which case however it becomes useless; (iii) it is unusable because weare uncertain what is to count as an event. A more fully argued version is inSection 1 of Tiles (1981). See also Quine (1985) for similar charges.

A critical examination (ending with a rebuttal) of Strawson’s(1959) claim that a language could be used to talk about material objectswithout its speakers being able to talk about events. The analysis covers therole of such notions as part and whole, limits and extent, temporal and spatialconnectedness, intersubjective identification and reidentification. Reviewed byBrumbaugh (1982), Feldman (1983), Hirsch (1984), C.A. Macdonald (1984), Oaklander (1986),Unwin (1982).

In relation to the Austin-Strawson (1950) debate, argues that"facts can be assimilated neither to events nor to truth and true statements[...] The question whether facts are in the world or not involves a use of ‘fact’that is highly deviant" [p. 117].

1979 ‘SomeRecent Work in Action Theory’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

, 40, 576-93.

Includes a detailed critical study of Brand (1976a) (withcriticisms of Brand’s criteria for event identity) and of Kim (1976) (askingfor "details concerning the important notions of substance and property as theyoccur in his two basic principles about events" [p. 584]).

1987 ‘CriticalReview of Brand’s Intending and Acting’,Noûs, 21, 45-55.

Includes objections to Brand’s event identity criterionrelating to the nature of the underlying modal logic (in particular, the roleof the S4 principle nA ® nnA). Repliesin Brand (1989b).

1989 Philosophyof Mind and Action Theory (PhilosophicalPerspectives, Vol. 3), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.

Includes Brand (1989a), Dretske (1989), Horgan (1989), Kim(1989a), and McLaughlin (1989).

1990 ActionTheory and Philosophy of Mind(Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 4), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.

Views causation as a relation among individual state ofaffairs which determines "the direction of the logical transmission ofprobabilities" and thereby "the likelihoods of different types of events" [p.321]. Chapters 8 and 9 set out postulates that specify "how the probabilitiesof events depend upon the causal relations into which they enter" [ibid.].Critical Notice in Fales (1990b).

1990 ‘Causation:Reductionism Versus Realism’, Philosophy and Phenomenology Research

, 50, Suppl. Vol., 215-36.

On "whether causal relations between events are reducible toother states of affairs, including the non-causal properties of, and relationsbetween, events. The reductionist holds that they are; the realist that theyare not" [p. 215]. The realist approach is favored.

1989 Reviewof LePore and McLaughlin, eds. (1985), The Modern Schoolman

, 66, 229-30.

On the ontology of causation, with a discussion of theextensionality issue of the causal connective ‘because’. Includes a criticaldiscussion of Anscombe (1969a) and Davidson (1967c).

Argues against some classical (e.g. Davidson’s 1967a)justifications for bringing events into philosophical analyses: "where suchanalyses take events as particulars devoid of any propositional character [...]they are subject to counter-example; where such analyses take events as having(at least in part) a propositional character, they are convertible into simplerno-event analyses" [p. 185].

1980 TheIndividuation of Acts and Actions as Events,Doctoral Dissertation, Florida State University.

An analysis of the unifier/multiplier controversy suggeststhat both parties have conflated the terms ‘act’ and ‘action’. An act/actiondistinction allows one to come out of the individuation impasse.

1977 HumanAction and Its Explanation. A Study on the Philosophical Foundations ofPsychology, Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel.

Chapter 2 is an ample discussion of the ontology of actions(action tokens being understood as complex, process-like particular eventsbrought about by an agent). Concerning event identity, it is argued that bothDavidson’s (1969a) causal criterion and Quine’s and Lemmon’s spatio-temporalcriterion can be taken to give epistemicgrounds to identity statements whose meaning

is actually given by Leibniz’s law. (In particular,the acceptance of Quine’s and Lemmon’s criterion stems from the considerationthat seeming counterexamples truly concern "the same event [...] conceptualizedin two different ways" [p. 19].)

1982 ‘Explanationof Action’, in G. Fløistad, ed., Contemporary Philosophy. A New Survey.Volume 3. Philosophy of Action, Boston:Nijhoff, pp. 15-43.

A critical review of some central features of thephilosophical debate on action-explanations, focusing on the decade 1966-1976.

Chapter 6 provides a basic introduction to early theories oftemporal reasoning in artificial intelligence. Claims that "one of the centralconceptual problems in the application of standard temporal logic to AIconcerns the interplay between events and time"; indeed, "events ought to betaken as conceptually prior to instants, as this seems so whether or not weregard events as some sort of mental experience or physical phenomenon".Includes a discussion of Kamp (1979, 1980), J. F. Allen (1981), McDermott(1982).

Negative assessment of the identity criterion of Brand (1976a,1977), with discussion of counterexamples. "Any philosophically adequatecriterion must state general conditions for counting events in both actual andpossible cases. However, it seems clear that this requires a specification ofthe identity of events across possible worlds or, in other words, theiressence. And so the individuating criterion cannot be entirely separated from theidentity conditions" [p. 87]. Conclusion: as the intelligibility of Brand’sparticularist conception of events rests upon a satisfactory criterion, oneshould give up particularism and move "to the view that events are complexeswhich include properties as well as particulars and times" [p. 81].

1993 Issuesin the Philosophical Foundations of Lexical Semantics

, Doctoral Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology.

The final part, on the truth-conditional semantics of verbs inrelation to the metaphysics of events, criticizes T. Parsons’s neo-Davidsonianapproach.

Argues that one cannot distinguish semantical and metaphysicalissues in the way attempted by J. Bennett (1988): the metaphysics is bound tobe just as indeterminate as the semantics. After an original analysis of theproblem, concludes that the identity criteria for events "remain as mysteriousas ever" [p. 330].

1994a ‘Onthe Logic of Event-Causation. Jaskowski-Style Systems of CausalLogic’, Studia Logica, 53, 551-78.

Investigates the formal counterparts of causal relations amongsingular events. "Causal logic" is understood as "that part of non-classicallogic which deals with causal connectives in their interaction with classicalpropositional connectives" [p. 552]. Focuses on systems inspired by the work ofS. Jaskowski.

1994b ‘CausalPriority: Towards a Logic of Event Causation’, in G. Meggle and U. Wessels,eds., Analyomen 1. Proceedings ofthe 1st Conference "Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy"

, Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, pp. 386-96.

A study in the spirit of (1994a). Characterizes events inrelation to epistemic systems: "The explosion of a star may be very short e.g.for a historian and considerably longer for a C.E.R.N. physicist" [p. 389].

1995 ‘OnCausality. Ingarden’s Analysis vs. Jaskowski’s Logic’, Logic andLogical Philosophy, 2, 55-68.

1970 ‘SomeRemarks on Action and Desire’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 67, 503-19.

A discussion of the view that if an agent performs an actionbecause of a desire, the desire cannot be described without reference to theaction itself. One of the arguments involves the thesis that individual actsare necessarily (de re) performed by theagents who perform them.

A study of the connections between point-based and interval-basedapproaches to tense logic, intervals being thought of as the temporal"substrata" of events.

1983 TheLogic of Time, Dordrecht, Boston, andLondon: Kluwer Academic Publishers (second revised edition 1991).

A model-theoretic investigation into the varieties of temporalontology and temporal discourse. Chapter I.5 compares a "classical analysis ofevents"--where, "starting from points, intervals are created during whichcertain statements hold, and events then become ‘intervals cum description’"--withthe reverse approach, where "events are taken to be the primary entities,inducing periods as secondary--and hence points as merely tertiary objects".Claims that "events are linguistic constructions. Experience is a continuousmovie, which humans cut into manageable slices using their language" [p. 113].

1989 ‘Time,Logic, and Computation’, in J. Bakker, W.-P. de Roever, and G. Rozenberg, eds.,Linear Time, Branching Time and Partial Order in Logics and Models forConcurrency, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp.1-49.

1995 TemporalLogic, in D. M. Gabbay, C. J. Hogger, and J.A. Robinson, eds., Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence andLogic Programming, Volume IV: Epistemic and Temporal Reasoning

, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 241-48.

Argues that ‘being earlier than’ is not genuinely dyadic:since simultaneity is not a condition necessary for event identity, ‘beingearlier than’ is a triadic relation incorporating as its third relatum sometemporal perspective.

1995 ‘CombiningSituation Calculus and Event Calculus’, in L. Sterling, ed., LogicProgramming. Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference (ICLP ’95)

, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 83-97.

Presents a new formalism that subsumes both the situationcalculus of McCarthy and Hayes (1969) and the event calculus of Kowalski andSergot (1986). Applications to temporal reasoning.

1997 ‘RepresentingDiscourse in Context’, in J. van Benthem and A. G. B. ter Meulen, eds., Handbook of Logic and Language, Amsterdam: Elsevier; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 179-237.

Has a section on tense and aspect, with verbs represented witha "Davidsonian argument" [pp. 225ff].

1970 AnIntroduction to the Philosophy of Time and Space, New York: Random House.

Section II.3a on therelations between physical objects and events. Events are the basic relata ofthe temporal relations; objects are indirectly in time because events happen tothem. Indeed, "the general way to describe an event is to say that it is a caseof X being F

(supplying the relevant object and property terms)and that it happened at a time t(supplying the relevant date)" [p. 34]. Compare also section III.4c

on time as a logical space, and the structure ofevents.

Events as particulars, non-recurrent and non-recurrableentities. Identity criterion à laDavidson (1969a), regarded also as a condition for transworld identity. Indeed,it is suggested that "since substances (like human beings and tables) should beindividuated by their causal origins, and since we are talking about eventsthat, like substances, are particulars", it is plausible to suppose that noevent could have differed in its causal ancestry. Relevant material discussedin Carter (1979) and Hughes (1994).

1978b ‘ADefinition of Chisholm’s Notion of Immanent Causation’, Philosophia

, 7 [Special Issue on "The Philosophy of Roderick M.Chisholm"], 567-81.

An attempt to explain Chisholm’s notion of causation as arelation borne by agents to events ("immanent" causation, as opposed to"transeunt" causation understood as a relation between events). Events aretreated as unrepeatable particulars, but mainly for the sake of the argument:"I am not sure what a demand for [an argument that there really are

events] comes to if it is a demand for more thancriteria of identity and truth" [p. 574].

Restatement of the (1978a) view that events (like otherparticulars) essentially have the causal origins they have [pp. 169-70].

Events play a role in answering the "Special CompositionQuestion", (i.e., loosely speaking, the question In what circumstances is athing a part of something?): there exists a y such that the xs composey iff the activity of the x

s constitutes a self-maintaining, well-individuated,"jealous" event of the sort that may properly be qualified as a particular"life". [Section 9 and passim.]

"It would seem that there cannot be an event unless there issomething that is not an event. An event is a change in something or a changein the relations that hold among two or more things. If there were no "things"there to undergo change, there could be no events. It may be that eventsthemselves can change (a war that had been confined to Europe might spread tothe Far East, and that sounds like a change in an event), but it is very hardto see how there could be events ‘in the first place’ if there were no thingsof other kinds that were capable of change" [p. 26].

Includes Armstrong (1980), Brand (1980a), Chisholm (1980),Shoemaker (1980), Smart (1980), Swain (1980).

1986 EventStructure, Doctoral Dissertation,University of Ottawa; revised version published with the same title, Amsterdamand Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1988.

An event-based study of various phenomena (unaccusativity,passivization, reflexivization, tense, aspect) in English, Dutch, and French.Extensively reviewed by Doherty (1990).

1992 ‘TheAspectual Semantics of Psychological Verbs’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 15, 65-92.

An analysis of some classes of psychological verbs based onVendler’s (1957) and Dowty’s (1979) quadripartition of verb types intoaccomplishments, activities, achievements, and states.

1969 ‘Complexityand Ambiguity; Some Observations on Arthur Danto’s "Complex Events"’, Philosophyand Phenomenological Research, 30, 78-83.

Comments on Danto (1969), focusing on the problem of an"interspace of non-eventival remnance" [p. 81].

Includessome remarks on the analogy between spatial boundaries (such as thesurfaces of physical bodies) and temporal boundaries (the beginnings andendings of processes). Discussion of some puzzles relating to change.

On the role of the agent in the explanation of human action. Adiscussion of agent causation.

1957 ‘Verbsand Times’, The Philosophical Review,66, 143-60; reprinted with revisions as Chapter 4 of Vendler (1967b), pp.97-121.

Seminal paper. Refining Ryle’s (1949) account, presents afourfold classification of verb types: activities, accomplishments,achievements, and states ("that puzzling category in which the role of verbmelts into that of predicate, and actions fade into qualities and relations"[p. 109]). Compare the classifications of Ryle (1949) and Kenny (1963).

1962a ‘Effects,Results and Consequences’, in R. J. Butler, ed., Analytical Philosophy

, New York: Barnes and Noble, pp. 1-15; reprintedwith revisions as Chapter 6 of Vendler (1967b), pp. 147-71).

Early attempt to characterize the nature of effects through ananalysis of the nominals used to relate them. The nominalizations denotingeffects "are taken in the process sense" [p. 5]. "Effects are not facts orphysical objects, but events or processes which are due to other events orprocesses in the world" [p. 7] On the other hand, results are not effects,because "they are not events or processes at all" [ibid.]. Causes are notevents either--they are fact-like entities. Discussed by Bromberger (1962) andDray (1962). See also Shorter (1965).

1962b ‘Reactionsand Retractions’, in R. J. Butler, ed., Analytical Philosophy

, New York: Barnes and Noble, pp. 25-31.

Clarifies the linguistic analysis employed in (1962a). Holdsthat "effects, which are processes, are effects of other processes: effectchains are homogeneous. Causes, which are facts, cause processes: causal chainsare heterogeneous" [p. 29].

Influential paper on the classification of nominal phrases,which fall into two categories: "one [imperfect nominals] in which the verb isstill alive as a verb, and the other [perfect nominals] in which the verb isdead as a verb, having become a noun" [p. 131]. (See Vendler 1968 forlinguistic refinements and J. Bennett 1988 for philosophical developments.)Events take place in time, material objects are located in space, but facts"are not in space and time at all. They are not located, cannot move, split, orspread, and they do not occur, take place, or last in any sense. Nor can theybe vast or fast" [p. 144]. Includes a criticism of Austin (1950).

Comment on Davidson (1967c). Causes "are not events but ratherfacts [...] The case of the ‘causal story" or "causal explanation" is the typicalcase, and what Mill calls the ‘producing cause’, i.e., the event to whichanother event is attributed under the umbrella of a covering law is not thecause of the second event, but the event of which the second event is theeffect" [pp. 704-5]. (Thus, causes and effects are not terms of the samerelation.)

Part 1, on "Nominalizations" [pp. 11-82], gives a fulldevelopment of the theory of nominals put forward in (1967a), distinguishingbetween proper nominalizations, complete nominals, and incomplete nominals.Very large choice of examples discussed in the text.

1984a ‘Agencyand Causation’, in P. A. French, T. Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein, eds. (1984),pp. 371-84.

"When John raises his arm, the physical event involved,namely, the rising of that arm, issomething for which causes can be given: contraction of muscles, firing ofneurons, and the like. This event, moreover, is not ‘done’ by anybody; therising of an arm is not something that can be done--it is not an action. What isan action is the raising of thearm: this is done by John, and not caused by anything" [p. 372].

An action always "contains" an event: "An action-descriptionconsists of an event-description in a ‘causative’ frame. To put it poetically:an action is an event with a handle" [p. 127].

Develops a theory of aspects according to which the aspectivalinformation is composed of information contained in the verb together withcertain nominal constituents. EmphasisesReichenbach’s (1947) distinction between "thing predicates" and"event predicates" and gives an analysis of action sentences as involvingexistential quantification over events as in Davidson (1967a) [pp. 156-62].

1973 ‘TemporalPrepositions as Quantifiers’, in F. Kiefer and N. Ruwet, eds., GenerativeGrammar in Europe, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp.582-615.

Argues that temporal prepositions can be conceived of as quantifiers(over time). Puts forward an account of verb aspects as being of acompositional nature. Includes a discussion of the function of determiners indating events.

1976 ‘InterpretiveRules and the Description of Aspects’, Foundations of Language

, 14, 471-503.

A reformulation of the account put forward in (1972). Infunctional-semantic representations, predicates of change are treated as eventpredicates in Reichenbach’s (1947) sense.

1978 ‘ThematicRelations and the Semantic Representation of Verbs Expressing Change’, Studiesin Language, 2, 199-233.

Argues that the semantic functions Theme, Source, and Goal(Jackendoff 1972, 1976) can be analysed "in terms of a change-predication, consisting of a two-place predicate change and two arguments, namely aSource-proposition and a Goal-proposition" [p. 199]. Applies the analysis toaspectival phenomena [pp. 228ff].

1980 ‘Onthe Proper Classification of Events and Verb Phrases’, TheoreticalLinguistics, 7, 137-48.

A criticism of Gabbay and Moravcsik (1980), focusingparticularly on the ontological categorization of events and the correspondingclassification of verb phrases. Claims that the latter "could not even beconsidered a notational variant" [p. 137] of the one put forward in Verkuyl(1972, 1973, 1976, 1978). Reply in Moravcsik (1980).

1985 ‘TemporalInsulation: On the Construction of Events’, Dutch Crossing

, 27, 22-45.

1987 ‘NondurativeClosure of Events’, in J. A. G. Groenendijk, D. de Jongh, and M. Stokhof, eds.,Studies in Discourse Representation Theory and the Theory of GeneralizedQuantifiers, Dordrecht: Foris, pp. 87-113.

An analysis of the opposition between durative and nondurativesentences (he played versus heplayed a sonata) based on the idea that"the notion of a nondurative aspect pertains to events having a structure thatis closed off in some sense by a ‘culmination point’" [p. 87]. The formalaccount is given in the framework of the theory of generalized quantification.

1988 ‘AspectualAsymmetry and Quantification’, in V. Ehrich and H. Vater, eds., Temporalsemantik. Beiträge zur Linguistik der Zeitreferenz

, Tübingen:Niemeyer, pp. 220-59.

Focuses on the interpretation of terminative aspect inevent-reporting sentences such as ‘Judith ate six sandwiches’, given that"aspect construal can be seen as the processing of arguments of a verb suchthat their denotations become (asymmetrically) involved in the temporalstructure generated by the verb" [p. 220]. Includes an account of the ambiguityof the event described by plural sentences such as ‘Three men lifted a table’.

1989 ‘AspectualClasses and Aspectual Composition’, Linguistics and Philosophy

, 12, 39-94.

A detailed discussion of Vendler’s (1957) quadripartition ofverb types and of its bearing on the linguistic theory of aspect. Starting fromthe basic question of whether Vendler proposed an ontological or a linguisticclassification (or both), the examination leads to the conclusion that Vendler"mixed up" some of the criteria used to establish the quadripartition. OnVerkuyl’s own "constructive" approach, "it is not classes that play a role inthe explanation of aspectual phenomena but rather some semantic factors fromwhich the classes are constructed, thus [...] leaving behind aVerb-classification as of no use to aspectual theory" [p. 41].

1990 ‘Didthe Guns of Navarone Hit Miles Twice?’, in M. Stokhof and L. Torenvliet, eds., Proceedingsof the 7th Amsterdam Colloquium, Amsterdam:ITLI, pp. 581-95.

A criticism of T. Parsons’s (1989) arguments against intervalsemantics. "His notion of an event turns out to be contaminated with agentivegerms" [p. 582].

1993 ATheory of Aspectuality. The Interaction Between Temporal

and Atemporal Structure

, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

A rich and original account, advocating a compositional characterizationof aspectuality. Events are not treated as primitive individuals but construedas complex "dividuals"; and the view is held that an aspectual theory may verywell be able to speak about events as if they exist in the ‘real world’ withoutreferring to them in representations" [p. 242]. Chapter 2 offers a detailedcriticism of approaches in the spirit of Vendler’s aspectual classes. Chapter11 is entirely on "Event Semantics and Aspect Construal"; and Chapter 13 on"Event Construal". Includes also ample discussion of the views of Davidson,Dowty, Kamp, Kenny, Krifka, T. Parsons, and von Wright inter alia

1995a ‘Indicesand Habituality’, in P. M. Bertinetto, V. Bianchi, J. Higginbotham, and M.Squartini, eds. (1995), pp. 195-217.

On the habitual interpretations of sentences such as ‘Mary atethree sandwiches’ (as opposed to their obvious terminative, unique-eventinterpretation). Includes also a clear statement of Verkuyl’s philosophicalviews on events as derived entities, which makes "it impossible [...] to embraceevent semantics as it originated in Davidson (1967a). The application of eventsemantics to the notion of aspectuality seems to me comparable with applyingonly macro-economic principles to the analysis of a micro-economic aggregate"[p. 212].

1995b ‘Aspectualizersand Event Structure’, in P. Amsili, M. Borillo, and L. Vieu, eds. (1995), PartA, pp. 31-48.

Application of the "compositional" theory of aspectuality putforward in (1993) to such aspectualizers as ‘begin’, ‘finish’, keep’, etc.

1985 ‘NegativeActs’, in B. Vermazen and M. B. Hintikka, eds. (1985), pp. 93-104.

Extends Davidson’s (1967a) theory to cover "negative acts"such as refrainings, omissions, and avoidances.

Includes Bratman (1985), Chisholm (1985b), H. A. Lewis (1985), Davidson (1985b, 1985c), Smart(1985), Strawson (1985), Thalberg (1985), Vermazen (1985). Reviewed by Ezquerro (1986/7); Hornsby (1986c), C. A. Macdonald (1985b), Shaw (1985).

1980 Tempset adverbs de temps en français contemporain. Essai de sémantique formelle

[Times and Adverbs in Contemporary French.An Essay in Formal Semantics, in French]Genève: Librairie Droz.

A study of the temporal system in French, with emphasis on thesemantics of temporal adverbs. Includes a detailed analysis of aspectualclasses and of Vendler’s (1957) fourfold classification of verb types intoactivities, accomplishments, achievements, and states [pp. 55ff].

1994 ‘FutureTense and Discourse Representation’, in C. Vet and C. Vetters,eds. (1994), pp. 49-76.

Argues among other things that, in French, the PeriphrasticFuture always introduces an event, whereas the discourse function of the SimpleFuture depends on the Aktionsart of thesentence (it may introduce an event or a state depending on whether or not the Aktionsartis "transitional").

1985 ‘TheDiscourse Functions of the Past Tense in French’, in V. Lo Cascio and C. Vet,eds., Temporal Structure in Sentence and Discourse

, Dordrecht: Foris, pp. 133-59.

A criticism of Kamp’s (1979, 1980, 1981) hypothesis on theindivisibility of past simple events: a preferred approach is one in which "anevent is conceived of as a concept which applies to a space-time region" [p.132].

1991 ‘Freedom,Causation, and Counterfactuals’, Philosophical Studies

, 64, 161-84.

Argues that the causal power requires more than merecounterfactual dependence--it requires "nested" counterfactual dependence. See(1995a) for developments.

1995a ‘Causes,Effects, and Counterfactual Dependence’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

, 73, 560-73.

Offers a counterfactual account of causation, treating "c

caused e"as meaning "if c had not occurred,then (e would not have occurred and

if chad occurred, then e would haveoccurred)". The account is a strengthening of D. K. Lewis’s (1973) originaltheory, which is found inadequate in view of the demands that it places on theunderlying theory of events. (The paper contains a detailed criticism of thistheory.) By contrast, the new account "distinguishes causes from effectswithout relying on a gerrymandered theory of events" [p. 573]. Indeed it isclaimed that the account can be adapted to the view that the causal relata arenot events, but facts or states of affairs.

1995b ‘Replyto "Causes and Nested Counterfactuals"’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

, 73, 579-81.

1994 ‘Changein Homogeneity in Verbal and Nominal Reference’, in C. Bache, H. Basbøll, andC.-E. Lindberg, eds. (1994), pp. 139-64.

Homogeneity is a property of states and processes(collectively referred to as "continuities") as opposed to events (furthercategorized as protracted or instantaneous events). On this basis, it is arguedthat aspect in French can be viewed as a "homogeneity-changing device".Connections with homogeneity properties of nominals (masses vs. individuals).

Vila, L., Reichgelt, H.1996 ‘TheToken Reification Approach to Temporal Reasoning’, Artificial Intelligence

, 83, 59-74.

Presents a new reified temporal logic which is claimed toavoid most of the objections to the reified approach. "It is based on the ideaof reifying event tokens instead of event types. However, unlike other suchattempts, our logic contains ‘meaningful’ names for event tokens, thus allowingus to quantify over all event tokens that meet a certain criterion. Theresulting logic is more expressive than alternative approaches. Moreover, itavoids the ontologically objectionable reification of event types, whilestaying within classical first-order predicate logic" [p. 59, Abstract].

Distinguishing between "(a) Specifying the whole causepartially, and (b) Specifying only part of the whole cause" underminesDavidson’s (1967c) analysis of singular causal statements [p. 105].

1981a ‘TheSemantics of the Progressive’, in P. Tedeschi and A. Zaenen, eds. (1981), pp.271-92.

Proposes an account of the progressive as an operator (a"stativiser") converting non-stative sentences into stative ones.

1981b ‘Lasémantique du temps et de l’aspect en anglais’ [‘The Semantics of Time andAspect in English’, in French], Langages,115, 65-79.

Discusses Vendler’s (1957) fourfold classification of verbtypes in the frame of Montague semantics (1973). Compare Hoepelman (1978).

Proposes an analysis of naked infinitive perceptual reports(like ‘John saw Mary cry’) as involving quantification over events. The accountis similar to that of Higginbotham (1983).

1973 ‘Countingthe Consequences’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 3, 225-33.

Argues that (i) the consequences of an event may accrueendlessly, and yet (ii) the endless accrual of consequences does not preventone from determining the size of an event’s consequences (and hence the importanceof the event).

A unifier’s solution to the time-of-a-killing problem (Goldman1971, Thomson 1971a): the shooting and the killing are the same action--even ifthe victim dies at a later time--insofar as an action can be the cause ofdifferent effects at different times: an action need not be a killing when itis a shooting, but it may turn into a killing when the victim dies. Compare J.Bennett (1973) and Grimm (1977) for similar accounts. See also Davidson (1985b,1987). Critical discussion in G. Ross (1977).

Explains a notion of cause ("an event which was not sure tohave occurred and whose occurrence first guaranteed that of the effect", p.563) in a framework of branching worlds, pointing out its relations to theconcept of an agent’s bringing about an event (in the spirit of von Wright1974b). Includes a discussion of the distinction between causes and necessarycircumstances.

Proposes an account for coarse-grained events within a theoryof events as propositions in the spirit of R. Montague (1960) and D. K. Lewis(1986b). The account relies on the notion of an event as a "set of segments ofworlds" used also in von Kutschera (1993a).

"When we say that an individual event happens on a certainoccasion we may regard this occasion for the happening of the event asconstituted by two successive occasions for the obtaining of certain states ofaffairs" [p. 37]. Analyses action sentences as expressing the bringing about ofa change from a state where p holds intoa state where q holds (p

and qbeing sentence variables). Actions are not themselves events, but rather thebringing about of an event [pp. 35-36]: see also Chisholm (1964) and K. Bach(1980). (Recent technical developments also in Segerberg 1989a,

1989b among others).

Further elaboration and generalization of the account putforward in (1963), along with some modifications.

1968 ‘AnEssay in Deontic Logic and the General Theory of Action. With a Bibliography ofDeontic and Imperative Logic’, Acta Philosophica Fennica

, 21 (entire volume).

Chapter 2, on "The Elements of a Logic of Action" [pp. 37-57],includes a characterization of action as the bringing about and preventing ofchanges in the world.

Part 2 gives an extensive account of the theory of causalityunderstood as a relation of bringing about of an event by an agent.

1973 ‘Onthe Logic and Epistemology of the Causal Relation’, in P. Suppes, L. Henkin, G.C. Moisil, and A. Joja, eds., Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of ScienceIV, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 293-312;reprinted in E. Sosa, ed. (1975), pp. 95-113.

Argues "for one essential limitation to the reification andthus also ‘causalization’ of action. This limitation is set by the implicitdependence of the very notion of cause on an (unreified) concept of agency andaction" [p. 312].

1974a ‘Handlungslogik’[‘Logic of Action’, in German], in H. Lenk, ed., Normenlogik. Grundproblemeder deontischen Logik, Pullach bei München:Verlag Dokumentation (UTB 414), pp. 9-24.

1974b Causalityand Determinism, New York and London:Columbia University Press.

Full exposition of von Wright’s views on causality (developingon the ideas put forward in 1971). Section 2.6 on the ontological background: alogico-atomistic world-model based on the categories of a "generic state ofaffairs" and of an "occasion" [p. 13]. Section 3.3 defends the view that "thecausal laws [...] are, primarily, not laws connecting states of affairs

but laws connecting events

" [p. 70]. However, an event is defined as "a changeor transformation among states of affairs" [p. 71]. Thus, "states retain theirplace as belonging in a basic ontological category in our account of causality"[p. 14].

1981 ‘Explanationand Understanding of Action’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie

, 35, 127-42; reprinted in G. H. von Wright (1983b),pp. 53-66.

An updated outline of von Wright’s views. "To understand anindividual human action is [...] to give a truthful answer to the question why

the action was undertaken. ‘Why?’ means ‘from whatmotive?’ or ‘for what reason?’. Canit also mean ‘from what cause?’? In a trivial sense, certainly. Motives andreasons are often called ‘causes’ of actions. But in a non-trivial sense thequestion is problematic" [p. 127]. See sections 10-11 for criticisms to the"causalist" theory of action.

1982 ‘Onthe Logic of Norms and Actions’, in R. Hilpinen, ed., New Studies in DeonticLogic, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 3-35;reprinted with minor revisions in G. H. von Wright (1983b), pp. 100-29.

Section 2 on action sentences and the logic of action.Distinguishes two aspects in which the content of an action sentence ("onewhich says that an agent a on anoccasion o does a certain thing p

", symbolized as [p

] (a

, o

)) can be viewed, namely under the aspect of achievement

and the aspect of process

. These "are related, loosely, to the ideas of makingand doing respectively". Includes a discussion of action identity andindividuation.

1983b PracticalReason. Philosophical Papers, VolumeI, Oxford:Basil Blackwell.

1947 ‘Duréeset instants’ [‘Durations and Instants’, in French], Revue Scientifique

, 85, 131-34.

Classic paper on construing time mathematically from events."Time is Nature’s way of keeping everything from happening at once".

1971 ‘SomeLogical Roles of Adverbs’, The Journal of Philosophy

, 68, 690-714.

Presents in some details an account of adverbs andadverb-dropping inferences very close to Davidson’s (1967a). Based mostly on aFregean conception of "logical grammar".

1974 Causalityand Scientific Explanation. Volume Two: Classical and Contemporary Science

, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

A discussion of various causal theories, concluding that "aphilosophy of science that rejects an event ontology and encourages causalinquiry in terms of things and their attributes, including powers andpotentialities, offers promise for dealing with the whole range of experiencefrom the inanimate to the human" [p. 322].

Argues that the Kenny-Chisholm-von Wright style account of thesyntax of agency (which partitions action sentences into agents, states ofaffairs and an operation of bringing about) "not only can [...] deal well enoughwith Davidson’s problems to restore itself as an interesting subject ofinvestigation, but in some respects it handles these problems so perspicuouslythat we can begin to see them in a entirely new perspective, one that isfavorable to [it]". [p. 75].

Critical study of Binkley, Bronaugh, and Marras, eds. (1971)and Pörn (1971, 1974).

An action-theoretic analysis (in the spirit of Brand 1971) ofthe distinction between positively bringing about something and passivelyletting something happen.

1980b ‘Onthe Logical Form of Some Commonplace Action Expressions’, Grazerphilosophische Studien, 10, 141-48.

Introduces the concept of a "pure action proposition" to givean analysis of action expressions in terms of the "bringing about" relation.

1986 ‘Chisholm’sTheory of Action’, in R. J. Bogdan, ed., Roderick M. Chisholm

, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 169-93.

"Chisholm’s approach of taking ‘bringing about’ as the basicconcept of the theory of action is potentially much more powerful and deeperthan its main contender--Davidson’s theory of actions and events" [p. 170].

1959 ‘TheOrigin of Causal Necessity’, TheJournal of Philosophy, 56,

493-500.

Argues that the idea of causal necessity does not originatefrom the need of "animalistic" explanation of events.

An action involves physical change, belongs to something, andis specified by an activity-verb phrase; an act requires a personal agent andis specified by an accomplishment-verb phrase.

1994 TheMind-Body Problem. A Guide to the Current Debate, Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Includes Foster (1994), Honderich (1994), Horgan (1994),O’Shaughnessy (1994) and reprints of Kim (1989c) and LePore and Loewer (1987).

1953 ‘EveryEvent Has a Cause’, in A. Flew, ed., Logic and Language (Second Series)

, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 95-111.

"There is no definition of ‘event’ by the help of which ‘Everyevent has a cause’ can be transformed into a manifest tautology" [p. 101].

The temporal direction of causation is determined by that ofthe continuing events.

1973/4 ‘AreCauses Events or Facts?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

, 74, 161-70.

Events are caused to occur, or not to occur, or to havecertain properties--but they are not caused and they are not causes. Moregenerally, "to give the causes of any effect we must discover that certainfacts are facts and state that they are. Naming individuals is of no use,whether they be particulars or facts. We must do this merely to present thecauses. To state, further, that they are the causes, we must assert aproposition with the general form ‘The tree came into leaf, with the effectthat its shadow deepened’ [...] Causes and effects are not individuals of anytype and so, to the question which forms the title [...] I answer ‘No’" [p. 170].

1987a ‘TwoSteps Closer to Event Reference’, University of Pennsylvania, Department ofComputer and Information Science, Technical Report MS-CIS-86-74.

1987b ‘EventReference’, in Theoretical Issues in Natural Language Processing.Proceedings of the Third Conference, LasCruses, NM: Association of Computational Linguistics, pp. 137-42.

1987c ‘TheInterpretation of Tense in Discourse’, in Proceedings of the 25th AnnualMeeting of the Association of Computational Linguistics

, Stanford: Association of Computational Linguistics,pp. 147-54.

Proposes an account of the role of tense in the listener’sreconstruction of the events and situations described by a speaker.

1972 BasicAction: A Component Approach, DoctoralDissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle.

Puts forward a component analysis of action (avoiding "theconfused view that any or all ingredients of basic and non-basic action have tobe actions" [p. 112]) in terms of which a "non-reductive unifying" account ofaction identity is defended against the "reductive unifying" account ofDavidson and the "multiplying" account of Goldman. Forms the basis of Chapter 5of Thalberg (1977).

"Suppose you do something basic. You wave your hand. Youthereby (1) raise your hand above your head, (2) greet a visitor, (3) frightena hummingbird. [...] The actions referred to in (1), (2) and (3) can benon-identical with your hand-waving yet not countably different from it or eachother" [The Philosopher’s Index Abstract].See Hornsby’s (1981a) reply.

1977 ‘Relativityand the Spatiality of Mental Events’, Philosophical Studies

, 31, 279-84.

Argues that "mental events like the occurrence of a thought orpain have definite spatial locations" [p. 279]. Compare Lockwood (1984a, 1985).Criticisms in Gibbins (1985).

1978 ‘Descriptionsof Actions and their Place in History’, in Y. Yovel, ed. (1978), pp. 69-84.

An inquiry into the category of facts, of which events aretreated as a subclass: "An even[t] is a fact in which two or more other factsare related by the relation of simultaneity, or the relation of temporal priority,etc. These other facts cannot themselves be events, because they are notparticulars" [p. 16].

An investigation into the role of events in the philosophy ofmind. Suggests that mental events are not identical with, reducible to, orstrongly supervening on physical events.

1965 ‘UnconsciousMental Events’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

25, 400-3.

1979/80 ‘Shooting,Killing and Fatally Wounding’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

, 80, 1-15.

"Shooting and killing are different kinds of acts, though oneand the same act may be of both kinds" [p. 6]. Presents some legal evidence forthe discussion of the time-of-a-killing problem (Goldman 1971, Thomson 1971a).

Includes reprints of, Austin (1956/7), Danto (1965), Davidson(1963), Feinberg (1965), Prichard (1949).

Analyses Davidson’s thesis that an account of the logical formof singular causal sentences requires an ontology of events. Rejects variousattempts to defend an analysis of ‘caused’ as a connective, but argues thatDavidson’s (1967c) "slingshot" argument against that analysis makes the falseassumption that causal sentences preserve truth under substitution of logicallyequivalent sentences. Even so, the event-based analysis is eventually to bepreferred insofar as "when it comes to details, the task of providing atruth-theoretic treatment of ‘caused’ when viewed as a sentential connective ismore difficult and more problematic than that required for treating ‘caused’ asa two-place predicate true of events" [p. 236].

Argues that "the logico-ontological thesis" that underliesDavidson’s (1967a) analysis of action sentences is "basically correct" [p.269], but the analysis itself yields wrong results when combined with the ideathat one action can have different descriptions. (Even if x

’s pulling the trigger and x

’s killing the victim with a revolver are the sameaction, x did not pull the triggerwith a revolver. Compare Cohen 1969 for an early formulation and relatedreferences.) A modified analysis is proposed in which prepositional modifiersfunction, not as predicates of events, but as unanalysed parts of action verbs.‘John buttered the toast with the knife’ becomes ‘(

$e)[(Buttered(e, John, the-toast) &Buttered-with (e

, John, the-toast, the-knife)’[pp. 288-89].

1989 ‘InDefense of Davidson’s Identity Thesis Regarding Action Individuation’, Dialectica

, 43, 281-88.

Defends Davidson’s unifying account of event identity againstthe time-of-a-killing objection (Goldman 1971, Thomson1971a). The objectionrests on upon the assumption that ‘x’s F

-ing yoccurred at t’ implies ‘x

F-ed y

at t’,which is argued to be invalid when Fis a causative action verb.

1974 ThreeTheories of Events, Doctoral Dissertation,University of Massachusetts at Amherst.

1976 ‘Chisholmon States of Affairs’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

, 54, 148-52.

A criticism of Chisholm (1970). It is argued that the axiomsgoverning the primitive locution "poccurs before q" fail todetermine a unique relation, and that the purported reduction of talk ofparticular occurrences of events to talk of general recurring events isdefective.

1981 ‘IdentityConditions and Events’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy

11, 77-90.

A critique of Brand’s (1976a, 1977) identity criterion forevents: "In nearly every case in which philosophers disagree about the identityof events x and y

, Brand’s proposal will be of no help in resolvingthe disagreement" [p. 82]. As an alternative condition, it is proposed that x

and yare the same event iff they are necessarily co-occurrent, i.e., such that x

occurs iff y occurs. However, since "it is difficult to say precisely what identityconditions are supposed to accomplish", the theoretical importance of thiscriterion is left in doubt [p. 90].

1975 ‘Why"Kill" Does Not Mean "Cause to Die": The Semantics of Action Sentences’ Foundationsof Language, 13, 491-528.

As against McCawley (1968) and Lakoff (1970), argues themeaning of causative verbs "cannot be represented simply as ‘causing something tobecome...’ because it involves a whole network of relations--causal, spatial,temporal, and volitional" [p. 528]. (For instance, ‘kills’ cannot simply mean‘causes someone to die’.) Proposes an alternative expression of the meaning ofcausative sentences "in terms of different parts of something sayable about thesubject" [p. 527, fn. 50]. See also Katz (1970), Fodor (1970b), Kac (1972),Shibatani (1972).

1979 ‘MereologicalEssentialism: Asymmetrical Essential Dependence and the Nature of Continuants’,Grazer philosophische Studien, 7/8[special issue "Essays in the Philosophy of R. M. Chisholm", also published asE. Sosa, ed. (1979)], 297-315.

"An event takes time, and will admit the question ‘How longdid it last?’ only in the sense ‘How long did it take?’. An event does notpersist in the way a continuant does--that is through

time, gaining and losing new parts. A continuant hasspatial parts, and to find the whole continuant you have only to explore itsboundary at a time. An event has temporal parts, and to find the whole eventyou must trace it through its historical beginning to its historical end. Anevent does not have spatial parts in any way that is to be compared with (orunderstand by reference to) its relation to its temporal

parts" [p. 25, n. 12].

1985/6 ‘Verbs andAdverbs, and Some Other Modes of Grammatical Combination’, Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society, 86, 273-304.

A revisitation of Davidson’s (1967a) account of action verbsand adverbial modification. Misgivings about the possibility of keeping failureof predicativity under control. A walk can also be a warning; suppose it is anuphill walk-- it is also an uphill warning? (Similar worry in M. Cohen 1969.)

1984 ‘Kodiak: A Knowledge RepresentationLanguage’, Proceedings of the 6th National Conference of the CognitiveScience Society, Boulder, CO [9 pages].

1987 ‘SomeProblems and Proposals for Knowledge Representation’, University of Californiaat Berkeley, Computer Science Division, Technical Report No. UCB/CDS 87/351.

Puts forward a Davidsonian-like representational form ofevents, states, and actions. The proposal is formulated within a much broaderknowledge representation theory much of which has been implemented in thelanguage Kodiak (Wilenski 1984).

1957 ‘PersonalIdentity and Individuation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

, 56, 229-52.

1992 ‘TheDate Analysis of Tensed Sentences’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

, 70, 198-203;reprinted in L. N. Oaklander and Q. Smith,eds. (1994), pp. 104-10.

Argues that the semantic non-equivalence of tensed andtenseless sentences does not show that they are used to describe differentstates of affairs and, therefore, does not support the tensed theory of time.

1996 ‘TheMetaphysics of A- and B-Time’, The Philosophical Quarterly

, 46, 371-81.

Criticizes the "common way" to think of tensed (A-) time "asevents possessing properties that events in [tenseless] B-time do not possess,namely, pastness, presentness and futurity [...] It is not evident how the shiftof presentness from event to event in A-time differs from the transition fromoccurrence to occurrence in B-time" [pp. 379f].

1951 ‘TheMyth of Passage’, The Journal of Philosophy,48, 457-72; reprinted with slight revisions in D. C. Williams, Principlesof Empirical Realism, Springfield, IL:Thomas, 1966, pp. 289-307; also in S. Hook, ed., AmericanPhilosophers at Work, New York: CriterionBooks, 1956, pp. 315-31; in R. M. Gale, ed. (1967), pp. 98-116; in R. C. Hoyand L. N. Oaklander, eds., Metaphysics. Classic and ContemporaryReadings, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1991, pp.55-63; and in J. Westphal and C. Levenson, eds., Time

, Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1993, pp.131-47.

"I believe that the universe consists, without residue, of thespread of events in space-time, and that if we thus accept realistically thefour-dimensional fabric of juxtaposed actualities we can dispense with allthose dim non-factual categories which have so bedevilled our race: thepotential, the subsistential, and the influential, the noumenal, the numinous,and the non-natural. But I am arguing here, not that there is nothing outsidethe natural world of events, but that the theory of the manifold is anyhowliterally true and adequate to that world" [p. 458].

1953 ‘Onthe Elements of Being’, The Review of Metaphysics, 7, 3-18 (Part I), 171-92 (Part II); reprinted as ‘The Elements ofBeing’ in D. C. Williams, Principlesof Empirical Realism, Springfield, IL:Thomas, 1966, pp. 74-109.

Classic account of the metaphysics of "tropes", i.e., exemplificationsof single properties at particular spatio-temporal locations. "And generallyspeaking, an event is a trope" [1966, p. 90].

An extended essay on the identity thesis, including views onthe identity of mental and physical events.

1985 Explanation,Causation and Deduction, Dordrecht, Boston,and Lancaster: Reidel.

Defends a deductive-nomological model of explanation, treatingcausality as a non-truth-functional connective. Section 3.6 [esp. pp. 290-332]does so against Davidson’s (1967a) arguments ("slingshot") and Kim’s (1973a)attempt to "fix up" Davidson’s position.

1980 ‘TheIntentionality of Human Action’ Acta Philosophica Fennica

, 31, nos. 2-3 (entire double issue); revised andenlarged edition published as a volume, The Intentionality of HumanAction, Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress, 1989.

Chapter 2 investigates the ‘logical grammar’ of simpledescriptions of action. The proposed account involves a modification ofDavidson’s (1967a) original analysis (in the spirit of Ross 1972) whereby asentence like "Phil coughed" is rendered by "($e

)(Phil performed e

& ewas an act of coughing)" rather than simply "($e)(e

was a coughing by Phil)" [pp. 26-28]. Other chapterscover the analysis of causatives, nominals, intentionality, reasons for action,and more.

1985 ‘Davidsonon Intentional Action’, in E. LePore and B. P. McLaughlin, eds. (1985), pp.151-61.

1959 ‘SubstancesWithout Substrata’, The Review of Metaphysics, 12, 521-39.

"An individual and a quality are both abstractions from facts.Facts alone are concrete. Facts are what we primarily observe. We only observeindividuals and qualities as constituents of some facts" [p. 538].

1974 ‘Facts,Events, and Their Identity Conditions’, Philosophical Studies

, 25, 303-21.

Argues that all singular event talk is eliminable in terms offirst order resources plus identity. General event talk is eliminable in favorof fact talk. "There is no such thing as an event distinct from a fact" [p.317].

Correcting a claim made in (1974), regards an event-identitystatement such as "the flipping of the switch is identical with the alerting ofthe prowler" as false.

1987 ‘EventStructures’, in G. Rozenberg, ed., Advances in Petri Nets 1986

, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 196-223.

Full presentation of the mathematical theory of eventstructures (Nielsen, Plotkin and Winskel 1981) based on the idea thatdistributed computations can be viewed as event occurrences constrained byrelations of consistency and enabling.

1989 ‘AnIntroduction to Event Structures’, in J. Bakker, W.-P. de Roever, and G.Rozenberg, eds., Linear Time, Branching Time and Partial Order in Logics andModels for Concurrency, Berlin:Springer-Verlag, pp. 364-97.

1976 ‘WhereDo Instrumental NPs Come From?’, in M. Shibatani, ed., Syntax and Semantics,Volume 6, The Grammar of Causative Constructions, New York: Academic Press, pp. 165-80.

Suggests that "the predicate CAUSEnecessarily takes sentential subjects, as well as sentential objects, in deepstructure" and that "the sentential subject of CAUSEprovides a source for instrumental NPs as well as for lexical structure" [p.165].

On event identity: "Just as we cannot count (physical) objectsas such, so we cannot count events or actions [...] as such. It makes no sense toask how many events a witnessed thismorning, how many actions b hasperformed [...] but only how many events of a certain sort a

has witnessed this morning (e.g. how many accidents),how many actions of a certain kind bhas performed (how many meals bhas eaten, for instance)" [p. 218].

1970 ‘Onthe Nature of Universals’, in M. J. Loux, ed., Universals and Particulars:Readings in Ontology, Garden City, NY:Anchor Books, pp. 206-32 (Second Edition Notre Dame, IN, and London: Notre DameUniversity Press, 1976).

"Suppose that Mary is coughing. Then there are the followingentities to be distinguished: the action of coughing, Mary, and Mary’scoughing" [p. 228].

Actions and states are "predicable entities", along withproperties and assertibles.

1979 ‘CanOntology Do without Events?’, Grazer philosophische Studien

, 7/8 [special issue "Essays in the Philosophy of R.M. Chisholm", also published as E. Sosa, ed. (1979)], 177-201.

Chisholm’s arguments in (1976a) to the effect that concreteevents can be dispensed with in favor of states of affairs are deemedunsatisfactory. This leads to the conclusion that the title question is stillopen: "We do not know whether ontology can do without events" [p. 201].

1984 ‘ATheory of Singular Causal Explanation’, Erkenntnis

, 21, 231-62; reprinted in D.-H. Ruben, ed., Explanation

, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 246-74.

Argues that singular causal statements do not differ radicallyin structure from singular causal explanations. In particular, many suchexplanations relate event-like terms (rather than fact-like terms, as authorsin the tradition of Davidson 1967c have suggested). "Many singular causalexplanations are not explanations of why events or other particulars possesscertain properties, but are rather [...] explanations of the occurrence ofindividual events" [p. 231].

Criticises Kim’s (1989a, 1990) account of how the principle of"explanatory exclusion" for individual events can be made compatible with theexistence of both mental and physical explanations for behavior. Proposes analternative account involving appeal to counterfactuals.

With reference to a problem raised by Hornsby (1980a, pp.20-21): there is no danger of causal loop in subscribing to both "John clenchedhis fist by contracting his muscles" and "John contracted his muscled byclenching his fist", for there is an ambiguity in the ‘by’ locution. In thefirst use, ‘by’ means ‘and this was caused (or causally generated in Goldman’s sense)by’; in the second, ‘by’ means ‘and this was indirectly achieved or performedby’. See replies and comments by Hornsby (1987), White (1987), Pfeifer (1988b).

1994 BooleanEvent Lattices and Thematic Roles in the Syntax and Semantics of AdverbialModification, Doctoral Dissertation,Cornell University.

Focuses on the syntax and semantics of such adverbs as‘appassionately’, ‘appropriately’, ‘reluctantly’.

On the bearing of a thing’s essence on its causal powers, andon how it helps explaining "how events exactly alike in every ordinary respect,like the bolt suddenly snapping and itssnapping per se, manage to disagree in what they cause" [p. 403, Abstract]."Nothing causes an effect which is essentially overladen with materials towhich the effect is in no way beholden" [p. 436].

1992b ‘MentalCausation’, Philosophical Review, 101,245-80; reprinted in P. Grim, G. Mar, and P. Williams, eds., ThePhilosopher’s Annual. Volume XV, 1992,Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1994, pp. 267-302.

Argues that "since a determinate cannot preempt its owndeterminable, mental events and properties lose nothing in causal relevance totheir physical bases [...] If anything, it is the other way around" [p. 250].

1979 ‘CounterfactualAnalysis of Event Causation and Kim’s Examples’, Analysis

, 39, 100-5.

Suggests a way to handle Kim’s (1973b) counterexamples to D.K. Lewis (1973) counterfactual analysis of causation. The account also involvesthe novel notion of a complex: "For anycomplex c, there are a certainevent e and a certain state ofaffairs s such that for any time tc happens at t

iff eoccurs at t and s

holds at t" [p. 103].

"A bit of behaviorbecomes an action only withreference to some rules" [p. 309].

1973 ‘Action:Metaphysics and Modality’, American Philosophical Quarterly

, 10, 71-85.

Explores the nature of causation in action, drawing adistinction between the causes of a person’s acting and the causes of his/heractions.

1978 Philosophyof History and Action, Papers Presented at the First Jerusalem PhilosophicalEncounter, December 1974, Dordrecht:Reidel; Jerusalem: Magnes Press.

1993 ‘Supervenienceand Anomalous Monism: Blackburn on Davidson’, Philosophical Studies

, 71, 59-80.

Argues that anomalous monism can accept metaphysicalnecessities linking the physical to the mental while denying the existence of"interesting" psychophysical laws.

1996 ‘GoodOld Supervenience: Mental Causation on the Cheap’, Synthese

, 106,67-101.

Against the charge of epiphenomenalism, argues that thecombination of supervenience with Davidson’s anomalous monism "does not makemental properties causally inert" [p. 68]. To the contrary, "the causalefficiency of the mental cannot be explained without supervenience. Andsupervenience is enough to explain it. Supervenience is both necessary andsufficient" [p. 98].

1989 ‘TemporalBecoming Minus the Moving Now’, Noûs,23, 504-24; reprinted in L. N. Oaklander and Q. Smith, eds. (1994), pp. 234-51.

On the debate between Schlesinger (1980, 1985) and Oaklander(1984, 1985) on vindicating McTaggart’s "positive" conception of time. Reply inOaklander (1992).

1970 ‘FourOntologies’, The Journal of Philosophy,67, 213-47; reprinted in F. Pelletier, ed., Mass Terms: SomePhilosophical Problems, Dordrecht: Reidel,1979, pp. 63-80.

Distinguishes between continuants, events, types, andprocesses depending on whether a particular is partly or wholly present at acertain place or time. "An event is an entity that exists, in its entirety, inthe area defined by its spatiotemporal boundaries, and each part of this areacontains a part of the whole event" [p.233].

Criticizes Davidson’s (1967a) account of adverbialmodification and proposes an alternative account whereby "Sebastian walkedquickly" is analysed as "Sebastian was quick qua walker", with no resort to an ontology of events. "Events, I believe,do not exist, and certainly do not exist in space [...] Statements about eventsand changes in (three-dimensional) individuals can be eliminated in favour ofstatements about the properties of four-dimensional individuals" [pp. 94-95].

1992 TheReality of Meaning and the Meaning of ‘Reality’, Hanover and London: Brown University Press.

Chapter 7 [pp. 136-55] develops an "Aristotelian account" ofthe nature of action.

1971 ‘Identificationof Characteristics of Mental Events with Characteristics of Physical Events’, AmericanPhilosophical Quarterly, 8, 13-23.

"It seems possible to have a conceptual framework such that,given appropriate correlations, the former characteristics could be numericallyidentified with the latter similarly as within our existing framework aparticular felt smoothness can be identified with a particular seen smoothnessas being a single common sensible" [The Philosopher’s Index

Abstract].

1970 ‘TheLogical Structure of English Sentences’, in H. E. Kiefer and M. K. Munitz,eds., Language, Belief, and Metaphysics,Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, pp. 25-36; reprinted in P.Ziff, Understanding Understanding,Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972, pp. 39-56.

Complains that standard quantificational logic is not equippedto handle adverbial modification. Gives an analysis similar to Davidson’s(1967a), but draws opposite ontological conclusions. "One must cast ‘slowly’ inthe guise of ‘is slow’, which means conjuring up an entity to fill the bill in‘x is slow’ [...] One could represent thesentence ‘Something ran slowly’ as ‘($x

)($y

)[Pxy

& Ry& Sy

]’, where ‘Pxy’ stands for ‘x performedy’ [...] This is to construerunning as a relation between a person and a run he performs. In this case theanalysis is easily see to be a façon de parler

. We are not required to suppose that somehow runshave an existence of their own apart from things that run" [p. 32].

1993 ‘Azionied Eventi’ [‘Actions and Events’, in Italian], Discipline Filosofiche

, 3/2, 299-312; revised English edition published as‘Actions and Events’, Journal of Philosophical Research

, 20 (1995), 585-94.

Negative assessment of K. Bach’s (1980) arguments to theeffect that actions are not events.

1989 TheLanguage of Propositions and Events,Doctoral Dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherst; revised versionpublished as The Language of Propositions and Events. Issues in theSyntax and Semantics of Nominalization,Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993.

On the relation between noun meaning and verb meaning. It isargued that a good account of the interpretation and distribution of differenttypes of nominals requires a threefold distinction between events, propositions,and states of affairs. Chapter 4 includes a discussion of the theories ofBarwise and Perry, Chierchia, Cresswell, Davidson, Kim, T. Parsons interalia.

Appendix: Early References

For convenient reference, we includein this appendix some works published before 1947 that have been particularlyinfluential on the literature reviewed in the foregoing.

1923 ScientificThought, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul;reprint Paterson, NJ: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1929.

An event is "anything that endures at all, no matter how longit lasts or whether it be qualitatively alike or qualitatively different atadjacent stages of its history" [p. 54]. A thing "is simply a long event" [p.393].

Classic account of epiphenomenalism: "Epiphenomenalism may betaken to assert one of two things: (a) That certain events which havephysiological characteristics have alsomental characteristics, and that no events which lack physiologicalcharacteristics have mental characteristics [...] And that an event which hasmental characteristics never causes another event in virtue of its mentalcharacteristics, but only in virtue of its physiological characteristics. Or(b) that no event has both mental and physiological characteristics; but thatthe complete cause of any event which has mental characteristics is an event orset of events which has physiological characteristics. And that no event whichhas mental characteristics is a cause-factor in the causation of another event,whether mental or physiological" [p. 472].

1924 Causationand the Types of Necessity, Seattle:University of Washington Publications in the Social Sciences, Vol. 1, pp.70-200; reprinted with additions as a volume, New York: Dover Publications,1969.

Locus classicus for thesingularist conception of causality as a relation between "single, individualevents" ("constant conjunction is a possible corollary, not the definition, ofcausation" [p. 21]).

1926 ‘Onthe Nature and the Observability of the Causal Relation’, The Journal ofPhilosophy, 23, 57-68; reprinted in C. J.Ducasse, Truth, Knowledge and Causation, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968, pp. 1-14; in A. B.Schoedinger, ed., Introduction to Metaphysics. The FundamentalQuestions, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books,1991, pp. 133-44; and in E. Sosa, ed. (1975), pp. 114-25.

"By an event is to be understood either a change or an absenceof change (whether qualitative or relational) of an object" [p. 115].

1935 ‘Vomformalen Aufbau des individuellen Gegenstandes’ [‘The Formal Structure ofIndividual Objects’, in German], Studia Philosophica

, 1, 29-106.

Early general classification of event-like entities. Atemporalentities (such as numbers) are opposed to non-atemporal ones. These divide inentities in time (material objects) and temporal

entities, which further divide in processes andevents. Processes are temporally extended; events are punctual--they may bebeginnings, endings, or else crossings of processes.

1928 ‘Opodstawach matematyki, Rodzial IV: O podstawach ogólnejteoryi mnogosci.I’ [‘On the Foundations of Mathematics, Part IV: On the Foundations of theGeneral Theory of Sets. I’, in Polish], Przeglad Filozoficzny

, 31, 261-91 (Eng. trans. by D. I. Barnett, ‘On theFoundations of Mathematics, Chapter IV. On "Foundations of the General Theoryof Sets. I"’, in S. Lesniewski, Collected Works

, ed. by S. J. Surma, J. T. Srzednicki, D. I.Barnett, F. V. Rickey, Warszawa: PWN - Polish Scientific Publishers; Dordrecht,Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, Vol. 1, pp. 227-63.

Part of an extensive work devoted to the development of ageneral theory of parts and wholes (or Mereology), contains formal criticisms of Whitehead’s (1919) axiomatic basis forthe concept of an event. (See the lengthy footnote at the end, pp. 258-63 ofthe Eng. trans.; omitted in the abridged Eng. trans. by V. S. Sinisi, with thesame title, in Topoi, 2, 1983,7-52.) Compare also Srzednicki and Stachniak, eds. (1988), and Sinisi (1966)for an overview.

1938 ‘Symposium:What Is Action?’ (Symposium with A. C. Ewing and O. S. Franks), Proceedingsof the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol.17, 69-85.

Early plea for an account of the ontology of actions and ofthe logical form of action expressions. "The distinction between object

and action is a fundamental distinction in reality. How otherwise could thenecessity for a grammatical distinction between substantives and verbs beaccounted for? [...] Substantives are qualified by adjectives. Verbs are modifiedby adverbs. This again suggests that we may go badly astray if we assume thatthe distinction between adjectives and adverbs is logically unimportant [...]Unfortunately the actual process of logical reformulation [...] loses the verbaland adverbial forms" [pp. 71-72]. Includes a tentative analysis of the contrastbetween actions and events. See comments by A. C. Ewing [pp. 86-101] and O. S.Franks [pp. 102-20].

1908 ‘TheUnreality of Time’, Mind, 17, 457-74;reprinted in J. Westphal and C. Levenson, eds., Time

, Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1993, pp.94-111.

Formulation of the celebrated argument to prove that time isunreal: (i) the reality of time requires change, hence tensed facts: factsconcerning events being past, present, or future; but (ii) tensed facts areincoherent: for one and the same event cannot satisfy the incompatiblepredicates ‘past’, ‘present’, and ‘future’; hence (iii) time is unreal. Theargument has been the focus of a lively debate on whether presentness,pastness, and futurity are indeed attributes of events.

1924 Lageometrie dans le monde sensible, Paris:Alcan; reprinted Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962 (Eng. trans. byP. P. Wiener, ‘Geometry in the Sensible World’, in J. Nicod, Foundationsof Geometry and Induction, London: KeganPaul, Trench, Trubner & Co.; New York: Harcourt Brane & Co., 1930, pp.1-192; also translated by J. Bell with the same title in J. Nicod, Geometryand Induction, ed. R. F. Harrod, London:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970, pp. 3-155).

Chapter I of Part 2 on spatio-temporal relations. "I followwith my eye the flight of an eagle crossing my field of vision with a slow andcontinuous swoop [...] In the middle of his flight, the eagle flapped his wingsonce. Between these two events as I saw them there stands out a very clear andvery simple relation which I express by saying that the first of these twosensed terms is interior to the second"[1930, p. 52].

1927 ‘Factsand Propositions’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

, Suppl. Vol. 7, 153-70; reprinted in F. P. Ramsey, TheFoundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays (R. B. Braithwaite, ed.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1931,pp. 138-55; also in F. P. Ramsey, Foundations: Essays in Philosophy,Logic, Mathematics and Economics (D. H.Mellor, ed.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, pp. 40-57, and in F. P.Ramsey, Philosophical Papers (D.H. Mellor, ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 34-51.

Generally considered the first formulation of the view thatevents are particulars to be distinguished from facts: "‘That Caesar died’ isreally an existential proposition, asserting the existence of an event of acertain sort, thus resembling ‘Italy has a king’, which asserts the existenceof a man of a certain sort. The event which is of that sort is called the deathof Caesar, and should no more be confused with the fact that Caesar died thanthe king of Italy should be confused with the fact that Italy has a king" [1990,p. 37]. Referred to by R. M. Martin (1969b) and Davidson (1969a, 1969b) interalia.

1914 Our Knowledge of theExternal World, As a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy

, Chicago and London: Open Court; reprints: New York:Norton, 1920, 1929; London: Allen & Unwin, 1922 (revised edition 1926),1929, 1949, 1952, 1961, 1972; New York: Humanities Press, 1953; New York: NewAmerican Library: 1960; London: Routledge, 1993.

Chapter 4 is a classic reference (along with Whitehead 1919,1920, 1929) for the project of construing temporal instants as classes ofextended events. The same account is presented in (1936) as well as in variousother less technical works.

1927a AnOutline of Philosophy, London: Allen &Unwin; reprints: New York: Norton (under the title Philosophy

), 1927; London: Allen & Unwin, 1949, 1951, 1956,1971, 1976; New York: Meridian, 1960; Cleveland: World Publishing.

"The only way to get clear is to make a fresh start, with events

instead of bodies" [p. 110].

1927b TheAnalysis of Matter, London: Kegan Paul,Trench, Trubner & Co.; New York: Harcourt Brane & Co.; reprints:London: Allen & Unwin, 1954, 1959; New York: Dover, 1954; London:Routledge, 1995.

"And what we can primarily infer from percepts, assuming thevalidity of physics, are groups of events, again not substances. It is a merelinguistic convenience to regard a group of events as states of a ‘thing’, or‘substance’, or ‘piece of matter’" [p. 284].

1936 ‘OnOrder in Time’, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society

32, 216-28; reprinted in Russell’s Logicand Knowledge. Essays 1901-1950 (ed. R. C.Marsh), London: Allen & Unwin (reprints: New York: Macmillan, 1956, 1971;London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 347-63.

A formal account of the construction of time presented in(1914), with further investigation of the conditions for the existence ofinstants.

Discusses Whitehead’s conception of things as sequences ofevents [pp. 166 ff.]. Also presents some problems in event composition [p. 186]and gives examples of event-boundaries [p. 197].

1919 AnEnquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge

, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (secondrevised edition 1925).

Formulation of the view that individual, concrete events arethe primary natural entities in terms of which nature can be exhaustivelyanalysed. An event is "what does become in nature. It can never happen again;for essentially it is just itself, there and then" [p. 61]. Events "pass",i.e., are swallowed up in larger events; but they never change [p. 62]. (Bycontrast, objects do not pass but change, and are only derivatively in spaceand time via their relations toindividual events [p. 63].) Formally the analysis uses the method of extensiveabstraction (Chapter 8), which is based on a formal treatment of the mereologyof events (every event is part of other events, and comprises other events asparts). Includes also a seminal account of the construction of instantaneousevents as converging classes of nestedevents.

Restatement of the conception of events put forward in (1920):all nature may be resolved into events, with nothing "left over" [p. 78].Slight variant of the event mereology as presented in the earlier work.

1929 Processand Reality. An Essay inCosmology, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, and New York: Macmillan; reprints New York: Social Science Bookstore,1941; New York: Harper & Bros., 1960; New York: Free Press, 1969; CorrectedEdition ed. by D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne, New York: Free Press, 1978.

Contents

Introduction

An Annotated Bibliography 1947 to 1997

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

K

L

M

N

O

P

Q

R

S

T

U

V

W

Y

Z

Appendix: Early References